ATbar Chechen Jihad: An Analytical Overview
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Chechen Jihad: An Analytical Overview

12/08/2009 | by Scher, Gideon  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY-CHECHNYA

The conflict in Chechnya is one of secession and not Islamic fundamentalism. The objective of the resistance is the creation of an independent Chechnya and not a fight against the West. Foreign Jihadists first arrived in Chechnya during the first Chechen war in 1994. They had previous fighting experience from the Jihadi arenas of Afghanistan and Bosnia. The Chechen arena provided the foundation for Wahabist influence in the Caucuses. In 1999 the second Chechen war began. The reason for the Russian invasion was ostensibly to fight terrorism and the Jihadist rebels. The true reasons are thought to be the prevention of Chechen secessionism, to avenge the previous Chechen victory and to maintain Russia's geo-political influence in Central Asia and the Middle East. The current leader of Chechnya is Ramzan Kadyrov. There are allegations of violent human rights abuses under Kadyrov's rule

Major players in the Chechen arena include prominent Chechen politicians, local Chechen warlords and foreign Jihadists who became leaders in the Chechen resistance movement. The connection between leaders of the Chechen resistance and al-Qaeda is also examined. Foreign Jihadi fighters have assumed leadership positions in the Chechen resistance. In Chechnya, foreign fighters were recruited by means of the international distribution of the speeches of prominent Chechen fighters and footage of successful Jihadi attacks in Chechnya. Local fighters were recruited by foreign Islamic clerics inside the Caucuses. The poor socio-economic situation of Chechen youth, as well as tribal codes and ethics, facilitated recruitment of local fighters. Chechen Jihadists have been trained by al-Qaeda both inside and outside of Chechnya (Afghanistan/Georgia). More experienced local Chechens also train fighters inside Chechnya. Funding for the Chechen Jihad comes from Islamic charity organizations, al-Qaeda, fundraising videos, money taken from those who collaborated with Russia and confiscated funds which Russia attempted to transfer to the Chechen government.

Foreign Jihadists in Chechnya came from the countries of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Pakistan and parts of Central Asia and the Northern Caucuses.

The Beginning of Modern Jihad in Chechnya


At the very outset it is important to emphasize that the conflict in Chechnya is one of secession and not Islamic fundamentalism. The goal of Chechen resistance movements is the creation of an independent state and not the destruction of the West. Furthermore Chechens are by tradition not that religious. Families and clans are more important in Chechen society than religion. In accordance with this, the birth of Chechen resistance was not because of the rise of radical Islam or international terrorism. Although there is an Islamic link, its absence would not significantly change the core essence of the conflict i.e. Chechen resistance to Russian sovereignty.[1]



Jihadi fighters entered the Chechen arena during the first Chechen war which began at the end of 1994 and continued till August 1996. The infamous warlord Ibn Khattab allegedly set up Wahabbi training camps for hundred of fighters throughout Chechnya.[2] Khattab had fought in Afghanistan and Tajikistan before his arrival in Chechnya. In accordance with his Wahabist and Jihadist ideology he stated that his objective was to free all of Russia or at least the Russian republics. Khattab was killed by Russia at the beginning of 2002.[3] The Chechen war provided a foundation for Wahabi influence in the Caucuses. In 1998 the grand Mufti of Chechnya, Ahmed Kadyrov, stated," Units of Wahabi volunteers from Arab countries came to help us. These units were very well armed, so our Chechens willingly joined them. Many of them became adherents of that doctrine, and tried to teach it to us, saying that we were distorting Islam" [4] Radical Islamists involved in the Chechen arena did not see the liberation of Chechnya as their sole objective. They would like to merge Chechnya with the neighboring republic of Dagestan and create an Islamic state. Dagestan is of importance as its position allows access to the Caspian see and oil.[5]



