ATbar The United Nations Approach to International Terrorism following 9/11
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The United Nations Approach to International Terrorism following 9/11

25/07/2005 | by Kfir, Isaac (Dr.)  

 Abstract

This article is a product of a lecture given by the author as part of the ICT course on Homeland Security. The article explores the United Nations reaction to the events of 9/11, through the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to various reports and panels led by the Secretary-General. The article also looks at the reaction of states to UN-led initiatives on counter terrorism. The paper concludes that the United Nations has accomplished much in the realm of counter terrorism by establishing some useful facilities to encourage international cooperation. However, the UN fails to take any effect action those who continue to support international terrorism, and this detracts from its efforts, cast doubts on its abilities, and prevents international cooperation. [1]

Al-Qaeda's surprise attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 shocked the international community[2] and forced states and international organisations to adapt and adopt new procedures, ideas, and policies in the war against international terrorism.[3]

The United Nations, the premier international organisation, reacted with surprising alacrity to the events of 9/11-the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 (2001), whilst the General Assembly adopted Resolution 56/1,[4] which unequivocally condemned the attack and began a process of dealing with the threat of international terrorism. Resolution 1368 emphasised that states have right to self-defence-as stipulated under Article 51 of the Charter, whilst also calling on the international community to work together to counter the new menace. The resolution effectively justified US action since the attack, which the United States and its Allies saw as creating a 'state of war' against Al-Qaeda.[5]

Prior to 9/11, terrorism was seen by the UN as a national or regional problem within UN. This allowed the organisation to focus on specific instances of terrorism, such as the attempted assassination of President Mubarak, the Lockerbie Bombing, and the bombing of the American embassies in East Africa.[6] Moreover, the organisation largely opted to use sanctions to encourage sponsors or facilitators to abandon their support of international terrorism.[7] The collapse of the Twin Towers made it clear that terrorism is an international problem, forcing the UN to lead a campaign for its eradication.[8] The Security Council-the body entrusted with guaranteeing international peace and security-led this campaign. However, very quickly other UN organs adopted other non-military policies and agendas to deal with international terrorism. Issues addressed included democratisation, the eradication of poverty and disease, money laundering and light weapons proliferation.[9]

Counter-Terrorism Committee & Counter-Terrorism Executive

Directorate

On September 28, 2001, Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and imposed measures against acts of terrorism throughout the world and against the perpetrators, sponsors and facilitators of terrorist acts. The resolution called on members not to provide any financial assistance or physical support to terrorists, it also obligated countries to assist one another through information-sharing, prosecution of terrorists and ratification of international conventions.[10]

The process of implementing Resolution 1373 and thus fulfilling the mandate of the CTC, involves three stages. Stage A examines whether a State has the necessary legislation needed to combat terrorism, with emphasis on terrorist financing. The next stage, (Stage B), explores the entire anti-terrorist programme of the State, examining mainly what the executive machinery is doing to prevent terrorist recruitment, movement, safe-havens and whatever else may assist terrorists or their organisations. The final stage, (Stage C), focuses on monitoring the compliance and implementation of Resolution 1373, which includes ratifying international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, enhance information sharing, etc.[11]

It is worth noting that within the realm of technical assistance, the CTC established two programmes: the CTC Assistance Matrix and the Directory. The Matrix acts as a centralised, comprehensive indicator of States' assistance needs and provides information on assistance programmes known to the CTC. The Directory is a compilation of information on standards, best practices, and sources of assistance in the area of counter-terrorism. These two facilities assist the implementation of 1373 by providing States' with a pool of information.[12]

On March 26, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1535, establishing the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) to reinforce CTC efforts through coordinating the capacity and efforts of international, regional and sub-regional organisations and brokering assistance to those states needing help to meet their 1373 obligations.[13] The work of the CTC and the CTED resulted in the following developments:[14]

* Every member state of the United Nations has submitted a first-round report to the CTC on their efforts to comply with Resolution 1373. Of the 191 members, 161 countries have already responded to requests for additional information. In total, the CTC has received around 550-country reports and many action plans on domestic laws programme revision.

* International, regional, sub-regional institutions have provided the Committee with information on compliance with Resolution 1373.[15]

* Since 9/11, there has been a substantial increase (between 20-40%) in the ratification of counter-terrorism conventions, as seen for example, in the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997) in which membership rose from 28 countries to 115; the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, (1999) saw ratification increasing twenty-fold from five to 117 countries.

