

The Islamic State's Web Jihadi Magazine Dabiq and Rumiyyah. More than just Propaganda

Dr. Eitan Azani and Francesco Dotti

July 2021

Abstract

The present research focuses on the study of the Web jihadi magazines developed by the Islamic State from 2014 until 2017. This study analyses the content of the Islamic State's magazines Dabiq and Rumiya in relation to the events occurred on the ground both within the core Caliphate and in the global arena. The goal of this research through the parallel analysis of the history of the Islamic State and the magazines' content is to assert whether the narrative of these two products is just propaganda or provides also information on the strategic thinking of the Islamic State's leadership.

KEYWORDS Terrorism; Islamic State; Magazines; Strategy

Introduction

The Islamic State has suffered significant setbacks on the ground, yet has demonstrated the ability to adapt to the constant evolving strategic environment. Due to the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Syria, where the underlying conditions that allowed IS to emerge and grow are still present, and the several networks established around the world, the Islamic State will likely maintain the capacity to align its military and information operations (IO) in the coming years and to retain physical, but more clandestine, sanctuaries and command and control capability in Iraq, Syria, and its 'provinces' (Gambhir, 2016). IS' information operations' campaign has supported multiple objectives, including control over territory, coercion of populations, and recruitment. This campaign has enabled IS' survival and execution of international terror attacks on one hand and the delivery of a detailed narrative of IS' goals, 'legitimate' claims, religious interpretations, and historical reviews on the other. All of this gave life to the so called 'Virtual Caliphate', a radicalized community organized online that empowers the global Salafi-jihadi movement and that could operate and survive independently of IS' core Caliphate.

In this context, the Web Jihadi magazines 'Dabiq' and 'Rumiyah', developed by the Islamic State from 2014 until the end of 2017, represent one of the most relevant and useful means adopted by IS to support those multiple objectives mentioned above within the virtual domain.

By reading Dabiq's and Rumiyah's content it seems pretty clear that the two magazines reflect IS' mind-set and mirror the events occurring on the ground. What is less clear is whether the magazines' content is coherent with IS' strategic approach. Do such products reflect also IS' strategic behaviour in addition to ideology and propaganda? Do their narrative provide hints on how IS' priorities and strategies evolve and change over the time? In conclusion, is it possible to

extract useful information and to rely on IS' magazines, in addition to other sources, in order to increase the level of predictability of the Islamic State's actions on the ground?

The purpose of this research is to identify and trace the process of IS' strategic behaviour through the analysis of IS' online magazines, not just to list and discuss how IS' strategy evolved over the time. Therefore, this study on IS' Web Jihadi magazines Dabiq and Rumiyaah will try to answer the following research question: Does the content of Islamic State's magazines provide operational information regarding IS' strategic behaviour and reflect changes within IS' strategic environment?

The assumption of the present work is that some events occurring on the ground, both locally (Iraq and Syria, the core of the Caliphate) and globally, impacted IS' narrative, and a careful analysis of the narrative can provide hints on how the Islamic State moves, changes strategy, and adapts to the constant evolving environment.

The first part of this study highlights the main strategic phases IS went through from 2014 until 2017. These strategic phases were identified thanks to an historical review of major events occurred in that period both within the core Caliphate and abroad. The analysis, supported by the open source tool 'TagCrowd', subsequently moved to the content of the 15 Dabiq's issues (released from July 2014 until July 2016) and the 13 Rumiyaah's issues (released from September 2016 until September 2017). For both Dabiq and Rumiyaah, only the English versions were taken into account in the present analysis. Finally, a comparison of the changes within the magazines' narrative and the events occurred on the ground was conducted. This last analysis allowed to assert whether or not the major themes discussed in Dabiq and Rumiyaah not only reflect what happened in Iraq, Syria and abroad, but also to check if the themes touched by the magazines provide some hints regarding changes of strategy by IS in the near future.

Literature on Islamic State's Web Jihadi Magazines

The biggest part of the current research on IS' Web Jihadi magazines has focused on the analysis of the overall content and structure of the magazines. Julian Droogan, Shane Peattie (2017), Brandon Colas (2016) and David G. Kibble deeply analysed Dabiq's and Rumiya's content, structure, and the way they present IS' ideology to its constituency.

The field of study of Dabiq and Rumiya's communication strategy is very important as well as highlighted by Michael G. Zekulin (2018), Haroro J. Ingram (2016), Harleen K. Gambhir (2015), Julian Droogan and Shane Peattie (2017). This research field focused on the Islamic State's ability to translate its ideology in easy and understandable messages for the wide range of readers around the world in order to mobilize sympathizers and supporters for a call to arms.

A third interesting field of study of IS' Web Jihadi magazines, as highlighted by Agathe Christien (2016) and Claire Berlinsky (2016), is that one which focuses on social and individual identity dynamics exploited by Dabiq and Rumiya. While the first two fields of study provide knowledge on the characteristics of IS' ideology and its communication strategy, the sociological and psychological studies answer to the question 'why' IS' propaganda showed to be so effective in influencing young European Muslims.

The studies of Shannon C. Houck, Meredith A. Repkeb, Lucian Gideon Conway (2017) and Haroro J. Ingram (2017) contributed also to the fourth field of research of Web Jihadi magazines, which compares IS' and Al Qaeda's propaganda.

While all the present literature provides answers to the issues related to ideology, communication strategy, operational content, and psychological incentives in joining a terrorist organization, there is a field which has not been studied enough: How IS' online texts are linked

to the evolving situation on the ground. By focusing on how the magazines' narrative change when specific relevant events occur on the ground can help to predict how the Islamic State could change its strategy and which next steps it could take.

The Strategic Phases of the Islamic State from 2014 until 2017

According to Eitan Azani (2017), it is possible to identify six main phases within IS' operational campaign, which summarize the changes of IS' strategies following the events occurred both within the Caliphate and abroad.