In 1999 the second Chechen war began. The war began as a result of a combination of events. In August 1999 Ibn Khattab led a raid into the Russian republic of Dagestan. But the straw that broke the camel's back was a bomb attack in Moscow which killed 300 people.[6] According to Russia, the objective of the war was to confront Chechen rebels hiding in the mountains. The war was presented as a fight against terrorism and to prevent the secession of Chechnya from Russia. However it became clear that Russia was intent on reversing the defeat it suffered in 1996, maintaining its access to Caspian Sea oil and its influence in Central Asia and the Middle East.[7] The presence of Russian troops in Chechnya was the motivation behind two brutal terror attacks which claimed hundreds of casualties i.e. the Moscow theatre attack and the Beslan school attack. Chechen separatists claimed responsibility for both these attacks.[8]


Current situation in Chechnya:

The current president of Chechnya is Ramzan Kadyrov. He is the son of assassinated Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov. He was nominated by Vladimir Putin in spring 2007 and sworn in shortly thereafter. Ramzan Kadyrov succeeded Alu Alkhanov who was transferred to a post in the Russian government. Ramzan Kadyrov is apparently in control of a brutal militia force called "Kadyrovtsky" which he has assigned to operate against rebel forces. Kadyrov and his force have been the target of numerous allegations of violent human rights abuses. In response he claims that strictly enforced law is a key element of stability and that there may be "rogue elements" amongst the militia force responsible for such abuses. Kadyrov as Prime Minister also oversaw many reconstruction projects. He describes himself as a believer of traditional Islam.[9]

Concrete descriptions of gross human rights abuses in Chechnya abound. Victims tell of their experiences of abduction, torture and forced confessions. Often the perpetrators though identified are not arrested or put on trial as a result of their affiliation with the security forces. There is a reduction of people appealing to the authorities regarding the abduction or disappearance of relatives. This is apparently not because such incidents do not occur but because of fear of being targeted after making such a report. The level of personal safety dropped when control over security in Chechnya was transferred from Federal Russian forces to the local security forces. Although Chechens may criticize the actions of Federal forces they fall silent when questioned about the actions of the "Kadyrovtsky".[10]

Chechnya's oil wealth also continues to an important issue with legitimate Russian and Chechen interests competing for the benefits of the oil reserves. Furthermore criminal entities also seek access to and wealth from Chechnya's oil.[11]



Major Players in the Chechen Arena:

This section will give a brief overview of major players (past and present) in the Chechen arena.

Dzhokar Dudayev:

Dzhokar Dudayev was a former Soviet air force general. He was the leader of the secessionists in 1991 when the USSR disintegrated. He was elected president of Chechnya. However the elections were not recognized by Russia and pro-Russian elements in Chechnya did not recognize his authority. Following this chain of events and Dudayev's election and leadership of the Chechen secessionist movement Dudayev became one of Russia's most wanted fugitives. Dudayev was killed by a rocket attack in April 1996, with Russia strongly suspected of being responsible for the attack [12]

Aslan Maskhadov:

Aslan Maskhadov succeeded Dudayev as leader of Chechnya in 1997. He managed to sign a treaty with Russia after the first Chechen war giving Chechnya de facto independence.[13] Maskhadov was opposed to fundamentalist Islam and tried unsuccessfully to ban Wahabism in Chechnya. He described the perpetrators of the Beslan attack as "madmen". Another major player, Shamil Basayev, as well as local warlords undermined his authority and influence.[14] Maskhadov was killed in 2005 during a Russian operation in Chechnya.[15]

Ibn Khattab:

Ibn Khattab arrived in Chechnya at the end of 1994. He was Saudi born. His full name was Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailem. Khattab become renowned as a brilliant fighter and one of his operations resulted in the destruction of a whole Russian battalion.[16] As mentioned, Khattab had fought in Afghanistan and Tajikistan before his arrival in Chechnya. He was reported to be a close associate of Osama Bin Laden.[17] Furthermore he allegedly set up Wahabi training camps for hundred of fighters throughout Chechnya. He was killed by Russian forces in 2002. [18]


Shamil Basayev:


