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### *Hybrid War and the Gulliverization of Israel*

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## **Abstract:**

This article contends that we are currently in the midst of the latest historic shift in the species of war waged against the Jewish State. The new species of war is *Hybrid War* in which anti-western states and armed Non-State Actors (NSA's) form transnational alliances, exploit ungoverned spaces, hijack global institutions, and abuse international law to wage military, terrorist, media, diplomatic, and legal battle against Western democracies. The new mode of war is therefore "hybrid" in two fundamental senses: in the formation of novel types of State-NSA alliances, and in the utilization of the panoply of instruments of attack, ranging from the sub-national to the international, from hard to soft. Both are enabled by globalization and the proliferation of technologies that empower organizations, networks, and even single individuals as never before.

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[This article contends that we are currently in the midst of the latest historic shift in the species of war waged against the Jewish State. The new species of war is *Hybrid War* in which anti-western states and armed Non-State Actors (NSA's) form transnational alliances, exploit ungoverned spaces, hijack global institutions, and abuse international law to wage military, terrorist, media, diplomatic, and legal battle against Western democracies. The new mode of war is therefore "hybrid" in two fundamental senses: in the formation of novel types of State-NSA alliances, and in the utilization of the panoply of instruments of attack, ranging from the sub-national to the international, from hard to soft. Both are enabled by globalization and the proliferation of technologies that empower organizations, networks, and even single individuals as never before.]

Since 1948, the State of Israel has not only experienced many wars *per se*, but several succeeding species of war – conventional, economic, and terrorist. Historically, as one mode of war failed to overwhelm the Jewish State, a process of strategic adaptation on the part of its foes has taken place, resulting time and time again in the emergence of succeeding species of attack. When a shift from an old to a new mode of war takes place, Israel is called upon to recognize the emerging species of assault, conceptualize it correctly, assess the nature and seriousness of the threat, and adapt its own strategic concepts, institutions, and behavior to counter it. The ability to identify an emerging

species of war swiftly, understand it correctly, and respond to it effectively, is thus a critical challenge for Israel's national security.

This article contends that we are currently in the midst of the latest historic shift in the species of war waged against the Jewish State. The new species of war is *Hybrid War* in which anti-western states and armed Non-State Actors (NSA's) form transnational alliances, exploit ungoverned spaces, hijack global institutions, and abuse international law to wage military, terrorist, media, diplomatic, and legal battle against Western democracies. The new mode of war is therefore "hybrid" in two fundamental senses: in the formation of novel types of State-NSA alliances, and in the utilization of the panoply of instruments of attack, ranging from the sub-national to the international, from hard to soft. Both are enabled by globalization and the proliferation of technologies that empower organizations, networks, and even single individuals as never before.

In facing *Hybrid War*, moreover, liberal democracies are compelled to struggle within a rapidly thickening web of both domestic and external constraints on the use of force, regardless of the necessity or justice of such use. Western democracies are today "gulliverized" to an unprecedented degree; bound and tethered by their own self-restraining culture of peace, their deep attachment to the norms and institutions of a rules-based international order, and by relentless and omnipresent global surveillance to which they are now subjected at the hands of unaccountable international organizations, NGO's, law, markets, and media. Small, open, export-dependent states that possess narrow margins of survival and are not part of large regional blocs – i.e. states like Israel – are particularly vulnerable to the pincer dynamic of *Hybrid War* and gulliverization.

### *Shifting Species of War*

The history of the Arab/Iranian-Israeli conflict is in many respects the history of shifting modes of war by the former and adaptation by the latter. In 1948, 1967, and 1973 Arab armies waged conventional “Clausewitzian War” against Israel, hoping to do away with the nascent Jewish State by sheer military power, supported by mass mobilization and Arab-nationalist ideology. The infamous “Three No’s”, articulated by Arab heads of state in Khartoum in September 1967, captured perfectly Arab objections to the very fact of Israel’s physical existence in the early decades of the country’s independence.<sup>i</sup> The uniformity of this attitude was only broken in 1977, after successive Arab defeats, when Egyptian president Anwar El Sadat travelled to Jerusalem to talk peace.

