On Political Order and the “Arab Spring”

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Abstract:

This article contends that the “Arab Spring” does not constitute a single phenomenon, nor a disparate series of unrelated events. Rather, what we are witnessing across North Africa and the Middle East is the simultaneous unfolding of three grand, historic political processes. To gain a better understanding of the causes and consequences of the Arab awakening, we need to analyze them through three interpretative prisms: (1) democratization; (2) authoritarian adaptation/succession; and (3) state failure.
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It has been a year since a young vegetable vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire after his cart and dignity were confiscated by police in the provincial Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. Since the death of the 26 year old, millions of similarly disenfranchised, poor and prospect-less Arabs have risen in revolt across North Africa and the Middle East in a phenomenon widely dubbed the “Arab Spring”.

On January 14 2011, less than a month after Bouazizi’s death, Tunisia’s dictator, Ben Ali – who had ruled the country for 23 years – fled to exile in Saudi Arabia. Nine months later, on October 23, Tunisians went to the polls to elect a new constituent assembly which will draw up a new constitution. Tunisia's formerly banned Islamist party, Hizb al-Nahda (the “Renaissance Party”) won the first generally free and fair elections to emerge from the "Arab Spring".
In Egypt, after only 18 days of mass protests, Hosni Mubarak handed over power to the military on February 11 – ending the pharaoh’s 30 year reign as president. Jubilant crowds poured into Tahrir square to celebrate and demand a swift transition to civilian rule. The very next day the Egyptian army suspended the country’s constitution and said it will rule by martial law until elections.

Elsewhere in the region – in Bahrain, Jordan, Iran, Morocco, Syria and Yemen – “day of rage” protests flared up in the aftermath of the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt. They were typically accompanied by the sporadic killing of demonstrators by state security forces and the arrest of opposition leaders. In Saudi Arabia demonstrations were quelled before crowds could gather in the streets. Oil revenues were then lavishly used to bolster the salaries of Saudi policemen, teachers and clerics.

By contrast, between late February and his lynching to death on October 20 2011, the world’s longest ruling dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, lost Libya to a motley coalition of tribal militia, backed by NATO air strikes. In Syria, a minority Alawite regime is fighting for survival with extraordinary brutality, edging the country towards a full-blown civil war. Yemen too slips in and out of civil war. In July, Sudan split along ethnic-religious lines into two separate states. Kurdish national aspirations are resurgent in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. Al-Qaeda leaders in the Arabian Peninsula, the Maghreb and the Sahel are urging their adherents to seize the numerous new opportunities presented by chaos in Libya, Sinai, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, to advance the cause of global Jihad.
What are we to make of these tumultuous and varied events? What, if anything, is the common thread running through them? Are we witnessing, as Fuad Ajami would have it, a long-silenced Arab world: “clamoring to be heard, eager to stake a claim to a place in the modern order of nations”\

\[ ^{i} \] Is the flowering of popular revolt doomed to be extinguished by the onset of a harsh new “Islamist Winter”, as Khaled Abu Toameh warns?\[ ^{ii} \] Or will most Arab autocrats manage to adapt and remain in power?

This article contends that the “Arab Spring” does not constitute a single phenomenon, nor a disparate series of unrelated events. Rather, what we are witnessing across North Africa and the Middle East is the simultaneous unfolding of three grand, historic political processes. To gain a better understanding of the causes and consequences of the Arab awakening, we need to analyze them through three interpretative prisms: (1) democratization; (2) authoritarian adaptation/succession; and (3) state failure.

