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Maritime Terrorism has become a buzzword among security experts over the past seven years. Incidents such as the attacks on USS Cole (October 2000) and MV Limburg (October 2002) demonstrated in the most graphic and chilling way the vulnerability of maritime transportation infrastructures, of both military and merchant shipping.
Historically, the world’s oceans have not been a major venue for terrorist activity. According to the RAND Corporation’s terrorism database, maritime terrorist attacks have accounted for only two percent of all incidents since 1969. This number is relatively small due to the fact that security forces have had to deal with traditional terror groups such as the vestiges of political terrorism and separatist-irredentist terrorist groups. All these groups are characterized by their hierarchical, pyramidal structure and centralized command system. Almost all groups have a regional or local operational agenda using terrorism to target specific people or places, which as a result reduce the damage to small numbers or individual casualties.
The sophistication, expense, and training to carry out maritime terrorism necessitate considerable overhead. It requires terrorist organizations to acquire appropriate vessels, mariner skills and, specialist weapons / explosive capabilities. Many terrorist groups are either not located near coastal regions or do not possess the necessary means to carry out maritime attacks. Limited by scarce financial and operational resources, most traditional terrorist organizations have decided not to venture into the maritime arena as the ends do not justify their means. Therefore, following more pragmatic methods, many terrorist groups have preferred to stay with proven successful land based terrorism, especially when selected land targets are not too difficult to attack.
Among the most experienced traditional terrorist groups that possess maritime capabilities are the Middle Eastern Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Lebanese Hezbollah. All the above mentioned terrorist groups have a mutual enemy in the democratic State of Israel.
Having witnessed the first ever recorded attempt to infiltrate Israel by sea on April 14, 1953, Israel has accumulated a vast amount of experience in combating maritime terrorism. Over the past decades, according to a senior Israeli navy officer, Israel has detected more then 80 maritime terror plots. While most attacks have been foiled, terrorist operatives have learned to adapt to this rapidly changing environment. Incidents - such as the attack on INS Hanit (July 14, 2006) - show that groups such as Hezbollah have stayed at least one step ahead of the security services. Furthermore, as the global jihad movement is closing in on Israel and is experienced in maritime terrorism due to its Yemen operations, the danger has increased.
From this perspective, the question needs to be raised whether and how Israel has succeeded in diverting major maritime disasters. Therefore, this essay will analyze Palestinian and Al Qaeda’s maritime capabilities, focusing on the 1970s and from 2000 to 2006. Their past operations will be reviewed, new developments will be discussed, and projections will be given in order to help security services ensure a safer tomorrow.
II. Definition of Maritime Terrorism
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has offered an extensive definition for maritime terrorism:
"…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities."
This definition, however, does not define what terrorism is and whether it would only include maritime attacks against civilian (merchant) vessels or also attacks against military crafts. I define maritime terrorism, therefore, as the use or threat of violence against a ship (civilian as well as military), its passengers, sailors, cargo or a port facility with a solely political purpose. The definition can be expanded to include the use of the maritime transportation system to smuggle terrorists or terrorist materials into the targeted country.
Maritime terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target. Piracy, in contradistinction, according to article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is defined as:
(a) “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-
paragraph (a) or (b).”
Given these definitions, the grey area are cases of kidnap-for-ransom incidents, such as the May 2001 abduction of three American citizens and 17 Filipinos at the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an Al Qaeda affiliate. Motivated by the need to finance their political aims, ASG repeatedly perpetrated such acts of piracy. Their actions are an example of the blurring of the distinction between terrorism and piracy. In the Israeli arena however, we have not seen this phenomenon.
III. Israel, a Maritime Nation
Israel stands at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa. To the north, Israel is bordered by Lebanon and Syria, to the east by Jordan and to the south by the Red Sea and Egypt. Its western border is the Mediterranean Sea. Israel's combined coastline is 206 km., which puts it in close proximity to hostile neighbors, and to bases that serve as launch sites for terrorists or weapons smuggling. The majority of Israel’s population live in cities close to the shoreline, making them an inviting target for attacks from the sea. The northern city of Nahariya (population of 50,000) is only 9 km. south of the Lebanese border, where Hezbollah has built its maritime bases. To the south, Ashkelon (population 106,600) is just 15 km. north of Gaza, a stronghold of several terrorist organizations and nowadays ruled by Hamas. Eilat (population 55.000) the third largest harbor and gateway to Asia, is 8.5 km. north of Egypt and 2.4 km. west of Jordan. Israel’s major port and naval base at Ashdod (population 204,000) is 25 km. north of Gaza. Fast inflatable boats or scooters can cover such distances in minutes, giving Israel’s security organizations, particularly the Israeli navy, only minutes to identify, evaluate and - if necessary - engage the threat.
Besides the threat of a direct attack by terrorists using maritime means to attack its citizens, Israel is a state which depends on open waterways for its economic well-being. In 2006, Israel’s three major commercial ports, Haifa, Ashdod and Eilat handled 37.7 million tons of cargo and 260,000 passengers. According to the Israel Ports Development & Assets Company Ltd, Israel's seaports therefore handle 98% of the country's import and export cargoes. Moreover, Dr Sheinin stated that 93 percent of all security related goods are transported by merchant ships. For many of these essential goods, the maritime transport system is the only economical way for transport due to dimensional and weight restrictions. Israel’s main trade partners are the European Union (especially Belgium, Germany, and UK), Asia and North America. In order to reach these trading partners, merchant ships have to either pass the Straits of Gibraltar, or the Suez Canal, Straits of Tiran, Bab el Mandeb and the Malacca Straits. These straits are often called the arteries of regional and global trade. However, due to the geography of these narrow and shallow waterways, these arteries can be described as chokepoints. Located in geographical areas where local terrorist groups with ties to Al Qaeda possess maritime capabilities. The closure of one or two of these straits, for instance through sinking a VLCC tanker (Very Large Crude Carrier) or Oil tanker, would not only partially cut Israel off from the world market, but also increase the overall shipping costs through the increase of insurance fees worldwide and the re-routing of the ships to longer shipping routes for which Israel’s consumers would ultimately have to bear the increased costs of all imported goods.