* As of March 31, 2004, approximately 100 countries had expressed an interest in technical assistance to fight terrorism.

The CTC and the CTED face many challenges, and progress to date is impressive as countries and international, regional, and sub-regional organisations have submitted reports on progress-or lack of it-vis-à-vis the implementation of 1373; countries and organisations have ratified international conventions relating to terrorism, which assist the formulation and development of a concrete global campaign against international terrorism.

However, there has also been criticism. The CTC itself has criticised the 'Stage' Process as being artificial and a hindrance to its monitoring duties, due to the fact that the 'stages' are interconnected. A better way to determine implementation of 1373, it has been said, is to examine the States' legislative and operational programmes.[16] Moreover, the CTC depends on cooperation, transparency, and even-handedness as it is an intergovernmental entity, with no enforcement mechanism.[17] Finally, the reports themselves vary in their usefulness, as some are pages long providing useful information whilst others are barely a page long, focusing on the state's lack of any counter-terrorism mechanism (also helpful as it provides information and exhibits honesty[18]).

Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism

In October 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism (PWG) to identify the implication and broad policy dimensions of terrorism, in order to enable the UN to prioritise its activities towards terrorism.[19] The PWG called on the United Nations to adopt a tripartite strategy of dissuasion, denial, and cooperation.

Dissuasion

The dissuasion process emphasises the use of international legal instruments such as the protection of human rights,[20] along with the twelve UN conventions on counter-terrorism. States and aggrieved persons must know that there are international norms to aid them in times of injustice, thus discouraging people from turning to violence to settle their grievances.[21] The PWG view is that ratification of UN conventions aides the campaign by uniting states in publicly rejecting terrorism. Dissuasion relies on the wealthier and stronger members supporting the weaker ones, as resolutions, ideas, and programmes amount to nothing without money and political will. The programme of 'Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism,' which began in January 2003 and ends in December 2006 is a good example of dissuasion, as it actively encourages and assists states to ratify international conventions.

Denial

The second leg of the tripartite strategy relies on various organs and ideas of the United Nations. This developed following 9/11, when it became apparent that terrorist organisations are highly creative. Al-Qaeda exhibited incredible sophistication, intelligence and drive in its attack on the US.[22] In the past, terrorists had kidnapped civilian aircrafts and blown them up, when they were on the ground and empty. 9/11 introduced a new type of terrorist-dedicated, and committed to the extent that they would give their lives in an instant-and with the presence and availability of WMDs a new type of playing field emerged, as seen in the anthrax scares following 9/11. Moreover, the PWG stressed the importance of the 'Programme of Action' adopted in July 2001 by the United Nations 'Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects', whose aim is to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. These weapons appeal to terrorists as they are inexpensive, durable, and easy to carry and conceal.[23]

The final piece in the denial programme is the PWG's belief that terrorism is the result of an armed conflict.[24] The PWG, referring to Annan's 2001 report on conflict prevention,[25] emphasised that the UN must be active in conflict (operational) prevention-imminent or actual crisis-and post-conflict peace-building (structural prevention). By dealing effectively with an immediate crisis, the international community forestalls the possibility of terrorists using a crisis to recruit or create a base of operation. Afghanistan was used as a prime example; had the international community taken progressive action in the country following the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban would never have won power. More recently, the continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq and the failure to stem the violence in Iraq has created an 'Afghanistan effect' as young men (many of whom are Europeans) are heading to Iraq to fight coalition forces.[26]

Cooperation

The third leg in the strategy calls for enhanced cooperation. Multilateral and regional organisations launched a host of counter-terrorist initiatives to compliment existing international conventions on terrorism.[27] The PWG looked at the cooperation that exists in the European Union (EU) between the police and the judiciary, which led to such measures as common arrest warrants, common lists of terrorist organisations, routine exchange of information, joint investigative teams, etc.[28] The view being that the greater the cooperation, the greater the reward. This explains why in the past few years, NATO has solidified and intensified its Partnership programme,[29] whilst such organisations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have emerged. In the words of one commentator: "Its participants see the SCO as a potentially important player with regional politics as it had already begun making strides towards integration and promoting security throughout Central Asia during its inaugural year."[30] In Asia, the CTC has provided the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), with guidance and assistance in relation in to 1373.[31] The African Union (AU) reports that since the 1990s-and even more since 9/11-African countries "…have adjusted their national legislation with provisions in their penal codes and in some cases, specific anti-terrorism bills have been articulated to criminalize, punish and suppress crimes of terrorism including the financing, dissemination of information, establishment of associations or groups that support or harbour and encourage participation in terrorist-related activities."[32]

"A More Secure World" - Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change

The Panel 2004 Report, chaired by Anand Panyarachum, the former Thai Prime Minister, explored the challenges faced by the world following the end of the Cold War, the tumultuous 1990s and 9/11. The Report declared that "Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security."[33] The Report therefore focused on such matters as collective security, conflict prevention, terrorism, UN and reform.

