



"AND INSPIRE THE BELIEVERS"

Edan Landau, (Researcher, ICT)
26/05/2012

In June 2010, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published the first issue of an English-language magazine. Although this was not the first magazine published by the organization's media branch, Sada Al-Malahem, or by other Al-Qaeda affiliates, this was the first magazine written entirely in the English language and aimed at both Muslims and non-Muslims living in the West. The magazine was named Inspire, with the intention of inspiring its readers to join the cause of global jihad. Although the magazine was intended to be shared over the Internet, it was designed in a graphic manner not so different from that of “normal” Western media publications.

This paper will provide an analysis of the seven issues of the magazine published to date, in light of the agenda of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (hereinafter, AQAP). This will be done by examining the background of AQAP's media establishment and the inception of Inspire itself, as well as by taking a more thorough look at five different elements presented in the magazine, among them AQAP's ideology; various strategies and themes; methods of operation; and knowledge.

* The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).

"AND INSPIRE THE BELIEVERS"

Introduction

In June 2010, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published the first issue of an English-language magazine. Although this was not the first magazine published by the organization's media branch, Sada Al-Malahem, or by other Al-Qaeda affiliates, this was the first magazine written entirely in the English language and aimed at both Muslims and non-Muslims living in the West. The magazine was named *Inspire*, with the intention of inspiring its readers to join the cause of global jihad. Although the magazine was intended to be shared over the Internet, it was designed in a graphic manner not so different from that of “normal” Western media publications.

Inspire magazine is part of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s media foundation, which was established to promote the ideology of the organization. This it accomplishes through various media outlets, including Web-based magazines. The initial staff of *Inspire* included both local Yemeni Muslims and American Muslims, specifically Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, who through their experience and knowledge of the West, edited the magazine to appeal to a Western audience.

This paper will provide an analysis of the seven issues of the magazine published to date, in light of the agenda of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (hereinafter, AQAP). This will be done by examining the background of AQAP’s media establishment and the inception of *Inspire* itself, as well as by taking a more thorough look at five different elements presented in the magazine, among them AQAP’s ideology; various strategies and themes; methods of operation; and knowledge.

The most important of these elements, however, are ideology, strategy and themes. The distinction among the three is thus: while ideology is the most stable within the

organization, strategy is the way the organization executes that ideology, and themes change, usually according to circumstances, as they correspond to strategy. The chapter on ideology will explain Salafi-jihadist ideology as it relates to the ideology of AQAP, as demonstrated in examples from different issues of the magazine, which contain articles supportive of the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, and of conducting jihad in general. The strategy chapter will be based on both previously-published research and articles from the magazine, and will revolve around the global fight against the US with the intention of freeing all occupied Muslim land, the fight against the Yemeni government, and the fight against the Shiites. The chapter discussing the themes presented in *Inspire* will draw on those covered by the seven issues of the magazine analyzed, among them the need for individual jihad, as presented by Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, and the myth of the martyr. As noted, these themes, unlike strategies, changed according to events in Yemen as well as trends in global jihad.


All seven issues of *Inspire* magazine published interviews and speeches of Al-Qaeda's leaders. While some were exclusive interviews with prominent leaders, others were reprints of previous publications, some even several years old. This paper will show how the content provided by AQAP's leaders was used to fit *Inspire*'s themes and current events.

This paper will also show how the authors and editors of the magazine have been providing its readers with the specific knowledge and modus operandi for carrying out the strategies of AQAP. The analysis will focus on terrorist operations as described and explained in the issues of the magazine. An in-depth review of operating manuals, ways of joining jihad, and Do-It-Yourself bomb-making instructions will serve as the final chapter of this paper.

Background

AQAP's Media Structure

An internal analysis conducted by the Jihadi Website Monitoring Group (JWMG) at the ICT has identified several characteristics of global jihad's communication components. For example, the analysis established that most, if not all, of Al-Qaeda's media outlets are organized in a similar manner. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's media department was established in 2008 in this manner – that is, according to a structure that includes a communications committee responsible for the message intended to be disseminated, and media foundations, which are responsible for various publications, platforms, and forum



Source: ICT memo on global jihad media structure, 2011.

rooms. The communications committee is headed by Hasan Abu Salah, who is also in charge of the Sada Al-Malahem media foundation, which is responsible for publishing the leadership's speeches, producing videos, claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks, and publishing the magazines *Al-Malahem* (Arabic) and *Inspire* (English). The publications

produced by the media foundation are then disseminated to the consumer, whether he be a mujahid in one of the arenas of jihad or a Muslim living in the West in the process of being radicalized, through social networks, blogs, jihadist forums, jihadist or file-sharing Websites, and other platforms.

Inspire Magazine

In 2008, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, more commonly known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or AQAP, founded a media institution called “Sada Al-Malahem” (The Battles), through which it publishes a periodical called *Al-Malahem* (Echo of the Battles),¹ videos, audio tapes, official announcements and other publications. In June 2010, AQAP’s media institution produced a new jihadist magazine in English, called *Inspire*, and posted it on jihadist Web forums. This online publication was apparently aimed at American and British readers, with the intention of building on recent successes in the radicalization of Western citizens.² To date, only seven issues have been published, with an average of 60-odd pages per issue. The issues of *Inspire* are consistent in form, except for two special issues. Each issue of the magazine, to date, has had a central theme that was the focus of the articles, whether they were original and exclusive or transcriptions and translations of older writings and publications. The editors of *Inspire* tried to keep to current events, as evidenced in the second issue addressing the situation in Yemen, the fifth issue addressing the Arab Spring, and the sixth issue addressing the assassination of Osama bin Ladin. Of the two special editions published during the magazine’s life span so far, the first of these, issue three, extensively addressed what is referred to as “Operation Hemorrhage” (the so-called cargo plane plot), and the second of these, issue seven, published on the tenth anniversary of 9/11, reflected on a decade of operations against the West.