IV. Maritime terror attacks since the 1970s
Having successfully prevented the first attempt to infiltrate Israel by sea on Apr 14, 1953, historically, Israel’s main experience with maritime terrorism came in the 1970s. For the first time Palestinian terror organizations gained experience with and developed maritime terrorism tactics that are still relevant today. Three out of the four major terrorist attacks in Israel in the 1970s were maritime infiltration attacks. Moreover, Israel, as a maritime nation, developed in the 1970s what today is one of the best coastal defenses worldwide. In the historical overview, the author will also briefly go over the relatively calm periods of the 1980s -90s.
A. 1970th – Developing of Maritime Capabilities by the Palestinian terrorist Organizations and the Use of Direct Infiltration Attacks.
Following the events of Black September (1970), Palestinians were expelled by King Hussein from Jordan to Lebanon. Taking advantage of a weak Lebanese state, the Palestinians established their power centers in the South and along the Mediterranean coast. Utilizing the geographical location, Palestinian groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), started to develop maritime capabilities alongside land based techniques. Realizing the possibilities of attacking not only Israel's seaside towns but also Israel’s main cities such as Tel Aviv, and the moral significance associated with such an attack to Israel’s general population, prompted the PLO to increase its training to develop naval expertise and gain special knowledge such as diving. Training therefore was mainly conducted in Lebanon and Syria but also in Libya, Egypt and Algeria. However, as the Israeli northern border defenses did not pose a serious problem for these organizations in crossing into Israel and perpetrating terrorist attacks in the early 1970s, the option of penetrating Israel from the sea was not yet seen as imperative. Therefore, the terrorist groups focused their maritime activities on smuggling weapons from Syria and Cyprus to supply their camps in Lebanon and from Lebanon to Gaza, while only conducting smaller operations to test Israel’s response.
With the increase of Israeli navy activities in the Lebanese arena during 1971, PLO and other Palestinian terrorist organizations focused on collecting intelligence on Israeli ship movements and harbor visits in European cities and Cyprus, in order to conduct maritime terrorist operations using mines placed by divers; and developing other maritime capabilities, including remote controlled boats and divers brought by a mother ship, in order to attack Israeli ships, especially tankers, in Israeli harbors. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under Dr. George Habash, stated that Israel, as an abandoned island, surrounded by enemies, can only stay in contact with friendly states by air or sea transportation … “hence we must block these lines”. Their developed expertise led to the sinking of the Greek charter ship Sanya on March 4, 1973 in the Beirut harbor. Carrying 250 U.S. tourists bound for Haifa, Israel, it appeared that an attached mine detonated prematurely, as Fatah and Black September later claimed that the mine was designed to explode in Haifa. Following the Yom Kippur War (1973), the PLO intensified their cross border terrorist raids murdering the victims or taking them hostage, in order to use them as bargaining chips against the Israeli government. In light of this escalation, the IDF not only carried out cross border raids to destroy terrorist infrastructure, but also increased the effectiveness of its defensive measures by improving the border fence and increasing its patrols. Preferring the use of media effective hostage-taking, the Palestinian organizations had to adapt their terror tactics and therefore shift towards the use of their maritime capabilities to infiltrate Israel.
On June 24, 1974, the first of such attacks was perpetrated by three terrorists in Naharia. Having set sail from Lebanon, the team landed on the Naharia beach, seizing several hostages in a nearby apartment building. Before being killed in a gun battle with Israeli security forces, the terrorist succeeded in killing four and wounded eight more. As an immediate response, the Israeli security forces and especially the navy, increased their security measures on the northern border to prevent further infiltration, by setting up not only a radar station and lookouts at Rosh Hanikra, but also introducing security zones in which no civilian shipping and swimming was allowed. Moreover, Israel’s navy increased the number of patrol boats stationed near the northern border to three. These security measures successfully prevented most of the attempts to cross directly from Lebanon into Israel. The last successful attack (attempts still occur) that made use of this tactic, was the murder of the Haran Family in Naharia on the night of April 22, 23, 1979. Four terrorists from Abu Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), landed on the beach in a rubber boat killing a policeman and attacking an apartment building. Capturing a father and his four-year-old daughter, the terrorists killed both when the police arrived. Attempting to conceal her second daughter from the terrorists, the mother accidentally smothered her. Abu Abbas later stated that the attack was a protest against the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
B. 1970th – The use of Mother Ships by Palestinian Terrorist Groups
Following the implementation of tougher security measures on Israel’s northern border, the Palestinian terrorist organization changed their tactics in order to circumvent these measures. The terrorist organizations resorted to a tactic already conceived in 1972 – the use of mother ships. The idea was to circumvent the heavily defended northern border and launch smaller attack dinghies from a mother ship outside Israeli territory. Once launched, these fast dinghies would travel east in Israel’s blind spot, in order to land “out of nowhere”, at Israel 's major metropolitan cities.
