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In the Eye of the Storm: An Israeli Perspective on the “Arab Spring”

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Abstract:

From its advent, Israel had a more skeptical - and in retrospect a much more realistic - view than those of leading Western powers regarding the dynamics and likely trajectories resulting from the "Arab Spring". Israel never bought into the "Spring" idea, viewing the upheavals that erupted in early 2011 across much of North Africa and Middle East as being closer to Tehran 1979 than to Berlin 1989. Israel is today effectively surrounded by a deadly mixture of new Islamist regimes (dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood but also by new Salafist parties), increasing weak states, and chaos. This paper examines this turbulent reality and outlines how Israel has adapted its foreign policy so far to deal with it.

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Introduction

Few states in the world not taking direct part in the “Arab Spring” themselves have a higher stake in its causes, convulsions, and consequences than the State of Israel.

This is partly a function of geography. Though none of the twenty-two members of the Arab League have completely eschewed the tumult that has swept across much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since December 2010, those impacted most forcefully so far have generally been in Israel's more immediate, oil-poor, neighborhood. A metaphorical stone's throw from Jerusalem, Syria is in the midst of a bloody civil war, Lebanon simmers, Iraq titters, Jordan wobbles, and Egypt is in the throngs of a mighty struggle between the old masters of the Arab world – statist, socialist, secular, and sclerotic – and new species of Islamist governing elites.

That struggle threatens to undermine the very pillars of existing strategic arrangements upon which Israel has built the lion share of its national security and prosperity over the past several decades – most crucially the American supported peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan – and to empower the Iran-led “axis of resistance” inimical to the core Israeli interests in security and stability its vicinity.

Jerusalem is understandably more sensitive than most to the trans-border ripple effects, new alliances, and host of unintended consequences flowing out of the Arab revolts. Sophisticated weapons once hoarded by Qaddafi in Tripoli silos are proliferating through Sinai, and resurfacing in the hands of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza. Chaos in Syria has already begun to spill over into Lebanon, Jordan, and northern Iraq. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is recalibrating power dynamics across the Sunni world, between Sunnis and Shi'i, and limiting Israel's freedom of operation against the Palestinian branch of the brotherhood – Hamas.

What's Going On? A View from Jerusalem

Americans and Europeans observing the outbreak of revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were elated by what they widely interpreted to be Arab versions of their own freedom revolutions.

Most Israelis saw things differently. For them the very term "Arab Spring" reflected a Eurocentric worldview; one that conjures up favourable, but ultimately misguided, associations with the 1848 "Spring of Nations", the "Prague Spring" of 1968, and the liberation of Eastern Europe from the yoke of Soviet Communism, as symbolized by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.

What was happening at Tunis, Tahrir Square – and later in Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen – according to this rationale, was a long-silenced Arab world: “*clamoring to be heard, eager to stake a claim to a place in the modern order of nations.*”¹ Outdated Arab dictators were being thrown out by a new, younger generation of democrats emboldened by legitimate expectations of better lives and mobilized through the ultra-modern social networks of Facebook and Twitter – much like their peers in Serbia and Ukraine a few years earlier. If Islamists were mentioned at all, they were on the margins of events and an overrated force in Arab politics.

The “freedom’s march” interpretation provided the West with a comforting sense about the trajectory of human history, just at a time when Washington and Brussels desperately need a good shot of self-confidence.

If the MENA is finally democratizing, moreover, then democracy truly faces no serious ideological enemies with broad appeal in the region. Fascism and Communism are dead,

as is Pan-Arabism. Radical Islamists and *Jihadi* ideologies, according to this thinking, are no match for modern democracy as compelling models of political organization. Things may be rocky for a while, but ultimately the happy end of history is a step closer to being realized.

At a deeper heuristic level, Americans and Europeans were blindsided to the likely consequences of the Arab revolts by what Nader Hashemi has aptly called the “false universalism” paradigm of assumed uniformity between the Middle East and the West.