With repeated attempts to overwhelm Israel by conventional military force a failure, the Arab League embarked upon what Christopher Joyner described in 1984 as: “ideologically, the most virulent; organizationally, the most sophisticated; politically, the most protracted; and, legally, the most polemic” boycott and blacklist campaign in modern history.<sup>ii</sup> Coordinated by the Damascus based Central Boycott Office, and aided by regional offices operated as governmental agencies within each boycotting state, the campaign of economic warfare was pursued by the Arab League and its abettors at four target levels: a *primary* boycott of Israeli goods and services; a *secondary* boycott which blacklisted corporations suspected of doing business with Israel; a *tertiary* boycott, in which Arab governments pressured private firms to abstain from doing business with firms that continued to trade with Israel; and a *personal* boycott, in which designated organizations and individuals were blacklisted and threatened for suspected “pro-Zionist” sympathies.<sup>iii</sup>

Never uniformly applied, Arab economic warfare against Israel intertwined with the League's petro-politics, reaching a nadir in the 1970s, before ebbing (though never formally revoked) in the face of American-led international opposition to the boycott, positive breakthroughs in Arab-Israeli peace-making, and Israel's growing economic prowess. Four decades of boycott and blacklist took their toll, yet in the face of economic war too Israelis proved resilient. From an impoverished third world backwater in 1950, the country has transformed itself over the past generation into a global hub of entrepreneurship, scientific innovation, and export.<sup>iv</sup> In 2010 Israel's GDP per capita crossed a \$30,000 milestone and the country has now joined the OECD club of high-income democracies.<sup>v</sup>

If not by conventional war, and not by economic strangulation, then perhaps by terror? Whether ascribed the appellation "*the Second*" or "*Al-Aqsa*" intifada, there is little doubt that the war-by-terror waged against Israel by the Palestinians in the years 2000-2004, represented a qualitative shift in the type of warfare experienced by the protagonists to the Arab-Israeli conflict. What conventionally was war between states – fought largely by regular forces, on defined battlefields, for a defined period of time – turned suddenly into a clash between a state and an assortment of non-state paramilitary organizations. Reversing the IDF's historical ability to conduct warfare away from home, groups such as Fatah's Tanzim, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, brought mass violence into the heart of Israeli cities, while wearing largely civilian garb and taking shelter among their own civilian population. Although suicide terrorism had been used by the Palestinians in the past, it was during the 2000-2004 war-by-terror that it emerged as the weapon of choice

at the hands of the terrorists. "A million martyrs", Arafat declared, were to "march on Jerusalem."

Between September 2000 and September 2004, some 553 suicide attacks were attempted on Israeli civilians, with 135 attacks "succeeding" – resulting in the killing of 880 civilians, mainly women, children and the elderly. Common wisdom at the time had it that such war-by-terror could not be defeated; that, as one Israeli commentator put it: "The regular army of a democratic state would never defeat terror-resistance-guerilla groups that operate within oppressed civilians like fish in water."<sup>vi</sup> Yet the suicide terrorism intifada was eventually beaten, and decisively so. Through a trial-and-error strategy that combined civilian defense (notably the separation fence), with innovative counter-terrorist measures, by mid 2004 Israel had adapted and effectively defeated the war-by-terror waged against it since the fall of 2000.

The pursuit of these varying species of warfare on the part of Israel's foes – conventional, economic, terrorist – has not been strictly separate or neatly sequential of course. The threat of conventional, State-to-State war has not disappeared from Israel's borders. The roots of Arab boycott of Jewish business interests can be traced back to the 1920s *Yishuv*. And acts of terrorism remain a perennial feature of anti-Israel violence. Yet the trajectory is clear, and the salient observation to be made here is one of a marked historical pattern. As one species of warfare fell short of achieving its desired goal of overwhelming Israel, a process of strategic adaptation on the part of its adversaries has resulted in the emergence of a succeeding species.

In the absence of genuine Arab and Iranian acceptance of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign nation in the Middle East, this pattern of strategic evolution in response to strategic failure is hardly to be wondered at. War, the father of modern military theory Carl von Clausewitz himself observed, is “a true chameleon” – deeply embedded in the socio-political world in which it unfolds; forever adapting to the technological, institutional, legal, and cultural conditions under which it is waged.

