California State University-San Bernardino Department of Political Science National Security Studies M.A. Program Redacted M.A. Thesis
Bibliography: Books, Articles, Reports, Statements and Other Documents Acosta, Benjamin T. “The Palestinian Shahid and the Development of the Model 21st Century Islamic Terrorist.” M.A. thesis, California State University-San Bernardino, 2008. Atran, Scott. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism.” Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534-1539. Berman, Yadid. “PA Glorifies Dimona Terrorists.” Jerusalem Post, 6 February 2008. Bin Laden, Usama. “Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice.” Al-Jazeera TV on 16 February 2003. Translated in Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series No. 476 (6 March 2003): accessed at . Bloom, Mia. “Female Suicide Bombers: A Global Trend.” Dædalus (Winter 2007): 94-102. ----------“Grim Saudi Export--Suicide Bombers.” Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2005. Brooks, David. “The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not Just a Means but an End.” The Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20. Debat, Alexis. “Osama bin Laden’s Heir.” National Interest 80 (Summer 2005): 155-157. Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman. Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007. Glasser, Susan B. “‘Martyrs’ in Iraq Mostly Saudis.” Washington Post, 15 May 2005, sec. A1. Gunaratna, Rohan. “The New al-Qaida: Developments in the Post-9/11 Evolution of al-Qaida.” In Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats, edited by Boaz Ganor. Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005. Hafez, Mohammed M. Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom. Washington D.C.: United States (U.S.) Institute for Peace Press, 2007. ----------“Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism.” In Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, edited by Ami Pedahzur. New York: Routledge, 2007. ----------Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace Press, 2006. Hentoff, Nat. “The Poisonous Cult of Martyrdom; Palestinians with Legitimate Grievances Are Infected.” The Washington Times, 8 April 2002. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Revised and Expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. ----------“Modern Terrorism Trends: Reevaluation after 9/11,” In Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats, edited by Boaz Ganor. Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005. Ibrahim, Raymond. The Al Qaeda Reader. New York: Broadway Books, 2007. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends (March 2007): accessed at . Israeli, Rafael. “A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 4 (24 January 2002): 23-40. Karmon, Ely. “Who Bombed Northern Israel? Al-Qaida and Palestine.” ICT: Articles (1 January 2006): accessed at on 28 January 2007. Keath, Lee. “Bin Laden Wants ‘Caravan’ of ‘Martyrs.’” Associated Press, 11 September 2007. Lewis, Bernard. The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam. New York: Basic Books, 2003. Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Moghadam, Assaf. “The Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach.” In Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, edited by Ami Pedahzur. New York: Routledge, 2007. ----------“Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 65-92. Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. New York: First Vintage Books, 2001. Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007. Notes from ICT seminar on “Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism Strategies,” given by Boaz Ganor and Itamar Marcus, in Herzliya, Israel on 9 June 2005. Notes from ICT seminar on “The Global Jihad,” given by Reuven Paz in Herzliya, Israel on 21 June 2005. Oliver, Anne Marie, and Paul Steinberg. The Road to Martyrs’ Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber. Oxford University Press, 2004. Oppel Jr., Richard A. “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S.” The New York Times, 22 November 2007. Paz, Reuven. “The Islamic Legitimacy of Palestinian Suicide Terrorism.” In Countering Suicide Terrorism. Updated ed., edited by Boaz Ganor. Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007. Pedahzur, Ami. Suicide Terrorism. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2005. Pedahzur, Ami and Arie Perliger. “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective.” Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987-2008. Reuter, Christoph. My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Translated by Helena Ragg-Kirkby. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002. Rosen, Nir. In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq. New York: Free Press, 2006. Sageman, Mark. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Scheib, Ronnie. “The Cult of the Suicide Bomber.” Daily Variety, 5 June 2006. Schweitzer, Yoram and Sari Goldstein Ferber. “Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism.” Memorandum No. 78. Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2005. Swarup, Ram. Understanding the Hadith: The Sacred Traditions of Islam. New York: Prometheus Books, 2002. “Usama bin Laden: Al Qaeda Will Continue Holy War Until Liberation of Palestine.” Associated Press, 16 May 2008. Victor, Barbara. Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. Emmaus, Pennsylvania: Rodale, 2003. DVDs, Videos, and Other Electronic Recordings The Cult of the Suicide Bomber. Produced and directed by David Betty and Kevin Toolis. 1 hr. 35 min. Many Rivers Films, 2006. DVD. Hamas Leader Khaled Mash’al Praises Yousef Al-Qaradhawi for His Support of Suicide Operations. Al-Jazeera TV, 16 July 2007. ASF. Accessed at on 10 February 2008. Young Guns II. Produced by Paul Schiff and Irby Smith. Directed by Geoff Murphy, 1 hr. 43 min. Morgan Creek/Warner Bros., 1990. DVD.