The first phase is the *strategic offensive*, from June until August 2014, when IS launched a major multi-front assault in Iraq and partially also in Syria (Reese & ISW Iraq Team, 2014). This campaign was aimed to give the organization control of terrain (Lewis & Ali, 2014) which actually happened. Overall, during this phase the Islamic State conducted extraordinary, well-designed, rapid military operations mostly in northern Iraq (Lewis & Ali, 2014). Tomáš Kaválek (2015, p.6) defines the period between May and June 2014 as the 'conventional' stage of the Islamic State, which is the tipping point where an insurgent actor is able to successfully conduct conventional warfare against counter-insurgent actors.

The second phase is the *end of offensive campaign*, from August until September 2014. In this stage, the Islamic State consolidated the territory it conquered during the previous months and began preparing for the next phase, more oriented towards facing a raising number of enemies, and holding ground while keeping expanding.

The third phase is the *strategic defence*, from November 2014 until March 2015. During fall 2014, the Islamic State reached the peak of territorial control, covering approximately 58.372 km² in Iraq and 47.497 km² in Syria (Jones et al., 2017, p.20) IS also established formal provinces

in Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria during 2014 and in the Caucasus, Afghanistan, and Nigeria during 2015 through co-optation of existing militant networks (Jones et al., 2017, p. 26-28). With the intensification of the US-led coalition air strikes in 2015 and the increased gains by rivals like Jabhat al-Nusra since February 2015, the Islamic State shifted its tactics, relying on opportunistic attacks on its opponents, but still attempting to expand its geographic presence (Khatib, 2015, p. 17). As wanted by the Islamic State, the increasing military pressure of the anti-IS coalition was exploited to validate IS' narrative that it was engaged in a defensive jihad in order to protect Muslims from the Western aggressions, and to boost recruitment by escalating its calls for *hijra* (migration to the Caliphate) and *bayah* (pledging allegiance to the Islamic State).

The fourth phase is the *spring campaign*, which started on March 2015. During this phase, the Islamic State retreated from some areas in Iraq and began regrouping in Syria. The group's emergence as the strongest jihadist actor in the region was paralleled by increased losses by the Syrian regime. During 2015, Assad's forces focused on defending core areas in Sahel area and Damascus (Khatib, 2015, p. 20). This shift had been translated into the Syrian government's abandonment of areas like Idlib and Palmyra, which resulted in a vacuum subsequently filled by IS.

The fifth phase is the *static defence*, which started from May 2015. Despite tactical retreats in October and November, the Islamic State found itself in a relatively secure position and it faced limited meaningful threats to its core (GPF Staff, 2015). On the Syrian front, IS was relatively threatened by Assad's forces, which were still more focused on countering the rebel militias. On the Iraqi front, the only threat to IS was represented by Kurdish groups, supported by anti-IS coalition's airstrikes. The situation on the ground began changing towards the end of 2015, when the Islamic State, pressured from several directions, started losing territory.

Finally, the sixth phase is the *strategic hardship*, which began in 2016. During this stage, the Islamic State suffered considerable losses of territory within the core of the Caliphate and began intensifying attacks in the West while reducing those in Iraq, Syria, and the provinces (Jones et al., 2017, p. 33).

The correlation between the loss of ground by IS and the increased number of terrorist attacks in the West can be explained as the attempt of the Islamic State to shore up the morale by proving to its members and sympathizers that it was bringing the war into its enemies' houses and inflicting more damage than it was receiving (Jones et al., 2017, p. 177). Parallel to the loss of territory, by middle 2016 the Islamic State saw a fall in the numbers of foreign fighters by as much as 90 percent (Gibbons-Neff, 2016). Such deep decrease was probably due to a combination of causes, such as the increase of anti-IS coalition efforts in Syria and Iraq, the raising difficulties for foreign fighters to travel and reach the two countries, but also the increased focus of IS towards the West and Europe, which led IS operatives and sympathizers to take action in their homelands. While switching the focus on Europe, the Islamic State showed a change of tactics both on the Syrian and Iraqi fronts as well starting from summer 2016. IS indeed began to switch to guerrilla operations against ISF and the Syrian army and to attack the 'soft bellies' areas in Iraq and Syria, with the aim of forcing its opponents to dislocate forces (Anagnostos & ISW Iraq Team, 2016), establishing networks within the towns recently lost, and spreading feeling of insecurity within the population. Such tactics are noticeably different from those adopted by the Islamic State during the conventional phase in 2014, when it rapidly conquered territory mostly through frontal attacks.

Therefore, a seventh strategic phase can be identified in addition to the six already mentioned. Such phase can be defined as *Strategic Hardship – Shift to Guerrilla Warfare*, which

goes from the beginning of 2017 until the end of the year. In addition to focusing more on the European theatre, IS was noticed to expand its range of activities also in areas like Afghanistan and Libya, suggesting the intention of the leadership to continue the jihad from those provinces where IS previously established formal affiliates.

The seven strategic phases mentioned above can be visualized in Annex 1 and Annex 2 at the end of the article, together with the main events that affected IS both locally and globally and the issues of Dabiq and Rumiya outlined chronologically. These tables can help to follow visually the discussion of Dabiq's and Rumiya's content in relation to the evolution of IS' strategic situation.

The Local and Global Fronts

While during 2014 Islamic State's violence was almost solely concentrated in Iraq and Syria, 2015 represents a turning point in which attacks in the West increased drastically (Jones et al., 2017, p. 33-34). Such attacks conducted out of the Caliphate's core territory are considered part of the so called 'global campaign' carried out by the Islamic State. Within IS' global campaign framework, four main 'rings' can be identified since the establishment of the Caliphate in 2014. Within the first ring, the 'core terrain', IS attempted to remain and expand its territorial control in Syria and Iraq. In the second ring, the so called 'near abroad ring', IS sought to weaken the Middle East's power centres of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The third ring, similar to the second, consisted of other Muslim majority countries where IS tried to expand through attack networks and, when possible, ground operations. The fourth and last ring is made by the non-Muslim majority world, or the 'far abroad'. Here IS conducted spectacular attacks in order to polarize the communities and radicalize their minority Muslim populations (Cafarella & Pavlik, 2017).