Shamil Basayev was a notorious Chechen warlord. He was killed in 2005 by a truck explosion allegedly orchestrated by Russian Special Forces. Pro rebel forces claim that the explosion was accidental. [19] Basayev was initially seen as a fierce fighter, a brilliant commander and a national hero. During the mid-nineties he rarely involved himself in operations related to terror.[20] He ran for Chechen presidency in 1997 losing to Maskhadov. He was also the Prime Minister for a few months in the same year but did not succeed in the post and became a powerful Chechen warlord instead. He also organized a raid with Ibn Khattab into Dagestan apparently with the aim of setting up an Islamic state.[21] As the struggle against the Russians continued Basayev become increasingly brutal in his methods and operations. By the end of the nineties his avoidance of terrorism no longer existed and he changed to become an organizer and perpetrator of brutal terror attacks. He organized the explosion of two Russian civilian airliners, the Moscow Theater attack as well as the Breslan school attack. This caused him to lose support amongst the Chechen population and become one of Russia's most wanted fugitive till his death in 2005.[22]

Mohammad bin Abdullah al-Seif:

Mohammad bin Abdullah al-Seif, also known as Abu Omar Muhammad al-Seif was one of the leaders of Chechen Jihad and is of Saudi origin. He arrived in Chechnya in 1995 and joined the ranks of Ibn Khattab. He was given the task of setting up a Sharia court which he did successfully and it expanded to encompass a major part of Chechnya. As a result he had numerous different titles including "legal advisor to the Chechen Mujahidin" and "head of Court of Cessation". He was considered the spiritual leader of Arab fighters in Chechnya. In 2005, in response to Putin's election, he called for Muslims to give more support to the Chechen Jihad.[23] Al-Seif also issued a fatwa permitting the use of female suicide bombings.[24] According to the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB) al-Seif officially represented al-Qaeda in Chechnya. He was also thought to be involved in the planning of the Moscow Theater and Beslan attack. Al-Seif was reportedly killed in a battle with the Russian forces in Dagestan in late December 2005. [25]

Emir Abu al-Walid:

Abu al-Walid replaced Ibn Khattab as a leader of Chechen Jihad following Khattab's death. Al-Walid's real name is Abd al Aziz al-Ghamdi and he is originally from southern Saudi Arabia. In 1987 al-Walid left Saudi Arabia and trained in Peshawar before entering Afghanistan. After fighting in Afghanistan he returned briefly to Saudi Arabia before traveling in 1993 to fight in Bosnia. He appears to be among the foreign Bosnian Jihadists who entered Chechnya in 1995 after being pressured to leave Bosnia by the Dayton accords. Prior to Khattab's death he functioned as Khattab's deputy and was involved in several large successful military operations.[26]Al-Walid was killed in a Russian ambush in Chechnya on 16 April 2004.[27]

Abu Hafs al-Urdani:

Abu Hafs al-Hurdani replaced al-Walid as a leading commander in Chechnya after al-Walid was killed. Al-Hurdani signed some of his communiqués as "Commander of the Eastern Front", the title claimed by al-Walid prior to his death. Al-Hurdani was Jordanian and the first non-Saudi to command foreign fighters in Chechnya. According to the FSB he helped finance the Beslan attack. He reportedly relocated to Georgia under al-Qaeda orders to take command of al-Qaeda operations in the Pankisi gorge as well as to supervise al-Qaeda funds destined for Chechnya. Al-Hurdani also declared US interests in Chechnya to be legitimate targets, the first time a threat against the US had been made by Chechen militants.[28]Al-Hurdani was reported killed by Russian forces on 26 December 2006.[29]

Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev:

Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev was briefly the president of Chechnya after Dzhokar Dudayev was killed. He was assumed to have played a significant role in armed incursions into Dagestan in 1999. He was compelled to leave the region as a result of Russian security forces' activity. He fled to the Gulf States and toured the world to raise funds for the Chechen separatists' efforts. He settled in Qatar. Russia accused him of being involved in the planning of the Moscow theater attack and sought his extradition from Qatar.[30] Yanderbiyev was killed by a car bomb in February 2004. Two Russian operatives were arrested and convicted by the Qatari authorities for the assassination.[31]

Doku Amarov:

Doku Amarov is the new leader of the Chechen separatist armed movement.[32] He is believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda and has declared an Islamic Emirate in the greater Russian Caucus region. Amarov has been referred to as the "Emir of the Mujahidin of the Caucuses". He has stressed the importance of implementing Sharia law in the area and that it is the responsibility of the Muslims to fight the "infidels". In his declaration of the Islamic Emirate he included Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Ossetia and the Nogay Steppe. He stated, ""I declare ethnic, territorial and colonial zones carrying names of 'North-Caucasian republics', 'Trans-Caucasian Republics' and other such terms as outlawed." However he did not declare clear boundaries stating," I do not believe it is necessary to draw the borders of the Caucasus Emirate." According to Amarov his goals are to expel non-Muslims and implement Sharia and to expand Jihad beyond the Russian Caucuses.[33]

Figure 3: Flag that could be adopted for Amarov's self-declared Emirate.