The Report claimed that terrorism offends the very nature of the UN Charter because it disregards human rights, the rule of law, and the rules of legal warfare, all of which protect civilians in times of war and peace. The adoption of terrorist methods-indiscriminate attacks that injure both military and civilian populations, violent rhetoric and usage of illegal means to secure funds and materials-mean that terrorist organisations exist outside of normative society and their ways and means oppose the very essence of tolerance and disregard the concept of peaceful resolution of differences.

The Panel in its review contributed to the long-running debate on what is the best way to deal with terrorists, with some-primarily Europeans and members of the developing world-arguing that the international community needs to address the root causes of terrorism. Proponents hold that terrorism arises in situations where there is despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extensive human rights abuses, foreign occupation and weak state control, which hinders the state's ability to control law and order and provide basic services. On the other side are those that subscribe to the American view, which argues that the focus must be on a military solution, in which terrorism is physically destroyed, though as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan there is an interest in creating an effective democratic infrastructure as part of the overall strategy. The argument is that democracies do not support terrorism.

In seeking a solution, the Report built on the recommendations and views expressed by the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, the CTC, CTED, and the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.[34] These UN organs focused on improving the legal mechanism through ratification of international conventions, the creation of better mechanisms to deal with terrorist financing and money laundering, and greater usage of Security Council sanctions against Sudan and the Taliban.[35]

The Panel maintained that since the 'war on terrorism' began, there has been an erosion of the values targeted by terrorists: human rights and the rule of law. The Panel called on States affected by terrorism not only to focus on military means, but also adopt a comprehensive programme, which emphasises the strengthening of human rights and the rule of law. The Panel used the work of the United Nations Development Fund, Arab Human Development Report, as a positive innovation because it promotes debate in the Middle East on the need for gender empowerment, political freedom, rule of law and civil liberties.[36] At the other end of the spectrum, focusing on the developed western world, the Report underlined the importance of transparency to ensure that only groups affiliated with terrorism endure sanctions so as not to upset or cause resentment.[37]

The significance of the High Panel Report is its call for a comprehensive and collaborative effort in combating global security matters, of which terrorism is one aspect, coupled with the urgent need for an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. That is, for the Panel, the international community needs to address the root causes of terrorism, which it holds as being grave human rights abuses, little or no civil and political freedom, poor economic and social facilities, etc.

The Report, unfortunately failed to address the issue that international terrorism-of the Al-Qaeda model-arises out of an ideology that that rejects western secularism and materialism.[38] Moreover, this type of terrorist organisation exists outside of the national let alone international community. Al-Qaeda has neither offices, or headquarters nor recognised delegates compared to other terrorist organisations such as Islamic Jihad, Hamas or Hizbollah.[39] Thus, there is no one to negotiate or discuss matters with, which encourage an aggressive military programme to root out such terrorist threat, whilst other considerations, such as political development receive less attention.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (ODC) leads many of the UN efforts against terrorism. The ODC focuses mainly on technical assistance and advisory services to countries, based on mandates recommended by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (a subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council) and approved by the General Assembly. In other words, the involvement of the ODC ensures the participation of the other principle organs of the United Nations in the war against terrorism. Responsibility for the mandates falls on the ODC Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), created in 1999, which operates within the Division of Treaty Affairs (DTA).[40] The TPB up to 9/11 focused mainly on research and analysis, after 9/11, the TPB took more of a lead in the campaign against terrorism. Thus, the ODC and the TPB have successful pursued such projects as 'Strengthening the Legal Regime Against Terrorism,' which focused on the provision of direct legal advisory services to assist States to incorporate the relevant provisions contained in the twelve universal anti-terrorism conventions and protocols into national legislation.[41] Of the 61 States that have received bilateral assistance from the Branch since the launch of the project in October 2002, 40 have become parties to one or more of the instruments.[42]