Notes: [1] Established in January 1964 at a summit of Arab states, Munazzmat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (the Palestine Liberation Organization) or PLO did not find widespread acclaim by Palestinians until its cooptation by Yasser Arafat’s militant group Fatah. Meaning “conquest” in Arabic, Fatah is the inversion of the acronym Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistini (the Palestine National Liberation Movement). [2] Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage, 2001), 373-379. [3] Bruce Hoffman, “Modern Terrorism Trends: Reevaluation after 9/11,” in Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005), 40. [4] In Arabic intifada literally means “shaking-off.” In the case of the two Palestinian uprisings, it refers to shaking off the “occupiers.” [5] Hezb’ollah stands for the “Party of God” in Arabic. Although not officially founded until February 16, 1985, Iranian Pasdaran operatives set up Hezballah in 1982, and operated it under the cover name Islamic Jihad Organization. [6] The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006; Ronnie Scheib, “The Cult of the Suicide Bomber,” Daily Variety, 5 June 2006. [7] Initially, the Shi’a were simply a political faction that supported Mohammad’s son-in-law and cousin Ali. The battle in 860 helped to “[transform] the Shi’a from a party to a sect.” Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 22. [8] Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 33-51. [9] Meaning “Guards” in Persian, Pasdaran is short for Sepah-i Pasdaran-i Enqelab-i Islami (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) or IRGC. [10] Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 71. [11] These groups included: Amal, the Syrian Social-Nationalist Party, the Syrian Ba’ath (Renaissance) Party, and the Syrian Socialist-Nasserite Party. [12] Not only does the Shi’a martyrdom narrative and Ashura holiday derive from the story of Hussein and his 72 faithful followers, who died with him, but the 12th Century Assassins also contribute to the tradition of Shi’a self-sacrifice, as they used daggers in suicidal assassination missions. [13] Some refer to al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin (The Islamic Jihad in Palestine) simply as Jihad Islami (Islamic Jihad). Others call it Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini (The Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ. [14] Notes from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism seminar on “The Global Jihad,” given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya, Israel (21 June 2005); Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534-1539; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 151. [15] Meaning “zeal” and “courage” in Arabic, the acronym Hamas stands for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement). [16] Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 55. [17] “Islamist” refers to an individual or organization that subscribes to a political ideology based on the fundamental tenets of Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of those tenets spawned a variety of Islamic sects, nearly an equally number of versions of Islamism or political Islam exist—whether, Salafi, revolutionary Shi’a, or otherwise. One could understand a “hardline Islamist” as an Islamic supremacist, who views political Islam as the only viable and righteous political ideology. An “Islamic fanatic” demonstrates a willingness to sacrifice his or her self-interest for a collective cause. [18] Rapprochement publicly commenced in October 1991 at the Madrid Conference, and began showing progress with the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, in which Israel and the PLO recognized one another diplomatically. [19] For a complete list of Palestinian suicide-homicide attacks carried out against Israeli targets from April 1993 to April 2008, see Appendix A in Benjamin T. Acosta, “The Palestinian Shahid and the Development of the Model 21st Century Islamic Terrorist” (M.A. thesis, California State University-San Bernardino, 2008), 225-233. [20] Fatah created Kataeb Shuhada al-Aqsa (al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade) or AMB. However, the majority of its members come from Tanzim (meaning “squad” in Arabic), which operates Fatah’s grassroots following. Furthermore, members of Force 17, Fatah’s elite Presidential guard, often organize and conduct AMB’s attacks. [21] Commentators also commonly refer to al-Aqsa intifada simply as the second intifada. [22] See Acosta, 225-233; and Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends (March 2007): 51-55; accessed at . [23] The term “disputed territories” is used because the listed areas do not qualify as “occupied territories,” considering there has never been a “Palestinian” state. From the years 1967 to 1979 and 1967 to 1994, it could have been argued that the territories in question were “occupied Egypt” and “occupied Jordan,” respectively, since these were the nation-states that Israel captured the territories from during the Six-Day War; however, both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments have since relinquished all claims to the territories. Thus, they are not “occupied,” but, indeed, rather “disputed” between Israel and the Palestinian Authority—especially since the failure of the Oslo peace process has left a final status agreement on the territories indefinitely unresolved. [24] A term coined during the British Mandate, “West