The Connection between Local Chechen and Global Jihad:

The connection between local Chechen and global Jihad (i.e. al-Qaeda) is one that exists on a number of levels. It is necessary to state at the outset that Osama Bin Laden, in principal, supports Muslims who are persecuted for their political beliefs and are engaged in ethno-nationalist campaigns.[34] Like the Afghanistan arena, Chechnya will always be seen as a focal point of for Islamists around the world. This is because both arenas saw Jihadists overcoming vastly superior Russian forces ( first Chechen War).[35] Furthermore al-Qaeda's encouragement of the concept of martyrdom and the suicide attack modus operandi has led to a sharp increase in the ferocity of the Jihad fighters in Chechnya as well as the tactic of suicide bombings.[36]

Bin Laden and Ibn Khattab had close ideological, financial and technological ties. Bin Laden and Khattab had fought together in Afghanistan.[37] Khattab and Bin Laden cooperated in the areas of resources and personnel. Khattab reportedly recruited fighters for the Chechen and Dagestan arenas from Ossetia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. These fighters were funded by al-Qaeda. Many Chechen born fighters were trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. [38] Thereafter al-Qaeda also supplied these fighters with weapons. Al-Qaeda also trained recruits inside Chechnya.[39] When fighting broke in 1994 Shamil Basayev had a close relationship with Osama Bin Laden. Basayev and Khattab also formed an alliance and worked together.[40] Therefore Bin Laden's influence was even more prevalent.

Another connection between global Jihad and Chechnya is that of leadership. This aspect is that of the link between fighters in the Chechen arena and those leading them who are not Chechen born and are connected to global Jihad. This has already been discussed in the section "Major Players". As mentioned Ibn Khattab, Mohammad bin Abdullah al-Seif and Abu al-Walid are of Saudi origin and were leaders of fighters in Chechnya. Abu Hafs al Hurdani was Jordanian.

A claim does exist that the connection between al-Qaeda and Chechnya appears to have been trumpeted by the Russians to provide legitimacy for, and international acceptance of Russian offensives in the region. By relating Chechnya to the post 9/11 Global War on terror, Putin created for himself greater flexibility when using Russia's military might.[41] Russian Federal Security Services (FSB) assertions that the Chechen resistance is managed by foreign terrorists such as Bin Laden are also viewed as unlikely. This is because, as stated at the very beginning of this report, the Chechen insurgency is a secessionist, nationalist struggle and therefore would not be managed by a foreign influence.[42] Yet this certainly does not mean that all the afore-mentioned al-Qaeda involvement does not exist. It requires the need to acknowledge that support and assistance given by al-Qaeda may not translate into al-Qaeda's overall control of the direction and strategy of the jihad in Chechnya.

The financial connection which exists between al-Qaeda and the Chechen is discussed on a section below which deals with the funding of the Chechen Jihad.

Foreign and Local Recruitment of Fighters:


The different nationalities of fighters in the Chechen arena indicate that recruitment is indeed both foreign and local.

After the demise of the USSR in 1991, Saudi clerics steeped in Wahabi Islam entered former Soviet republics preaching to the local population. Jihad as a religious obligation is one of the tenets of Wahabism.[43] Video-recorded attacks of Chechens on Russian forces as well as speeches by prominent leaders such as Basayev were translated into Arabic and sold all over the world including in London and Jerusalem. The material called for all Muslims to join the Chechen Jihad.[44] Al-Hurdani recruited Turkish fighters.[45]

In 2003 it was observed that there was a reduction in the presence of Arab fighters in Chechnya. Although there may be a small number of these fighters they are important because of the command and control role they play and because they form a link to others in the Arab world wanting to join the fight. A reduction in financial support at the time from the Gulf States may have resulted in a lesser influence of Arab Mujahidin in Chechnya. [46] In 2005, in response to Putin's election, al-Seif called for Muslims to give more support to the Chechen Jihad. The call can be interpreted as being aimed at recruiting fighters both local and foreign.[47] However recruitment of foreign fighters for the Chechnya can also been problematic. The reason for this is that Jihadists see Russia as a less of a danger to Islam than the US.