### ***Hybrid War***

In thinking about the changing nature of armed conflict since the end of the Cold War, we observe the emergence of *Hybrid War* in the convergence of several trends.

First, the protagonists (or units of analysis) of war have changed. Conventional war between two or more states (intra-state war) has become mercifully rare, and appears to be getting rarer. Armed conflict today takes place overwhelmingly either within states (civil war) or between Western states and non-Western adversaries composed of relatively backward, non-nuclear powers, NSA's, and terror networks. In the total of 124 armed conflicts recorded between 1989 and 2007, a full 117 took place either within a single state or involved cross-border conflict between at least one NSA and a state. Only 7 involved State-to-State warfare.<sup>vii</sup>

The number and power of NSA's is also substantial and likely growing. Although reliable data on their proliferation is lacking, the IISS Military Balance study now lists 345 armed NSA's worldwide.<sup>viii</sup> As U.S. Defense Secretary, William Gates, observed in April 2010, furthermore, the military power of at least one NSA, Hizbollah, extends beyond the capabilities of many states in the world.<sup>ix</sup>



Israel's own experience correlates strongly with this shift in the units of analysis of war. Since the 1973 Yom Kippur war the country has not faced State-to-State armed conflict, but has pursued five campaigns against a medley of State/NSA adversaries: the First Lebanon War (1982-1999); the First Intifada (1987-1993); the Second Intifada (2000-2004); the Second Lebanon War (2006); and Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009).

A second feature of *Hybrid War* – as distinguished from both conventional and civil war – is the formation of dynamic alliances, formal and informal, between non-Western states and NSA's. Here the Iran-Syria-Hizbollah-Hamas "radical axis" represents only one prominent example. Other such alliances include the murky Pakistan-Taliban network facing NATO forces in Afghanistan and Waziristan; the Pakistan-Hizbul Mujahidin alliance against India in Kashmir; and the Iran-Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) syndicate.

That warring states seek to ally with armed non-state actors in pursuit of their interests *per se* is not entirely new of course. Yet there is qualitative innovation in the nature of the transnational alliances that characterize *Hybrid War*. Rapid developments in communications, transport, and proliferation of weaponry, empower NSA's and facilitate cross-border transfers and cooperation as never before. Conventional armies and classical-era insurgency groups (i.e. revolutionary groups who fought so-called wars of national liberation from 1944 to about 1980) copied each other's tactics. But each operated within its own borders, emulation typically took place after the event, and direct cooperation between movements was rare.<sup>x</sup> In contrast, today we observe real-time learning, emulation, response, and cross-pollination – particularly among Islamist groups and their patron states – operating across countries, even vast regions.<sup>xi</sup> Iranian rockets,

improvised explosive technology, command and control tactics, and intelligence appears almost instantaneously in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza. Hamas emulates tactics developed by Hizbollah, and both respond in real time to events affecting Syria and Iran.<sup>xii</sup> As the head of the IDF Military Intelligence Branch stated in December 2009: "The level of cooperation [between members of the Iran-Syria- Hezbollah-Hamas axis] has reached levels never seen before...There are well known sites in Iran and Syria where, during testing of new weaponry, you can see Hizbollah and even HAMAS operatives invited to watch the test...The financing, the technology and training comes from Iran, the preferred production sites are in Syria, and the products are distributed between all members of the axis, on sea, by air and on ground."<sup>xiii</sup>

The resulting conflicts between Western states and alliances, on the one hand, and non-Western states/NSA networks, on the other, are neither traditional inter-state wars, nor internal insurgencies. They defy conventional categorization of armed conflict, blur state responsibility for armed attacks, and undermine deterrence. If a Syria trained and Iranian equipped Hezbollah unit kills Israelis in a cross border raid, who might Israel legally retaliate against? Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Hezbollah alone, or all of the above? If a dirty bomb containing Pakistani materials, assembled in Iran, shipped through Syria to Gaza, is detonated by a Sinai based *Jihadi* group in the Israeli city of Eilat, who can Israel legally and effectively take action against?

