Whether or not a terror attack will take place is a function of two factors: the motivation of a terrorist organization to perpetrate attacks, and its operational capability of doing so at a given time. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, Yasser Arafat has adopted a policy whereby he refrains from disrupting the military infrastructure of the Palestinian radical groups, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the areas under his control. Thus, he was free to preserve the constant threat of terrorism as a bargaining chip to be used against Israel, acting to prevent attacks when it served what he saw as the Palestinian national interest. But whenever such prevention was necessary it was always accomplished through a policy of persuasion and threats—never by direct military action. Arafat managed to convince the leadership of the organizations that terrorist attacks at that time would harm the Palestinian interest—removal of Israeli forces from the territories, and the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital—and that he would be obligated to act against anyone attempting to perpetrate attacks, thereby risking civil war. At the same time, Arafat, who controlled the Palestinian media, worked to insure that the popular environment was not conducive to terrorist activity.

The last wave of coordinated suicide attacks by Hamas did not come in revenge for the killing of Hamas leader Mahmoud Abu Hanoud or the accidental death of five Palestinian children. These terrorist acts must be considered in the context of America's war on terrorism, the inclusion of the radical Islamic organizations Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah on the updated US list of terrorist organizations and US special envoy Anthony Zinni's mission in the region.

As the magnitude of the horrific events of September 11 sinks in and our nation implements its multifaceted military, diplomatic, and economic response, greater public attention is once again being paid to the Middle East—in the media, on college campuses, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, much of this discussion is misinformed and lacks historical context.

As the Bush administration begins what appears to be an extended fight in Afghanistan, it has been unable to reach any clear conclusion with regard to where the Palestinian terrorist groups—Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad—and the Palestinian Authority itself, fit into its global campaign against terrorism.

In the wake of the terror attacks of “Black Tuesday,” investigators are seeking to follow the “money trail” back to the perpetrators, hoping to learn who ultimately gave the order. While American officials would like to see a clear trail leading back to the legendary wealth of Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden, tracing this financial path back to him is likely to be difficult—perhaps more difficult even than finding the perpetrators themselves.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks which caused the destruction of the Twin Towers of New York's World Trade Center, damaged the Pentagon, and destroyed four large airliners with all aboard, securities-exchange investigators on three continents are poring over trading records to determine whether one or more parties profited by their advance knowledge of the disaster.

An article appeared in the 13 August edition of the Lebanon-based Palestinian weekly, Al-Manar, stating that there is “serious thinking” among the Palestinians about obtaining biological weapons, according to a special dispatch by The Middle East Media Research Institute.

The violent confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians has escalated in recent months to a state of a limited, but constant, war. In this war, the Palestinian Authority has emerged as a terrorism-supporting entity, operating alongside the “traditional” terror organizations who carry out intensive terrorist and guerilla activities. One of the main means of attack open to these organizations is suicide terrorism. The choice of this type of attack emanates from the fact that it is easily put into practice and materially “inexpensive” to execute, while at the same time very damaging to the enemy’s morale. This article will endeavor to briefly examine the phenomenon of suicide attacks perpetrated today by the Palestinians, before examining other aspects of the phenomenon worldwide. The ultimate goal is to determine whether such attacks constitute a “winning” strategy as employed by terrorists around the world or whether it is merely one more in a progressive series of spectacular, but limited “show case” operations.

Hamas has succeeded, through its popular influence and close relations with leading elements in the Palestinian Authority (PA), in making some important moves toward the "Islamization" of the PA/Fatah on one hand and a large part of the Palestinian public on the other. The longstanding rivalry between Hamas and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)/PA started with Fatah in the late 1970s, in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood's abstention from the Palestinian armed struggle. The PLO/Fatah, backed by the Marxist fronts, treated the newly established Hamas as if it were unimportant and posed no challenge to the position of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Yet, Hamas viewed itself as an ideological and political alternative to the PLO.