The recruitment of local fighters in the Chechen insurgency has been facilitated by a number of factors. Young fighters may want revenge for a murder or humiliation that they or a member of their families experienced at the hands of the Russians.[48] Furthermore a 70% unemployment rate amongst Chechen males in 1996 provided a source of eager and unoccupied young men. There was also the existence of fear of deportation, similar to that which had occurred under Stalin in the 1940s. Additionally in Chechnya's ruined economy of the mid nineties, money was a powerful influence. Furthermore the influence and power of the society's traditional religious and cultural elites had been undermined. This situation was exploited by radical Islamists.[49]

According to the article North Caucasus Insurgency Attracting Mainly Young and Committed Members written by Mairbek Vatchagaev, today's young fighters join the insurgency also as a result of religious and political motivations. Vatchagaev stresses that is not merely the simple desire for revenge over a wrongdoing or another form of anger at authorities that will drive a person to fight. New young fighters are influenced by internet sites where Chechen militants are displayed as heroes and liberators freeing the homeland from the "kafirs"/infidels. The new recruits enter the struggle driven more by radical religious viewpoints than by a desire for revenge or rebellion.

Vatchagaev also explains that today, although young recruits form the majority of militants they are not the strong inner core. This inner core incorporates the more experienced fighters who can link between the past and the new recruits of the present. There are also no age limits. Both the father of Shamil Basayev and a former Dagestani minister were seventy years old when killed in combat. Those new young recruits who do not have the staying power or enough motivation to endure the hardship of the insurgent's life in the Chechen Mountains do not lose contact with their unit. They continue to provide support (food, operational information) even after they return to their home villages. [50]

Another motivation for recruitment is that of the ethics of family ties which is infused in those living in the highlands of the Caucuses. According to the code of values in the region, it is a matter of family honor to assist a member of the family who is involved in the Chechen resistance.[51]

Training:

From as early as 1998 Bin Laden and al-Qaeda were active in the training of fighters involved in the Chechen arena. The Soviet influence in Afghanistan came to an end in the late eighties and with it any hurdles posed by Soviet forces and Afghan communists. This allowed for Bin laden to train fighters from areas such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Chechnya. Even after Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991 he continued to operate training camps in Afghanistan. Once Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996, al-Qaeda continued to assist Islamist movements in Central Asia, including those from Chechnya. The assistance also involved training Central Asians in Afghan training camps. The role and loyalty fighters from this region played in battles again US led coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom is seen as evidence of this assistance.[52]

In a 2003 report titled, The Afghanistan of Chechnya, Peter Brownfeld claims that the closeness of the Caucasus to Afghanistan meant that training camps had already relocated, or would relocate to Chechnya. In the same report Jean-Louise Bruguiere, a renowned Belgian investigative judge stated, " The Caucuses, and in particular Chechnya, is becoming a base for terrorism." Rohan Gunaratna the author of Inside Al-Qaeda writes that Chechnya and the Pankisi gorge are locations for al-Qaeda training. [53] The possibility of course exists that as al-Qaeda trains its own fighters it also trains Chechens. Although Afghani veterans in the past were very important for the training of Chechens, the Chechens experience of the need has greatly reduced the need for outside training as they can now train themselves.[54]

Funding:

The funding for Chechen fighters has been obtained from several sources. The amounts given by each source also fluctuates according to factors specific to each source. These sources and factors will now be discussed.