The first such attack occurred on March 5, 1975 when eight terrorists landed on the Tel Aviv beach and attacked the Savoy hotel. Barricading themselves together with thirteen hostages, the terrorists threatened that if the Israelis did not release 20 Palestinian prisoners within four hours, the hostages would be killed. In the morning, the Israeli commando unit Sayeret Matkal stormed the hotel, killing seven terrorists and capturing one. Five hostages were freed and eight were killed. Three soldiers were also killed. A few hours later, the mother ship which had transported the terrorists, was captured by the Israeli navy on its way to Cyprus. The timing of the terrorist attack was clearly aimed to coincide with the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, who intended to promote a political settlement between Egypt and Israel. Panic-stricken, the PLO hoped that by carrying out a terrorist attack they would sabotage Dr. Kissinger’s mission. Moreover, the attack was designed to kill Jews and non-Jews, in order to enhance Arafat's prestige in the eyes of his supporters and coalition partners. Established after the Yom Kippur war, the Fatah naval arm was linked operationally to its special reconnaissance and intelligence unit, lead by the head of Fatah’s military wing, Abu Jihad. Fatah’s naval arm underwent basic training, including diving instruction, in Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Syria. In mid-January, 1975, the group which was comprised of Hader Muhammed, Musa Juma El-Tallka, Muhammed El Masri, Muhammed Mashala, Ahmed Hamid, Ziad Talk El Zrir, Musa Awad and Abu El Lel, commenced training as a team at the Fatah training base at Duma. At the end of the month, the group was transferred to a training base of the naval arm in Latakiye, before being transferred in February to a Fatah base in southern Lebanon. Here the group received final instructions in the art of bargaining for human lives. The group also received instructions on how to conduct the mission. According to the original plan, the group was to split up and operate as two separate units, barricading themselves together with the hostages. They would threaten to blow themselves up if their demands were not fulfilled. Furthermore, the group was given prepared propaganda that would further their aim in preventing a peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel, by making claims which would incriminate Egypt, thus drawing Israel into a reprisal that would make Dr. Kissinger’s efforts worthless (if caught) or, if the mission was successful, the group would claim that it was a Fatah cell from the Israeli-held territories; thereby increasing Arafat’s prestige in these areas. In both cases the propaganda was to conceal the involvement of both Lebanon and Syria. Reality, however, proved otherwise; not only was the operational execution of the plan insufficient, as the group stayed together, but the propaganda stories were discovered and the crew of the mother ship was taken prisoner. While the defense establishment swore that any terrorist penetrating Israel “should pay the full price for this savage and crazy method”, the general Israeli population was struck with anxiety, as the feeling prevailed that there was no place within Israel that would be safe from terrorist attacks. Moreover, the immediate result of the Savoy attack was that Israel’s hotel industry had many cancellations of bookings made by foreign guests and delegations such as the Vienna Burgtheater, which canceled its show which was to take place in Israel on March 13, 1975.
The Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) response to the Savoy attack was to increase naval activities, including the use of missile boats along Israel’s Mediterranean and the Lebanese coasts. Moreover, the IDF used aircrafts to search the Mediterranean for suspicious ships and established coastal observation points, artillery batteries and used reconnaissance units to patrol the beaches in order to prevent further infiltrations from the west. While these security measures prevented some attempts by the Palestinian groups to copy the Savoy operation and led to the surrender of a speed boat team at the Tel Aviv Marina (September 1976) and the capture of mother ships such as the Ginan (March 1979) and Stephanie (March 1979), it did not prevent one of the major terrorist attacks in the history of the State of Israel.
The Coastal Road attack on March 11, 1978 killed a total of 37 Israelis and injured more then 70. Orchestrated by Abu Jihad (Fatah), thirteen terrorists set sail on March 8, 1978 from Tyre, Lebanon on board a mother ship. The plan was for the terrorists to land in two dinghies on the shores of Tel Aviv, taking hostages in order to free five imprisoned terrorists. However, as the captain of the mother ship was afraid of being caught by the Israeli navy approaching Israel, he made the terrorists disembark onto their smaller dinghies further away from the shore then planned. The Captain of the mother ship exploited the navigational ignorance of the terrorist group, in order to secure his own safety. Furthermore, the stormy sea on that day complicated the navigation and caused the death of two of the terrorists. Eventually, eleven terrorists, led by Dalal al-Maghrabi, landed on the Maagan Michael beach, killing six people whom they encountered on the way. After stopping two buses and herding the passengers together into one bus carrying over 70 hostages, most of them women and children, the terrorists headed south towards Tel Aviv, firing at passing cars. Determined to prevent the bus from entering Tel Aviv, the police blocked the road just north of the city and succeeded in halting the vehicle. In the resulting gun battle between the police and terrorists the bus caught fire due to a terrorist grenade. Nine terrorists involved in the attack were killed and two captured. As the Israeli security forces did not know the fate of all the terrorists, for the first time since 1968, they imposed a curfew over the population area between northern Tel Aviv and Nethanya, while thousands of troops and police searched for terrorists thought to be still at large. The curfew was called off the following evening, when it became clear that none had escaped.
Following the Coastal Road attack, Israel launched a wide scope of military actions, in order to prevent Palestinian terrorism from Lebanon. On March 14, 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani. During the seven day offensive, the IDF first captured a belt of land approximately 10 kilometers deep with the aim of pushing Palestinian militant groups, particularly the PLO, away from the border with Israel. The operation was later expanded in order to occupy all the territory, with the exception of Tyre, up to the Litani River. However, despite the superiority of the IDF and the high casualties on both sides, the operation did not destroy the Palestinian terror infrastructure in Lebanon. Israel’s invasions into Lebanon also resulted in UN Resolution 425 and Resolution 426 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the establishment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the mandate to restore peace and sovereignty to Lebanon. As a result of the Litani operation, the terrorist groups were driven out of the immediate border area with Israel, making it more difficult for the terrorist organizations to infiltrate Israel by land. This increased the motivation to enhance the development and education of the terrorists in maritime terror tactics.
C. 1970th – Terror in the Red Sea
Encouraged by their successes, the Palestinian terror organizations continued their attempts to infiltrate Israel from the north. However, as the IDF, and especially the Israeli navy, continuously enhanced their defensive measures along the northern and the Mediterranean Sea borders (the only successful infiltration from Lebanon directly into Israel was the murder of the Haran Family in April1979), the terrorist groups searched for the weak spot in Israel’s coastal defense.
On September 30, 1978, the Israeli Navy intercepted and sunk a bomb-laden freighter, Agius Demetrius, off the Sinai coast near Dahab. This foiled a plot devised by Fatah to attack Israel’s southern coastal city and sea port of Eilat. The terrorists intended to destroy the oil tanks and pumping stations of the Eilat-Askhelon pipeline, by firing 42 Katyusha rockets into the port of Eilat, and then ram the 600-ton boat, crammed with 5-6 tons of explosives (TNT), onto the beach which was crowded with tourists for Israel’s New Year (Rosh Hashanah). The ship's keel was designed to explode on impact with the sand. According to a senior Israeli navy officer, the Agius Demetrius had been fitted with rocket launchers in Syria and with explosives in a Lebanese port. Being under surveillance by the Israeli Security Forces, the ship sailed through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez o where it was intercepted sailing under a Cypriot flag. The seven terrorists aboard the vessel were captured and the heavy armaments were seized before the ship was sunk.