Each issue of *Inspire* magazine is divided into several sections, which address ideological, strategic, tactical, religious and propaganda issues through articles and interviews with Al-Qaeda leaders and the republication of materials posted on jihadist Websites and in audio-visual publications. An issue's main article, whether it is original and exclusive to the magazine or taken from a previous publication, usually refers to current events. For example, Ayman Al-Zawahiri's article on "Short and Long-term Plans after Protests" dates to 2007, yet was published recently in *Inspire* as being relevant to the Arab Spring.³ The regular sections of the magazine include the editor's column, news briefs, and reactions to *Inspire* in the Western world. Other sections include articles intended to recruit new members to global jihad, as well as a section on the use of weapons, homemade explosive devices and their usage, and ways of joining fighters in the different arenas of jihad.

***Inspire* Production Staff**

The first issue of *Inspire* did not include a masthead. However, as new issues were published, it became obvious that certain writers and contributors were "regulars". Although more than ten different writers can be named, including prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda such as Osama bin Laden, most of the articles published were either translations or re-postings of material previously published on jihadist Websites. However, three main individuals can be identified as having a more permanent role in the publication of *Inspire* magazine.

- Yahya Ibrahim: Yahya Ibrahim is considered to be the editor of *Inspire* magazine. However, it wasn't until the fifth issue of the magazine, published during the Spring of 2011, that his name was associated with the position of editor. As for his biography, little is available on the Internet or through academic sources as to his origins, date of birth, and personality. If we are to assume that Ibrahim was the editor of *Inspire* from the start, we may note that his writings focus on explaining the reasoning behind the actions of Al-

Qaeda. Besides editing the section of letters to the editor, some of his more important writings include an article regarding the demand of Western countries that Muslim women be prohibited from covering their face with the niqab;⁴ an article regarding the attempt to bomb cargo planes in October 2010;⁵ and an article praising the 9/11 attacks, included in the special issue of *Inspire* dedicated to the tenth anniversary of those attacks.⁶

- Samir Khan: Samir Khan was a US citizen from Charlotte, North Carolina, who became an editor and one of the most vocal writers against the West in *Inspire* magazine. Khan was born as Samir ibn Zafar Khan in 1986 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a family of Pakistani descent. At the age of nine, his family immigrated and settled in Queens, New York. After 9/11, Khan started his own blog and Websites, which supported Al-Qaeda, before moving to Yemen to study Arabic.⁷ Khan's affiliation with *Inspire* only became clear in the second issue of the magazine, when he published an article titled "I Am Proud to Be a Traitor to America." In the subsequent issues of the magazine, his role as an editor and writer became more prominent, as the magazine displayed a more uniform style of writing. Samir Khan was killed alongside Anwar Al-Awlaki in Yemen on the 30th of September 2011, raising questions as to the continuation of *Inspire* magazine.
- Anwar Al-Awlaki: Anwar Al-Awlaki was born in New Mexico in 1971 to Yemenite parents. After coming under suspicion for being a spiritual advisor to three of the 9/11 attackers, he moved to Yemen in 2004, where he was detained by the local authorities for allegedly being involved in a terrorist plot.⁸ Anwar Al-Awlaki's name made headlines in connection with the terrorist attack carried out by Nidal Malik Hassan at the Ft. Hood military base in Texas in November 2009, and with the attempt by Nigerian Omar Faruq Abd Al-Mutallab to blow up an American passenger plane on Christmas Day 2009. In November 2009, the US declared Al-Awlaki to be a wanted man.⁹ After surviving several attempts on his life, he was killed in a US drone strike in western Yemen on 30 September

2011. Al-Awlaki is often mentioned on jihadist forums, and his stature amongst Web surfers and global jihad organizations is on the rise. Al-Awlaki's involvement in *Inspire* magazine was evident from the first issue, which carried the transcription of a message by him to CNN.¹⁰ However, his more direct involvement became apparent in the second issue, where he wrote a refutation of the Mardin Declaration.¹¹¹² Although he was influential in determining the content of the magazine, and although a call for questions to him was also made in the issues of the magazine, Al-Awlaki only managed to publish one more exclusive article before his death; it appeared in the fifth issue, and addressed the Egyptian people in regards to the Arab Spring.¹³

Leading Ideologies

When considering the ideology guiding Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), only one best fits the organization. AQAP, strategically, is very similar to other Salafi-jihadist groups, which hold that violent jihad against the West and alleged apostate regimes is the only way of achieving their objectives.¹⁴ In his book, *Jihad*, Kepel (2002) states that the term "salafism" represents a school of thought dating to the late 19th century, which was a reaction to the spread of European ideas. The Salafists were fundamentalists of Islam, and against all innovation. They respected the texts in their most literal form – including expressing an absolute commitment to jihad.¹⁵ Lia (2010) adds that other Salafist traits include an obsession with God's oneness [tawhid]; a rejection of human rationality; and an extreme exclusiveness and hatred of other schools of Islam. The Salafists may be divided into two extremes: sticklers who follow doctrinal purity even at the cost of alienating allies who share with them a common enemy (such as the Zionist-Crusader enemy); and hard-line jihadists and military strategists who are focused on political outcomes. Amongst these strategists is Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri, who is also a writer and theorist. Until his capture in 2005, Al-Suri was considered

one of the most outspoken voices in the jihadist camp. His view of jihadist ideology has four main sources: 1) the principles of al-hakimiyyah [God's sovereignty on earth], as set down in the organizational program of Sayyid Qutb; 2) the belief in loyalty and disavowal (al-wala' wal-bara') in the doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya and the Salafiyya; 3) the jurisprudential and doctrinal heritage of the Wahhabite sect; and 4) basic elements of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology.¹⁶

