Research Fellow, ICT, Israel
Dan Diker is a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. He writes a regular column on Foreign Affairs for the Jerusalem Post
From 2011 to 2013 Mr. Diker served as Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress, the global diplomatic organization representing the official Jewish communities in 100 countries.
From 2002 to 2010, Diker served as senior foreign Policy analyst and then Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs where he edited several policy books on the Iranian regime Israel’s national security doctrine.
Previously, Mr. Diker wasKnesset Affairs reporter for Israel’s Channel One English News . He continues to provide analysis on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs on local and international news networks, including Al Jazeera, al Hurra, CNN, and Fox.
Born in New York City, Diker graduated from Harvard University in 1984, and subsequently attended the Harvard Graduate School of Business He completed a Master’s degree in government and counterterrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzelia. He immigrated to Israel 1990 and lives in Gush Etzion near Jerusalem with his wife and five children.
Hamas’ bloody takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 came as a strategic surprise for the United States and Israel. However, the six day routing of the Fatah commanded Palestinian Authority forces did not take place in a vacuum. It occurred in the context of a 25 year ongoing Hamas-Fatah civil war. Hamas’s Strategic Surprise also represented the climax of a series of watershed events that began with Israel’s Gaza withdrawal in 2005 and was propelled by Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006. In the immediate strategic background, Israel and the United States overestimated and over relied on the capabilities and assessments of the PA’s security apparatus that was headed by Mohammed Dahlan, PA National Security Advisor, long known as “Fatah’s strong man” in Gaza. There was also confusing “noise” and “signals”, and an overall failure to “connect the dots”. On a deeper level, Israel, the United States and the Western powers misunderstood Fatah and Hamas’ political culture and their passive and active use of deception of one another and US interlocutors. Lessons learned from Hamas’s surprise 2007 takeover of Gaza can be helpful in assessing and managing the complexities of the seemingly irreversible two-headed government in the Palestinian controlled territories of Gaza and in the former West Bank of Jordan.