**Freedom’s March: The Fourth Wave of Global Democratization**

One interpretive prism would read the “Arab Spring” as the belated arrival of democracy in the sole region of the world that previously seemed impervious to it. Viewed through this lens, the 2011 Arab revolts represent another important milestone in the centuries-long process by which modern political norms and institutions have traveled – by conquest, trade, and diffusion of ideas – from modest origins in 18\textsuperscript{th} century Europe to global dominance at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st}. The “Freedom’s March” interpretation goes something like this:

Three major waves of democratization have occurred prior to the 2011 Arab revolts.\[ ^{iii} \] The first, long wave (1774-1926) was rooted in the values of the American and French
revolutions, but materialized in the emergence of national democratic institutions in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries – notably through the gradual extension of universal adult suffrage and the establishment of executive accountability to national parliaments as a matter of law. By 1926, 33 countries (mostly in Europe and the overseas English dominions) experienced transition to democracy, though many would subsequently lapse back into old or new, and far more brutal, forms of authoritarianism in the bleak 1930s and early 40s.\textsuperscript{iv}

The Allied victory in the Second World War and early phases of decolonization in Asia and Africa marked the advent of a second, short wave of democratization (1945-62). Post-war Allied occupations helped establish representative regimes in Austria, West Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea.\textsuperscript{v} In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela either returned to democracy, or ushered in freely elected governments for the first time between 1943 and 1946. And a number of new states – India, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka – began independent life as electoral democracies.

Despite significant retreats in the 1960s and early 70s – a reverse wave experienced most harshly in Latin America – the dialectic of history proved fortuitous to the spread of democracy once again. On April 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1974, the Portuguese Revolução dos Cravos (Carnation Revolution) overthrew the longest standing dictatorship in Southern Europe. Portugal’s domestic revolution heralded the launch of a global one. The third wave of democratization quickly spread to the rest of the Iberian Peninsula and Greece, then in the 1980s to Latin America, several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and, with the demise of Soviet communism in 1989-1991, to Central and Eastern Europe.
By the turn of the millennium 80 democracies were created or restored, and the percentage of democratic states in the world rose from 27% in 1974 to 63%. For the first time in human history, democracy had become not only a near universal human aspiration, but the predominant form of government in the world. Transitions in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004), together with steady democratic consolidation among the other Balkan states, extended global democratic gains a little further still – prompting McFaul to identify a fourth wavelet of democratization from 2000 to 2005. In 2006 there were 123 electoral democracies, 64% of the world’s total.

Moreover, the “Freedom’s March” interpretation would assert, democracy no longer faces an ideological rival with broad global appeal. Fascism and Communism are dead, as is Pan-Arabism in the Middle East. Salafist-Jihadi ideology, while antithetical to liberal values, is no match for capitalist democracy as a compelling organizing model for political order. Western victory in the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks on the United States, not only facilitated the expansion of democracy into the former Soviet bloc, the non-aligned group of states, and several Middle Eastern countries. They also eliminated chief rationales for tolerating some odious autocracies.

As a bulwark against communist ambitions in Africa, for example, the Apartheid regime in South Africa could win support among Western democracies. The disappearance of bipolarity, however, removed the already shaky ground upon which white rule rested, resulting in the breakdown of Apartheid and transition to democracy in the early 1990s. For its part, the disappearance of Soviet patronage eliminated a key pillar of support for autocratic regimes in the Middle East, notably for Egypt, Sudan, and Syria.
Even where authoritarians still prevail, they mostly no longer champion an alternative model of government, but either claim their regime was democratic (as in the case of Russian “managed democracy”) or that they are gradually steering their volatile societies towards democracy (China, Egypt under and post-Mubarak, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia).

At the same time, democracy had now proven its ability to travel to regions of the world previously thought to lack the necessary economic, social and cultural prerequisites for political freedom. In Latin America – a continent long assumed to be too Catholic to sustain the Protestant ethic – all but Cuba and Venezuela became democratic. “Asian values” and China’s ascendancy as a market-autocracy notwithstanding, by 2006 democracy took root in at least 10 Asian nations, including India, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand.

In the same year, of the 48 sub-Saharan African states, no fewer than 23 (48%) were electoral democracies, including some of the world’s poorest, post-conflict countries. As Diamond observed enthusiastically in 2003: “If democracy can emerge and persist in an extremely poor, landlocked, overwhelmingly Muslim country like Mali—in which the majority of adults are illiterate and live in absolute poverty, and the life expectancy is 44 years—then there is no reason in principle why democracy cannot develop in most other very poor countries.”

