In October and November of 2010, the Arab media quoted studies and statements made by Arab researchers regarding the recent changes in Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). One cannot exclude the possibility that some of the studies and the journalistic coverage is essentially biased and meant to point to a certain weakening and laxity in the organization's activity, while at the same time emphasizing the success of the Arab countries in coping with this infrastructure.
From the portrayal made by the Arab researchers, the following points come up:

• For tactical reasons, the organization was forced to carry out smaller, cheaper and less spectacular terrorist attacks, due to the pressure put on the organization by security forces in the area. This pressure is expressed in the increased surveillance capabilities and in drying out the organization's financial resources. Following these steps, the organization is on the defensive and carries out small and simple terrorist attacks only to prove that it still exists.
• These terrorist attacks are aimed at economic targets and especially oil installations, which are vulnerable due to the difficulty in securing them.
• The change in the organization's operational pattern is backed up by an operational doctrine based on religious justifications pertaining to “economic Jihad” whose objective is to wear the enemy down and cause as much economic damage as possible.
• The continued pressure on the part of security forces in the area alongside the change in the operational pattern is also accompanied by a change in Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's conduct, expressed in its breaking off from the parent organization and the use of small unstable cells, so as to increase their ability to mislead security forces.
• Researchers contend that Al-Qaeda still suffers from an ideological weakness due to the deviation from the religious ideas of the organization's founders, especially regarding the determination of enemies.
• Al-Qaeda also has some “foreign” involvement, as it receives the aid of foreign, most likely Iranian, intelligence services.

On the end of October 2010, two packages of explosives were discovered in Britain and Dubai. Reports in the Arab media claim the package in Britain was discovered on a UPS aircraft whilst the one in Dubai was found at a FedEx installation, deposited inside a printer's ink cartridge which contained an electrical circuit and a cellular phone mechanism. Both packages were addressed to Jewish synagogues in Chicago and contained powerful PETN explosives. According to investigators, this type of explosive hints not only to the organization behind the attempted attack, but also to the identity of the manufacturer himself, suspected to be Ibrahim Hassan Al-Asiri, a Saudi citizen who is on the list of the 85 men wanted by the Saudi authorities.

On January 2011, the 16th edition of the “Sada Al-Malahem” Jihadist magazine was published. A number of articles on the affair of the explosives packages were included, revealing how Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has succeeded in overcoming security and bypassing the X-ray systems at the airport in Yemen.

This interim report includes significant extracts and summaries of information from Jihad websites and forums relating to Osama Bin Laden, as well as a profile of the former Al-Qaeda leader. The report also contains ICT analysis and reaction to Bin Laden's death in the global media, and past articles published by the ICT on the subject of Bin Laden. 

There is no doubt that the Jihadi forums are a main component of the Jihadi public relations and information-sharing system. The forums are also a crucial platform for spreading Al-Qaeda's doctrine, as well as that of other Jihadi organizations, for updating their collaborators with news relating to the various Jihadi fields, for recruiting new members and collaborators, etc. In general, this medium has a strong influence in shaping the Jihadi discourse according to the forum members' viewpoint, their perception of the processes, etc. The forum members, who are committed to advancing the ideas of Jihad and who identify, to various degrees, with the Safafi-Jihadi credo, can be perceived as a “virtual imaginary community”. As such, the directors of the Jihadi forums place considerable importance on strengthening their ties with the surfers.
One of the main measures designed to strengthen the ties between the Jihadi forums and their surfers is the provision of an open platform to registered surfers for a limited period of time (usually a few days). During this time, the surfers have the rare opportunity to pose questions on various issues directly to a senior Jihadi-Salafi sheikh who is a guest on the forum. After closing the platform, the forum publishes an electronic booklet containing most of the surfers' questions and the sheikh's responses.
The following document focuses on an “open meeting” with Sheikh Abu Sa‘ad Al-‘Amili, a Jihadi-Salafi sheikh whose real identity remains a secret.

Recently, we have been witnessing a new phenomenon – key figures in the Islamic world, who in the past took part in armed Jihad or at least ideologically supported it, are now working to counter the radicalization process and to minimize recruitment to terrorist organizations. This phenomenon is known as “retraction”.
This phenomenon of “retraction” reflects a targeted effort, particularly on the part of authorities within the Muslim world, to harness the Islamic sources being used for radical indoctrination and to instead employ them as tools for fighting Islamic extremism.
The de-radicalization process is not new. Throughout the Muslim world, there are and have been rehabilitation programs, some of which are controversial as to their degree of success. For example, over the last two years, a de-radicalization process has taken place in Libya, led by Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, resulting in the LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group) organization declaring its abandonment of the path of Jihad. At this point in time, however, it is still too early to estimate the success of the de-radicalization process in Libya or how this process will impact Al-Qaeda's conduct and activities in the Maghreb.
The following document gives examples of the “retraction” phenomenon.