A second example of the advancement in maritime terror tactics by terrorist organizations in general and the PLO in particular, was the attempt to blow up an oil tanker in the Eilat harbor with the help of European divers in March 1997.
D. Lesson Learned – relative calm in the 80s and 90s
The maritime terrorism attacks in the 1970s and early 1980s had direct implications on Israel’s defense doctrines which called for even harder military retaliation against terrorist infrastructures, thereby often invading the sovereign territory of third states. Moreover, these attacks showed the necessity to increase the navy's budget, in order to improve Israel’s existing coastal defense layout and establish new regulations relating to maritime safety. These defensive measures, including aerial reconnaissance beyond Israel’s territorial waters, the purchase of modern and faster patrol boats, and radar stations and improvements in the communication systems, together with offensive counter terrorism operations, increased the difficulties in perpetrating maritime terrorism operations from Lebanese territory. Furthermore, as the UNIFIL appeared to be incompetent in stopping the increasing bombardment of Israel’s northern communities by the Palestinian terrorist organizations, Israel felt impelled to invade Lebanon in order to finally destroy the terrorist infrastructure. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described the situation and U.S. policy as “No sovereign state can tolerate indefinitely the buildup along its borders of a military force dedicated to its destruction and implementing its objectives by periodic shelling and raids. Operation Peace for the Galilee lasted from June 6 to August 23 1982, when the first PLO terrorists were expelled from southern Lebanon and Beirut. By September 1, 1982, over 14,000 armed PLO forces had left Beirut. As most of the Palestinian terror organizations found a new home in Tunisia they also lost the geographical proximity to Israel. This meant that any further maritime attacks by the PLO and its sister organizations had to deal with a greater distance which significantly increased the response time of the Israeli security forces. Moreover, as the remaining members of the Palestinian terror organizations found it increasingly difficult to carry out maritime terrorist infiltrations, even with improved maritime vehicles such as jet-skies, they turned their efforts towards attacking IDF forces in Lebanon itself and in perpetrating attacks against Israel from and in foreign countries. Six major maritime terrorism tactics were employed during the 80s and 90s:
On September 25, 1985 (Yom Kippur) a team of three Palestinian terrorists belonging to PLO’s Force-17 seized an Israeli yacht in the harbor of Larnaca, Cyprus. Accusing their hostages of being Israeli spies, the terrorists first demanded the release of 20 Palestinian terrorists held in Israel in exchange for the three Israelis. Later, however, the terrorists murdered the sailors in cold blood before surrendering to local police.
On 1 October 1985, Israel launched a long range air strike against the PLO headquarters in Tunis, killing over 73 people and wounding about 100 others. At a press conference held by Israeli Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff Moshe Levy, and Air Force Chief Amos Lapidot, Israel announced a new policy where terrorist targets would be attacked wherever they were located and that no terrorist was safe: “As long as PLO terrorism, or any other terrorism, operates against Israel, Israel will fight against it. Israel will determine the manner of combat and the site of the attack in accordance with its own considerations exclusively.”
On October, 7 1985, four members of the PLF seized the Italian passenger ship Achille Lauro with 349 passengers and crew on board, shortly after it sailed from Alexandria to Port Said. Measuring 643 feet long, the Achille Lauro, normally carried up to 900 passengers. Run by the Chandris Company, which offered low-cost cruises throughout the Mediterranean, the Achille Lauro was based in Genoa. On October 3, 1985, some 750 passengers had boarded the cruise ship for a twelve day cruise, calling at ports such as Naples (Italy), Alexandria (Egypt), Port Said (Egypt), Ashdod (Israel), Limassol (Cyprus), and Rhodes (Greece). Fortunately, most of the passengers had debarked at Alexandria for a tour of the Pyramids planning to travel overland to Port Said to continue their voyage. The hijackers demanded the release of 50 members of PLO’s Force-17, including Samir al-Qantari, a PLF member arrested by Israel for the murder of the Haran Family (1979). Heading to the Syrian port of Tartus, the terrorists killed Mr. Leon Klinghoffer, an American Jew, handicapped and bound to a wheelchair. Mr. Klinghoffer, a retired small appliance manufacturer, was celebrating together with his wife, Marilyn, their thirty-eighth marriage anniversary. Later on, two crewmen were forced to throw his body overboard. Syria however did not allow the terrorists to land in Tartus and thus the Achille Lauro returned to Port Said where the terrorists, after lengthy negotiations, agreed to free all hostages and surrender the ship, in return for free passage to Tunisia. Both Arafat (PLO) and Abu Abbas (PLO / PLF), were involved in negotiating the deal. Excerpts of the negotiations, however, later revealed that both men were involved in the planning of the hijacking. Returning to Tunisia, United States warplanes forced the hijacker's jet to land in Italy where most of the terrorists were tried and imprisoned. Claiming not to have sufficient evidence, Abu Abbas, was allowed to leave Italy and found shelter in Yugoslavia. Returning to Tunisia, the government ordered Abu Abbas and the PLF to leave the country. Establishing a new base in Iraq, Abu Abbas moved to Baghdad, where he was arrested in April 2003 by U.S. forces. While most analysts’ believe that the hijacking of the Achille Lauro was a spontaneous act, after having being discovered by a crew member, and that the original target was Ashdod; some analysts believe the original plan called for the hijacking of the cruise ship on the open seas and transferring the hostages to PLF safe houses in Syria, where the hostages would have been held until Israel released the prisoners. PLF’s internal documentation committee however describes the hijacking as the Ashdod Port Operation, giving more weight to the first explanation:
"When the Zionist enemy carried out an air strike against the Palestinian HQ in Hamam al-Shatt in Tunis in October 1, 1985, the Front reacted to this aggression by attempting a sea landing in Ashdod port... this operation was unsuccessful, forcing the Front's fighters to change the original plan... once they were uncovered on the ship taking them.”