IS began its campaigns out of Iraq and Syria and in the Muslim world as early as late 2013, when the IS' external operations wing in Syria began to recruit, train, and deploy foreign fighters to conduct spectacular attacks in Europe and across the Middle East and North Africa. In 2015, IS increased its efforts on the Muslim world and 'far abroad' after reaching its apex in Iraq and Syria by seizing the cities of Ramadi and Palmyra.

By the beginning of 2016, the Islamic State kept projecting an image of continued expansion through its regional campaign within the near abroad ring, such as in Libya (Coyne & Gambhir, 2016). Overall, the Islamic State used its growing presence and influence in other countries like Libya and Afghanistan so to establish additional regional bases in which it could implement social control and expand the Caliphate (Forrest & DeKold, 2016), mostly when it began losing ground in Syria and Iraq in 2017. In this regard, the expansion of the Caliphate in territories other than Syria and Iraq can be understood as part of the overall IS' global strategy of granting the Islamic State additional logistical hubs to receive and train foreign fighters as it was becoming more difficult for them to join the organization in Iraq and Syria (Cafarella & Pavlik, 2017).

On the Western front, or the far abroad ring, the number of attacks carried out by Islamic State's operatives and sympathizers began increasing by 2015. Among the most notable attacks occurred during the year, it is possible to mention the attack at the offices of the newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the suicide bombing at the Bataclan concert hall in Paris, in addition to the mass shooting in San Bernardino. During 2016, Islamic State's violence continued to expand into the West with the attacks in Brussels, Orlando, Nice, Berlin and Istanbul. By intensifying its attacks in the European soil, the Islamic State sought to accomplish two main goals: First of all to punish those countries that were attacking it in Iraq and Syria; second, to exacerbate internal tension

within Europe thanks to the raise of defensive requirements within European states, the spreading of fear, and the subsequent economical damage resulting from such context (Gambhir, Coyne and ISW's Counterterrorism Team, 2016). Overall, the Islamic State's strategy towards Europe aimed at destabilizing the continent through polarization by provoking state and social backlash against European Muslim communities, encouraging therefore radicalization and jihadist recruitment within the latter (Gambhir, Coyne and ISW's Counterterrorism Team, 2016). Such goal was part of a bigger strategy, defined by IS itself as 'destroying the grey-zone', those areas where Muslims have not yet been forced to choose sides. Therefore, the large number of IS attacks in Europe were not to be considered as 'desperate' reaction to the occurring losses in Iraq and Syria by the Caliphate, but rather as a continuation of its global objectives in spite of them (Forrest & Shahrokhi, 2016).

In conclusion, by expanding internationally its range of activities, the Islamic State, more than merely increasing the geographical boundaries of the Caliphate, aimed at implementing a multidimensional strategy. Under a psychological-ideological point of view, IS aimed at boosting the morale of its followers, trying to show them that it had global impact, not only regional (Khatib, 2015). Moreover, by increasing the number of terrorist attacks around the world, IS aimed at demonstrating its influence and power despite the crescent losses it began facing within the core of the Caliphate (Kurdi, 2016, p. 3). Under a strategic point of view, IS global campaign aimed at creating alternative logistic bases for the future in face of the loss of ground in Syria and Iraq.

The Islamic State's Web Jihadi Magazines: Dabiq and Rumiya

The first issue of Dabiq was released in July 2014, following an experiment of two other magazines, 'Islamic State News' and 'Islamic State Report', produced by the Islamic State's Al Hayat Media

Centre (Macnair & Frank, 2018, p. 110). Dabiq, which is originally a small town in northern Syria identified in some Hadith texts as the eventual site of an apocalyptic battle between victorious Islamic armies and the forces of 'Rome', gave the name to the subsequent magazine which quickly gained notoriety in terms of high-quality production, direct appeals to Western audiences, and translation into multiple languages such as English, French, and German. Usually, each issue of Dabiq contained several major themes: religious discussions and descriptions of Islam; the West; military updates in and around IS territory; celebrations and incitements of attacks against the West; emigration; praising of jihadist groups that ally with the Islamic State (Colas, 2016, p.178). Initially, Dabiq was released on a consistent monthly schedule. Nonetheless, as the magazine entered its later issues, the release time between them become longer and more irregular. Most importantly, following the losses of territory and influence in Iraq and Syria, the new magazine Rumiya started being produced from September 2016 and replaced Dabiq after the Islamic State lost control of the homonymous town. Slightly shorter in average length than Dabiq, Rumiya initially maintained a consistent monthly release schedule and officially replaced Dabiq as the primary non-Arabic propaganda magazine of the IS (Wignell, Tan, O'Halloran and Lange, 2017). Like its predecessor, a standard issue of Rumiya consisted of several regularly occurring sections that documented the actions, members, and ideology of IS.

Analysis of Dabiq's Content

The study of the fifteen issues of Dabiq highlighted what was expected to be found. First of all, the magazine seems to be coherent in reflecting the evolution of the events on the ground, occurred both in Iraq, Syria and around the world. According to the specific historical moment, each issue focused the attention on particular topics and through the careful reading of the

magazine it was possible to catch those elements that flagged a possible change of strategy from the Islamic State.

The first issues of Dabiq deeply focused on the new-established Caliphate. As one could expect, several sections of the magazine dealt with the issue of *bay'ah* (pledge of allegiance) of local tribes, militias and civilians to the Islamic State, and the issue of *imamah* (authority, leadership), highlighting the legitimacy of IS to exist and to rule the Muslim community. These two topics are joined by long lists of IS military operations and recent victories in Iraq and Syria. Nonetheless, the most relevant and redundant topic present in all the first issues of Dabiq is *hijrah*, term that originally refers to the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina, used here as a call to all Muslims to leave their homes, wherever they are, and to migrate to the Islamic State. Though, the importance of *hijrah's* topic does not rely on the explanation and justification that IS gave of it, but on its 'operational' meaning. By analysing the timeframe when the first three issues of Dabiq were released (the ones that focused the most on the topic of *hijrah*), it is possible to notice that such timeframe (June-September) coincides with the strategic offensive phase, when IS began seizing big portions of territory in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, it is highly probable that IS leadership's call to *hijrah* was part of the current IS strategy at that time, which was focused on expanding the Caliphate further and needed the raw material to implement it: people.