The Salafi-jihadist ideology is very apparent throughout the issues of *Inspire* magazine. First and foremost, it is represented in the republication of the writings of Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri, under the title, "The Jihadi Experience", in which the different schools of jihad, secret military organizations, open front jihad and overt operations, and individual jihad, are extensively discussed. This particular section is also used to argue that the weakness of various organizations is caused by the fundamental and revolutionary change of the times, which has altered the course of history, present time and consequently the future.¹⁷

Another example of the Salafi-jihadist ideology can be found in the second issue of the magazine, where Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaki wrote an extensive reply to the New Mardin Declaration. Al-Awlaki felt that the new declaration, which came to re-interpret the fatwa written by Ibn Taymiyyah, was an insult to Islam, as it ignored the current state of the ummah [Muslim nation] and the destruction of the last Islamic caliphate. He further spoke out against the call to refrain from terrorism and jihad, stating that only with jihad would there be justice for Islam.¹⁸ In another article, Al-Awlaki discussed the importance of jihad to one's wealth, also stating that jihad today is fard'ayn [individually obligatory] and that the governments of the Muslim world have lost legitimacy because they govern according to man-made laws and take disbelievers as allies.¹⁹

Strategies

As part of the Sada Al-Malahem media foundation, it might be expected that *Inspire* would echo AQAP's strategies. Before examining this aspect of the magazine, it is important to fully understand the organization's strategies. AQAP's initial goal was to seek legitimacy within the region, while trying to focus its efforts against the Yemeni regime as any armed resistance would. This was achieved by combining different grievances into a single narrative, according to which jihad remained the only solution.²⁰ However, in the years following the establishment of AQAP, and due to the roots it set down in Yemen, its narrative started shifting outward to include the Saudi regime and Western targets. This change in strategy was made clear by the attempt on the life of Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, in August 2009; attacks on foreigners inside Yemen, including the bombing of South Korean tourists in Spring 2009; attacks on Western embassies and dignitaries; and attacks on west-bound airliners and cargo planes. This shift in strategy may be attributed in part to a transition from traditionally local grievances, to an attempt to channel those grievances into a single narrative of illegitimate governance and Western expansion throughout the Arabian Peninsula.²¹

Throughout the seven issues of *Inspire* reviewed here, certain main strategies are apparent. These recurring strategies resemble and resound with those of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's strategies, yet it would seem, as *Inspire* is printed in the English language, that their focus is more on issues external to the Arabian Peninsula. The strategies propounded by the magazine include a constant call to engage in jihad that targets the West, with an emphasis on an economic war of attrition; a reminder of the importance of waging battle against the current rulers and monarchs of the Muslim world; and a reminder of the continued fight against the Shiites. *Inspire* portrays these recurring strategies in various ways, ranging from editorials, to the republishing of older content and speeches by Al-Qaeda leaders, through new and exclusive interviews with leaders and fighters to dedicated sections

of the magazine, and culminating in jihadist posters. That being said, this change in strategies has not in any way affected the importance of local issues.

Jihad against the West

The strategy of jihad against the West was clear from the first issue of *Inspire*. This specific strategy is the most repetitive and most emphasized of the three strategies cited above. It was made manifest in claims of responsibility for acts of terrorism by AQAP, such as the operation of Omar Faruq Abd Al-Mutallab (a failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009)²² and Operation Hemorrhage (an attempt to down two cargo aircraft in October 2010);²³ and in articles that explained the importance of jihad against the West and called for more attacks. Articles pertaining to jihad against the West included interviews with the leadership of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; transcripts of previously-published speeches by Al-Qaeda's leaders; a whole section of the magazine dedicated to providing tools for jihad; and articles discussing the issue of economic jihad.

The first, second and fifth issues of *Inspire* magazine featured exclusive interviews with the top echelon of AQAP, in which they laid out their goals and strategies. Sheikh Abu Basir, then-head of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, addressed the issue of attacking the US through a discussion of the attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009. He explained the reasoning behind this attack as a response to the West's aggression and occupation of Muslim nations. This strategy bears the fruit of causing economic loss to the US by requiring it to develop enhanced security measures; instilling widespread fear in the American public and amongst air travelers; and setting an example for Muslim youth the West.²⁴ Sheikh Abu Sufyan, then AQAP's second-in-command, stated the imperialistic and crusader-like goals of the US and Israel, while addressing the need for Muslim youth in the West to perform hijra [immigrate to Muslim lands] or fight jihad in the

West.²⁵ In an interview with AQAP's military commander, Sheikh Abu Hurairah, the issue of jihad against the West was posited as a call to western Muslims to take up arms and retaliate against the killing of Muslims worldwide.²⁶

Transcripts of previous speeches by Al-Qaeda leaders were used even more extensively to present the strategy of jihad against the West. Some discussed the need to punish the West for its defamation of Islam, by causing Muslims in the West to realize that jihad is the only realistic solution to the problem of Muslim humiliation.²⁷ A direct message to Muslims in the West, similar to those of Adam Gadahn²⁸ and Anwar Al-Awlaki, several of whose appeals appear in the issues of the magazine, states:

“Any nation that enters into war with the Muslims, or participates in invading a Muslim land has by de facto [sic] become Dar al-harb. Therefore all of the Western nations that have an active participation in the occupation of Afghanistan of Iraq or any other Muslim land are considered to be Dar al-harb.”^{29,30}

The seventh and, to date, the last issue of *Inspire*, further emphasized the importance and success of global jihad by portraying in photographs the blows struck against the West. This particular issue was published on the tenth anniversary of 9/11, and focused on references to attacks against the West, including 9/11 itself, the Madrid and London bombings, the Ft. Hood attack by Nidal Hassan, the Times Square attack, and the attempted bombing of the cargo planes.³¹