On April 25, 1988, the first ever maritime suicide operation occurred in the Lebanese arena. Perpetrated by a member of Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), the suicide bomber steered a fishing boat loaded with explosives near an Israeli naval vessel and detonated it. No casualties or damage were reported by the Israeli navy. This attack came seven years after the first suicide bombing perpetrated by the Iraqi Shiite Dawa Party on the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in December 1981. Until 1997, five maritime suicide attacks against Israeli naval vessels were registered. All attacks were carried out against Israeli boats patrolling the Lebanese coast and were carried out by either Palestinian (PFLP-GC, PFLP, Fatah etc.) or secular Shiite Lebanese (Amal) organizations.
On May 30, 1990 Israeli security forces foiled an attempt by PLF terrorists to infiltrate Israel from the sea near Gaash and Nitzanim. Code named Al-Quds, the 16 terrorists departed from Benghazi, Libya on May 27, 1990 on a Libyan ship. According to PLF leader Abu Abbas, the preparation for this operation had taken nearly three years and cost about three million dollars. Sent by Abbas in October 1988, Muhammad Ahmed al-Hamad Yousef, the deputy commander of the operation to Libya, and the rest of the raiding party, underwent intensive training, including the use of rubber boats and speedboats and being trained in firing from ship to shore. Abu Abbas and Abu Kassem (Commander of the PLF naval forces) met them every four to five months to monitor their progress, but his deputy Abu Ez was with them all the time. The plan involved shelling hotels and houses from the sea, using 107 mm Katyusha rockets, 23 mm cannons, and machine guns. Furthermore, they were to enter the Sheraton hotel and kill everyone they encountered. According to Abu Abbas the operation was in revenge for the killing of Palestinians in Rishon-le-Zion on May 20 1990. In order to prevent detection by Israeli aerial reconnaissance, Abu Ez and Abu Kassem ordered the raiders not to go on deck during the day time while sailing on the mother ship. According to the plan, the terrorists disembarked from their mother ship on May 30, 1999 in six speedboats. Made out of fiber glass and equipped with two engines, the speedboats could reach twice the speed of Israel’s Dabur patrol boats. Moreover, five days before the operation, the six speedboats were painted with a special paint in order to decrease their detection by radar. One of the boats further served as a tanker for the other boats. The terrorists were split up and sailed on separate boats called: Hittin, Mislon, Hatij, Castel, Port Said and Alfao.
However, the difficulties started as one of the speedboats sank while being lowered into the sea. While the mother ship turned back towards Libya, the terrorists continued with five speedboats. Later on, two more boats broke down, the tanker-speedboat also turned back toward Port Said and the 16 terrorists continued their journey on the remaining two speedboats. While one boat headed north-eastward with five terrorists and finally was intercepted by the Israeli navy some 40 km off Gaash, the second speedboat headed south-eastward toward Nitzanim. Alarmed by the capture of the first boat near Gaash, the second boat was located by a reconnaissance plane and a Dabur patrol boat, which however was unable to engage the speedboat. The terrorists reached the shore and started to run eastward, constantly monitored by the IDF jet. IDF combat helicopters engaged the terrorists, killing four of them while seven terrorists surrendered to the arriving infantry forces.
Following the failed plot, the PLO announced through Kaled al-Hassan on June 4, 1990, that the PLF operation was utilizing the wrong technique “because everyone knows that Israel has stated that its radar lab can scan as far as Malta. From the technical point of view it was an act of madness.” Hassan also said that Abu Abbas had no right to launch such an operation and give the enemy a bigger weapon against the PLO, which had not announced until then the annulment of its peace process. Abbas on the other hand stated that the PLF had not informed Arafat (PLO), about the operation in advance and was not obliged to do so. Furthermore, Abbas pointed out that the main target of the operation was a recreational center for senior military officers. President Bush announced on June 19, 1990, that he was suspending the ongoing PLO-U.S. dialogue until the PLO denounced the attempted attack.
On May 30, 1992 four Palestinian terrorists from the PLF swam five kilometers from Jordan to Eilat pulling rafts loaded with weapons. One of the water-proof containers began to leak in the water which resulted in one of terrorists drowning. A second container leaked and had to be cut loose. The remaining two terrorist reached Coral Beach where they killed an unarmed Israeli security guard and attempted to massacre tourists, but were prevented by police and army troops.
The Israeli ship Jrush Shalom was bombed on December 25, 1993 while it was docked at Eilat. No fatalities were reported, however, eleven people suffered injuries. The Palestine National Liberation Movement, a Fatah fraction, claimed responsibility.
V. Maritime terror developments since 2000
With the signing of the joint Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP) on September 13, 1993, Israel agreed to transfer government in the Gaza strip to the Palestinian National Authority (PA). Allowing members of the PLO to return to Israel (Gaza and the West bank) had several complications. First, it allowed returning terrorists with special maritime skills to reduce the geographical distance to possible targets within Israel. Second, the continuous peace talks presented ample opportunity for Sunni Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to sabotage possible peace plans. Moreover, the expulsion of the Palestinian groups from the Lebanese arena under Operation Peace for the Galilee gave ample opportunity for Shiite groups, first the secular Amal, and later the Islamic Hezbollah to take their place in attacking Israel. Due to Israel’s developed coastal defense system along the Northern and Mediterranean coast, terrorist organizations similar to the ones of the 1980s and 1990s turned their efforts towards attacking IDF forces in Gaza itself and to carry out attacks against Israel from and in foreign countries.