Dabiq issue number 4, released in October 2014 and following the beginning of the anti-IS coalition's airstrikes, focuses most of its attention on negative narrative against those Western countries involved in the fight against the Islamic State. This issue differs from the previous ones in one important thing. For the first time, calls to attack the 'crusaders' in their homelands and globally, not only in *Sham*, appear clearly in the magazine:

‘At this point of the crusade against the Islamic State, it is very important that attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. [...]’ (Dabiq 4, p. 44).

Targeting IS’ enemies abroad and in their homelands is coherent with the analysis of IS strategic phases and the following events that would have occurred mostly in Europe. Issue number 4 was released just in the between of the end of IS strategic offensive and beginning of strategic defence. Therefore, the hints suggesting IS willing to be more active not only within the core Caliphate but also globally, were present already in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

Issue number 5, titled ‘remaining and Expanding’, presents further hints on the evolution of IS strategy. During the wording analysis, among the most recurring terms were found ‘Arabian Peninsula’, ‘Algeria’, ‘Libya’, ‘Sinai’, and ‘Yemen’. This issue indeed focused on the establishment of new IS’ *Wilayat* (provinces) in those regions. From here it is possible to notice how the global agenda of IS’ strategy, at that time, was dual-track: On one hand, to strike the crusaders elsewhere, in their soft bellies (the homelands); on the other, to expand the Caliphate and to establish operational outposts in key areas of the Muslim world where the Islamic State began exert its influence.

Issue number 7 caught the attention because of the redundant term of ‘grey zone’. This term is key to understand one of the main goals the Islamic State aimed to achieve by increasing the attacks in the West, mostly in Europe. All the European countries in which big Muslim communities live represent, to the Islamic State, ‘grey zones’, places where Muslims have not yet been forced to choose sides and live in a state of hypocrisy. As Agathe Christien (2016) notices, IS’ attacks on Europe and in the West are designed to destroy these grey zones. By raising the level

of tension within Western countries, IS expected the Muslim European communities living there to become increasingly target of suspiciousness, discrimination, racism, and eventually hatred by the rest of the population. This would have played a double role in IS' global agenda: On one hand, the Islamic State could show that, despite the coalition's airstrikes, it was still able to strike back, even in the enemies' homes; on the other, IS could fulfil its objective to create the two-camps for an all-out war between Muslims and crusaders, with no space for something in between. For both these two goals, the European Muslim communities were playing a key role, both as victims and as possible future sympathizers.

The title of issue number 8 is self-explanatory: 'Shari'ah alone will rule Africa'. In celebrating the new-established *wilayah* in Western Africa, the Islamic State focuses again on calling all Muslims to perform *hijrah*. Nonetheless, there is a relevant difference between issue 8 and the first three issues of Dabiq. This time, the call for *hijrah* is to migrate to Africa as well, not only to the core Caliphate in Iraq and Syria:

'So whoever is stopped by the disbelieving rulers, and prevented from emigrating to Iraq, Shām, Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, or Khurāsān, will not be prevented – by Allah's permission – from emigrating to Africa' (Dabiq 8, p. 15).

Even more direct is the reference to Libya:

'Libya has become an ideal land of hijrah for those who find difficulty making their way to Shām, particularly those of our brothers and sisters in Africa' (Dabiq 8, p. 26).

In the chronological analysis of Dabiq's narrative, it had been noticed how *hijrah* maintained a relative high level of importance in the IS' magazine. Nonetheless, the call to perform migration gradually changed 'destination': from the core Caliphate to the extended Caliphate, the *Wilayat*. From 2015 the Islamic State began both intensifying the attacks in the West (Jones et al., 2017, p.

33-34) and concentrating more resources for the global campaign. Therefore, this ‘change of fashion’ of the *hijrah* concept highlighted in issue 8 did provide some hints on the subsequent evolution of IS’ strategy, more oriented towards the near and far abroad rings.

Issue 11 is worth to mention because of its reference to the historical battle of Al-Azhāb, when the outnumbered Muslim defenders of Medina resisted and defeated the besieging Arab and Jewish army in a 30 days battle. By comparing the ancient-times battle of Al-Azhāb with the current war of the anti-IS coalition, the Islamic State delivers an important message both to its constituency and to its enemies: The Islamic State can wait, while its opponents do not possess strategic patience. As it is explained in the magazine, ‘The patience and perseverance of the Muslims in the Battle of al-Ahzāb meant they were a force to be reckoned with [...], their enemy would soon have to admit defeat and concede to a truce [...]’ (Dabiq 11, p. 54). Such narrative is coherent with the strategic phase the Islamic State is going through, a static defence in preparation for hardship, given the enlargement of IS’ enemy front (Russia started Operation Retribution in September 2015, same month in which issue 11 was released).

While praising the terrorist attacks in Paris and the takedown of the Russian airplane, issue 12 follows up the narrative of the previous issue and declares that the Islamic State is *bāqiyah* (remaining), despite challenges and difficulties appearing at the horizon:

‘The Islamic State then, in 1427-1428AH, began losing territory to these crusader-backed apostates. It was experiencing just some of the tests and tribulations that all truthful believers face [...]’ (Dabiq 12, p. 17).

Differently from issue 13, issue 14 switches the attention on the ‘fake’ Muslims and imams of the West. During the analysis, it had been noticed that the last issues of Dabiq focused more on religious topics, rival jihadist factions, and on a harsh narrative against those Muslims who do

not align with the Islamic State, the so called *Bughāt*, (Muslims who fight against the right Muslim authority, therefore apostates). Such narrative seems to follow up the IS agenda of destroying the ‘grey zones’ in Europe mentioned in issue 7: ‘To kill the crusaders and other disbelievers and apostates, including the imāms of kufr, to make an example of them, as all of them are valid – rather, obligatory – targets according to the Sharī’ah, except for those who openly repent from kufr before they are apprehended’ (Dabiq 14, p. 17).