However, *Inspire* magazine does not limit itself to calling for jihad against the West and providing legal and moral justification for such a jihad. The magazine also provides its audience with tools, or rather knowledge, for actually conducting individual jihad. This will be discussed in detail in the knowledge chapter of this analysis. It is worth noting here, however, that except for the two special issues of *Inspire*, issues three and seven, each of the other five issues of *Inspire* included the Open-Source Jihad section, whose contents included

information on bomb-making techniques, training with automatic weapons, encryption, and ideas for making killing machines.³²³³³⁴³⁵³⁶

Yet it would seem that when discussing the strategy of jihad against the West, the method most revered by the magazine was that of economic jihad. This subject received special attention from the authors and editors of *Inspire*, primarily when they explained the benefits of attacking American assets. Operation Hemorrhage and its coverage in issue three of the magazine best exemplifies this. The authors more than once point out the low cost of the operation – \$4,200 – and the high cost to Western economies.³⁷ In its coverage of the attacks against the West and especially those of 9/11, as noted, the seventh issue cites the relatively low costs of execution and the high cost to Western economies.³⁸

The Fight against the Yemeni Government

As part of its attempt to receive legitimacy for its actions, AQAP has worked to position itself as protector of the people of Yemen from the corrupt Saleh regime. The organization claimed that public sentiment demanded it act against corruption, lack of public services, government disinformation, unequal distribution of profits from natural resources, and security ties with the US. AQAP viewed the regime as neither representative of its people nor of Islam, and attributed both of these failings to the concept of al-wala wal-bara (which determines who is a friend and who an enemy, and delineates total separation between Muslims and non-Muslims).³⁹

Inspire magazine has repeated these messages against the Yemeni Saleh regime in several of its issues, mostly in interviews with the local leadership of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In the first issue, then-head of AQAP Abu Basir pointed out that the president of Yemen was lying for the purpose of extorting money from the US.⁴⁰ Issue three focused on cooperation between the Arab rulers in general and the Yemeni regime specifically,

emphasizing the failed-state situation in Yemen in a full-page poster or “advertisement”.⁴¹ In an interview with *Inspire*, Abu Hurairah, the military commander of AQAP, described both the Yemeni regime and the Saudi monarchy as disbelievers, whom Allah had commanded him to fight. It should be noted that AQAP targets both the Yemen and Saudi regimes on and off the Web, and views them both as corrupt and illegitimate.⁴²

Inspire magazine did not limit its attack on the Saleh presidency to interviews, but also covered actual ground operations. Issues two and four presented readers of the magazine with detailed descriptions and photographs of several operations and the reasoning behind them. In a pictorial article titled, “The Operations of Abyan in Images”, the author showed a series of attacks on Yemeni military forces in Abyan Governorate.⁴³ Issue four gave a first-hand account of other operations in the region, provided by one Abu Zakaria Al-Eritri. While Al-Eritri did not explain why these attacks took place, he did depict the Yemeni soldiers and regime as enemies of Al-Qaeda and Islam.⁴⁴

Fighting the Shiites

Another leading strategy of AQAP is the fight against the Shiite population in northern Yemen. As with presentation of the previous two strategies, this strategy was presented in several interviews with AQAP leaders. Although this strategy is not as appealing to Western media as are jihad targeting the West and attempts at regime change in Yemen, AQAP does view it as an important part of its Salafi-jihadist ideology. In an interview in the second issue of *Inspire*, Abu Sufyan Al-Azdi, the deputy emir of AQAP, stated that as written in the Quran, polytheists, including Shiites, are amongst the worst enemies of Islam. In Al-Azdi’s view, they are aligned with the US against all Sunnis, which is why AQAP must follow in the footsteps of Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi in fighting them.⁴⁵ This same view was echoed by Abu Huraira in an interview appearing in issue five of *Inspire*, in Spring 2011.⁴⁶ Issue four

provided an even closer look at this subject, through the editor's column and AQAP's official claim of responsibility for operations against the Shiite population of Yemen. Here again, the magazine claimed that an alliance against the Muslim ummah [nation] exists among the "Zionist-Crusaders", the apostate Yemeni regime, and the Shiites. In claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks against Shiites in Al-Jawf and Saada, AQAP reasoned that they were conducted to defend Ahl As-Sunnah [the Sunnis] from Iranian expansion into Yemen.⁴⁷

Themes of *Inspire*

Unlike the ideology and strategies presented in *Inspire*, which remained constant, the themes presented throughout the seven issues of the magazine addressed here changed and were adapted to current events at the time of publication. (Some of the themes followed the suit of the strategies discussed in the previous chapter, and did remain constant.)

One of the recurrent themes was that of the importance of individual jihad. This theme was best portrayed in the writings of Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri, who emphasized the importance and success of individual and small-cell terrorism. His writings place him within the school of jihad that targets the US and its allies, and ascribes legitimacy to attack on civilians, as well as on the leaders and security forces of Muslim countries. According to Al-Suri, the characteristics of individual jihad are use of assassination; small, covert cells; the achievement of military success by creating anxiety; actions that security forces find hard to foil; successful, ongoing recruitment of operatives; and a tendency to embarrass the enemy.⁴⁸⁴⁹⁵⁰⁵¹⁵²

Al-Suri's articles were not the only means of promoting this theme, however. Individual jihad was also present in articles by AQAP leaders, such as Anwar Al-Awlaki⁵³ and Abu Sufyan Al-Yazdi,⁵⁴ and articles covering individual operations such as the

Roshonara Choudhry martyrdom in Sweden.⁵⁵ The theme of individual jihad is congruent with both Salafi-jihadist ideology and the strategy of jihad against the West.