A. Gaza and the Maritime Activity Zones (MAZ)
Having experienced maritime Fedayeen raids (1950s and 1960s) and smuggling operations, the Gaza Strip presents a unique concern for Israeli maritime security. Documented in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (May 4, 1994), the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip is governed by a series of Maritime Activity Zones (MAZ). Implemented to thwart seaborne terrorist infiltration and smuggling efforts, the MAZ are composed of three Maritime Activity Zones labeled K, L and M. The two outer zones (K, M) are sterile security zones that extend 20 nautical miles off the coast of the Gaza Strip. Zone K extends in the sea from the coast in the northern part of the sea of Gaza and 1.5 nautical miles wide southwards, while Zone M extends in the sea from the coast and one nautical mile wide from the Egyptian waters. The area in between running the length of the Gaza coast is referred to as zone L. Both Maritime Activity Zones “K” and “M” are for the exclusive use of the Israeli Navy while MAZ L remains open for Palestinian fishing, recreation, and economic activities. As documented in Article XI of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, several restrictions are enforced within zone L (prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza in 2005).
Commercial fishing boats, for example, were restricted to a maximum speed of 15 knots while recreational boats were restricted from operating motors stronger than 10 horsepower and were forbidden from being more than three-and-a-half miles off shore. Personal watercrafts such as Jet-Skis were not allowed to operate. Foreign vessels approaching zone L from the open sea were not allowed within 12 nautical miles of the coast without prior approval. All vessels were banned from carrying weapons.
The Palestinian Police Authority were to allowed up to eight control boats with a displacement of up to 30 tons and speeds less then 20 knots. The control boats were allowed to be equipped with weapons up to a 7.62 caliber. The Palestinian Police boats were allowed to operate up to six nautical miles from the Gaza Coast within zone L, in special circumstances and approval by the Israeli Navy up to 12 nautical miles. All Palestinian boats had to carry identification markings.
On any given night, 400-600 Palestinian fishing vessels navigate the MAZ L and identifying potential terrorists is a task that often overwhelms Israeli Navy forces assigned the mission of patrolling the MAZs.
B. Gaza – Maritime Suicide Operations
On November 23, 2002, two Palestinian terrorists from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) attempted the first maritime suicide attack on an Israeli naval vessel since the Palestinian Intifada began in September 2000. Sailing with an explosive-laden fishing boat into Israeli-controlled waters off northern Gaza (MAZ K), the terrorist waited for an Israeli patrol boat to examine the situation. Approached by INS Daboor - an Israeli 20-m costal patrol boat - in order to warn it to turn back, the terrorist blew up the boat killing themselves and injuring four sailors. PIJ’s military branch, the Al-Quds Brigades, identified the suicide bombers as Jamal Ali Ismail, 21, from al-Breij, and Mohammed Samih al-Masri, 19, from Beit Hanoun. Both towns are in the West Bank. While the PIJ claimed that the suicide bomber succeeded in ramming their explosives-laden boat into the Israeli patrol boat, sinking it, and that an Israeli rescue boat retrieved the four casualties, the Israeli navy said the patrol boat was damaged but made it back to shore. Following the attack, the IDF closed the Mediterranean waters off Gaza, barring all Palestinian fishing.
A second example of an attempt to strike an Israeli naval vessel was initiated by Hamas on January 17, 2003. The Israeli patrol boat INS Daboor observed a life raft within the Gaza’s northern maritime security zone (MAZ K), 2.1 nautical miles from Dugit. Following procedures the Israeli sailors tried to establish communication, as they did not receive any reply, the soldiers fired a warning shot into the air and afterwards towards the raft. Guided by a suicide bomber the booby-trapped raft subsequently exploded.
C. Gaza – Maritime Infiltrations
Following the assassination of Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin on March 22, 2004, the terrorist organization vowed to avenge Israel in graphic terms: "a strong, earthshaking response to make the sons of monkeys and pigs taste a painful death." During the following days several terrorist attacks were foiled because of heightened security measures in the Gaza Strip. On March 25, 2004, Hamas launched a maritime infiltration attempt at Tel Katifa at the northern end of the Gush Katif settlement block. Three armed Palestinians wearing diving gear and armed with an RPG rocket launcher, Kalashnikov rifles and grenades emerged under cover of darkness from the Mediterranean. Firing shots and RPG’s at the army post guarding the settlement the two terrorists were killed and a third was wounded and fled during the ensuing 15-minute gun battle.
This, however, was not the first attempt to infiltrate a Jewish community within the Gaza Strip since 2000. On June 8, 2002, a navy control post in the northern Gaza Strip, near Dugit, identified at night time two terrorists swimming towards the coast. Opening fire, IDF soldiers killed at least one terrorist who was later found dead at the beach. The terrorist was wearing a bag containing four fragmentation grenades, a Kalashnikov assault rifle and four ammunition clips. A second attempt was made in August 2002. Terrorists attempting to infiltrate the Dugit settlement were spotted by an IDF patrol and killed before reaching shore. The latest attempt to infiltrate a settlement in the Gaza Strip (Dugit) was on November 9, 2004, when a Dabur coastal patrol boat discovered a terrorist swimming towards the Israeli shore. Not reacting to the warning shots and requests to stop, the terrorist was killed by the soldiers.
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D. Gaza –Smuggling Operations
With the start of the second Intifada, Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza made an enormous effort to not only improve the quality of their terror tactics and home-made weapons, but also to import large amounts of quality weapons, including anti-tank rockets and Strela antiaircraft missiles. The Maritime transportation system with the ability to transport large amounts of weapons at the same time and Gaza’s geographic location near the Mediterranean, made maritime smuggling the preferred method. Furthermore, Iran’s interest to further the Intifada by transferring arms to the PA, made maritime smuggling - whether directly from its territory (Karine-A) or indirectly from Lebanon using its affiliated terrorist organizations the PFLP-GC and the Hezbollah (Santorini & Abu Hassan) - a necessary mean.