Illustrative of the challenge encountered by Western states in confronting NSA's is the question of whether states victimized by such actors even have a right to self defense under article 51 of the UN Charter. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2005 decision in the *Armed Activities* case starkly demonstrated, international law as presently

conceived, finds great difficulty in handling NSA's who have seized control of territory within a weak or failed state and are using it to wage attacks across borders.<sup>xiv</sup> The ICJ's decision in *Armed Activities* to restrict the concept of armed attack in international law to attacks committed by or directly attributable to a state, means that there is very little protection for a victim state against a non-state aggressor acting from within the territory of a state unwilling or unable to restrain the NSA. Indeed, *Armed Activities* and its 2004 sister judgment on Israel's security barrier in effect reach the absurd conclusion that attacks carried out by NSA's that are not directly attributable to a state do not constitute an armed attack under international law and therefore do not entitle the victim state to respond with force in self-defense. Seizing upon these authoritative judicial opinions, NGO's hostile to Israel have claimed that the state has no right to engage in military action to protect its citizens for attacks conducted by Hizbollah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad.<sup>xv</sup>

A third dimension of *Hybrid War* is the hijacking of "ungoverned spaces" by non-Western States and their NSA allies, and the exploitation of such spaces as bases from which to organize and launch attacks against the West. The seizure by non-Western States/NSA alliances of physical environments (on land, sea, and air) – where state weakness or outright collapse creates vacuums in public order and the disappearance of the monopoly on the use of organized violence – is arguably the most serious, rapidly unfolding, yet underappreciated strategic threat to Israel and the free world more broadly.

The Westphalian States' prime function – and the fundamental basis of the existing international order – is the provision by the State of that essential public good called security. Domestically, the State's role is to, at a minimum, prevent large scale public

disorder and criminality, and to enable citizens to live in basic human security. Internationally, its responsibility is to prevent the export of security threats and control cross-border activity. State weakness undermines these essential functions, whereas full state failure obliterates them. Israel's immediate strategic environment is increasingly shaped by the presence of weak states (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Yemen), failed states (Somalia, Sudan, Iraq) and failed non-states (Gaza). Further afield, the list of ineffectively ungoverned spaces extends to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, Eritrea, parts of West Africa and beyond.

This reality has several far reaching consequences. Weak and failed states are breeding grounds for conflict, since a vacuum in state authority invites pervasive violence on multiple levels: insurgent against regime, inter-tribal, ethnic, religious, and plain criminal. In weakly governed spaces NSAs typically prey on unarmed civilians, establish cross-border criminal "shadow economies", and draw loyalty away from the State. The resulting insecurity, poverty and frustration feed illiberal ideologies, anti-Western and anti-Semitic conspiratorial worldviews, and *Jihadi* recruitment. This is the case in several parts of Lebanon, for example, where under the aegis of a failing State, Hezbollah – backed by Iran and Syria – is constructing a large military presence, often within civilian population centers, while at the same time promoting local recruitment and weakening Lebanon further by providing the local populace some of the functional equivalents of regular state activities – jobs, housing, health services, mosques, and schooling.

NSA's operating within weak and failed states are not only actors that cause internal chaos and may trigger cross-border armed conflicts, they also make it increasingly difficult to end wars and restore stability. As the behavior of Hezbollah in Lebanon and

rogue Palestinian factions in Gaza demonstrates, even after large scale hostilities have subsided, NSA's often act as "spoilers" who have the potential to trigger fresh flare-ups at any given moment, undermine state-building, and wreck peace processes.

Weak state institutions also typically mean weakly controlled borders, which in turn encourage the infiltration of fighters, weapons, money and drugs across borders, and facilitates the development of patron-client alliances – as in the case of the Iran/Syria-Hizbollah alliance in Lebanon, and the Iran-Hamas relationship in Gaza. Porous borders greatly increase the threat of terrorism and proliferation of weapons, including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD's).

The weakening of state authority or fragmentation into different zones of control – processes far advanced in Lebanon and Palestinian territories among others – further reduces the ability of Western states to deter their adversaries or hold them to account for acts of violence emanating from within their borders. Effective deterrence depends not only on one's adversary possessing valued destroyable assets (and weak and failed states tend to possess relatively few of those to begin with), but on the existence of a broadly centralized authority interested in preserving those assets and capable of enforcing discipline within its territory.<sup>xvi</sup> Where there is no government exercising a monopoly on the use of large scale force across borders, deterrence is inherently precarious. Indeed, where a weak state (Lebanon) is challenged internally by an insurgent or terrorist organization (Hizbollah), the latter may seek to provoke an attack by an external actor (Israel) as a means of further weakening the State and advancing the provocateur's parasitic exploitation of its territory and other resources.