The Arab Spring 2.0

Most Israelis never bought into the initial Western euphoria, cognizant though they were of the great long-term desirability of genuine democracies emerging in the region.²

Diversity of opinion in its public arena notwithstanding, Israel was condemned for being less than gung-ho about what Tom Friedman heralded as the “Arab democratic awakening”.³ The Jewish State was accused of being alarmist and raining on the parade. All of the leading candidates in the May 23rd 2012 presidential elections represent the competing illiberal forces of political Islam and re-heated Mubarakism. None are secular democrats.

Islamists have also won the elections held thus far in Tunisia, Morocco and Kuwait, and are playing a prominent role in post-Qaddafi Libya and the Syrian insurgency against the al-Assad regime.

Even in Tunisia – the MENA country with the most favorable socio-economic conditions for genuine democratization – there are worrying signs that the devolution of power to the people may be accompanied by anti-Semitic populism, rather than tolerance and openness. The victorious *Ennahda* has tried to appease its Salafist rivals by taking more radical positions on Israel. The party’s president, Rached Ghannouchi, recently declared that “*there can be no normalization*” of relations with Israel, and denounced Tunisia’s former leader Zine el Abidine Ben Ali as “*a collaborator with the Zionists.*”⁴ Salafist chants in Tunis have quickly morphed from “Death to the Zionists” to “Death to the Jews”.

Viewed from Jerusalem, the most ominous feature of the “Arab Spring” so far is not the replacement of capable old forms of authoritarianism with new ones, but the rapid decrease in the ability of Arab states to govern.

Lacking legitimacy, state capacity (and increasingly security), a growing number of Arab states are disintegrating. They leave behind them under-governed or ungoverned spaces that are being filled by a pre-modern, neo-medieval patchwork of non-state rulers – tribes, warlords, criminal gangs – as well as by transnational terrorist networks and new forms of hybrid terrorist/governance- providing organizations, such as Hizbullah and Hamas.

Like much of sub-Saharan Africa – where the largest proportion of failed states currently exists – Arab states came into being “instantly”, as the result of the dissolution of colonial empires. Rather than go through a slow, convoluted process of state formation – culminating in the development of the rule of law, accountability, and national identity –

Arab states became states before they could truly become nations. Thus, the societies of the Arab world are ancient, but as states they are “instant states” struggling to generate welfare-enhancing public goods, and that can effectively compete for loyalty against pre-modern tribal, ethnic, and religious identities.⁵

One need only peruse the five existing Arab Human Development Reports – sponsored by the UN and independently authored by courageous Arab scholars – to appreciate the depth of contemporary Arab state’s inability to deliver core public goods and opportunities to their bulging, youthful populations.⁶

By 2015 the Arab countries will be home to some 395 million people, compared to 150 million in 1980. Of these over 60% will be under the age of 25, with a median age of 22. Despite oil wealth, GDP per capita in the Arab countries grew by a paltry 6.4% over the entire period from 1980 to 2004 (i.e. by less than 0.5% annually) and oil has crowded out agriculture and manufacturing, so that Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than they were in 1970. Youth and women unemployment are among the highest in the world, with the overall poverty rate ranging from a “low” of 30% in Lebanon, to a high of 59.5% in Yemen, and 41% in Egypt.⁷ Along with sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab world is the only region where the number of hungry or starving has risen since the beginning of the 1990s.

Water scarcity and desertification are placing additional burdens on already overstretched land, causing conflict over natural resources, population displacement, and increased drug, weapons and human trafficking. All these, the latest Arab Human Development Report concludes, mean: “*that identity-based groups in some Arab countries have sought*

*to free themselves from the captivity of the nation-state in whose shadow they live.”*⁸ Like democratization, furthermore, state failure is a regional phenomenon, in that it predominantly occurs in clusters of geographically contiguous or proximate states.⁹

To be sure, the monopoly on the use of force had been undermined in most of countries in Israel’s vicinity, including Egypt, Syria, and further afield Yemen and Libya. Post-Qaddafi Libya – in which there are no fewer than 140 contending tribes, of which 30 are influential powerbrokers – is a growing source of arms.

Sinai is rapidly emerging as a source of multiple headaches for Israel, most dangerously as a potential venue for military flare-ups with Egypt. Handed back to Cairo as a demilitarized zone - as part of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty – the arid peninsula of 61,000 square kilometres (three times the size of Israel) was never fully brought under effective Egyptian authority. Through much of the past three decades the local Bedouin population – which now number over 300,000 – exercised a degree of local autonomy, making a living from tourism, fishing, as well as drug and people smuggling.