Bank” collectively refers to the areas of Judea and Samaria. [25] First used in explaining Palestinian society’s support for suicide-homicide bombers sometime after the initiation of the second intifada, a number of researchers, scholars and political analysts have since elaborated on the concept “culture of martyrdom” and its variations. See David Brooks, “The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an End,” The Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20; Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2006); Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs’ Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); Nat Hentoff, “The Poisonous Cult of Martyrdom; Palestinians with Legitimate Grievances Are Infected,” The Washington Times (8 April 2002); and Reuter, 79-114. [26] Optimization refers to the fact that one finds no shortage in Palestinian society of individuals willing to carry out suicide-homicide operations; potential shahids have become a sort of Palestinian natural resource, which terror organizations can extract from society at any given time. [27] Literally “the Base” in Arabic, al-Qa’eda additionally means “the Vanguard.” Abdallah Azzam established the organization in 1988 building off the well-established Mektab al-Khadimat (Office of Services), which served as a logistics base for mujahedin (holy warriors) in Afghanistan. [28] “Terrorism” is the use of violence by a non-state actor against civilians and/or non-combatants for the purpose of political gain. “Suicide terrorism” for all intents and purposes refers to an act of terrorism, in which the perpetrator kills oneself while initiating the attack. Furthermore, operational success, whether tactically, symbolically or both, requires the perpetrator to take his or her own life. The term “suicide-homicide bomber” represents the two separate, albeit simultaneous, acts “martyrdom”-seeking individuals commit while carrying out their attacks: suicide and murder. [29] Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, “Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism,” Memorandum No. 78 (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 8. [30] See Nir Rosen, In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq (New York: Free Press, 2006). [31] Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 3. [32] See Martha Crenshaw, foreword to Suicide Bombers in Iraq, ix. [33] Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), 19; Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S.,” The New York Times, 22 November 2007; Mia Bloom, “Grim Saudi Export,” Los Angeles Times, 17 July 17 2005; Susan B. Glasser, “‘Martyrs’ in Iraq Mostly Saudi,” Washington Post, 15 May 2005. [34] The first occurrence of an assailant strapping explosives to his chest and killing himself to kill others happened in 1980 during the Iran-Iraq War, when a 13-year old Iranian named Hussein Fahmideh strapped explosives to himself and detonated them while charging an Iraqi tank. Ayatollah Khomeini went on to use “martyrs” to clear Iraqi minefields and the Iranian Pasdaran subsequently exported the shahid concept to Lebanon in 1982. [35] Al-Qaeda’s long-term goals include: reinvigorating Islam to the extent of its “golden era.” For this to happen, however, al-Qaeda argues the Islamic world must come out of its new jahiliyya (godless dark-age) and the caliphate has to be reinstated. [36] Ely Karmon, “Who Bombed Northern Israel? Al-Qaida and Palestine,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT): Articles (1 January 2006): accessed at on 28 January 2007. [37] Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 26. [38] The intended use of the term “fanatic” here is, as philosopher Lee Harris defines, “someone willing to make a sacrifice of his own self-interest for something outside himself.” See Lee Harris, The Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam’s Threat to the West (New York: Basic Books, 2007), xx. [39] Walter Laqueur quoted in Assaf Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 95. [40] Regarding the Palestinian terror legacy, scholar Bruce Hoffman contends: “Between 1968 and 1980, Palestinian terrorist groups were indisputably the world’s most active, accounting for more international terrorist incidents than any other movement. The success achieved by the PLO in publicizing the Palestinians’ plight through the ‘internationalization’ of its struggle with Israel has since served as a model for similarly aggrieved [identity groups].” Simply put, the Palestinians revolutionized revolutionary violence. Hoffman goes on to credit the PLO not only with “internationalizing” terrorism, but also providing ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations with a “model,” as well as establishing the Palestinians as revolutionary terror “mentors.” Hoffman concludes, “the attention that the PLO has received, the financial and political influence and power that it has amassed, and the stature that it has been accorded in the international community continues to send a powerful message to aggrieved peoples throughout the world.” Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 64 and 71-79. [41] Hezballah launched its first suicide-homicide attack 11 months after Da’awa 17—a group that attacked Iraqi government targets, and most likely did so with the aid of the Pasdaran, similarly to Hezballah in its campaigns against Western forces. [42] David Brooks, “The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an End,” The Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 6 (2002): 19. [43] Moreover, martyrdom has traditionally played a much larger role in Shi’a Islam than Sunni Islam. For example, Shi’a Muslims celebrate Ashura, which commemorates the “martyrdom” of Hussein at the Battle of Karbala in 860. [44] In the late 1980s, Hezballah began to downplay its promotion of martyrdom within the population in Southern Lebanon. Hezballah’s spiritual advisor, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah even issued a fatwa (Islamic degree) authorizing martyrdom operations “only on special occasions” due to a fear of over “exaggerated use [by] over-zealous youth.” See Rafael Israeli, “A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 4 (2002): 30. [45] Recognized by Robert Baer in The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006. [46] Prior to Palestinian use of suicide terrorism, Hezballah and Amal in Lebanon and the LTTE in Sri Lanka used suicide-homicide attacks emphasizing military targets, with exceptions made for politicians. [47] Al-Qaradawi is the Head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, as well as the President of the International Association of Muslim Scholars. [48] Referring to the importance of al-Qaradawi’s role in legitimizing suicide terrorism, Hamas’s current leader Khaled Mash’al states: “[Qaradawi’s] unequivocal fatwa, the sheikh, may Allah reward him, considered martyrdom operations to be the most noble level of jihad. That was unparalleled support for the people of Palestine, because, brothers and sisters, you cannot imagine how difficult it is psychologically for a young Palestinian man or woman to sacrifice themselves or what is most dear to them, only to encounter a conflict in their minds and hearts as to whether they are on the path of righteousness, or whether they are committing a religious violation.” See Khaled Mash’al, Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007, trans. in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series No. 1672 (2007): accessed at . [49] Hafez notes: “Yussuf al-Qaradawi [has] declared jihad in Palestine as the individual obligation of every Muslim on many occasions during his weekly program on al-Jazeera entitled al-Sharia wal-Haya (Islamic Law and Life). His religious rulings regarding “martyrdom operations” aired on 23 December 2001 in a show entitled al-Amaliyat al-Istishhadiyya fi Falastin (Martyrdom Operations in Palestine) and on 31 May 2004 in a show entitled al-Muslimun wal-Unf al-Siyasi (Muslims and Political Violence). Yussuf al-Qaradawi’s blessing for suicide bombings can be found in interviews with the Kuwaiti-based weekly, Majallat al-Mujtama’a, no. 1201 [1996] and the London-based monthly, Falastin al-Muslima, March 2002. In the latter, he rules that it is permissible for women to engage in suicide bombings. His religious rulings and publications can be found on his web site www.qaradawi.net.” See Mohammed M. Hafez, “Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 77. [50] Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradhawi, Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007, trans. in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 1672 (2007): accessed at . [51] Hafez notes: “[in the book al-Amaliyat al-Istishhadiyya fi Mizan al-Fiqhi (Martyrdom Operations in Islamic Jurisprudence), Nawaf Hayel al-Takrouri] cites at least thirty-two religious ruling (fatwas) by Islamic scholars around the Muslim world supporting ‘martyrdom operations’ in Palestine.” Hafez goes on to explain: “This is one of the most important books to be published on this subject...[because the author] cites historical and contemporary Islamic scholars that affirm that martyrdom is dependent on religious faith and [jihad] in the path of [Allah]. See Hafez, “Dying to Be Martyrs,” 76. [52] “Islamist” refers to an individual or organization that subscribes to a political ideology based on the fundamental tenets of Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of those tenets spawned a variety of Islamic sects, nearly an equally number of versions of Islamism or political Islam exist—whether, Salafi, revolutionary Shi’a, or otherwise. [53] Many terrorism analysts frequently comment on al-Qaeda’s supposed disconnect from the Palestinian issue. [54] Meaning “Monotheism and Holy War,” Tawhid wal-Jihad eventually transitioned into al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers—also commonly called al-Qaeda in Iraq. [55] Alexis Debat, “Osama bin Laden’s Heir,” National Interest 80 (2005): 155-157. [56] Karmon. [57] Notes from ICT seminar on “The Global Jihad,” given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya, Israel on 21 June 2005. [58] See Appendix A in Benjamin T. Acosta, “The Palestinian Shahid and the Development of the Model 21st Century Islamic Terrorist” (M.A. thesis, California State University-San Bernardino, 2008), 225-233. [59] Rohan K. Gunaratna, “The New al-Qaida: Developments in the Post-9/11 Evolution of al-Qaida,” in Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios and Future Threats, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005), 47. [60] Gunaratna, 43. [61] One should not downplay the influence Hezballah has had on al-Qaeda’s style in simultaneously attacking multiple symbolic targets. The primary contention here is that Palestinian shahids paved the way for Sunni groups to target civilians using suicide-homicide attackers. Al-Qaeda’s current reduced capability, however, has led it to look closer at the Palestinian model on a tactical/operational level. [62] “Um Osama” quoted in “Bin Laden Has Set Up Female Suicide Squads: Report,” Arab News (Dubai), 13 March 2003, cited in Mia Bloom, “Female Suicide Bombers: A Global Trend,” Dædalus (Winter 2007): 99. [63] “Usama bin Laden: Al Qaeda Will Continue Holy War Until Liberation of Palestine,” Associated Press, 16 May 2008. [64] Quoted in Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 147, cited in Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 3. [65] Lee Keath, “Bin Laden Wants ‘Caravan’ of Martyrs,” Associated Press, 11 September 2007. [66] The mujahid and the feda’i both represent Islamic fighters who do not actively seek to die during jihad; the shahid does. Additionally, the mujahid and feda’i represent more of a participation in a group, whereas the shahid stands for any individual willing to answer Islam’s call to jihad. [67] Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 11 and 40. [68] Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 9. [69] CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center coined this term in the late 1990s. Gunaratna, 48. [70] Quoted in Kepel, 147, and cited in Sageman, 3. [71] Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 36. [72] Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 163. [73] Assaf Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 98. [74] Notes from ICT seminar on “Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism Strategies,” given by Boaz Ganor and Itamar Marcus, in Herzliya, Israel on 9 June 2005). [75] Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (2003): 68-69. [76] Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 16. [77] The World Islamic Front’s Declaration to Wage Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders in Raymond Ibrahim, ed. and trans., The Al-Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), 13. [78] In Ibrahim, 12. [79] For example, one Hadith saying quotes Mohammed: “The last hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them and until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or tree would say: Muslim, [oh] the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him.” In Ram Swarup, Understanding the Hadith: The Sacred Traditions of Islam (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), 215. See also Qur’an 5:64 on page 19 of this paper. [80] In December 1998, bin Laden argued: “The Jews have succeeded in obligating American and British Christians to strike Iraq...all the biggest [U.S] officials are Jews—have led the Christians to clip the wings of the Islamic world.” See in Ibrahim, 276. On 18 October 2003, bin Laden released a tape to al-Jazeera that stated: “[Bush] is carrying out the demands of the Zionist lobby that helped him into the White House—that is, annihilate the military might of Iraq because it is too close to the Jews in occupied Palestine...he is [also] concealing his own ambitions and the ambitions of the Zionist lobby in their desire for oil.” In Ibrahim, 211. [81] In Ibrahim, 276-7. [82] Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradhawi, Qatar TV on 25 February 2006, trans. in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 1102 (2006): accessed at . [83] Reuven Paz, “The Islamic Legitimacy of Palestinian Suicide Terrorism,” in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed., ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007), 61-62. [84] Usama bin Laden, “Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice,” Al-Jazeera TV on 16 February 2003, trans. in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 476 (6 March 2003), http://www.memri.org. I would like to thank Dr. Richard Saccone for identifying this sura as Qur’an 4:53. [85] Hamas charter in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 189-190. [86] Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 190. [87] Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 188. [88] Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 184-5. [89] While many acknowledge the U.S. as a primary target of al-Qaeda attacks, many analysts fail to recognize that al-Qaeda has consistently targeted Jewish targets around the world (e.g. its attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Kenya, etc.). [90] See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective,” Social Forces 84, no. 4 (2006): 2000. [91] Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 121-124. [92] One should note, in the Palestinian case social networks are usually based around the hamula (clan). [93] See Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends (2007): 51-55, accessed at ; see also Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 327, note 33; Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 3. [94] Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 116. [95] One could argue that only the pilots committed suicide during the 9/11 attacks. [96] The Shi’a Muslim employers of suicide-homicide attacks include Iranian soldiers, the Iraqi Da’awa 17 and Hezballah and Amal in Lebanon. The “secular” employers of suicide-homicide attacks include the Syrian Socialist-National Party, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; one should note, however, all of these organizations have employed some kind of religious or cultic symbolism in attracting individuals to carry out attacks. Fatah and PFLP even set up new Islamist “brigades,” to launch suicide-homicide attacks on their behalves. [97] For a comprehensive list of suicide-homicide attacks worldwide from December 1981 to June 2005, see Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 241-253. [98] One can add Turkey to the list if one counts the PKK as secular, despite its solely Sunni membership. [99] Yadid Berman, “PA Glorifies Dimona Terrorists,” Jerusalem Post, 6 February 2008. [100] Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 70. [101] Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 70. [102] Paraphrased from an explanation in Young Guns II, prod. Paul Schiff and Irby Smith, dir. by Geoff Murphy, 1 hr. 43 min., Morgan Creek/Warner Bros., 1990, DVD.