At the same time Western countries are themselves deterred from taking forceful action against weak and failing states, realizing the diminished benefits in terms of deterrence, and fearing greater instability in the aftermath of conflict on account of a further deterioration in governability. The breakdown of public authority in weak states also blurs the distinction between public and private combatants and objects, and between combatants and civilians; a pernicious situation which makes the application of the principle of distinction in international humanitarian law more difficult.

And where the weak or failed state houses international aid agencies, humanitarian NGOs or multilateral peace-keeping forces – as is now standard – Western actors are further constrained by fear of the diplomatic and public relations damage that would be caused to them should the do-gooders come to any harm. Consequently, NSA's and the States who support them are granted a degree of immunity by virtue of their very presence in weak and failed states. A damning indication of how the presence of international peace-keeping forces in Lebanon is cynically utilized by Hizbollah to illegally protect its fighters and deter Israel, was provided by a 2006 UNIFIL Report in which UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, stated that: "Some Hezbollah positions remained in close proximity to United Nations positions, especially in the Hula area, posing a significant security risk to United Nations personnel and equipment."<sup>xvii</sup> Should these UN personnel or equipment be harmed as a result of IDF targeting of the Hezbollah positions, Israel would be widely and unfairly condemned.

### *Hybrid War and the "Gulliverization" of Israel*

*Hybrid War* involves anti-Western states and their NSA protégés taking advantage of the vulnerable underbelly of globalization – its ungoverned spaces and porous borders. But it also entails an insidious assault upon the liberal international order constructed by the West after 1945; the hijacking and contortion of international human rights; the exploitation of loopholes in the existing laws of war; and the abuse of the free world's trade system, scientific achievements, openness, and tolerance, as weapons with which to wage violent, ideological, diplomatic, and legal battle against it. The sub-state level of attack is therefore complemented by a supra-state front.

The attacking alliance at the supra-state level overlaps with, but is by no means synonymous with, that operating at the sub-state one. The spectrum of assault at the supra-state level is broad – extending from the "hard edge" of Iran-led Holocaust denial, virulent Islamist Anti-Semitism, and genocidal calls for Israel to be wiped off the map, to the "soft" tendency prevalent in some human rights, media, and academic circles to deny that Israelis too are entitled to national self-determination and self-defense.

In the mid range of the spectrum, we find a medley of international actors – states, NSA's and activist networks – utilizing the infrastructure and discourse of international law and institutions – with the aim of making Israel a global pariah and curtailing the Jewish State's ability to counter the violent arm of the State/NSA alliance against it. Prominent examples of such mid-range tools include the obsessive persecution of Israel by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) dominated UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC); the hounding of Israeli elected officials and military personnel through the

universal jurisdiction legislation, and the worldwide Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) network.

The goal of the media, diplomatic and legal dimension of *Hybrid War* is to undermine Israel through international isolation. “Our task”, stated Betty Hunter of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign at the 2004 International Conference on Palestine held in London, “is to isolate Israel and make it a pariah state”.<sup>xviii</sup> By eroding its security, diplomatic, economic, technological, and cultural ties, the hope of the delegitimizers is to weaken Israel, justify violence against its citizens, and eventually bring about its military incapacitation or actual implosion. In this, Israel’s detractors derive inspiration from the demise of the Soviet Union, Milosovic’s Serbia, but most of all from that of South Africa’s apartheid regime. Indeed, the experience of the latter is regularly cited by Israel’s adversaries as a model for bringing down the Jewish State.