With the advent of the “Arab Spring” freedom’s long march had finally reached the southern shores of the Mediterranean and the Arab heartland. A fourth global wave of democratization is upon us, protracted and messy as it may be. Like water dripping on a
rock, the forces of modernization and globalization have corroded and finally cracked open the last remaining region of the world which has long appeared – mistakenly as it turned out – impregnable to the norms and institutions of political competition and accountability. The fact that the revolts are occurring in clusters of geographically proximate states is also reminiscent of past patterns of democratization, which typically display regional “contagion” and “domino” effects.

As in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and even sub-Saharan Africa before it, sudden political transformation resulted from gradual socio-economic and cultural change. Urbanization, higher levels of literacy, and the internet produced social mobilization, attitudinal change, and expectations for a better life. Al-Jazeera, Facebook, and Twitter have made Arabs, particularly the numerous young, more capable of self-expression, more anxious to engage in political activities, and more adroit at political organization. They also removed the last vestiges of legitimacy from military, one-party, and monarchical forms of autocracy. Sooner or later, even the “benign dictatorships” of Jordan and Morocco are doomed to be swept away by the fourth wave of global democratization.

**Authoritarian Adaptation and Authoritarian Succession: From the Frying Pan into the Fire**

The second interpretative prism would read the “Arab Spring” as foreshadowing the replacement of “old” forms of Middle Eastern authoritarianism, with new ones. Just as autocratic Nasserism swept away the despotic ancien régimés of King Farouk and his likes in the 1950s and 60s, so the decrepit remnants of Arab secular, socialist nationalism,
are now being succeeded by new, notably Islamist, modes of political organization inimical to democracy. It is one thing to overthrow a dictator, the authoritarian succession interpretation would point out; quite another to replace that dictator with a functioning democratic society and state.

There are essential religious, cultural, and economic characteristics of the Middle East likely to perpetuate Arab exceptionalism in terms of the absence of democracy. Examining the political histories of 45 predominantly Muslim countries, analysts find that only Albania, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Senegal, and Turkey have ever had any record of political freedom. Of these, none could ever have been described as a durable, high-quality democracy. Among the Arab countries, there are zero states rated by Freedom House as democratic. Historically, as Elie Kedourie documents in his seminal book Politics in the Middle East, repeated attempts at liberal political reforms in North Africa and the Middle East have failed. The long-term pattern of political development in the region has been one where one form of authoritarianism replaces another.

Cultural beliefs about legitimate political order among Arabs also paint a discouraging picture. The Arab Barometer survey of five countries between 2003 and 2006 found that 56% of respondents agreed that “men of religion should have influence over government decisions”. A 2003-2004 survey found that more than half of Arab publics thought that government should only implement shari'a law.

Similarly, regional dynamics mitigate against positive democratic development. In Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia and Africa, countries became democratic partly
by emulating the norms and institutions of the neighbors they respected and wanted to resemble. With the possible, partial exception of Morocco and Tunisia (who glance northwards towards Europe), the societies of region are not located in neighborhoods that possess the norms of accountability, the rule of law, and respect for individual rights. The Arab world’s group of association is the Arab world, not America, Europe, or Israel.

Globally, furthermore, we are witnessing something of a “democratic recession”; not the advent of a new wave of democratization. In fact, since 2006, global levels of freedom have experienced the longest period of deterioration since the advent of the third wave in 1974.\textsuperscript{xvi}

Unlike in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, also, there is no effective liberal opposition ready to succeed the old regimes – no Arab equivalent of the Polish Solidarity movement. Decades of modern autocracy in the Arab world have all but decimated middle class, liberal constituencies in most Arab countries. Consequently, it is only the organized Islamists who are truly positioned to exploit opportunities for acquisition of power. The Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, has an unparalleled organizational network, and no compunction in using its mosques, schools, and charities in the service of its electoral ambitions.