The coming to power of Hamas in neighboring Gaza after Israeli withdrawal in 2005, and diminished Egyptian law-enforcement capacity following Mubarak’s demise, have quickly resulted in the expansion of organized crime and terrorist proliferation, particularly the spread of advanced anti-aircraft and surface-to-surface rockets. In early May 2012, Egyptian authorities intercepted a large consignment of advanced weaponry in Sinai, *en route* to Gaza, and Israeli intelligence estimates large quantities of such weapons have already reached Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Libyan weapons are also proliferating in Sinai itself, and in North Africa’s Sahel region, to the

benefit of *al-Qaida* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).¹⁰ presence in the peninsula – including that of *al-Qaeda*, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hizbullah.

Cross border terrorist attacks have followed, including the 2007 suicide bombing conducted by a PIJ militant in a bakery in the Israeli tourist city, Eilat, and an August 18th 2011 attack which killed eight Israelis and injured thirty-one. Five Egyptian border policemen were also killed in the ensuing shootout, straining Egyptian-Israeli ties.

This Israel-Egypt-Sinai-Gaza-Jordan imbroglio is becoming more explosive on a daily basis, with massive flows of increasingly sophisticated arms into Sinai and Gaza. These arrive mainly from Iran through war-torn Sudan, and now increasingly from chaotic Libya. In the absence of responsible sovereigns in its neighbourhood, Israel is increasingly anxious that Sinai-Gaza are becoming a single arena set to explode.

Israeli Policy Response So Far

The posture adopted thus far by Israeli policy chiefs in response to the Arab revolts can generally be described as defensive and risk-averse. One former chief of staff captured the prevailing sentiment among the country's security and foreign relations establishment, stating that: "*When the earth shakes, you don't go out on adventures. You take cover under a door ledge and stay put.*"¹¹

The circumspection is hardly abstruse. In view of its existing military superiority, domestic prosperity, narrow margin of survival – and in the face of regional uncertainties and hostilities – Israel under the broad Likud-Kadima led coalition government is

essentially a *status quo* power; concerned to preserve strategic assets, while sidestepping potentially costly security entanglements and political experiments.

Israeli policy chiefs are also concerned to avoid further regional isolation, and so are now searching keenly for opportunities to acquire new friends and fashion new alliances – notably with Greece and Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean, among the Kurds, and with the new state of Southern Sudan. Still, some Israelis have criticized the government’s “freeze instinct” as an excuse for inaction, even paralysis, at a time of great regional fluidity and therefore, according to the critics, opportunities for peace.¹² Israel’s policy response thus far can be interpreted as being guided by four mutually reinforcing principles, as elaborated below:

Strategic Silence

One of the first policy guidelines to emerge from internal consultations on how to respond to the Arab revolts was the instruction that ministers, diplomats and officers exercise “strategic silence”. Official Israel was to keep stumm - to be careful not to appear in any way to be meddling in the internal affairs of its Arab neighbors, let alone be accused of siding with one faction, at the expense of another.

The strategic silence posture, which has generally been adhered to, is revealing in three key respects. First, and most obviously, the posture represents keen Israeli awareness regarding levels of popular animosity and conspiratorial fears towards it in the Arab street. Any reformer credibly saddled with Israeli sympathies – let alone support – would be branded a Zionist collaborator and undermined by alleged association. The fear that processes involving transfer of power from the old elites to the street would be

accompanied by rise in anti- Israeli, even anti-Semitic sentiments, has been compounded by the barrage of media images in which Jewish and Israeli symbols – most notably the Israeli flag and Star of David – were invoked by protesters to condemn existing rulers and castigate the opposition. From Tunisia, to Egypt, to Libya, to Syria, images of the hated dictator were marked by stars of David, and effigies burnt shrouded in Israeli (as well as American) flags. Similarly, Islamist candidates for political office in Egypt made political hay by routinely, and successfully, accusing Omar Suleiman of being an Israeli stooge.