As current events in the Middle East and the Muslim world unfolded, *Inspire* adapted its themes to correspond to them. Two major events, while similar yet separate, provide an obvious example. The first was coverage and support of the uprising in Yemen. This was most apparent in the second issue, which covered operations in Abyan Governorate,⁵⁶ and published a call made by Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri to the people of Yemen to free Yemen.⁵⁷ Issue three, which covered the attempted downing of cargo planes with devices originating in Yemen, specifically mentions former Yemen president Ali Abdullah Saleh as a target of the operation.⁵⁸ The second event which caused *Inspire* to adapt was the Arab Spring. Issue five, titled “The Tsunami of Change”, was dedicated to this theme and featured articles, some new and some several years old, by prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda Abu Yahya Al-Libi⁵⁹ and Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri,⁶⁰ AQAP leaders Ibrahim Al-Rubaysh⁶¹ and Anwar Al-Awlaki,⁶² and other figures identified with global jihad ideology, such as Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.⁶³

The myth of the martyr and the divine reward that awaits him may also be considered a major theme of *Inspire* magazine. Issue six of the magazine was published only a few months after the assassination of Osama bin Laden, making it possible to feature the subject of martyrdom and all that it encompasses. *Inspire* did so through a series of articles, or rather obituaries for fallen mujahideen, depicting their ultimate sacrifice and the rewards of the afterlife.⁶⁴ Samir Khan, an editor of the magazine, also wrote an article glorifying Bin Laden, martyrdom, and the fruits of successful jihad in paradise.⁶⁵ The sixth issue also featured graphic illustrations and hymns to the glory of shuhada’ [martyrdom]. One such illustration showed a pristine stairway to heaven and a quote from the Prophet Muhammad,⁶⁶ and another showed a bed of flowers illuminated by the night sky with the legend, “Progeny of the Exceptional”.⁶⁷ A similar message had also appeared in the magazine’s first issue, which

featured a poem with lines such as “The martyr who fights and dies on the path of Allah, undoubtedly has the greatest chance of meeting his Lord as a victor. So what will your excuse be for restraining yourself from Paradise?”⁶⁸ Yet it is a transcript from one of Al-Awlaki’s lectures, which was printed in the second issue, that best illustrates the theme of martyrdom and its rewards. In the lecture, Al-Awlaki explained the differences between jannah [Eden] and dunya [the world] – that is, between the everlasting [akhira] and the temporary, respectively. He further pointed out the qualities of the permanent afterlife, such as a sense of purity, compared to the worthlessness of the temporary world we live in during this life.⁶⁹

Another theme arising from the pages of the magazine, which is somewhat subtle but nevertheless recurrent, is the call to free Palestine. This theme is reflected in quotes from the leaders of Al-Qaeda, general references, and graphic posters. The first issue quoted a message from Osama (bin Laden) to (Barack) Obama, in which the former bound the fate of the US with the liberation of Palestine versus continued support for Israel. Also, many references to the subject were made by Anwar Al-Awlaki.⁷⁰ However, most of the references to the Palestinian issue appear in collages of pictures depicting the atrocities of the occupation and graphic posters, mainly on the back page of the magazine. These posters carry messages such as “Al-Aqsa: The March Is On;”⁷¹ or show a picture of a dead child with the caption “Your Child. Our Child;”⁷² or a graphic image with the caption “Palestine... peer into the fog of death;”⁷³ or an illustration of the map of Palestine (Israel) made of and filled with words of conflict, under the title “Palestine Speaks a Thousand Words.”⁷⁴

Operation Coverage and Modus Operandi

Inspire magazine used two different ways to show its involvement in the operational side of jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. It would either publish official claims of responsibility, by

AQAP, for operations against domestic and foreign targets, or it would publish coverage of an attack in great detail. By utilizing either tactic, the magazine's authors demonstrated their direct involvement in and connection to the leadership, both organizational and operational, of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Claims of responsibility are translated from Arabic into English and posted on English-language jihadist Websites, along with the original Arabic, only to be republished in the magazine. Although the claims of responsibility are not new, they serve two purposes: to inspire other individuals to join jihadist movements, and to show the Muslim audience that AQAP is operating in accordance with its ideological and strategic goals.

Already in its first issue, *Inspire* magazine published an official claim of responsibility for the 2009 Christmas Day attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by Omar Faruq Abd Al-Mutallab.⁷⁵ Although the attack took place at least six months before the publication of the first issue, the editors and authors of *Inspire* deemed it important to convey their support for such operations as part of jihad against the West. Their subsequent operational coverage, however, was more up-to-date, although some articles did cover operations from the past from the point of view of mujahideen. The purpose of this coverage was to increase the motivation of those pondering the issue of joining jihad, by giving the story a personal angle. One such article was the story of Uthman Al-Ghamidi, who spent time in Afghanistan with Osama bin Laden, was incarcerated in Guantanamo, and later traveled to the Arabian Peninsula to rejoin Al-Qaeda.⁷⁶ Another example is a series of three articles from a book by Sheikh Abu Mus'ab Al-Awlaki titled, "Why Did I Choose al Qaeda?", in which Al-Awlaki describes, through his personal experiences, the qualities of the organization.⁷⁷⁷⁸⁷⁹ Other coverage of jihad operations included those dedicated to the Yemeni arena, like the article "The Jihad in Abyan",⁸⁰ and a military report of AQAP operations during a given period of time.⁸¹

However, two operations received a wider and more in-depth review by the editors of *Inspire*, which in turn revealed the modus operandi of the organization: operations in Abyan Governorate, and “Operation Hemorrhage”, the attempted bombing of two US-bound cargo planes. The article regarding AQAP’s operations in Abyan Governorate, Yemen, contained a series of pictures already published by Al-Malahem through other media outlets, such as Web forums. The pictures show several of the methods of operation used by AQAP in Yemen against government targets, one of which involves raids conducted at first light by vehicle-mounted assault teams combined with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Another tactic described is the hit-and-run attack on a military checkpoint or outpost. Yet another is the use of IEDs targeted at military and government vehicles and officials.⁸²