Structural economic conditions across most of North Africa and the Middle East also bode ill for democracy. Of the 16 Arab countries, 11 are “rentier” states in that they derive more than 70\% of their export income from oil and gas rents – income extracted from the ground, not from the productive efforts and taxation of citizens.\textsuperscript{xvii} In the Middle East, in other words, the Western notion of “no taxation without representation” is
perverted into “no representation without taxation”. Since most Arab states do not depend on taxing their population, they have failed – and will, for the foreseeable future, continue to fail – to develop the natural expectations of accountability and representation that emerge when states depend on tax paying citizens. The “resource curse” of oil and gas derived income also retards the development of other sectors of the economy, encourages cronyism, increases corruption, and allows Arab states to spend huge resources on repressive security apparatuses.

In sum, according to the authoritarian succession prism, the Arabs would have broken one set of handcuffs, only to have them replaced by a new, green set. The autocrats will either adapt successfully, or be replaced by theocrats, not democrats.

**Things Fall Apart: A Regional Cascade of State Failure**

The third interpretive prism is in many respects the most historically intriguing, but also the most unsettling. According to this reading, what we are witnessing across North Africa and the Middle East is not the late onset of democratization, or the replacement of capable old forms of authoritarianism with new ones, but a regional cascade of state failure.

Lacking in security, legitimacy, and capacity, fragile modern Arab states are disintegrating. They leave behind them under-governed or ungoverned spaces that are being filled by a pre-modern, neo-medieval patchwork of non-state rulers (tribes, warlords, criminal gangs), as well as by ultramodern transnational terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda, and new forms of hybrid terrorist/governance-providing organizations, such as Hizbullah and Hamas.
What we mean by “state failure” is perhaps best captured by recalling what we have come to expect from the modern, functioning state. The state is a political entity that successfully exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory and over a given population. A “normal” state also commands the loyalty of its citizens and provides core public goods – above all security and the rule of law, but also markets, transport infrastructure, health, and education.

Failed states are those which fall short of these minimal criteria, in that their performance is lacking in terms of security, legitimacy, and/or capacity to deliver basic welfare-enhancing public goods. State failure is thus a gradational concept, where under-performing states range on a continuum: from fragility, to failing and, in extremis, to fully collapsed states. Viewed through this prism, conditions across much of North Africa and the Middle East appear ominous:

In terms of security, state failure is predominantly caused, and accompanied, by ethnic, religious, tribal, or other forms of civil conflict. Countries experiencing serious security gaps include principally both those that are in the midst of armed conflict and those just emerging from warfare. Indeed, borrowing the State Failure Taskforce definition of the four major causes of state failure – revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime change, and genocides/politicides – we observe all four occurring in the Middle East today.

Revolutionary wars – episodes of sustained violent conflict between governments (or external occupying powers) and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, replace its leaders, or seize power in one or more regions – are
currently unfolding, with varying degrees of intensity, in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Bedouin and Jihadi groups are undermining Egyptian control of Sinai. Kurdish national aspirations hold the potential for major, protracted conflict involving Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. The military ousting of the Qaddafi regime by a coalition of tribal opposition militias back by NATO, represents a “successful” revolutionary war.

There are no fewer than 140 tribes and clans in Libya, of which 30 are influential power-brokers. It remains to be seen whether the National Transitional Council of Libya is able to hold the country together in the aftermath of the 2011 civil war, or whether conflicting interests and tribal differences will plunge post-Qaddafi Libya into further civil conflict. After pledging that they would disarm and submit to a single, central army after the overthrow of Qaddafi, many militia leaders in Libya now reportedly insist that they will retain their weapons and political autonomy as the new “guardians of the revolution”.