Second, and more positively, Israelis chose silence precisely because the Arab revolts were not about them. Indeed, one of the most encouraging aspects of the revolutions, from an Israeli perspective at least, is the breaking of the long-standing regional norm – felt most strongly in Syria – that emergency laws and an all powerful *Mukhabarat* were legitimate instruments of state repression, necessary for combating the Zionist bogeyman. The popular behavioral shift, whereby Arab publics saw through the callousness of this justification for their own oppression, and rejected it, augurs well for prospects of constructive domestic reforms and, in the longer-term, Arab-Israeli peace.

Lastly, Israel's choice of strategic silence says something fundamental about the Jewish State's self-image, its sense of place in the Middle East, and attitude towards democracy promotion. As a militarily powerful and economically prosperous democracy bordering struggling, obstructed societies, it is at least conceivable that Israel would have chosen the historic moment of the Arab revolts to call upon its Arab neighbors to embrace democracy as the surest path to prosperity and peace. The fact that it did not is partly a function of the strategic silence rationale, but equally (and more deeply perhaps) because

Israel does not view itself as a regional power capable of promoting positive political change in the Arab world, either actively or passively – as a “city upon the hill”.

As a small, young, largely inward looking state that has only recently achieved a modicum of economic prosperity and acceptance as an OECD country, Israel has never been in the business of promoting democracy abroad. Indeed Israeli security and foreign policy circles are generally skeptical about the ability of Arab societies to develop and sustain liberal institutions, and dismissive of American and European efforts to export democracy to the MENA region.

Asset Preservation

Israel’s highest and most immediate concern is to preserve four strategic assets in the face of the revolutions, civil wars, and civic unrest simmering in countries and territories surrounding it to the north, east and south.

The first, arguably most important and imperiled asset, is peace with Egypt; Israel’s formidable, 85 million strong, American armed southern neighbor. For three decades - from independence until the conclusion of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty – Egypt was Israel’s most potent enemy, with the two countries fighting no fewer than five wars, including the 1973 *Yom Kippur* War remembered traumatically as the country’s worst military blunder.

The American-brokered peace treaty – in which a de-militarized Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt in exchange for normalization of relations and a generous package of American military and civilian aid for both countries – never evolved into the warm people-to-people peace most Israelis yearned for. But the peace held, and for over thirty

years Egypt and Israel cooperated reasonably well on counter-terrorism, relations with the Palestinians, energy, and maritime issues.

Mubarak's demise and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood-Salafist parties, places Israel in a difficult bind. Egyptian Islamist leaders have publicly called for the Peace Treaty to be dissolved, for the sale of gas to Israel to be stopped, and regularly espouse virulent anti-Semitic opinions.¹³ So far at least, Israel's response has been the exercise of great verbal restraint and pretence of continued normalcy. Israel is careful not to supply fodder to resurgent Egyptian nationalism. The IDF is conscious of the fact that certain Egyptian, Palestinian, and world *Jihadi* groups are actively seeking to instigate an Egyptian-Israeli military crisis by launching terror attacks from Sinai into Israel, and hoping to provoke an Israeli response that would harm Egyptian soldiers manning the border. So far at least, both Israel and Egypt have managed not to be lured into the conflict trap.

Second, Israelis are concerned to preserve relations with Jordan, largely by making sure the Hashemite dynasty is not deposed and the 1994 Israeli- Jordanian Peace Treaty is not undermined. Like his father King Hussein before him, King Abdullah of Jordan maintains close cooperative relations with Israel, especially on managing relations with the Palestinians, preventing the infiltration of *Jihadi* fighters and weapons into the West Bank, and countering terrorism. Yet the Hashemite kings are minority rulers governing an increasingly restive population identifying themselves mostly as Palestinian, and the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are emboldened by the Brotherhood's victories in neighboring Egypt. The country is already simmering with frequent demonstrations against the high cost of electricity and rising inflation.

The “Arab Spring” could be reaching Jordan just at a time when the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom has never been so crucial to Israel’s, and the region’s peace and security. With the withdrawal of US troops, the risk of state failure in Iraq – accompanied by sectarian violence, Iranian infiltration, and growing *Al- Qaeda* presence – is very real.²⁷ Should Iraq implode, in whole or in part, Jordan will be the only thing standing between Israel and chaos on its longest, eastern border.