The second and more detailed operation received a special edition of *Inspire*, titled “\$4,200”, after the cost of the operation intended to down two US-bound cargo planes. The coverage of the operation started with an editorial, and publication of the official claim of responsibility by AQAP. It should be noted that in this issue and in the claim of responsibility, AQAP claimed that it had downed a UPS cargo plane in Dubai,⁸³ although there was no conclusive evidence to that effect.⁸⁴ The third issue of the magazine was divided into articles which dealt with different aspects of the operation, starting with its objectives and continuing to planning and budgeting, including a detailed description of the explosive devices, accompanied by photographs. According to the head of AQAP’s foreign operations, the objective of this operation was “...not to cause maximum casualties but to cause maximum losses to the American economy” – the strategy of economic attrition previously mentioned.⁸⁵ The most informative article however, was one translated from the Arabic, titled, “Technical Details”, written by Ikrimah Al-Muhajir of the explosives department of AQAP. The article describes how the operatives of the organization gathered intelligence about the bomb detection techniques used by airport security at cargo terminals, as well as about detection

equipment such as metal detectors, sniffers and X-ray equipment, in order to determine the best approach to placing an explosive device on a plane. The article goes on to describe the type and exact amount of explosives used, as well as how they were concealed inside the printer cartridges.⁸⁶ Lastly, a cost-benefit analysis was conducted by the magazine's editor, Yahya Ibrahim, in which he broke down the cost of the explosive devices to a mere \$4,200, which was designed to cause Western transport security agencies to spend far larger sums of money to counter such threats.⁸⁷

Knowledge

In all of the issues of *Inspire* magazine analyzed here, information was provided to homegrown or "lone wolf" terrorists. The section containing this information is titled "Open-Source Jihad"; it is a collection of resources for those who intend to join jihad or are thinking of doing so. The section has covered bomb-making techniques, security measures, guerrilla tactics, weapons training, and all other jihad-related activities. This section enables an individual to train at home, rather than risking dangerous travel to a foreign country.⁸⁸

Joining Jihad

Inspire published a four-part series of articles by Mukhtar Hassan for those interested in joining the fight in the lands of jihad. The first article was published in the first issue of the magazine, and focused on psychological preparedness to avoid confusion, shock, and depression. To this end, the main points of the article dealt with language barriers, companionship, culture blending, and the items one should and shouldn't bring to jihad.⁸⁹ The second installment in the series dealt with preparing for life in a training camp, and discussed the living conditions, daily life, and the importance of secrecy.⁹⁰ The third installment was

geared to preparing potential recruits for being under attack and sustaining injury. This part described in great detail the physical and psychological effects of an aerial attack, as well as the recommended behavior once injured. It also explained the importance of khidma [service], providing service to other fighters.⁹¹ The fourth and final installment in this series gave a brief overview of what capabilities would be expected from and recommended for a trainee at a training camp.⁹²

Operating Manuals

The operating manuals presented in *Inspire* are divided into weapons training, encrypted communication, and operational security. While there is no substitute for physical weapons training, the AK-47 training manual provided by Abu Saleh is extensive. Issues four through six of the magazine provided the reader with an overview of the weapon and its parts,⁹³ explained how to disassemble and reassemble it for the purpose of cleaning and maintenance,⁹⁴ and offered advice on shooting stances and techniques.⁹⁵ In the first issue of *Inspire*, an author provided a detailed explanation of the use of the Asrar Al-Mujahideen encryption program, including recommendations for operational security. This specific program enables users to communicate safely by blocking Western intelligence agencies from intercepting the content of their messages.⁹⁶ In the second issue of *Inspire*, the editor, Yahya Ibrahim provided a list of security tactics for operating inside the US, including warnings regarding informants, unknown individuals posing as jihadists, and overseas travel with the intention of joining the mujahideen in one of the arenas of jihad. Other tips included building a cover story, not keeping jihadist material, and getting information from non-Islamic Websites that monitor global jihad.⁹⁷

“DIY”

Another feature of *Inspire* magazine which attracted foreign media interest was the “Do It Yourself” section presented by “The AQ Chef”. Although most of the information provided in the different issues of the magazine has been available online for the past two decades, the articles caused alarm among the Western intelligence community and the public. The copies of this material provided by *Inspire* were geared for Muslims living in countries such as the US and UK, and showed the ease with which any individual could assemble an explosive device. In the first issue of the magazine, the author stipulated that the purpose of this section would be to provide the Muslim interested in defending the ummah [nation] against the war being waged by Western governments with military training, “right into your kitchen to relieve you of [the] difficulty of traveling to us”.⁹⁸ The first “recipe” was for a homemade pipe-bomb with a timer,⁹⁹ and the second issue described the ease and simplicity of transforming a pickup truck into “the ultimate mowing machine” by welding steel blades to the front end of the truck and driving it into a large crowd.¹⁰⁰ The next installment in this series focused on methods and techniques of destroying a building with a mechanical explosion, by igniting gas leaked into the weak sections of the building’s structure.¹⁰¹ The last “recipe” for a homemade device – acetone peroxide – was provided by a Dr. Khateer. His article cited the advantages and disadvantages of explosives, alongside a list of available ingredients, and gave an example of their use by Palestinian terrorist groups.¹⁰²

Conclusions

This paper analyzed and compared the seven issues of *Inspire* magazine published to date, by examining the magazine in light of five main subjects: ideology, strategies, themes, operations coverage, and knowledge imparted. The magazine, which debuted in the Summer

of 2008, was part of a more elaborate scheme devised by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). *Inspire* was part of the Sada al-Malahem media foundation, which serves as the voice of AQAP, both in and outside of Yemen. While the magazine was produced mainly by American nationals Anwar Al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, the media foundation, through Yahya Ibrahim and the leaders of AQAP, offered a guiding hand. This well-organized and colorful magazine served as a propaganda tool for spreading the ideas of global jihad to the West, and specifically to the American Muslim community.