The second feature of the ODC's is the work that the Centre for International Crime Prevention provides to national administration adopt measures that enhance cooperation and exchange of information.< style='font-size: 12.0pt;'>[43] Thus, for example, following a request by the Afghan Government to the CTC, the ODC sent technical advisors to Kabul on June 5 to June 12, 2004, to advise the authorities on legislation needed to combat terrorism and transnational crime. The Afghani authorities in their letter to the CTC stated that the country had no laws or administrative measures dealing with terrorism. The ODC experts reviewed the legislation and following requests by the ministries of justice and education, drafted legislation to fight terrorism. They also assisted in the drafting of laws and relevant amendments to the penal code.[44]

The ODC's final involvement in the Global Programme campaign is in the realm of advocacy and prevention and covers such things as, public awareness and civil society mobilisation; public service announcements on prevention; contribution to the ODC's National Profiles; contribution to National Country Strategies; creation of 'best practices' kit.[45]

Conclusion

The United Nations as the leading inter-governmental organisation embraced the challenge of international terrorism following the 9/11. The UN made great strides in developing a comprehensive programme to deal and combat the threat of terrorism, which involves aggressive (quasi-military) policies through the application of Chapter VII (Resolution 1373 and 1566 for example), legal mechanising, financial support and economics.

The major problem with UN efforts is the fixation with semantics, which grows out of its large membership, which demands consensus politics. The General Assembly has been locked in a debate about defining 'terrorism' for over three decades, as it would not permit a definition that equates terrorism with national liberation movements, as seen in Assembly resolutions during the 1970s, which refused to equate those resisting colonial, racist rule or foreign occupation with terrorism.[46] This view has remained in the thinking of several Arab countries (normally those without close ties to the US) and organisations (League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Conference).[47]

The UN must castigate and ostracise states that sponsor terrorism. During the 1990s, Libya's involvement in terrorism and WMDs production led to UN sanctions and after more than a decade of sanctions Libya altered its stance and abandoned its programme of terrorism and pursuit of WMDs.[48] There is clear evidence that Syria and Iran allow terrorist organisations such as the Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad to operate offices and bases in their countries.[49] The UN must take action-debates in the General Assembly and possibly sanctions to get such countries to comply with Resolution 1373. In more extreme cases, if a Taliban type regime emerges again, the UN could adapt Article 6, which authorises the General Assembly, upon recommendations by the Security Council, to expel countries that violate the principles of the Charter, of which supporting terrorism must be one of.

The United Nations has to prove to the wealthy and strong countries that it could be trusted to lead the campaign. The work of the CTC has been commended, as has the speed in which states provided reports to the Committee. The Committee has forged relationships with regional and international organisations in its determination to comply with its 1373 mandate. It has arguably been more successful in getting international organisations to form departments or agencies to deal with terrorism, its sponsorship, finance and existence. Every major IGO has relations with the CTC as seen with the CTC Special Meeting of March 6, 2003 in which the Committee met with 57 international, regional and sub-regional organisations to discuss how to improve cooperation between the CTC and such organisations. Since the Special Meeting, for which participants prepared a short summary of the activities of their respective organisation counter-terrorism,[50] there have been other meetings: CTC-OAS/CICTE Special Meeting, October 7, 2003; CTGC/OSCE/ODC Special Meeting, March 11-12, 2004; CTC/CIS Special Meeting, February 26-28, 2005. The importance of such meetings is that they ensure that the CTC is working closely with other bodies to implement Resolution 1373.

Compliance does not detract from concerns of developed countries about sharing confidential information with the CTC.[51] From the mid-1960s, the United States increasingly felt isolated especially in the General Assembly, as that body adopted policies, conventions, ideas, that the US felt were inimical to its way of life. This led to increasing criticism of the organisation by people such as Daniel Moynihan, Charles Lichenstein and Reagan through Jeane Kirkpatrick.[52]

The United Nations must convince the major powers, and especially the US, as the largest contributor, that information would not be 'leaked' and used for nefarious activities. National intelligence communities must feel secure that information deposited with the UN would not compromise sources or forewarn terrorist organisation of potential operations against them.