The goal of dividing Western societies in two opposed camps and creating deep rifts within the populations is still clearly stated, and this time with more emphasis. Nonetheless, a big section at the end of issue 14 stands out because of the extensive narrative on Bengal. On one hand, the present issue deeply focused on the West, on the other, it moved to a completely different and far area of the world. In an interview with the amīr of Bengal, the relevance of this region is explained: ‘Bengal is an important region for the Khilāfah and the global jihād due to its strategic geographic position. [...] Thus, having a strong jihād base in Bengal will facilitate performing guerrilla attacks inside India [...]’ (Dabiq 14, p. 63).

In comparison to the first issues of Dabiq, it is noticeable how, during the evolution of the static defence and the strategic hardship phases, IS’ narrative begins shifting more and more attention on topics related to the global campaign: on one hand, the issues related to the near-abroad ring, the *Wilayat*, which are gaining strength; on the other, the issues related to the far-abroad ring, the Western countries and their societies, which are the soft bellies of the enemy and where internal rifts start to be created.

Probably not by coincidence, issue 15 exclusively focuses on the Christians and those aligned with them, the fake imams whose aim is to help the crusaders by dividing the Muslim community from within. While in the present issue IS operations in Iraq and Syria are barely

mentioned, a lot of attention is dedicated to operations carried out by IS' affiliates in the Philippines, Algeria, Sinai, Khurasan, Egypt and Somalia.

Analysis of Rumiya's Content

While maintaining the same style of Dabiq, Rumiya presented several differences respect to the previous magazine. Differently from Dabiq, the wording analysis conducted on Rumiya proved to be less effective in supporting the subsequent content analysis of the magazine's issues. Indeed, very few relevant words were highlighted within the narrative and this, following the deep study of the texts, showed that the developers of Rumiya preferred a less theme-oriented magazine. On the contrary, it is evident that the developers focused instead on a more generic content related to descriptions of best religious practices, role of the women in the Muslim society, negative narrative against the Shi'a, and general recommendations for mujahidin. The change of look from Dabiq to Rumiya could easily be related to the hardship phase that IS began facing from 2016, when it started losing territory in Iraq and Syria.

One of the most notable differences between Dabiq and Rumiya that had been identified during the analysis is the presence of more operational content within the second magazine. The section 'just terror tactics' represents a completely new addition in the second magazine.ⁱ This section provides the reader with technical and operational information on how to carry out terrorist attacks, ranging from the use of knives (Rumiya 2, p. 12-13; Rumiya 4, p. 8), vehicles and trucks for run-over attacks (Rumiya 3, p. 10-12; Rumiya 9, p. 56), arson operations (Rumiya 5, p. 8-10) and hostage taking (Rumiya 9, p. 46-51). Most importantly, the means and methodologies suggested in the sections of Rumiya's just terror tactics give hints concerning the targets of those attacks. It is clear that Western civilian targets, and not anti-IS coalition forces in

Iraq and Syria, are the objective. This represents a major shift respect to Dabiq magazine, where the West began being mentioned within the narrative from February 2015,ⁱⁱ but without providing the reader with operational information on how to actually strike the enemy. Following the gradual loss of ground in Iraq and Syria, this shift could suggest an increased attention to Europe and the West in general from IS. This increased attention to the West is also proved by the increase of terrorist attacks and operations in territories out of the core Caliphate mostly since 2015.

Another difference between Dabiq and Rumiya is the disappearance in the latter of sections dedicated to the life within Caliphate. These sections usually consisted in stories of daily life and how IS managed society and economy. Also in these case, given the loss of ground in Iraq and Syria, the removal of such sections seems reflecting the strategic phase of hardship began around the end of 2015.

Several Rumiya issues deal extensively with narrative against the so called ‘wicked scholars’ and ‘fake imams’, the Muslim preachers and scholars that reject IS jihadist ideology and promote moderation. These scholars, in the eyes of the Islamic State, are guilty of refusing to take action and support the fight against the unbelievers despite being men of knowledge and experts of the Qur’an and Hadith: ‘Anyone who looks at those who are ascribed to knowledge in our later times will find that the vast majority of them are not scholars and are not counted among the people of knowledge, due to their failure to fulfil the duty of action’.

Overall, IS’ criticism against the so called ‘evil’ or ‘wicked’ scholars consists in a repetitive narrative which accuses such scholars of concealing the truth, altering and distorting the law and being affected by dissuasion and scaremongering, which ultimately means being traitors of the Muslim community by serving the enemy (Rumiya 5, p. 26-28). The extensive narrative on the topic of ‘deviant’ scholars present in Rumiya suggests that IS pays a quite high level of attention

on such issue. The fact that Rumiayah presents a higher number of sections which purpose is to undermine moderate Muslim religious scholars in comparison to Dabiq, indirectly highlights the importance of the threat posed by the moderate narrative of Islam to IS. This finding, under an analytical point of view, is something that confirms the relevance of counter-narrative strategies, mostly those coming from the Muslim world itself, in limiting the impact of terrorist propaganda and the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit new members and attract new sympathizers.

Issue 2 provides the reader with new sections dedicated to the topic ‘Victory to the patient’ (Rumiayah 2, p. 26), sections that were completely absent in Dabiq, but present in several Rumiayah issues.ⁱⁱⁱ Through the word analysis, it had been noticed that the words ‘patience’ and ‘steadfastness’ appear several times among the 50 most recurring words within the issues of the IS magazine.^{iv} Even in those issues where ‘patience’ and ‘steadfastness’ are not highlighted through the word analysis, sections specifically dedicated to the topic are extensively present.^v These two words that began appearing recurrently within Rumiayah seem to be a further indicator of the phase of hardship that IS began facing following the increased military pressure of the anti-IS coalition forces: ‘This is jihad... a summit... a fruit... it comes after a lengthy patience and an extended stay in the land of battle, waiting to lure in one’s enemies and suffer their evils’ (Rumiayah 8, p. 24).