Two explosions shook the center of Stockholm, the Swedish capital, on December 11th 2010. At first, a car bomb detonated in one of the main streets of the city. Several minutes later, a suicide bomber blew himself up. As a result of the explosion, the terrorist was killed and a number of people were injured.
A short time before the explosions, the Swedish TT news agency received a threatening letter mentioning Sweden’s military presence in Afghanistan and the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, published five years ago in the Swedish press.
This attack, considered to be the first suicide attack in Scandinavia, aroused a widespread wave of responses on the Jihadi forums. The forum participants praised the attack, even though it did not result in any casualties, and called for a continuation of attacks on European soil.
This document aims to summarize the main points in the leading Jihadi forums, following the terrorist attack in Sweden.

The struggle raging between global Jihad activists and the Yemeni regime poses a great question mark over the Yemeni government's ability to cope with these developments, and increases fear of greater control over the country by the Jihadists.
The scenario of Jihadist control is not unrealistic and if it occurs, there will be a control/influence continuity on various levels of the terrorist organizations in Iraq, Yemen and Somalia – a scenario that may also affect the international shipping routes in Aden Bay, and later on along the Somalia coast, turning the region into an area of piracy and terrorist organizations' activity.
The connection between the Yemeni Jihadi infrastructure and two terrorist attacks against the United States (the attack at the Texas military base carried out by Nidal Malek Hassan in November 2009, and the failed attempt to blow up an American passenger plane in December 2009) have moved the danger arising from the Yemeni infrastructure into the spotlight and drawn international attention.
This document aims to present an analysis of the recent trends in Yemen while mapping the state of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Jihadi dialogue surrounding the situation in Yemen, in view of the developments in the local and international theaters.

On July 28th 2010 an explosion occurred on a Japanese oil tanker near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. One sailor was lightly injured as a result of the explosion.
The “M Star” tanker, loaded with nearly two million barrels of oil, was on its way to Chiba Port near Tokyo when the explosion occurred as the vessel entered the Strait of Hormuz, close to Oman.
The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf and Oman, is considered to be one of the most important routes in the world. Close to 40% of the world’s oil supply passes through this strait.
After a few days of speculation regarding the origin of the explosion, the Jihadi forums announced on August 4th 2010 that the Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack.

One of the most interesting and important phenomena yet to have received appropriate treatment in research literature is the de-radicalization process which several Islamic terrorist organizations have undergone and are still undergoing.
In the past decade we have been witness to attempts made by Muslim regimes to cope with the phenomenon of radicalization by formulating a policy and action strategy whose objective is to encourage a de-radicalization process. This approach has developed over the past decade and is attempting to provide an answer to all the elements of radicalization and its sources of development. Within this there are various and diverse methods of approach for coping with radicalization, thus far with no proven significant success.
This document wishes to examine the de-radicalization process undergone by the well-known Libyan terrorist group – the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) as of November 2006. Its peak was in September 2009 with the publishing of a new book written by members of the group during their stay in the Libyan prison. The book represents a turning point in the group’s way of thinking and in its path, constituting a new phase in the war on terrorism.

This document deals with an important publication written by Abu Obeida Abdullah Al-'Adm, a Salafi-Jihadi of Pakistani origin, who analyzes the chances of Pakistan's survival based on an estimate of the country's strengths and weaknesses.
The author points to a number of possible scenarios which can be expected to occur on the geo-political and operative plane in the aftermath of Pakistan's downfall. It would seem that the reason for this is to stimulate the Mujahideen into devising a flexible policy and a willingness to cope with the anticipated scenarios, or even to endeavor to influence them.
The author stresses that the demise of the Pakistani regime is not an impossible development, in light of the collapse of a number of power bases, such as the factor of religion, which will be discussed at length later on. However, he fears that its downfall will serve the interests of Western countries which seek to neutralize the Pakistani nuclear threat and, on the other hand, will create a new reality for the Mujahideen, who will be confined against their will to a much smaller operational area in Afghanistan.