Chechen fighters received funds from Islamic charity organizations. One such organization was a US based charity called the Islamic Benevolence Foundation (IBF). Prior to 9/11 the IBF transferred $700,000 to the Chechen cause. Another organization was the Saudi based Internationals Islamic Relief Organization (I.I.R.O.) and the Al-Haramein, an international charity based in Riyadh. [55] However, post 9/11, the Saudi government was more strict in the control of Saudi charities, NGOs and businessman who channeled funds to Chechnya as well as to other places.[56] As mentioned in the above section on recruitment, video footage of attacks as well as audio tapes were distributed around the world. These mediums called not only for fighters but also for finance.[57] In addition, as stated earlier, Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev toured the world to raise funds for the Chechen separatists' efforts after fleeing Chechnya to the Gulf States.[58] A Jordanian of Chechen descent, named Bader al-Din Izadin Bino Shishani, travelled parts of the Muslim world from Indonesia to Morocco raising a reported two million dollars for the Chechen cause. He claimed the money was for humanitarian needs only. Yet an audio tape sold by Shishani to raise funds begins with the sounds of a battle and a call not to forget Chechen Jihadists and their heroism.[59]

Al-Qaeda and other Islamist foundations also funded the fighting in Chechnya. As early as 1989 when al-Qaeda was still a young organization it was channeling funds to the Chechen arena.[60] Al-Qaeda is also reported to have funded Chechnya via a bank in the Gulf area.[61] In 1995 Bin Laden is reported to have given $1500 to Jihadi volunteers who were ready to go to Chechnya.[62] It became far more difficult to transfer funds to Chechnya in the post 9/11 crackdown on terrorist financing. For a similar reason militant Islamists collecting funds in Western countries found it very difficult to transfer the funds through Western banks to Chechnya. In one case funds were raised directly by one of the main leaders of Chechen Jihad. Abu Hafs al-Hurdani was involved in fundraising for the Chechen arena even making such direct efforts as appearing in fundraising videos distributed in Turkey.[63] Chechen fighters also confiscated funds that Russia intended to transfer to the Chechen government. They also extorted funds from Chechen collaborators.[64]

The Islamists who arrived in 1991 from Saudi Arabia brought with them funds which they used for humanitarian purposes thus luring people into the folds of Wahabism and the extremism that it represents.[65]

The Nationality of the Chechen Jihadists:

Apart from Arabs from Saudi Arabia, fighters have also come from North Africa (Algeria and Egypt). Foreign fighters have also arrived from Turkey, Western Europe, Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan, Central Asia and parts of the Russian North Caucasus. Many of the foreign fighters who had been in Bosnia moved to the Chechen arena as a consequence of the conditions of the 1995 Accords. Unfortunately it is difficult to ascertain the exact nationalities of these fighters who moved from Bosnia to Chechnya.[66]

The report, Abu Hafs al-Urdani: The Quiet Mujahid, states that al-Hurdani was in command of eighty foreign fighters most of whom were Arabs and Turks. The report was written in 2005 and says that from 2003 there were as many Turks and Diaspora Chechen Arabs amongst the foreign fighters as there were Gulf State Arabs. There are of course also local Chechens involved in the conflict as can be seen from the section in this report on "Recruitment". The Russian army reported in 2004, that 200 Chechens were training in the Pankisi Gorge along with thirty Turkish speaking fighters.[67]

CONCLUSION:

The Chechen Jihad is one that that will continue to be active as long as Russia refuses to relinquish its grip on the region. It is unlikely to end unless Russia manages to decimate the Jihad's leadership, supplies and recruitment.[68] Russia will continue to fight the Chechen Jihad and the U.S. is likely to maintain its influence on neighboring Georgia to make the movement and operation of Chechen fighters in the Pankisi Gorge ever more difficult. The Jihad in Chechnya is unlikely to end in the near future and it necessitates constant monitoring as Global Jihad continues to be fought throughout the world.

