The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)
"On 13 December 2005, the Government of the Republic of Lebanon requested the United Nations to establish a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are alleged responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 in Beirut resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1664 (2006), the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic negotiated an agreement on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Further to Security Council resolution 1757(2007) of 30 May 2007, the provisions of the document annexed to it and the Statute of the Special Tribunal thereto attached, entered into force on 10 June 2007.
The mandate of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is to prosecute persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction could be extended beyond the 14 February 2005 bombing if the Tribunal finds that other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005 are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005.
This connection includes but is not limited to a combination of the following elements: criminal intent (motive), the purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the attacks (modus operandi), and the perpetrators. Crimes that occurred after 12 December 2005 can be eligible to be included in the Special Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the same criteria if it is so decided by the Government of the Republic of Lebanon and the United Nations and with the consent of the Security Council".
INDICTMENT - The Prosecutor v. Mustafa Amine Badreddine,
Salim Jalim Ayyash, Hussein Hassan Oneissi & Assad Hassan Sabra
The Indictment contains the Prosecutor's allegations concerning the 14 February 2005 attack that killed Rafik HARIRI and 21 others and that resulted in injury to 231 others.
Accused Hizballah Man Speaks: Time, Thursday August 18, 2011
A Time reporter interviewed one of the four suspects accused in the assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Hezbollah in 2011
Mr. David Fankhauser and Ms. Olivia Lichaa (2012)
The finger pointing that followed the assassination of Rafik Hariri caused mounting tensions inside Lebanon, pitting opposing sides even further apart, and creating fear of possible crippling sectarian violence with which the country is all too familiar. The STL’s June indictments of four Hezbollah members, and their subsequent and expected denial of those charges, prompted many to fear retaliation from the group, who vowed it would do so if implicated. The government collapse in January paved the way for Syria and Hezbollah-backed parliament members to nearly double their seats, creating a seemingly irreparable rift between the March 8 coalition and Saad Hariri’s pro-Western Future Movement. The continuing fall-out over the Tribunal’s indictments will be a telling and decisive event in Lebanon.
The Rhetoric of Hassan Nasrallah during the Second Lebanon War
Col. (Res.) Ronen Cohen (2009)
This research is concerned with rhetoric of a leader during war, as a tool which can be used both to understand his actions and to make decisions about how to confront him. In the research, the rhetoric used by the leader of Hezbollah organization during the Second Lebanon War will be examined. In this paper, the Second Lebanon War will be used as a case study for the understanding of the development in Nasrallah’s perception of the balance of powers in the Lebanese campaign (July 12th-August 14th 2006), as was heard and seen in his media appearances. Such an insight may also aid decision-making processes, policy management, and activation of the Israeli security system in the future.
Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing Approach
Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis (2009)
This article emphasizes a framing analysis to understand how Hizballah communicates its goals and how it mobilizes support within its Shia constituency, in Lebanese society as a whole and elsewhere. Moreover, it is equally important to understand how the group makes sense of its social world. Framing theory derives from new social movement theory which emphasizes culture as a key issue in understanding social movements (Larana et al., 1994: 37). I will suggest that Hizballah has succeeded in finding successful frames that resonate with the local culture and the current political and economic realities, as perceived by a large fraction of the Lebanese population. I begin with a brief historical overview of the group. Then I will show how framing theory can be utilized to explain the popularity of Hizballah. Stated differently, I will examine Hizballah’s framing as a mobilization strategy. I will analyse Hizballah’s framing following David Snow and Robert Benford, who divided framing into three categories: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational (Benford and Snow, 2000). In addition, I will examine the master frames adopted by Hizballah. For source material, this article relies mostly on primary sources, including Hizballah publications (e.g. election programmes, statements, leaflets), as well as several interviews with group leaders, members and sympathizers.
Who Was Imad Mughniyeh?
Dr. Matthew Levitt & Mr. David Schenker (2008)
Yesterday's assassination of arch-terrorist Imad Mughniyeh was welcome news in Washington, Buenos Aires, Tel Aviv, and, albeit quietly, Beirut and Baghdad. For Hizballah and Damascus, however, the loss of Mughniyeh -- who was a brilliant military tactician, a key contact to Tehran, and a successful political leader -- is a severe blow to their ongoing activities and operations.
From Revolutionary and Pan-Islamism to Pragmatism and Lebanonization
Dr. Eitan Azani (2006)
The last three decades of the 20th century witnessed the rise of Islamic movements in the Middle East and their transformation into a leading power, opposing the existing social and political order. This Islamic wave is noteworthy for its scope, strength and the violence perpetrated by the extremists on the fringes. In Islamic culture, Islam plays a central and important role in political and social struggles. Islamic ideals constitute the basis for the creation of a joint political and social identity as well as a source of inspiration and legitimacy for the struggle. The success of the Iranian Islamic revolution became a source of inspiration and simulation for the revolutionary movements, particularly the Shiite movements, which sprang up in the 1980s. They were led by religious militants, under the leadership of Khomeini, who promoted the vision of an Islamic nation. The Hezbollah movement in Lebanon is one of the torch-bearers of this goal.
Hezbollah, a Global Terrorist Organization
Dr. Eitan Azani (2006)
Hezbollah simultaneously operates both within the Lebanese political system and outside of it, a fact that allows it greater leeway in both arenas. The organization’s pragmatic façade has fooled, and continues to fool, researchers and actors in the international arena. Indeed, Hezbollah’s entrance into the Lebanese Parliament in 1992 and the Lebanese government in 2005 was perceived by many as an important first step that demonstrated the organization’s moderation and abandonment of its radical ideology. Hezbollah even implemented a series of measures intended to highlight the change it allegedly went through.
Hizballah: A Pragmatic Terror Organization of Global Reach: A Snapshot
Dr. Eitan Azani (2005)
The fundamental difference in the international community's definition of Hizballah, thwarts any possibility of directly or indirectly pressurizing the organization. While the U.S. and Israel are acting to eliminate the organization as a terrorist entity, European diplomats are meeting with its leaders. This international environment enables Lebanon, Syria and Iran to maneuver between the European position and American pressure. The lack of a uniform definition of the term "terrorism" prevents international cooperation in fighting the terror organizations. This fact, and the fear of the international community players of becoming too involved in areas saturated with violence and terrorism, where their interests could be harmed, play into the hands of Hizballah. Even in the 1980s, when Hizballah was active in perpetrating attacks against the international community, they found it difficult to cooperate in bringing effective pressure to bear against the organization. The conclusion is therefore: In the absence of a basic agreement that the organization is a terrorist organization, the international community influence on Hizballah is totally marginal.
The Double Game of Hizballah
Dr. Ely Karmon (2005)
Hizballah is an odd religious and political movement: it was born of terrorism in the 1980s, developed guerrilla warfare capabilities in the 1990s, and, by the beginning of the new millennium, had matured into an important Middle East strategic player, capable of influencing the course of peace and war in the region.
Hizballah and the War on Terror
Dr. Ely Karmon (2002)
Recently, intelligence services in the U.S., Israel and European countries have expressed concern over potential cooperation between surviving al-Qaida terrorists and Hizballah’s extensive worldwide infrastructure. The flight of al-Qaida militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Lebanon has become a hot topic in the media.
An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program
This is a slightly abridged translation of "Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l-Mustad'afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam", published February 16, 1985 in al-Safir (Beirut), and also in a separate brochure. It carries the unmistakable imprint of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the Hizballah mentor, and is inspired by his book Ma'maal-Quwma fi-l-Islam (Beirut 1979). See also his article in al-Muntalak (Beirut), October 1986.
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