On May 6, 2001, the Israeli navy captured the Santorini fishing vessel carrying weapons en route from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip. The ship had set off from the port of Tripoli in northern Lebanon, and was headed towards international waters to a rendezvous in the Gaza Strip, until it was intercepted by an Israeli missile boat 150 miles west of Tyre in international waters. The suspicisous vessel had been spotted by an aerial inspection plane. Santorini’s crew consisted of four members of Ahmed Jibril's Damascus based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). According to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Santorini and another boat, the Calypso-2, made three successful smuggling operations of which the first was in November 2000. According to the interrogation protocol of Dib Muhammad Rashid Awita, the Santorini was bought in the Syrian port of Awad as “Abd Al Hadi”. As the boat suited their needs, the boat was registered as Lebanese. Awita furthermore informed the Israeli security services that the weapons- which were later found carefully wrapped in waterproof packaging and stored in barrels ready to be dropped into the sea at a designated point off the Gaza coast, where they would be retrieved by boats manned by Palestinian security services - were transferred from Syria via the Damascus-Beirut road in a passenger bus with Syrian registration numbers to Zahlah and then to Tripoli in North Lebanon. The terrorists the transferred the weapons onto the Santorini at the bay of Jiyah while 25 Hizbollah members secured the shore and the roads leading to it. On March 23, 2003, an IDF Military Court sentenced the Lebanese crew of the Santorini to ten years in prison, and the Captain for 12 years for their role in the weapons smuggling attempt. One crew member was acquitted of all charges in December 2002. In an interview, Ahmed Jibril stated that the Santorini operation was "not the first shipment, nor will it be the last."
Proof that the Santorini affair was officially sanctioned by the Palestinian Authority, as part of a larger maritime arms smuggling effort, came in the early morning of January 3, 2002. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) naval commandos in an operation codenamed Operation Noah’s Ark seized the 4,000 ton freighter Karine A on its way to the Suez Canal, some 300 nautical miles off the Israeli coast. The operation to capture the freighter included both the Navy and the Air force. When brought to Israel’s southern port of Eilat, Karine A’s shipment revealed 50 tons of diverse weapons featuring both 122 mm and 107 mm Katyusha rockets, 80 mm and 120 mm mortar shells, various types of anti-tank missiles, anti-tank mines, sniper rifles, Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition. The shipment also included dinghies and diving equipment, which would have facilitated seaborne terrorist attacks from Gaza against Israeli coastal cities. Moreover, according to the IDF, the 122 mm Katyushas could have threatened Ashkelon and other coastal cities. According to Israeli naval intelligence, Adel Mughrabi, PA’s main weapons purchaser contacted Iranian and Hezbollah liaison officers; among them Imad Mughniyeh in October 2000 in order to negotiate the arms deal worth $2 million (excluding the ships necessary for transport). Mughrabi, with the help of PA Naval Police commander Juma'a Ghali and his deputy, Fathi Razem, purchased Karine A in Lebanon. Manned by a crew of Egyptians and Jordanians, who were unaware of the voyage’s purpose, Karine A sailed to Sudan, where it was loaded with regular cargo for Dubai. It was in Sudan that Adel Mughrabi, and four Palestinian naval officers, among them Col. Omar Akawi, the future captain, took responsibility of the ship. Discharging their cargo in Dubai, the Karine A headed towards the Iranian island of Kish where it linked up with an Iranian ferry and 80 water-tight crates filled with weapons were transferred to it. The crates were produced in Iran and were equipped with a special configurable system that determines how deep they are submerged. In preparation of the smuggling tour, Hezbollah trained one of the Palestinian crewmen, Salim Mahmud al Sankari, who was a captain in the Palestinian navy, in deep sea diving and operating the device. According to Sankari, the Lebanese trainer was also present at the handover of the weapons for additional training. Sailing towards Egypt, the ship had to divert to the port of Hodeida in Yemen due to technical problems. After crossing the Suez Canal, the ship was supposed to meet with three smaller ships that were purchased in advance and to unload the weapons onto them. According to the plan, the smaller ships were to leave the weapons near El Arish in Gaza, wherefrom the weapons were to be taken by the commander of the Palestinian Naval Police Juma'a Ghali and his deputy Fathi Razem. According to Mughrabi, Fuad Shubaki, head of the PA General Security's Financial Directorate handled the financial operation to pay for the ships' operation while Hezbollah paid for the weapons. However, it is the assessment of the Israeli MFA that Hezbollah did not have the necessary means and that the deal was financed by Iran.
On January 12, 2002, Israeli naval boats and members of Shayetet 13 attacked a Palestinian naval police base in Gaza City, destroying two patrol boats in retaliation for the Karine A smuggling operation.
On May 20, 2003, Israeli naval commandos intercepted an Egyptian fishing trawler approximately 100 nautical miles west of Rosh Hanikra. Abu Hassan was heading for the Gaza Strip from Lebanon, loaded with five metal boxes containing 122-mm rocket fuses, other weapons, and bomb-making components, including a radio activation system and electronic delay units. Among the six crew members, who mostly were not aware of the ship's mission, was Hamad Masalem Mussa Abu Amra, a Hezbollah bomb expert, who boarded the ship with 36 CDs which gave detailed instructions on how to manufacture different kinds of bombs, explosives and rockets, as well as advice on where a suicide bomber should stand in a bus to cause maximum fatalities. According to Israeli officials, this was the first incident of hi-tech smuggling which showed that the Palestinians were running short of bomb experts. It is believed that the operation was organized by deputy Naval Police chief Fathi Razam and Adel Almairibi. Both were already involved in the Karine A episode. The smuggling attempt occurred at a time when PA Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas attempted to reach an agreement with Israel regarding the road map. Since the Abu Hassan episode, several other attempts to smuggle weapons through the sea were prevented by the Israeli navy such as on May 9 and 14, 2006.
E. Terror at the Gulf of Eilat
On August 17, 2002, Jordanian security services reacted to a tip by a concerned citizen and arrested four Saudi nationals who crossed the Saudi-Jordanian border by swimming through the Gulf of Aqaba. Intending to continue swimming until reaching Eilat, the terrorists intended to conduct a terrorist operation.
Later that year, on October 16, 2002, the Israeli newspaper Maariv reported that Hamas military wing, Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, planned to bomb a passenger ship in the port of Eilat. The plan foresaw the use of a Palestinian suicide bomber with an Israeli identity card to smuggle a video camera filled with explosives on a local tourist ship. Eilat was chosen due to the fact that no suicide bombing had been perpetrated in that city until that date. In preparation for the attack, the brother of the suicide bomber was to conduct the essential intelligence on possible targets and buy a ticket for the suicide bomber. The plan was disrupted by the arrest of a senior leader of the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades. This led to the arrest of a resident of Sawakhara al-Sharkia, who -under interrogation - exposed the described plan and gave up the identity of the brothers who later were arrested.