The Rumiayah’s narrative linked to the concepts of patience and steadfastness also highlights the element of strategic patience, a very common component of the attrition strategy adopted by many terrorist organizations and groups. The element of strategic patience is coherent with the long-term thinking that emerges from Rumiayah’s narrative. In addition to minimizing the loss of the town of Dabiq (Rumiayah 3, p. 25), depicted as a minor battle of a broader fight, the Islamic State also highlights how likely in the future the small and temporary victories of the

‘crusaders’ will be worthless: ‘[...] The muwahhid mujahid merely needs to have patience and conviction during his ribat and battle until Allah divides the word of His enemies, scatters their hearts in disunity, ignites discord among them, and makes their hostility against each other’ (Rumiyah 3, p. 26).

The hints of a long-term thinking strategy adopted by the Islamic State are highlighted also by the major focus of IS, within Rumiyah, on themes related to the impact of IS operations on Western societies. For example, issue 6 explains the ‘effects of attacks by mujahidin on the economy of mushrikin’, which entail medium and long-term losses for the enemy, such as draining of capital, rise in internal security costs, losses in the tourism industry and so on (Rumiyah 6, p. 11).

In addition to the other elements discussed so far, the content analysis conducted on the IS magazines also highlighted an important difference between Dabiq and Rumiyah on the concept of *hijrah*. On one hand, the topic of *hijrah* almost disappears in Rumiyah’s narrative,^{vi} fact that highlights how IS strategic priorities began changing following the increase of territorial losses. On the other hand, when Rumiyah does discuss *hijrah*, the magazine does it in a different venue respect to Dabiq. While in the first IS magazine the call to migration is redundant and clearly invites IS sympathizers to move to the lands of the core Caliphate (Iraq and Syria), within the second magazine such call to migration is much broader and refers to the provinces of the Caliphate, the so called *wilayat*: ‘[...] Whoever is unable to perform hijrah to Iraq and Sham, then he should perform hijrah to Libya, Khurasan, Yemen, Sinai, West Africa, or any of the other wilayat and outposts of the Khilafah in the East and the West’ (Rumiyah 4, p. 2-3).

Another difference between Dabiq and Rumiyah is the constant recurrence of East Asia (Bengal, Philippines and Khurasan in particular) as operational theatre within the narrative of the

last IS magazine.^{vii} The increased focus of Rumiyaḥ’s narrative on operational theatres different from the Iraqi and Syrian ones highlights the Islamic State’s strategic approach during the hardship phase aimed at resisting and expanding elsewhere: ‘[...] losing territory was nothing new for the Islamic State. The loss of most of its territory in the wake of the Sahwah initiative in Iraq did not lead to its defeat. Rather, it only led to the Islamic State regrouping, redoubling its efforts [...], and expanding into Sham, Sinai, Khurasan, and multiple other regions around the world [...].’ (Rumiyaḥ 10, p. 5). This piece of Rumiyaḥ’s narrative clearly shows how the loss of territory in Iraq and Syria is framed as a temporary setback and natural outcome of the long conflict with the enemy. The total loss of the core Caliphate is not perceived as a dead blow. On the contrary, as probably predicted by IS in advance, the gradual loss of ground in Iraq and Syria would have simply pushed further the terrorist organization to be less centralized and to go global. This, again, would be an additional hint to the long-term thinking of IS.

Conclusions

The analysis of the Web jihadi magazines *Dabiq* and *Rumiyaḥ*, compared with the events occurred on the ground between 2014 and 2017, highlighted several elements, here worth to discuss. As noticed by Tomáš Kaválek (2015, p. 6), the period between May and June 2014 represents a turning point where the Islamic State reaches the conventional stage, becoming capable of conducting conventional warfare and operations. This was highlighted in the first issues of *Dabiq*, where the narrative extensively focused on sections and reports related to the rapid expansion of the Caliphate and *hijrah*.

The year 2016 signed the beginning of the hardship phase, mostly since March when IS forces started withdrawing from the frontlines in order to defend the territory around al Raqqa.

The main turning point of this period was the loss of the town of Dabiq by IS in October 2016. Through the analysis of the historical events, it was noticed that among the main characteristics of this hardship phase there was the increasing use of guerrilla tactics from IS in the areas where it had lost control. Parallel to this trend, the Islamic State began increasing its activities in the global front, mostly within the second, third and fourth rings, the near abroad and the far abroad. As Jennifer Cafarella and Melissa Pavlik notice, the expansion of the Caliphate in territories other than Syria and Iraq can be understood as part of the overall IS global strategy of granting the Islamic State additional logistical hubs to receive and train foreign fighters, as it was becoming more difficult for them to join the organization in the core Caliphate (Cafarella & Pavlik, 2017). Therefore, while the main goal of the narrative on the *wilayat* present in the first issues of Dabiq was to boost the morale of IS fighters and supporters to further expand the Caliphate, the same narrative of the last issues of Dabiq and then Rumiya hinted to a different and new role of such provinces: To diversify, decentralize and open multiple fronts against the enemy as the strategic situation within the core Caliphate worsened. This is in line also with the change of narrative from Dabiq to Rumiya of the concept of *hijrah*. While in Dabiq *hijrah* was clearly promoted so to collect new and fresh troops to be used in the expansion of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria during its conventional phase, the analysis of Rumiya highlighted how *hijrah* was used in reference to the *wilayat*, as the migration towards Iraq and Syria became more difficult. This overall change of narrative, again, not only reflected the occurring events on the ground, but it also hinted to the strategic thinking of IS leadership: In face of a possible loss of the core Caliphate in the future, the next phase would have been to relocate in those areas where IS had less pressure.

On the European front, IS increased the attacks against Western targets from the beginning of 2016, attacks aimed at exacerbating internal tension within Europe. This strategy

was clearly reflected in Rumiya magazine, where two specific sections showed to have a particular focus on the European theatre: Just terror tactics and the evil scholars. On one hand, the addition of the 'just terror tactics' sections in Rumiya hinted to an increased interest of the Islamic State to step up the jihad in the West by providing IS supporters with operational material clearly suitable for operations in Western cities. On the other hand, the extensive negative narrative targeting the deviant scholars and imams highlighted the level attention paid by the Islamic State to the ideological aspect within the European front, aiming at reducing the impact and spread of moderate Islamic narratives in opposition to the one of the Islamic State. By exacerbating internal tensions within European societies, the Islamic State pursued the goal of 'destroying the grey zones' (Berlinski, 2016), the areas in Europe inhabited by minority Muslim communities pressured by the increasingly more hostile European societies.