When dealing with terrorism, the international community cannot show any weakness or vacillation, which feeds the terrorist crusade, especially as its perpetuators ignore the norms of civil society.[53] A war on terrorism requires commitment and determination if it is to be successful, which explains America's unilateralist stance exhibited in the National Security Strategy, and its views on pre-emption and prevention.[54]

The United Nations must continue to lead, which it could only do by taking a very strong stance against those who support, sponsor, encourage and facilitate terrorism, which would alleviate American concerns and encourage multilateralism. Terrorism is an international problem, which would only be defeated with cooperation between states, regional and international organisations.

About the Author

Isaac Kfir received his PhD. from the London School of Economics in 1999. His thesis explored the impact of the New Right on the Reagan Administration, using the United Nations and UNESCO as test cases. He spent a year as a Research Fellow at the University of Buckingham, where he developed an interest in Law. Thhis led to his enrolment on the Post-graduate Diploma in Law programme at BPP Law School, where he also took the Bar Vocational Course. After a year working as a legal researcher at various City firms, he embarked on a two-year long trip around the world that took him to South America, the Pacific, South East Asia, Africa and the Middle East. During this time, he worked for various NGOs, IGOs, businesses and various education institutions.


Reference

Books

J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington Indiana University Press, 2004.

M. Vicziany, D. Wright-Neville & Regional Security in the Asia Pacific: 9/11 and After.

P. Lentini (ed.) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2004.

D. Cortright & G.A Lopez. The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000

J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy and Force. Vol. I & Vol. II. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988

Articles

C. Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, January-February 2000

C. de Jonge Oudraat, "Making Economic Sanctions Work," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3, Autumn, 2000

A.K Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002/2003.

Kendall Hoyt & "A Double Edge Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,"

Stephen G. Brooks. International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter 2003/2004

Barry R. Rosen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002

M.J Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed," Foreign Affairs, May-June 2003

A.P Schmid, "Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the UN," Terrorism and Political Violence, No. 1-2, Vol. 17, 2005.

J. Dhanapala, "The United Nations' Response to 9/11," Terrorism and Political Violence, No. 1-2, Vol. 17, 2005.

Osman Yavuzalp, "Working with Partners to Fight Terrorism," NATO Review, Spring 2003.

A. C Richard, "The Money Trail: Europe Can Do More to Shut Down Terrorist Funds," International Herald Tribune, March 19, 2004.

P. Beaumont, "Insurgents Trawl Europe for Recruits" The Observer, June 19, 2005.

N. Fielding, "European Terror Network Sends 'Martyrs to Iraq," The Times, June 19, 2005

United Nations Documents

* "Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism"

United Nations Office for Projects Services, FS/GLO/02/R35

* "Note by the Chairman" of the CTC, S/AC.40/2001/CRP.1, October 16, 2001.

* "Prevention of Armed Conflict"-Report of the Secretary General, 2001, A/55/985-S/2001/574

* Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, July 9-20, 2001, A/CONF.192/15

* "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002.

* "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism,"

UN Security Council A/57/273-S/2002/875

* "Index of International, Regional and Subregional Organizations," United Nations Security Council, S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2.

* "A More Secure World"

Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004.

* "Countering Terrorism: Progress and Challenge," United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/2375B, January 2005.

* "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the Problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)"

Security Council CTC, January 26, 2004, S/2004/70. See also:

* "Proposal for the revitalisation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee,"

Security Council CTC, February 19, 2004, S/2004/124.

* "A More Secure World"-Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004; "Terrorism and Human Rights"

Progress Report Prepared by Ms. Kalliopi K. Koufa, Special Rapporteur, Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, June 27, 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31

* "Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime"

Report of the Secretary-General, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, May 23-27, 2005, Vienna Austria, E/CN.15/2005/13.

* Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism-NATO Basic Text, Prague, November 22, 2002.

[1] I wish to thank Professor M.J Peterson of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, for taking the time to read this paper and for her valuable suggestions.

[2] The horror of the attack unified Europe, and even led to support from Castro and Qaddafi who expressed their disgust at the attack. K. von Hippel, "Improving the International Response to Transnational Terrorist Threat," J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

[3] States adopted legislation to counter threats of international terrorism as seen with the Patriot Act, 2002 (USA); Terrorism Act, 2000 (UK); Anti-Terrorism Act, 2001 (Canada), etc. Interpol strengthened its anti-terrorism campaign with the formation of the Fusion Task Force, the OSCE established the Action against Terrorism Unit.

[4] It has been said that because the Security Council acted so quickly over 9/11, that the General Assembly did not need to add to the Security Council Resolutions. J. Dhanapala, "The United Nations' Response to 9/11," Terrorism and Political Violence, No. 1-2, Vol. 17, 2005.

