The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades first emerged on the scene shortly after the outbreak of what has come to be known as the al-Aqsa conflict, in late September 2000. In a very real sense, the Martyrs Brigades was a response to the need to suit actions to words.

Lebanon may well have come to the West Bank and Gaza. Over the past year and a half, Hamas has adopted traditional Hizballah guerilla tactics such as roadside bombings, short-range rocket and mortar launchings, using squads of terrorists from a variety of groups, and videotaping attacks and potential suicide bombers. In the proud words of Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, “[Palestinians] are now operating against the Israeli occupation with Hizballah methods.” More ominous, there are increasing signs that Hamas may follow Hizballah’s example and broaden its operational objectives to include targeting Americans for attacks.

“Civil disobedience” is a term which has recently gained in popularity, both in this country in the context of the Intifada and the refusal of soldiers to serve in the territories, and further afield, particularly pertaining to the developments in Eastern Europe. In many cases, however, the usage of this term is wrong and often misleading.

Whether or not a terror attack will take place is a function of two factors: the motivation of a terrorist organization to perpetrate attacks, and its operational capability of doing so at a given time. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, Yasser Arafat has adopted a policy whereby he refrains from disrupting the military infrastructure of the Palestinian radical groups, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the areas under his control. Thus, he was free to preserve the constant threat of terrorism as a bargaining chip to be used against Israel, acting to prevent attacks when it served what he saw as the Palestinian national interest. But whenever such prevention was necessary it was always accomplished through a policy of persuasion and threats—never by direct military action. Arafat managed to convince the leadership of the organizations that terrorist attacks at that time would harm the Palestinian interest—removal of Israeli forces from the territories, and the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital—and that he would be obligated to act against anyone attempting to perpetrate attacks, thereby risking civil war. At the same time, Arafat, who controlled the Palestinian media, worked to insure that the popular environment was not conducive to terrorist activity.

The last wave of coordinated suicide attacks by Hamas did not come in revenge for the killing of Hamas leader Mahmoud Abu Hanoud or the accidental death of five Palestinian children. These terrorist acts must be considered in the context of America's war on terrorism, the inclusion of the radical Islamic organizations Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah on the updated US list of terrorist organizations and US special envoy Anthony Zinni's mission in the region.

As the magnitude of the horrific events of September 11 sinks in and our nation implements its multifaceted military, diplomatic, and economic response, greater public attention is once again being paid to the Middle East—in the media, on college campuses, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, much of this discussion is misinformed and lacks historical context.