The third strategic asset Israel seeks to preserve is not enshrined in a formal peace treaty, but is nonetheless of central value to its security interests. Although Bashar al-Assad’s Syria is a close ally of Israel’s nemesis, Iran, and actively supports both Hizbullah and Hamas, Syria has consistently refrained from direct confrontation with Israel, making the Jewish State’s north-eastern border with the Alawite dominated dictatorship quiet for decades.

Continued turmoil in Syria, or the eventual collapse of the Assad regime, risks undermining this *de facto* asset in several different ways. Some Israeli analysts worry that a desperate Bashar, facing an existential choice between domestic annihilation and a foreign war, will gamble on the latter. Hoping to shuffle the cards in an otherwise losing game, or even opting to go down in history as an Israel basher *par excellence*, Bashar may attack Israel directly. Syria’s chemical and biological weapons capability make this a serious, if not very probable scenario.

Chaos in Syria may also result in potentially large numbers of people – some combatants, others civilians – seeking to cross the border into Israel, either as refugees or as part of a regime instigated provocation. The scenario is not hypothetical. On May 1, 2011,

violence broke out as roughly a hundred Syrian and Palestinian protesters deliberately crossed the Syrian-Israeli ceasefire line on the Golan Heights. According to Israeli officials, the incident was an orchestrated “act by the Syrian leadership to deliberately create a crisis on the border so as to distract attention from the very real problems that regime is facing at home.”¹⁴ A more distant threat emanates from the growth in *Jihadi* militant groups in civil war torn Syria. To counter these last two threats Israel has bolstered border security and non-lethal means of crowd control on its side of the border with Syria and Lebanon.

Lastly, Israel is keen to maintain, and if possible bolster, the limited deterrence it has achieved vis-à-vis Hizbullah since the 2006 Lebanon war, and Hamas since Operation Cast Led in December 2009-January 2010. In practice, however, Israel has been willing to sustain significant rocket fire emanating from Hamas- controlled Gaza, to refrain from substantial military retort, and to allow Palestinian militias in Gaza to continue arm themselves with sophisticated weapons. It has done so for fear of escalation that could lead to a dangerous rift with post-Mubarak Egypt, strengthen radicals across the region, and risk dragging Israel into another round of military confrontation at a time of great regional volatility.

Eyes on the Prize: Avoiding Diversion From the Iranian Nuclear Threat

At the same time as keeping a quiet mouth and an alert eye on its immediate neighbors, Israel views Iran – not Jordan, Egypt, or even Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas – as the leading source of danger to its security, even physical survival. Indeed, Israel is leery of allowing the drama of the “Arab Spring” to obfuscate – for itself, as well as for the

international community – the primary, urgent need to stop the Islamic Republic of Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities.

In this sense the Arab revolts are an inconvenient distraction; a sideshow with the potential of dragging Israel into squabbles – minor or major – that risk diverting essential resources from the overarching strategic goal of preventing Iran from going nuclear – through diplomacy if at all possible, or through coercive means if absolutely necessary.

Accordingly, Israel places a high premium on avoiding attention diverting military confrontations on its borders, particularly with Hamas in Gaza, Egypt, Hizbullah in Lebanon, or Syria. So far at least, it has been willing to pay the high price of allowing armed non-state groups – particularly Hizbullah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – to continue to arm themselves with strategic weapons, without taking significant overt military activity to prevent, or slow down, the arms race.

New Friends Wanted

Finally, in facing an increasingly volatile and hostile neighborhood, Israel is consciously seeking new alliances in the region. This fourth guiding principle in response to the events of the “Arab Spring” stems both from a sense that the old, American-undergirded regional arrangements are fraying at the seams, and an awareness that the realignment of tectonic plates in the MENA region presents opportunities, as well as challenges.

The search for new friends has so far taken two main forms. First, in the eastern Mediterranean, Israel has over the past three years in particular, strengthened diplomatic, economic, and security ties with Greece and Cyprus to a substantial degree. It has been aided in this by the discovery and development of large deposits of natural gas and oil in

its territorial waters, but equally by Turkey's growing prickliness towards Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In an attempt to mitigate the loss of its erstwhile staunch ally, Turkey, and at the same time bolster strategic and economic interest in the eastern Mediterranean, Israel is seeking to position itself as a "creative energy" hub; developing new infrastructure and technology networks with Greece and Cyprus.