Notes:

[1] Brownfeld P., The Afghanistan of Chechnya, The International Spectator, March 2003

[2] Chechnya Free.RU website, The Nature and Evolution of the Modern Chechen Crisis, as taken from website 29 January 2009 http://www.chechnyafree.ru/en/article.php?IBLOCK_ID=352&SECTION_ID=0&ELEMENT_ID=42441

[3] BBC News, Chechens " Confirm" Warlord's Death, 29 April 2002, as taken from website 29 January 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1957411.stm

[4] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203

[5] La Franiere S., How Jihad Made its Way to Chechnya, The Washington Post, 26 September 2003 as taken from website on 1 April, 2009 http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2003/Jihad-In-Chechnya26apr03.htm

[6] Brownfeld P., The Afghanistan of Chechnya, The International Spectator, March 2003

[7] Global Security.org, Second Chechen War-1999-???, as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya2.htm

[8] Global Security.org, Beslan, North Ossetia, as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya-beslan.htm also in Karon T., Behind the Moscow Theatre Siege, Time CNN, 25 October 2002, as taken from website 1February 2009 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,383909,00.html

[9] BBC News Europe, Country Profiles Regions and Territories: Chechnya, as taken from website 5 April, 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm

[10] The Jamestown Foundation, Rights Activists Say Situation in Chechnya is "Monstrous", North Caucasus Weekly Volume: 8 Issue:5, as taken from website 5 April 2009http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ncw/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32448&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=189&no_cache=1

[11] Kupchinsky R., Chechnya: Stolen Oil and Purchased Guns, Global Security.org as taken from website 6 April 2009 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/10/mil-051025-rferl04.htm also in Vatchagaev M., Oil in Chechnya : A Brief History, The Jamestown Foundation as taken from website 4 April 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4870

[12] Brownfeld P., The Afghanistan of Chechnya, The International Spectator, March 2003 also in CNN Online, Chechen Leader Confirmed Dead, 24 April 1996 as taken from website 5 April 2009 http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9604/24/dudayev/

[13] Brownfeld P., The Afghanistan of Chechnya, The International Spectator, March 2003

[14] BBC News, Obituary: Aslan Maskhadov, 8 March 2005, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/459302.stm

[15] BBC News, Chechen Leader Maskhadov Killed, 8 March 2005, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4330039.stm

[16] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203

[17] Scheuer S., Central Asia in al-Qaeda's Vision of the Anti-American Jihad, 1997-2006, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 2(2006), pp 7

[18] BBC News, Chechens " Confirm" Warlord's Death, 29 April 2002, as taken from website 29 January 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1957411.stm

[19] BBC News, Chechen Rebel Chief Basayev Dies, 10 July 2006, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5165456.stm

[20] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203

[21] Steele J., Shamil Basayev, guardian.uk, 11 July 2006, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/jul/11/guardianobituaries.chechnya

[22] Steele J., Shamil Basayev, guardian.uk, 11 July 2006, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/jul/11/guardianobituaries.chechnyaalso in Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203 also in De Nesnera A., Separatist Leaders have shaped Chechnya's Recent History, NewsVOA.com 5 April 2005 as taken from website 2 February 2009

[23] Al-Shishani, Portrait of a Chechen Mujahid Leader, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 May 2005 as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=399

[24] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-20

[25] The Jamestown Foundation, Abu Omar Reportedly Killed, 15 December 2005 as taken from website 2 February 2009. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ncw/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31223&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=187&no_cache=1

[26] Religioscope, Chechnya: Amir Abu al-Walid and the Islamic Component of the Chechen War, 26 February 2003 as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.religioscope.info/article_88.shtml

[27] Global Jihad website, Al Walid, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1038

[28] McGregor A., Abu Hafs al-Hurdani: The Quiet Mujahid, The Jamestown Foundation, 1 February 2005 as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27481

[29] McGregor A., Death of a Jordanian Mujahid, The Jamestown Foundation, as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3404

[30] Bamford D., Obituary: Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev, BBC News, 13 February 2004 as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3486179.stm

[31] Myers S., Qatar Court Convicts Two Russians in Top Chechen's Death, New York Times, 1 July 2004 as taken from website 2 February 2004 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E6D91338F932A35754C0A9629C8B63

[32]United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Chechnya Current Situation, as taken from website 2 April 2009 http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/alert/chechnya/contents/02-current/

[33] Roggio B., Doku Amarov declares Islamic Caucuses Emirate, The Long War Journal, 29 November 2007 as taken from website 2 April 2009 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/doku_umarov_declares.php