So-called “ethnic wars” - episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal groups challenge governments to seek major changes in status or forms of political order – are simmering in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, Yemen and among Palestinian factions. In Egypt, dozens of Coptic Christians have been killed in clashes with state security forces since October 2011. Among Palestinians, Fatah-Hamas rivalry has already led to the 2007 violent, successful Hamas coup in Gaza, with Hamas seeking a further major Islamist revision in the form of politics not only in the West Bank, but in Jordan as well. And in Lebanon, Hizbullah effectively controls parts of the country and is widely acknowledged to be
militarily stronger than Lebanese state forces – thus exercising a permanent, hair-trigger threat to the fragile, ethnic-based constitutional order in the country.

“Adverse regime change” – major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including periods of severe elite or regime instability – recently occurred, or is currently experienced, in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Lastly, “genocide and politicide” – sustained activities by states or, in civil wars, by either of the contending sides that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group – have taken place over the last decade in Algeria and Sudan. Genocide and politicide are also grim possible scenarios in Afghanistan and Iraq (once American troops leave), in Libya (should major reprisals be exacted against the Qaddafi tribe), and in Syria (should the ruling Alawite minority lose its grip on power).

According to the state failure interpretation of the “Arab Spring”, furthermore, the security gap across much of North Africa and the Middle East is both facilitated and exacerbated by deep underlying deficits in the legitimacy and capacity of Arab states.

A legitimacy gap exists within a state where a significant portion of its political elites and society either reject the rules regulating the exercise of power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth in the country, or resort to alternative, competing sources of authority - tribal, ethnic, religious, or national. Legitimate states are ones where a strong sense of national identity has been successfully formed; where the concept of citizenship holds genuine meaning for elites and society; and where state institutions function transparently and are accountable to the people.
The underlying problem for many Arab states today, lies in their fundamental lack of legitimacy. Like much of sub-Saharan Africa – where the largest proportion of failed states currently exists – Arab states came into being “instantly”, as the result of the dissolution of colonial empires. Rather than go through a slow, convoluted process of state formation – culminating in the development of the rule of law, accountability, and national identity – Arab states became states before they could truly become nations.

The societies of the Arab world are ancient, but as states they are “instant states”. This means that, with the possible exception of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and the tiny Gulf oil kingdoms, Arab states have not managed to forge national collective identities that are so vital for the ability of a society to generate welfare-enhancing public goods, and that can effectively compete for loyalty against pre-modern tribal, ethnic, and religious identities.

True, for several decades following the withdrawal of the British, French and Ottoman empires, Arab nationalism and Cold War patronage managed to paper over the essential differences. But the experiment in instant state formation has basically failed, and we are now witnessing the manifestation of this failure on a grand historical and regional scale. Arab states are mostly Potemkin-states – brittle entities increasingly unable to hold themselves together by commanding the loyalty of their populace and exercising an effective monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their borders.

Security and legitimacy deficits are compounded by weak state capacity. One need only peruse the five existing Arab Human Development Reports – sponsored by the UN and independently authored by courageous Arab scholars – to appreciate the depth of
contemporary Arab state’s inability to deliver core public goods and opportunities to their bulging, youthful populations. xxiv

By 2015 the Arab countries will be home to some 395 million people, compared to 150 million in 1980. Of these over 60% will be under the age of 25, with a median age of 22. Despite oil wealth, GDP per capita in the Arab countries grew by a paltry 6.4% over the entire period from 1980 to 2004 (i.e. by less than 0.5% annually) and oil has crowded out agriculture and manufacturing, so that Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than they were in 1970. Youth and women unemployment are among the highest in the world, with the overall poverty rate ranging from a “low” of 30% in Lebanon, to a high of 59.5% in Yemen, and 41% in Egypt. xxv Along with sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab world is the only region where the number of hungry or starving has risen since the beginning of the 1990s.