[5] Following the attack NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO), whilst America's allies in the Pacific region invoked Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty. The National Security Strategy of the US (2002) regarded the campaign against international terrorism as 'war' that the US and its Allies must fight and win. The Strategy makes clear that the 'war' against terrorists would not be similar to other campaigns because of the very nature of the opposition-Non-State Actors-and their ways of fighting-targeting civilians. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002.

Available on line at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf 

[6] J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. "Whither Terrorism and the United Nations?" J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

[7] See for example D. Cortright & G.A Lopez. The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. The authors note that sanctions were imposed on Libya to encourage Qaddafi to abandon terrorism, and they worked, as there was marked reduction in Libyan involvement in terrorism.

[8] On the difference between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 terrorism: A.K Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002/2003; On the General Assembly: M.J Peterson, "Using the General Assembly," J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

[9] "A More Secure World"-Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004; "Terrorism and Human Rights"-Progress Report Prepared by Ms. Kalliopi K. Koufa, Special Rapporteur, Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, June 27, 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31

A.K Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002/2003.

[10] "Note by the Chairman" of the CTC, S/AC.40/2001/CRP.1, October 16, 2001.

1373 began a process that saw several more Security Council Resolutions adopted to counter international terrorism.

[11] Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) September 28, 2001.

[12] CTC Directory of Counter-Terrorism Information and Sources of Assistance.

Available on line at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ctc_da/index.html 

[13] See for example: "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the Problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)"-Security Council CTC, January 26, 2004, S/2004/70. See also: "Proposal for the revitalisation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee,"-Security Council CTC, February 19, 2004, S/2004/124.

[14] CTED, "Countering Terrorism: Progress and Challenge," United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/2375B, January 2005.

Available on line at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/CTED_progress_and_challenges.pdf 

[15] "Index of International, Regional and Subregional Organizations," United Nations Security Council, S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2.

[16] "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the Problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)"-Security Council, January 26, 2004, S/2004/70. The report provides other criticism and is available on line at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/219/97/PDF/N0421997.pdf?OpenElement 

[17] "Note by the Chairman" of the CTC, S/AC.40/2001/CRP.1, October 16, 2001.

[18] Some commentators have viewed the reports as a way for states to highlight what they want from the international community K. von Hippel, "Improving the International Response to Transnational Terrorist Threat," J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. The African Union in its report the CTC concludes by stating that implementation of 1373 has "…been constrained by certain prevailing factors in the continent, such as conflict and political instability, diversity in African legal traditions, poverty and poor standard of technology, and budgetary constraints in many member States." "Index of International, Regional and Subregional Organizations," United Nations Security Council, S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2.

[19] "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism," UN Security Council A/57/273-S/2002/875

[20] Terrorism is a violation of human rights-Article 6, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[21] "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism," UN Security Council A/57/273-S/2002/875

[22] There were nineteen active terrorists supported by least a dozen helpers who spent years preparing and training for 9/11 in the full knowledge that they will die, and yet they never wavered. They studied airports and airplanes to determine which is the most vulnerable and which carried the most fuel to maximise the damage (767s). Barry R. Rosen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002.

[23] Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, July 9-20, 2001, A/CONF.192/15.

[24] "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism," United Nations Security Council A/57/273-S/2002/875

[25] "Prevention of Armed Conflict" Report of the Secretary General, 2001, A/55/985-S/2001/574.

[26] P. Beaumont, "Insurgents Trawl Europe for Recruits" The Observer, June 19, 2005; N. Fielding, "European Terror Network Sends 'Martyrs to Iraq," The Times, June 19, 2005.

[27] Osman Yavuzalp-"Working with Partners to Fight Terrorism," NATO Review, Spring 2003; Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism-NATO Basic Text, Prague, November 22, 2002.

[28] "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism," United Nations Security Council A/57/273-S/2002/875

[29] At the Istanbul Summit, the Alliance launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), to promote cooperation in defence and security matters between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

"Istanbul Summit-Reader's Guide" NATO, 2004, ISTRG_ENG1204

[30] P. Lentini, "The Shanghai Cooperation and Central Asia," M. Vicziany, D. Wright-Neville & P. Lentini (ed.) Regional Security in the Asia Pacific: 9/11 and After. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2004.