[34] Gunaratna R., Inside al-Qaeda, Columbia University Press, 2002, pp 22

[35] Ibid 234

[36] Gunaratna R., Inside al-Qaeda, Columbia University Press, 2002, pp 92

[37] ibid pp 134-135

[38] ibid pp 135

[39] ibid, pp 5

[40] Williams B., The "Chechen Arabs": An Introduction To the Real Al-Qaeda Terrorists from Chechnya, The Jamestown Foundation, 5 May, 2005 as taken from website 10 February, 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=435

[41] Brownfeld P., The Afghanistan of Chechnya, The International Spectator, March 2003

[42]McGregor A., Death of a Jordanian Mujahid, The Jamestown Foundation, as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3404

[43] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203

[44] Steele J., Shamil Basayev, guardian.uk, 11 July 2006, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/jul/11/guardianobituaries.chechnya

[45] McGregor A., Death of a Jordanian Mujahid, The Jamestown Foundation, as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3404

[46] Religioscope, Chechnya: Amir Abu al-Walid and the Islamic Component of the Chechen War, 26 February 2003 as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.religioscope.info/article_88.shtml

[46] Global Jihad website, Al Walid, as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1038

[47] Al-Shishani, Portrait of a Chechen Mujahid Leader, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 May 2005 as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=399

[48] Vatchagaev M., North Caucasus Insurgency Attracting Mainly Young and Committed Members, The Jamestown Foundation, 15 January 2009 as taken from website 26 January 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=399

[49] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203

[50]Vatchagaev M., North Caucasus Insurgency Attracting Mainly Young and Committed Members, The Jamestown Foundation, 15 January 2009 as taken from website 26 January 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=399

[51]Vatchagaev M., North Caucasus Insurgency Attracting Mainly Young and Committed Members, The Jamestown Foundation, 15 January 2009 as taken from website 26 January 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=399

[52]Scheuer S., Central Asia in al-Qaeda's Vision of the Anti-American Jihad, 1997-2006, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 2(2006), pp 7

[53]Brownfeld P., The Afghanistan of Chechnya, The International Spectator, March 2003

[54]Religioscope, Chechnya: Amir Abu al-Walid and the Islamic Component of the Chechen War, 26 February 2003 as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.religioscope.info/article_88.shtml

[55] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203 also in Williams B., The "Chechen Arabs": An Introduction To the Real Al-Qaeda Terrorists from Chechnya, The Jamestown Foundation, 5 May, 2005 as taken from website 10 February, 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=435

[56]Al-Shishani, Portrait of a Chechen Mujahid Leader, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 May 2005 as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=399

[57] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203

[58] Bamford D., Obituary: Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev, BBC News, 13 February 2004 as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3486179.stm

[59] Working R., War :back home" divides Jordan's Chechen community, The Japan Times Online, 20 December 2001, as taken from website 1 April 2009 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20011220a3.html

[60] Gunaratna R., Inside al-Qaeda, Columbia University Press, 2002, pp 5

[61] ibid pp 64

[62] Williams B., The "Chechen Arabs": An Introduction To the Real Al-Qaeda Terrorists from Chechnya, The Jamestown Foundation, 5 May, 2005 as taken from website 10 February, 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=435

[63] McGregor A., Death of a Jordanian Mujahid, The Jamestown Foundation, as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3404

[64] McGregor A., Abu Hafs al-Hurdani: The Quiet Mujahid, The Jamestown Foundation, 1 February 2005 as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27481

[65] Henkin Y., From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995-2004, Central Asian Survey, March-June 2006, 25(1-2) pp 193-203

[66] Religioscope, Chechnya: Amir Abu al-Walid and the Islamic Component of the Chechen War, 26 February 2003 as taken from website 2 February 2009 http://www.religioscope.info/article_88.shtml also in Williams B., The "Chechen Arabs": An Introduction To the Real Al-Qaeda Terrorists from Chechnya, The Jamestown Foundation, 5 May, 2005 as taken from website 10 February, 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=435

[67] McGregor A., Abu Hafs al-Hurdani: The Quiet Mujahid, The Jamestown Foundation, 1 February 2005 as taken from website 1 February 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27481

[68] Gunaratna R., Inside al-Qaeda, Columbia University Press, 2002, pp 234