From the time the first issue saw the light, it was apparent that the editors were voicing the agenda of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This was made clear through the open promotion of Salafi-jihadist ideology, as expressed in the writings of Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri and the articles written by Anwar Al-Awlaki. Their writing echoed the ideas of AQAP's leadership, who adhere to the militant, purist views of the Salafists – among them, the promotion of the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. Their goal is to achieve political victory by any means necessary, and by following a very strict and traditional interpretation of the Quran and fatwas.

The Salafi-jihadist ideology described in this paper thus serves as the basis for the strategies of AQAP. *Inspire* promotes these strategies in its pages, focusing on jihad against the West, the fight against the corrupt Yemeni government, and the fight against the Shiites in Yemen. The first two of these strategies received broader attention in the seven issues of the magazine analyzed here, as they are more relevant to Muslims living in the West. In discussing jihad against the West, the magazine focused not only on violent jihad, but also on the virtues of waging economic jihad against the US and other Western countries. In addition, it is apparent from *Inspire* that AQAP has acknowledged the benefits of conducting many smaller and less expensive operations against economic targets, such as air travel and transportation installations. It would seem that AQAP is attempting to bring down Western

civilization by attacking its economic foundation and the freedoms associated with it – which is not that different from Western countries attacking the financial structure of terrorism.

The themes presented in the issues of *Inspire* magazine analyzed here changed and were adapted to current local and global events, yet remained true to the strategies and ideology of AQAP. The authors and editors of *Inspire* always discussed events in hindsight, and never made predictions. While the uprising in Yemen and the Arab Spring received wide coverage in a few issues of the magazine, through exclusive interviews and transcripts of older speeches made by Al-Qaeda leaders, other themes were present in all seven issues. Individual jihad and the myth of the martyr were recurrent themes, and always received emphasis through the writings of Al-Suri, Al-Awlaki and other prominent leaders in and outside the Arabian Peninsula. The combination of these two themes best served the purpose of recruiting more operatives for the cause of global jihad, in Yemen and in the Western world. While subtle and always shunted to a back page, the matter of Palestine was also present in all issues, whether in messages and speeches by Al-Qaeda's leaders or in graphic posters. The matter of Palestine may well have been manipulated in this way to gain traction amongst Muslims who do not agree with Salafi-jihadist ideology.

While the magazine served as a tool for promoting the ideas of AQAP as part of a theoretical discussion, *Inspire* also provided tools for practicing what it preached. By analyzing operations and modus operandi, the writers and editors of *Inspire* demonstrated the relative simplicity of jihad. Furthermore, the magazine shared extensive knowledge on how to construct weapons of mass murder, whether they be bombs or other killing devices, how to use light weapons, how to wield counter-espionage tools and encrypted communication, and how to join jihad. Through a series of articles in a section titled "Open-Source Jihad", the magazine promoted the themes of individual jihad and the myth of the martyr, as well as the

strategies of AQAP – specifically, jihad against the West and the fight in different theaters of jihad.

While the future of *Inspire* magazine is uncertain after the demise of both Anwar Al-Awlaki and Samir Khan on September 30, 2011, its presence is still evident on the Web and amongst potential jihadists worldwide. The seven issues of the magazine discussed here are a strong propaganda tool for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, both theoretically and practically. While this paper did not cover the effect *Inspire* has had on English-speaking Muslims and the Western media, it is obvious that decision-makers in Washington deem its existence as a threat. Despite being written in the English language and geared toward a unique target audience, *Inspire* remained true to the agenda of AQAP throughout these seven issues.

Bibliography

1. BBC News, "Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki," September 30, 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920> [accessed: November 11, 2011].
2. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, *A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen*, September 2011.
3. Gardham, Duncan, "Al-Qaeda claim they launched three aircraft attacks in a year," *The Telegraph*, November 5, 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8113945/Al-Qaeda-claim-they-launched-three-aircraft-attacks-in-a-year.html> [accessed: November 3, 2011].
4. Global Jihad, "Samir ibn Zafar Khan," N.D. http://globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1861 [accessed: November 11, 2011].
5. Hines, Nico, "Al-Qaeda launches English language magazine," *The Times*, July 1, 2010 <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2582200.ece> [accessed: November 11, 2011].
6. ICT's Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, "Yemen: The Campaign against Global Jihad and the Houthis – Situation Report and Directions of Development," October 2010 http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWVG_Yemen_Global_Jihad.pdf [accessed: September 20, 2011].
7. *Inspire*, Issue 1, (Al-Malahem Media, Summer 2010).
8. *Inspire*, Issue 2, (Al-Malahem Media, Fall 2010).
9. *Inspire*, Issue 3, (Al-Malahem Media, November 2010).
10. *Inspire*, Issue 4, (Al-Malahem Media, Winter 2010).

11. *Inspire*, Issue 5, (Al-Malahem Media, Spring 2011).
12. *Inspire*, Issue 6, (Al-Malahem Media, Summer 2011).
13. *Inspire*, Issue 7, (Al-Malahem Media, Fall 2011).
14. Kepel, Gilles, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Mass., 2002.
15. Lia, Brynjar, "Jihadi Strategies and Doctrinarians," In Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds.), *Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa'ida and its Periphery*, (Combating Terrorism Center, 2010), pp. 100-131.
16. Page, Michael, Lara Challita and Alistair Harris, "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2011), pp. 150-172.