[31] See for example statement "United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Technical Assistance Programme," by Helene Seligman, Technical Assistance Team, UNCTC to APEC Counter Terrorism task Force, Phuket, August 20, 2003. Available on line at:

[32] "Index of International, Regional and Subregional Organizations," United Nations Security Council, S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2.

[33] "A More Secure World"-Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004.

[34] "A More Secure World"-Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004.

[35] For a good critique of economic sanctions, C. de Jonge Oudraat, "Making Economic Sanctions Work," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3, Autumn, 2000.

[36] "A More Secure World"-Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004.

[37] Americans have been quicker at shutting down charities suspecting at providing-directly or indirectly-funds to terrorists, an approach that brought some criticism from Europe. A. C Richard, "The Money Trail: Europe Can Do More to Shut Down Terrorist Funds," International Herald Tribune, March 19, 2004.

Available on line at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/03/19/edrichard_ed3_.php 

[38] "Al-Qaeda wants the United States, indeed the West more generally, out of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. In bin Laden's view, the United States helps to keep Muslim peoples in poverty and imposes upon them a Western culture deeply offensive to traditional Islam. He blames the United States for the continued suffering of the people of Iraq and for the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." Barry R. Rosen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002.

[39] For example, the US has managed to hold talks with some insurgent groups in Iraq, but no Al-Qaeda. H. Jabar, "UN 'In Talks with Iraq Rebels,'" The Times, June 26, 2005.

[40] The objectives of the DTA are: (a) Fulfil the treaty obligations of the UN Secretariat regarding the international treaties and conventions on drug control and crime prevention. (b) Provide advice and assistance to Governments in formulating, implementing and monitoring treaties, conventions and other internationally binding instruments on drug control, crime prevention and criminal justice, especially in strengthening related legal frameworks, institutional capacity building and international cooperation. (c) Provide advice and assistance to Governments in ratifying and implementing the international legal instruments relating to terrorism, especially in strengthening related legal frameworks, institutional capacity building and international cooperation; (d) Provide necessary services to the member countries and the intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations for dialogue, standard setting and policy formulation on drug and crime issues.

[41] "Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime"-Report of the Secretary-General, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, May 23-27, 2005, Vienna Austria, E/CN.15/2005/13.

"Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism" United Nations Office for Projects Services, FS/GLO/02/R35

[42] "Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime"-Report by the Secretary-General, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Vienna, May23-27, 2005. E/CN.15/2005/13

[43] A.P Schmid, "Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the United Nations," Terrorism and Political Violence, No. 1-2, Vol. 17, 2005.

[44] Note from the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the CTC, March 10, 2003, UN Security Council, S/2003/353.

"Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime"-Report by the Secretary-General, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Vienna, May23-27, 2005. E/CN.15/2005/13 . The report also notes the support given to Paraguay to ratify all UN conventions relating to terrorism.

[45] A.P Schmid, "Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the United Nations," Terrorism and Political Violence, No. 1-2, Vol. 17, 2005.

[46] M.J Peterson, "Using the General Assembly," J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

[47] "Index of International, Regional and Subregional Organizations," United Nations Security Council, S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2; Letter from the Charge of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the CTC, December 21, 2001, UN Security Council, S/2001/1332; Note from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the CTC, December 13, 2001, UN Security Council S/2001/1201; Note from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the CTC, December 26, 2001, S/2001/1323; Note from Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the CTC, March 4, 2002, UN Security Council, S/2002/239.

[48] C. de Jonge Oudraat, "The Role of the Security Council," J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004; D. Cortright & G.A Lopez. The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p107-121.

[49] The Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are terrorist organisations according to US State Department List of foreign terrorist organisation (2004). On Syria, see, "Trail of Terror," The Times, June 22, 2005.

[50] "Index of International, Regional and Subregional Organizations," United Nations Security Council, S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2.

[51] K. von Hippel, "Improving the International Response to Transnational Terrorist Threat," J. Boulden & T.G Weiss. (ed.) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

[52] J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy and Force. Vol. I & Vol. II. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988; D.P Moynihan A Dangerous Place. London. Secker & Warburg, 1979.

[53] For a general view, see: Barry R. Rosen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002. On Biological weapons, see: Kendall Hoyt & Stephen G. Brooks. "A Double Edge Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter 2003/2004.

[54] "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002. Available on line at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. C. Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, January-February 2000; M.J Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed," Foreign Affairs, May-June 2003.