The analysis of the two Web jihadi magazines also highlighted the redundant presence of the concept of patience and steadfastness in Rumiya. These two words began appearing recurrently when IS approached the phase of strategic hardship. The analysis of Rumiya highlighted that yes, the main goal of the narrative around patience and steadfastness was to boost the morale of the mujahedin and to reassure of the ultimate victory despite the hard times and severe challenges. Nonetheless, another pattern emerged from this narrative. Despite the multitude of enemies, despite the territorial and human losses, the Islamic State can wait because it possesses something that all its enemies do not have: Strategic patience. This is a key element in the Eastern mentality and culture, where results and achievements are not measured in the short-term but in the long one, where the right time to take action or reaction can occur not in months but years. Despite the hardship phase that it was facing, the Islamic State was able,

through the magazines' narrative, to effectively deliver the message that all those setbacks were not only taken into account, but also part of the natural flow of events when a jihad occur.

Another element that was identified during the analysis of the magazines was the recurring topic of the Shi'a. The growing harsh narrative against the Shi'a that begins appearing in Dabiq, since early 2016, and which is present mostly in Rumiya, seems to be not only a mere reflection of the growing military pressure from Iran and its affiliated militias such as Hezbollah, but also to indicate a rediscovered interest from IS to adopt the strategy of Zarqawi, former AQI leader, whose main goal was to raise the hatred towards the Shi'a among the Sunni communities so to eventually unleash a civil war so chaotic that the Sunni parts of Iraq would break away from the rest (Neumann, 2016, p. 59). Even though this is more an assumption that emerge from the analysis of Dabiq's and Rumiya's content, the IS narrative on the Shi'a should still be taken into account as an indicator of the never vanished hatred towards the Shi'a community and the IS priority to keep targeting them, mostly in Iraq, so to maintain the chaos and instability that allowed many years ago AQI to grow.

Concerning the research question of the present work, it is possible to assert that yes, the content of both Dabiq and Rumiya magazines not only reflect the evolution of IS strategic environment, but it also provides useful operational information that help to better frame and analyse how the Islamic State reacted to the evolving strategic context. More specifically, the operational information that resulted from this research consisted in fragments or pieces that put together increased the level of understanding (and to a certain extent of predictability) of IS strategic behaviour. The overall goal of this analysis was not to identify the study of IS Web Jihadi magazines as the most important or reliable intelligence tool for monitoring and predicting Islamic State's moves and changes of strategy. Intelligence analysis is made by combining different tools

and methods and by taking into consideration as many dimensions of the topic analysed as possible. The analysis of online jihadist material, in this case the Web magazines specifically, can be taken as a piece to add to the others into the bigger puzzle that is the work of intelligence: Trying to reach a final image that is the clearest possible, an image not made of one piece, but of many put all together. Nowadays, there is the dangerous common misconception that the world is in a 'post-IS phase' (Ganor, 2019), following the destruction of the core Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Such assumption is incorrect because, on one hand, we can state only that the world is in a 'post-physical Caliphate phase' in Iraq and Syria, whereas IS control of territory did not disappear in other areas of the world, such as Africa and South-East Asia; on the other hand, it is possible to notice that the Islamic State is transforming and adapting to the new strategic situation. Therefore, more than a post-IS phase, we could speak of a 'transition phase'. This transition phase that the Islamic State is facing shows several similarities with the period between 2009 and 2011, when the back-then Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), following the loss of Omar al Baghdadi and many other commanders, went into a dormant stage. The organization adopted a low profile, it focused on criminal activities and established sources of income. During that period, instead of increasing the level of violence of the insurgency, ISI focused on raising funds and establishing criminal networks in order to regain force later on.

Web jihadi magazines, as this research showed, represents a cheap, fast and effective way for a terrorist organization such IS to deliver messages, directions and ideology to its constituency. It is not possible to exclude that such an effective tool will be used again by IS and other terrorist organizations in the future. Therefore, from here the necessity to monitor and study the development of Web jihadi magazines and related products and to add this piece to the overall puzzle which is the intelligence work.

Notes

-
- ⁱ This section is present in Rumiya issues 2, 3, 4, 5, 9.
- ⁱⁱ The most relevant issue in this regard was Dabiq issue 7, where Europe and the ‘destruction of the grayzone’ is extensively discussed.
- ⁱⁱⁱ This section is found in Rumiya issues 2, 4 (here titled ‘Stories of victory after patience’), 9 (here titled ‘Be patient, for indeed the promise of Allah is true’).
- ^{iv} The words ‘patience’ and ‘steadfastness’ appear among the 50 most recurring words in issues 4, 8, 10.
- ^v These sections are found Rumiya issues 2, 3, 9, 11.
- ^{vi} Only Rumiya issues 3, 4, 8 and 13 briefly mention the topic of *hijrah*, in some paragraphs or one-page insets.
- ^{vii} Topics related to IS operations in East Asia appear frequently in the form of articles and reports in Rumiya issues 2, 7, 8, 10, 11.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Bibliography

- Anagnostos, E. & ISW Iraq Team. (2016). Iraq Situation Report: September 7-19, 2016. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/09/iraq-situation-report-september-7-19.html>
- Azani, E. (2017, December). *ISIS’ Operational Campaign*. Paper presented at the class of Radical Islamic Ideologies, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel.
- Berlinski, C. (2016, April 25). Nourishing The Viper. *National Review*. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2016/04/25/belgium-isis-attacl-response-russia-gain/>
- Cafarella, J. & Pavlik, M. (2017). ISIS’s Global Campaign Remains Intact. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/06/isiss-global-campaign-remains-intact.html>
- Christien, A. (2016). The Representation of Youth in the Islamic State’s Propaganda Magazine Dabiq. *Journal of Terrorism Research* 7. doi: [10.15664/jtr.1201](https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1201)
- Colas, B. (2016). What Does Dabiq Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organizational Fractures within Dabiq Magazine. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40, 173-190. doi: [10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184062](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184062).
- Coyne, C. & Gambhir, H. (2016). ISIS’s Regional Campaign: January 2016. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/02/isiss-regional-campaign-january-2016.html>
- Dabiq. *Reflection on the Final Crusade*. Dabiq 4.

