ICT’s Research and Publications include short analyses and in-depth publications on a wide variety of topics including: terrorism, counter-terrorism, homeland security, radicalization process, cyber-terrorism, reviews from Jihadi Websites and insights from our database.
A year has passed since Israel and Gaza last went to war but one of the war's most important lessons has yet to be learned. In its much anticipated report on last summer's Operation Protective Edge, a commission appointed by the UN Human Rights Council virtually ignored the main precipitant and tactical breakthrough of the war: underground warfare.
Is it legal to target political leaders of other nations in times of war? This issue is given virtually no attention in existing legal scholarship. International Humanitarian Law outlines who can be legally killed in wartime, but the legality of targeting political leaders is not addressed. Based on existing legal principles that determine when an individual can be targeted in wartime, I explore how these concepts can inform if and when it is legal to target political leaders.
Tunnels were used by the British Army during World War I, the Vietcong in Vietnam, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and even the rebels during the current conflict in Syria, tunnels have not been seen as a key strategic threat in decades – until they formed the Israeli government’s main justification for Operation Protective Edge this July.
Tunnels have been used as a tactic of war since ancient times, but, unlike other military means and methods which are regulated by international law, tunnels as such are not addressed in the law governing war. Some would interpret this silence as indicating that tunnel warfare does not raise any unique legal issues. Dealing with tunnels, they might argue, does not significantly differ, from a legal perspective, from waging war in urban areas. But it does.
First published in Times of Israel
Various efforts have been undertaken in recent years to clarify the legal framework governing the outsourcing of security and military functions to private actors. While national and international legislation have made little progress, self-regulation has advanced steadily. The article provides the first normative assessment of self-regulation in the private security and military industry – and as such offers interesting insights for other industries that are transnational in reach and under-regulated by domestic, regional, and international law. Though industry critics tend to deplore the normative 'softness' of self-regulation and its voluntary nature, it appears to have shifted behavioral norms and triggered a compliance pull. Its weakness, I argue, lies elsewhere: regrettably, emerging self-regulatory schemes in the industry focus on monitoring (as opposed to sanctioning) and on corporate accountability (as opposed to individual accountability). To overcome these limitations, I suggest the adoption of an OECD-type model of governance for the private security and military industry. The model would combine the use of regional bodies at the monitoring level with an international supervisory body at the sanctioning level. Unlike existing regulatory schemes, the proposed model has the ability to monitor and sanction both corporations and their employees – something none of the proposals currently on the table contemplates.At a time where many industries struggle to find optimal modes of governance, the Article draws attention to an industry where much creativity has been shown. Beyond the lessons learned for the regulation of war and security, the experience of the private security and military industry highlights the potential of a mode of governance that has somewhat fallen out of fashion, the benefits of involving certain non-state actors in law-making, and the need to reflect on the nature of the 'law' thus developed.
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the IHH, its humanitarian structure, its links to terrorism (documented and alleged) and their involvement on the Mavi Marmara.
By A.E. Stahl and Sheena Reiss