F. Ashdod Port Attack
Ten people were killed and 16 were wounded at 17:00 on Sunday afternoon, March 14, 2004, in a double suicide bombing at the Ashdod Port. The two Palestinian suicide bombers, both 18, hid behind a false wall in a 15 meter container and succeeded in infiltrating the Israeli Port of Ashdod. Emerging from the shipping container wearing army uniforms, the two split up. The first suicide bomber blew himself up close to a group of workers standing next to a machine repair workshop, killing five people. The second terrorist detonated his bomb moments later near the outer fence on the sidewalk in a storage and refrigeration area. Hamas and Fatah (Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades) claimed responsibility for the attack. The bombers were identified as two 18-year-olds, Nabil Massoud and Mahmoud Salem, from the Jabalya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. The port of Ashdod is considered to be one of the most sensitive strategic sites in Israel, and contains a number of bromine tanks and other hazardous chemical storage facilities. The attack showed that even the most stringent security regulations can be broken. For example, not only was the container inspected at the Karni Crossing but also at Ashdod port. Both times the human eye even with the aid of technology equipment failed to detect the false wall. Abdel Aziz Atallah - an officer in the Palestinian preventative security service – was arrested in a joint operation between Israel’s internal security service (GSS) and IDF forces on June 6, 2004. Atallah was responsible for arranging the release of the containers from the crossing. During his interrogation, Atallah noted that both Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades viewed the Karni Crossing as a weak point in Israel’s defensive measures around Gaza and therefore had prepared for Atallah to smuggle another pair of suicide bombers through it into Israel. Moreover, Hamas, assisted by Atallah, was planning to purchase trucks and establish a company for transporting containers from the Gaza Strip into Israel, using it as a guise for smuggling terrorists into Israel. In response to the Ashdod attack, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon cancelled his immediate plans for peace negotiations with the Palestinians, maintaining that “they are doing nothing to stop attacks against Israelis”.
G. Attack on an Israeli cruise ship in Turkey
Five cruise ships carrying some 5,000 Israeli tourists have been diverted from Turkish ports to Cyprus following the arrest of Syrian national Louai Sakka, 32, on August 6, 2005 in Diyarbakir, south-east Turkey. According to Turkish intelligence, Sakra was planning to attack Israeli cruise ships in international waters with speedboats packed with explosives. Born as Loa'i Mohammad Haj Bakr al-Saqa, Louai Sakka also used aliases under the names of Lian bin Mohammed Saka, Abu Mohammed al-Suri, Abu Haya al-Suri, and Ala al-Din. Accused of being an Al Qaeda operative, known as Aladdin al-Suri, serving between the group's leaders and suicide bombers, Sakka hid his tracks by using an array of fake IDs, undergoing plastic surgery and finally faking his death in Fallujah, Iraq, in late 2004. Sakka didn’t surface until August 2005 when an accidental explosion forced him to flee his safe house. Louai Sakka was also wanted in Turkey for financing the 2003 bombings of two synagogues, the British Consulate and the local headquarters of HSBC bank in Istanbul which killed 58 people. Sakka proclaimed that he does not have any regrets: "I was going to attack Israeli ships. If they come, my friends will attack them." Moreover, according to Sakka’s interrogation transcript, his mission to attack the Israeli cruise ships was financed by Taliban chief Mullah Omar, who allegedly gave him $50,000.
Suspects tried in Turkey for the 2003 bombings said they were originally planning to attack an Israeli cruise ship in the Mediterranean. According to a court indictment, the terrorist cell had prepared a pickup truck with 30 bags containing 50 kilograms of ammonium nitrate-fuel oil slurry each and 10 five-kilogram boxes of explosives connected to a detonator which would be controlled by the suicide driver. In November 2003, the suicide bomber was sent to the Mediterranean port of Antalya, where he waited for eight days for an Israeli cruise ship to dock. When the cruise ship failed to call at the port of Antalya due to inclement weather, the suicide bomber returned to Istanbul, where he attacked the British Consulate General, killing 18 people, including the British Consul General while wounding hundreds of others and demolishing part of the consulate building.
H. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah’s use of Rockets against Ships
On August 19, 2005, Al Qaeda of the Two Rivers attempted to strike two U.S. amphibious warships - the USS Ashland and the USS Kearsarge moored in Jordan’s only seaport Aqaba - using three Katyusha rockets. The Al Qaeda cell consisted of four members lead by Iraqi Mohammed Hamid Hussein. The cell consisted also of Syrian national Mohammed Hassan Abdullah al-Sihly and his two sons Abdullah and Abdul-Rahman. While Abdullah and Abdul-Rahman al-Sihly entered Jordan together with Hussein through the eastern desert border at al-Karama on Aug. 6 using forged Iraqi passports, Mohammed Hassan Abdullah al-Sihly was living in Amman. Once in Aqaba, the terrorists rented a hilltop warehouse overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba where the rockets were assembled and mounted on rocket launchers. It is believed that the cell smuggled the rockets from Iraq into Jordan hiding them in the modified gasoline tank of their Mercedes. By controlling the launch of the rockets by a timing device, three of the terrorists were able to escape to Iraq prior to the attack, while Mohammed Hassan Abdullah al-Sihly was arrested on August 22, 2005 by Jordanian security forces. Two rockets overshot the warships, hitting a Jordanian military warehouse and killing its guard while a third rocket landed in Eilat, Israel, but did not cause any major damages. Both amphibious ships left Aqaba shortly after the failed attack. On August 23, 2005, Al Qaeda of the Two Rivers, then led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the attack Aqaba, saying it was chosen because of the status of the city as a center for tourism and the media attention a successful attack would have generated.
Following the abduction of two I |
