[1] 9/11 Commission Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Washington, 2004, p. 234. [2] B. Raman,”Al Qaeda Empire In Pakistan” 26. 11. 2002. http://www.saag.org/papers6/paper554.html [3] Yoginder Sikand, Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-i Tayyeba, November 20, 2003. http://www.sacw.net/DC/CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/sikand20Nov2003.html [4] http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/fto_aliases.shtml [5] Treasury Designations Target Terrorist Facilitators, December 7, 2006 http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp191.htm. [6] http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/7682ADFF1EABDFE7CA256FCD001CFF73?OpenDocument [7] Boaz Ganor, “The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide attack phenomenon” 21/03/2007. https://www.ict.org.il/Article/973/TheRationalityoftheIslamicRadicalSuicideattackphenomenon [8] Ajai Sahni, “Mumbai: The Uneducable Indian”. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/index.htm [9] B.RAMAN, “AFTER MUMBAI : POINTS FOR ACTION” in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.474 , December 2, 2008. http://globalintel.net/wp/2008/12/02/after-mumbai-points-for-action/ [10] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3535668/Britain-unprepared-for-Mumbai-style-attack-former-head-of-SAS-says.html