A second set of opportunities for new cooperative relationships derives from the disintegration of states in east Africa and the Middle East. In what can be understood as a revival of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's 1950's "periphery strategy" – which involved Israeli support for non-Arabs in the Middle East – Israel has advanced rapidly to aid Africa's newest (and Christian) state, South Sudan. Indeed, soon after independence in July 2011, South Sudan's founding president, Salva Kiir, made his maiden foreign voyage to no other city than Jerusalem, accompanied by his foreign and defence ministers.

Though facing formidable challenges as a poor, fragile state, the new Texas sized east African country provides Israel with some economic and diplomatic opportunities. As one analyst observed, for Israel "South Sudan offers access to natural resources, especially oil. Its role in Nile River water negotiations offers leverage vis-à-vis Egypt."¹⁵ For South Sudan, in turn, Israeli support means help with agriculture, health, and education.¹⁶

Israel's relations with the new state of South Sudan fit into a broader, revitalized periphery strategy that includes Cyprus, Greece, the Berbers and the Kurds. The latter group – which has long maintained informal ties with the Jewish State, partly through

diaspora Kurdish Jews – is of particular interest to Israel. If the tenuous political agreement reached among parties and factions in Iraq at the end of 2010 collapses, as it appears to be, Kurdish northern Iraq will most likely continue on a path towards *de facto* autonomy, perhaps even formal independence. Either way, Israel will seek to strengthen ties with this non-Arab island of relative freedom and economic dynamism, partly in an effort to limit Iranian influence in Iraq.

¹ Fuad Ajami, “Demise of the Dictators: The Arab Revolutions of 2011”, Newsweek (February 14, 2011) p. 18. 3 Nader Hashemi, *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

² See: Amichai Magen, “On Political Order and the Arab Spring” 6/1 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs (2012) pp. 9-21.

³ Tom Friedman, The Arab Awakening and Israel, NYT, November 29 2011.

⁴ Press TV, “Tunisia’s Ghannouchi rules out normal ties with Israel (April 1, 2012) (<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/234200.html>).

⁵ For a discussion of “instant states” and accompanying problems see: Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (Harper, 2009) pp. 169-199. See also: Uzi Rabi, *The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society* (2011).

⁶ The five Arab Human Development Report are available at: <http://www.arab-hdr.org>.

⁷ All figures drawn from the 2009 Arab Human Development Report: The Report in Brief (available: <http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/contents/2009/execsummary-e.pdf>).

⁸ Ibid. at p. 4.

⁹ Stefan Wolff, “The regional dimensions of state failure”, 37 Review of International Studies (2011), pp. 951-972. 18 Egyptians Stop Consignment of Surface to Surface rockets from Libya to Sinai, Haaretz Newspaper (May 10, 2012) [Hebrew]

¹⁰ Karen Leigh. "North Africa's Sahel: The Next Terrorism Hot Spot?", Time (September 12, 2011).

¹¹ Former Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen (Ret) Dan Halutz, comments in the Herzliya Conference preparatory meeting, January 2011, IDC, Herzliya.

¹² Mark Heller, “Israeli Responses to the Arab Spring”, in Yoel Guzansky and Mark Heller eds., “One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications”, INSS Memorandum 113 (2012) pp. 75-77, at 76.

¹³ See: Robert S. Wistrich, “Post Mubarak Egypt: The Dark Side of Islamic Utopia”, 6/1 Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs (2012) pp. 23-32. 26 See: Has the Arab Spring Reached Jordan?, Haaretz Newspaper (May 14, 2012) [Hebrew].

See: Ned Parker, “The Iraq We Left Behind”, 91/2 Foreign Affairs (March/April 2012) pp. 94- 110.

¹⁴ Yaakov Katz, Ben Hartmann, and Khaled Abu Toameh. "Scores of Syrian protesters breach Israeli border." The Jerusalem Post (16 May 2011).

¹⁵ Daniel Pipes, “South Sudan, Israel’s New Ally” The Washington Times (January 3, 2012).

¹⁶ Ibid.