Water scarcity and desertification are placing additional burdens on already overstretched land, causing conflict over natural resources, population displacement, and increased drug, weapons and human trafficking. All these, the latest Arab Human Development Report concludes, mean: “that identity-based groups in some Arab countries have sought to free themselves from the captivity of the nation-state in whose shadow they live.” xxvi

Like democratization, furthermore, state failure is a regional phenomenon, in that it predominantly occurs in clusters of geographically contiguous or proximate states. xxvii

Lastly here, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League notwithstanding, the Middle East remains singularly lacking in meaningful regional security, political, and economic arrangements that could help hold Arab states together. There is no Arab
equivalent of the European Union (EU), or the weaker Organization of American States (OAS) that might render collective assistance to Arab states in distress. No Arab version of NATO, or even the functional equivalent of the African Union (AU) that could provide indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms or peacekeeping forces. State failure in one or two Arab countries – particularly in strategic ones such as Iraq or Syria – are likely to produce dire spill-over effects for neighboring countries, resulting in a possible cascade of failures across the region.

All Together Now

The three sets of grand political processes outlined above are, in reality, all unfolding simultaneously in the North African and Middle Eastern geopolitical space; intertwining within and across national borders; interacting with one another, as well as with broader variables in the contemporary international system. Briefly, they carry the following consequences for Israeli foreign policy:

Israel has a deep vested interest in the emergence of consolidated liberal democracies in North Africa and the Middle East, and so should strive, wherever possible, to establish links with genuine democrats and to empower them where it can. Moreover, just as the emergence of Southern Sudan as an independent state provided Israel with a rare opportunity to establish diplomatic, economic and security ties with a south eastern African country, resurgent Kurdish nationalism creates new opportunities for constructive alliances.

Under the authoritarian adaptation scenario, existing regimes will reluctantly liberalize in response to fear of instability; striving to accommodate and co-opt opposition forces.
Such accommodation may be direct – in that it will legalize formerly banned political parties and form coalition governments with Islamists – or indirect – opening up new space for opposition participation in economic life, civil society, the media, and security forces. Authoritarian adaptation may therefore lead to the “Pakistanization” of the state security forces of erstwhile western supported Arab states, with Islamist elements penetrating military, police, and intelligence agencies.

Liberalized autocracy is an inherently unstable equilibrium, however, and so is likely to be succeeded, sooner or later, if not by democracy, then by new forms of authoritarianism. Together with its allies, Israel would do well to closely study, monitor, and report on Islamist movements’ efforts to exploit or subvert new political openings. Military, diplomatic, and economic aid to North African and Middle Eastern countries must also be more closely coordinated by Western powers, and conditioned more stringently on substantive democratic reforms.

State failure means reduced threat of conventional war, but the proliferation of unconventional threats, notably the strengthening of terrorist networks and weapon smuggling. Jihadist nodes in Yemen, Sinai, Somalia, Libya, Chad, Mali and Nigeria, will be in a better position to cooperate where central government control is weak or absent. Chaos in Libya, and regime weakness in Egypt, has already resulted in a flood of sophisticated weaponry into Sinai and Gaza. These trends are likely to deteriorate further if Syria disintegrates into civil war and Iraq becomes even weaker once US forces withdraw.
Finally here, at a time of great geopolitical fluidity, regime instability, and a state failure, Israel would be well advised to avoid the ceding of territory to Syria or the Palestinians. In particular, it must insist that there should be no new sovereignty without proven responsible sovereignty. 

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xii On urbanization and literacy in the Arab world see the 2009 United Nations Arab Human Development Report (http://www.arab-hdr.org). For example, in 1970 only 38% of the population in the Arab world lived in urban areas. By 2009 it was nearly 60%. See also: Beth Simmons et al. (eds.) The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy (2008).


xiv Elie Kedoury, Politics in the Middle East (1992)


xvii Larry Diamond, Supra note 15, at p. 98.


xxi International Herald Tribune, “Local militias in Libya balk at giving up their arms” (November 2nd, 2011).

xxii See: Charles T. Call, Ibid. at p. 6.


xxvi Ibid. at p. 4.