¹ ICT's Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group "Yemen: The Campaign against Global Jihad and the Houthis – Situation Report and Directions of Development," October 2010, p. 12
http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Yemen_Global_Jihad.pdf [accessed: September 20, 2011].

² Nico Hines, "Al-Qaeda launches English language magazine," *The Times*, July 1, 2010
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2582200.ece> [accessed: November 11, 2011].

³ *Inspire*, Issue 5, (Al-Malahem Media, Spring 2011), pp. 33-34.

⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 1, (Al-Malahem Media, Summer 2010), pp. 19-20.

⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 3, (Al-Malahem Media, November 2010), p.15.

⁶ *Inspire*, Issue 7, (Al-Malahem Media, Summer 2011), p. 3.

⁷ Global Jihad, "Samir ibn Zafar Khan," N.D. http://globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1861 [accessed: November 11, 2011].

⁸ BBC News, "Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki," September 30, 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920> [accessed: November 11, 2011].

⁹ JWMG, pp.67-68.

¹⁰ *Inspire*, Issue 1, pp.56-58.

¹¹ *Inspire*, Issue 2, (Al-Malahem Media, Fall 2010), pp. 33-40.

¹² The Mardin conference and its declaration was held on March 28, 2010. The declaration addressed the issue of takfir [apostasy] as it was presented in Ibn Tamiyya's fatwa. The declaration condemned those who seek support from the fatwa for killing Muslims and non-Muslims. It further called to resist aggression and defend freedom of worship.

¹³ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 50-53.

¹⁴ Michael Page, Lara Challita and Alistair Harris, "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2011), p. 158.

¹⁵ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 219-220.

¹⁶ Brynjar Lia, "Jihadi Strategies and Doctrinarians," In Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds.), *Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa'ida and its Periphery*, (Combating Terrorism Center, 2010), pp. 102-108.

¹⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 1, pp. 48-53.

¹⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 33-40.

¹⁹ *Inspire*, Issue 4, (Al-Malahem Media, Winter 2010), p. 55-60.

-
- ²⁰ The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, *A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen*, September 2011, p. 41.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-51.
- ²² *Inspire*, Issue 1, p. 5.
- ²³ *Inspire*, Issue 3, p. 4.
- ²⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 1, pp. 14-16.
- ²⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 2, p. 44.
- ²⁶ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 27-28.
- ²⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 1, pp. 26-28.
- ²⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 4, p. 17.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- ³⁰ Dar al-harb: House of war. Those areas which are not controlled by Islam.
- ³¹ *Inspire*, Issue 7.
- ³² *Inspire*, Issue 1, pp. 31-44.
- ³³ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 51-59.
- ³⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 37-46.
- ³⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 22-25.
- ³⁶ *Inspire*, Issue 6, pp. 35-45.
- ³⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 3, p. 15.
- ³⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 7, pp. 12-14.
- ³⁹ CTC, *A False Foundation?*, pp. 41-42.
- ⁴⁰ *Inspire*, Issue 1, p. 16.
- ⁴¹ *Inspire*, Issue 3, pp. 11-12.
- ⁴² *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 26-28.
- ⁴³ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 27-31.
- ⁴⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 29-30.
- ⁴⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 2, p. 44.
- ⁴⁶ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 26-27.
- ⁴⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 5-6.
- ⁴⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 1, pp. 48-53.
- ⁴⁹ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 17-21.
- ⁵⁰ *Inspire*, Issue 3, pp. 31-35.
- ⁵¹ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 29-32.
- ⁵² *Inspire*, Issue 6, p. 15.
- ⁵³ *Inspire*, Issue 2, p. 37.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.
- ⁵⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 4, p. 24.
- ⁵⁶ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 27-31.
- ⁵⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 1, p. 11.
- ⁵⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 3, pp. 10-12.
- ⁵⁹ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 13-15.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-42.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 50-53.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-21.
- ⁶⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 6, pp. 17-30.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-50.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54.
- ⁶⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 1, p. 30.
- ⁶⁹ *Inspire*, Issue 2, p. 64.
- ⁷⁰ *Inspire*, Issue 1, p. 29.
- ⁷¹ *Inspire*, Issue 5, p. 70.
- ⁷² *Inspire*, Issue 6, p. 61.
- ⁷³ *Inspire*, Issue 4, p. 67.
- ⁷⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 3, p. 23.
- ⁷⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 1, p. 5.
- ⁷⁶ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 11-16.
- ⁷⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 48-50.

-
- ⁷⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 62-64.
- ⁷⁹ *Inspire*, Issue 6, (Al-Malahem Media, Summer 2011), pp. 32-34.
- ⁸⁰ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 29-30.
- ⁸¹ *Inspire*, Issue 5, p. 60.
- ⁸² *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 27-31.
- ⁸³ *Inspire*, Issue 3, p. 4.
- ⁸⁴ Duncan Gardham, "Al-Qaeda claim they launched three aircraft attacks in a year," *The Telegraph*, November 5, 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8113945/Al-Qaeda-claim-they-launched-three-aircraft-attacks-in-a-year.html> [accessed: November 3, 2011].
- ⁸⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 3, p. 7.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- ⁸⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 1, p.32.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47.
- ⁹⁰ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 24-26.
- ⁹¹ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 52-53.
- ⁹² *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 65-66.
- ⁹³ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 42-43.
- ⁹⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 5, pp. 24-25.
- ⁹⁵ *Inspire*, Issue 6, pp. 37-38.
- ⁹⁶ *Inspire*, Issue 1, pp. 41-44.
- ⁹⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 55-56.
- ⁹⁸ *Inspire*, Issue 1, p. 33.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-40.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Inspire*, Issue 2, pp. 53-54.
- ¹⁰¹ *Inspire*, Issue 4, pp. 39-41.
- ¹⁰² *Inspire*, Issue 6, pp. 39-45.