The campaign to brand Israel as a “racist”, “colonialist”, “apartheid”, even “Nazi” state, is not entirely new of course. As the Catholic philosopher and diplomat, Michael Novak – who served as United States Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Commission from 1981 to 1982 – observed shortly after the passing of the infamous "Zionism in Racism" UN General Assembly Resolution, the combination of Moslem states’ immense numerical advantage over Israel at the UN, coupled with the world body’s aptitude for manufacturing mountains of political paper, clothed in human rights speech, had made flagrant anti-Israel vitriol a perennial feature of the UN back then too. The purpose of UN “Orwellian speech” – which “uses words to mean their opposite, and then repeats such words over and over, in the hope that truth can be manufactured from untruth solely by



repetition” – Novak concluded already in 1981, “is to undermine the legitimacy and the existence of the state of Israel.”<sup>xi</sup>

Yet a number of rapidly evolving changes in the international system are conspiring to turn the supra-state arm of *Hybrid War* from verbiage to bite, from nuisance to genuine threat. Since the end of the Cold War, international law dedicated to prosecuting alleged war criminals has morphed from vague principles to a detailed legal corpus capable of substantial enforcement. At the same time, the transfer of judicial power to international courts – including a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) – has exploded. Indeed, the number of international courts, whose jurisdiction covers trade, human rights and/or war crimes, rose from 8 to 28 in the last two decades. 90% of judgments ever issued by international courts have been handed down after 1990. Concurrently, the number and power of NGOs interpreting international human rights norms and filing legal suits in national and international courts – some of whom display obsessive and biased focus on Israel – has burgeoned.<sup>xx</sup>

The result of these combined developments is the rise of "Lawfare" – the use and abuse of domestic and international law and institutions as a means of damaging an opponent militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The goal of lawfare is fivefold: (1) to neutralize a state's willingness and ability to take military action, even where necessary and justified, by sowing fear of legal prosecution among its politicians, military commanders, and soldiers; (2) to "decapitate" its political and military leadership through legal entanglement, arrest and prosecution; (3) to degrade its militarily and technological capabilities by suing corporations and investors that do business with the targeted state; (4) to question the ability of the targeted state's domestic legal system to independently

and justly investigate allegations of wrongdoing, and so to replace its judgment with that of external actors; and (5) as a naming, shaming and demonizing strategy in the court of international public opinion.

Lawfare, and gulliverization more broadly, are further aided by developments in communication technology. Media penetration and “virality” have reached unprecedented levels through the proliferation of mass media technology and ubiquitous internet access. Practically every incident in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq (and many in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Yemen) is now recorded by terrorist or observer video teams, used for propaganda and recruitment purposes, or “spun” and disseminated instantaneously through viral media and social networking outlets. Moreover, as David Kilcullen observes: “modern communications compress the operational level of war, so that almost any tactical action can have immediate strategic impact.”<sup>xxi</sup> A case in point is the June 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident, where a minor military operation assumed substantial strategic dimensions almost instantaneously.

At the international level, in sum, *Hybrid War* exploits the fact that Western democracies must now operate not only within a thick web of global governance – of international institutions, law, courts, and NGOs – but with increasingly omnipresent, real-time “global surveillance” of their militaries by civil society, media, and markets.<sup>xxii</sup>

These external constraints on liberal democracies – and liberal democracies alone – are matched by internal ones. That advanced democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another is one of the few laws of social science that has the virtue of being both widely known and true.<sup>xxiii</sup> Democratic Peace – which was created and maintained over the past

65 years by a virtuous cycle of the spread of democracy, economic interdependence, and US-led international institutions (the UN, WTO, World Bank, IMF, NATO, OSCE) – has diminished the probability and experience of war between liberal democracies to practically zero.

But democracies have been aptly labeled "powerful pacifists" for another, less widely known reason.<sup>xxiv</sup> For together with the already war-cancelling effects of Democratic Peace on the international level, liberal societies have undergone profound processes of internal pacification which have made them allergic to war in general, almost regardless of the nature of their adversary. As Azar Gat recently observed, the consensual nature, individualism, pluralism, and emphasis on peaceful resolution of disputes characterizing contemporary liberal democracies, has made them essentially free from large scale domestic violence and their citizens unaccustomed and unaccepting of such violence. Wealth and comfort have also "tended to work against martial virtues."<sup>xxv</sup>

This has led to the dual effect of low tolerance for sustaining casualties at home, and low tolerance for inflicting death abroad. Israel may well be more martial than Scandinavia, but with the rise of modernity, individualism and decadence in the Jewish State over the past two decades in particular, Israelis too now possess relatively low tolerance for sustaining casualties or inflicting them. The kidnapping or death of a single soldier is cause for national trauma; the killing of others – especially civilians – provokes intense domestic media scrutiny, NGO outrage, judicial investigations, and criminal prosecutions. The Israeli Supreme Court intervenes regularly and deeply in the decisions of the country's security forces. High-ranking, independent investigative committees are becoming ubiquitous legal addendums to large (Lebanon 2006; Cast Lead 2008-9) and

small (Flotilla) clashes. No fewer than 600 Israeli commanders and soldiers were investigated at the initiative of the IDF itself in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead.