- Dabiq. *The Bay'ah from West Africa*. Dabiq 8.
- Dabiq. *From the Battle of Al-Ahzāb to the War of Coalitions*. Dabiq 11.
- Dabiq. *Baqiyah*. Dabiq 12.
- Dabiq. *Kill the Imāms of Kufr in the West*. Dabiq 14.
- Dabiq. *Interview with the Amīr of the Khilāfah's Soldiers in Bengal Shaykh Abū Ibrāhīm Al-Nanīf*. Dabiq 14.
- Droogan, J., & Peattie, S. (2017). Mapping the thematic landscape of *Dabiq* magazine. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 71, 591-620. doi: [10.1080/10357718.2017.1303443](https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1303443)
- Forrest, C. & DeKold, R. (2016). Warning Update: The Expansion of ISIS in Northwestern Afghanistan. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/02/warning-update-expansion-of-isis-in.html>
- Forrest, C. & Shahrokhi, D. (2016). ISIS's Campaign in Europe: March 25th - July 15th 2016. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/07/isiss-campaign-in-europe-march-25th.html>
- Gambhir, H. (2016). The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS's Information Warfare. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-virtual-Caliphate-isiss-information.html>.
- Gambhir, H. (2015). Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/dabiq-strategic-messaging-islamic-state-0>
- Gambhir, H., Coyne, C. and ISW's Counterterrorism Team. (2016). ISIS's Campaign in Europe: March 2016. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/03/isiss-campaign-in-europe-march-2016.html>
- Ganor, B. (2019, May). *Current trends in Counter-Terrorism: Perspectives from NATO, the EU, and Israel*. Paper presented at a conference in NATO Headquarter, Brussels, Belgium.
- Gibbons-Neff, T. (2016, April 26). Number of foreign fighters entering Iraq and Syria drops by 90 percent, Pentagon says. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/26/number-of-foreign-fighters-entering-iraq-and-syria-drops-by-90-percent-pentagon-says/>
- GPF Staff. (2015, December). Islamic State's Current Standing. *Geopolitical Futures*. Retrieved from <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/islamic-states-current-standing/#>
- Houck, S., C., Repkeb, M., A. and Lucian Gideon Conway. (2017). Understanding what makes terrorist groups' propaganda effective: an integrative complexity analysis of ISIL and Al Qaeda. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 12, p. 105-118. doi: [10.1080/18335330.2017.1351032](https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2017.1351032)
- Ingram, H. J. (2016). An analysis of Islamic State's Dabiq magazine. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 51. doi: [10.1080/10361146.2016.1174188](https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2016.1174188)
- Ingram, H. J. (2017). An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's Propaganda War. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40. doi: [10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212551](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212551)
- Jones, S. J. et al. (2017). *Rolling Back the Islamic State*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Kaválek, T. (2015). From al-Qaeda in Iraq to Islamic State: The Story of Insurgency in Iraq and Syria in 2003-2015. *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 14, 6. doi: [10.21599/atjir.29299](https://doi.org/10.21599/atjir.29299)
- Khatib, L. (2015). The Islamic State's Strategy. Lasting and Expanding. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/islamic_state_strategy.pdf

-
- Kibble, D. G. (2016). Dabiq, the Islamic State's Magazine: A Critical Analysis. *Middle East Policy* 23. Retrieved from <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/mepo.12222>
- Kurdi, R. (2016). Islamic State. Background Report 23 NATO 03, 6. Retrieved from https://www.studentsummit.cz/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NATO_isis_final.pdf
- Lewis, J. & Ali, A. (2014). The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham Captures Mosul and Advances toward Baghdad. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham.html>
- Macnair, L. & Frank, R. (2018). Changes and stabilities in the language of Islamic state magazines: a sentiment analysis. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 11, 110. doi: [10.1080/17467586.2018.1470660](https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2018.1470660)
- Neumann, P. R. (2016). *Radicalized. New Jihadists and the Threat to the West*. London/New York: I.B.Tauris & Co.
- Reese, A. and ISW Iraq Team. (2014). ISIS Launches Major Multi-Front Assault. *Institute for the Study of War*. Retrieved from <https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2014/06/isis-launches-major-multi-front-assault.html>.
- Rumiyah. *Just Terror Tactics*. Rumiyah 2.
- Rumiyah. *Glad Tidings of Imminent Victory to the Patient*. Rumiyah 2.
- Rumiyah. *Just Terror Tactics*. Rumiyah 3.
- Rumiyah. *Towards the Major Malhamah of Dabiq*. Rumiyah 3.
- Rumiyah. *Just Terror Tactics*. Rumiyah 4.
- Rumiyah. *Hijrah does not Cease as long the Kuffar are Fought*. Rumiyah 4.
- Rumiyah. *Just Terror Tactics*. Rumiyah 5.
- Rumiyah. *Traits of the Evil Scholars*. Rumiyah 5.
- Rumiyah. *Effects of Attacks by Mujahidin on the Economy of the Mushrikin*. Rumiyah 6.
- Rumiyah. *Then the Final Outcome is Theirs*. Rumiyah 8.
- Rumiyah. *Just Terror Tactics*. Rumiyah 9.
- Rumiyah. *But Allah Came Upon Them From Where They Had Not Expected*. Rumiyah 10.
- Zekulin, M., G. (2018). More than the medium: how the communication literature helps explain ISIS's success in recruiting Westerners. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 13, p. 17-37. doi: [10.1080/18335330.2017.1412490](https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2017.1412490)
- Wignell, P., Tan, S., O'Halloran, K. L. and Lange, R. (2017). A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/592>