Non-Western States and NSA's fighting *Hybrid War* know this, and so adapt their tactics to take maximum advantage of liberal democracies' self-imposed limitations on ruthlessness, particularly against civilian persons and objects. As a result, Gat aptly observes, "democracies end up with a paradoxically losing combination in many small wars: they sacrifice capability to humanitarian considerations but still face a heightened outcry both at home and abroad over the war's atrocities, the killing of civilians, and collateral damage... Thus advanced liberal democracies' aversion to and inhibition in war tend to make even small wars against weak rivals an unbearable mess for them, which, in turn, only magnified their aversion."<sup>xxvi</sup>

### ***Towards Adaptation***

In his 1699 classic, *Voyage to Lilliput*, Lemuel Gulliver awakes on a beach in a strange land, after being shipwrecked by a sea tempest, to find himself bound and tethered to the point of incapacitation by a myriad of Lilliputians – a people one-twelfth the size of ordinary human beings. The "Gulliverization" of Jonathan Swift's imaginary hero is an apt metaphor for the process of sovereignty-restriction and self-defense-neutralization increasingly experienced by Western democracies as the result of cultural changes within their own societies; by structural changes to the international systems; and by the actions of the Lilliputians of this world – the overwhelmingly authoritarian member governments of the OIC and Arab League, the NSA protected by but exempt from respecting the laws

of war, the unelected international judge and bureaucrat, the unaccountable NGO and media outlet.

Israel and its Western peers are experiencing the effects of the latest historic shift in the species of war waged against the Jewish State, and must once again adapt their strategic concepts, institutions, alliances, and policies to counter the new species of assault. Successful adaptation begins with correct conceptualization of the new threat; a diagnostic task with which this article has sought to grapple. Beyond accurate conceptualization, Israel and its allies will have to articulate more clearly and forcefully the new strategic reality in the Middle East – a reality shaped by aggressive Iranian expansionism, dynamic new State/NSA alliances, and the exploitation of both sub and supra-state vacuums in the contemporary global order. Most urgent is the need for Israel to secure its southern borders against infiltration, to develop and apply a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Israeli equivalent of a Monroe Doctrine against the Iranian-led takeover of proximate ungoverned spaces, and to lead a determined campaign to update the laws of war and reform the UNHRC. Lemuel Gulliver managed to eventually unbind and escape Lilliput, and so must we.

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<sup>i</sup> "No to peace with Israel. No to recognition of Israel. No to negotiation with Israel".

<sup>ii</sup> Christopher C. Joyner, "The Transnational Boycott as Economic Coercion in International Law: Policy, Plan, and Practice" *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 17:2 (Spring 1984), pp. 206-286, p. 216.

<sup>iii</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217-18. See also: Nancy Turck, "The Arab Boycott of Israel", 55/3 *Foreign Affairs* (April 1977), pp. 472-493; Aaron J. Sarna, *Boycott and Blacklist: A History of Arab Economic Warfare Against Israel* (New Jersey, 1986).

<sup>iv</sup> On the "Israeli economic miracle" see: Linda Sharaby, *Israel's Economic Growth: Success Without Security*, 6/3 *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (2002); Jonathan Adelman, *The Rise of Israel: A history of a revolutionary state* (Oxford, 2008); Dan Senor and Saul Singer, *Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle* (New York, 2009).

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v Sever Plocker, *Our Economic Success Story* (available at: <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3871593,00.html>). On Israel and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development see: [http://www.oecd.org/country/0,3377,en\\_33873108\\_39418575\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/country/0,3377,en_33873108_39418575_1_1_1_1_1,00.html)

vi Sever Plocker, *2<sup>nd</sup> intifada forgotten* (available at: <http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3558676,00.html>).

vii Figures are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (available at: [http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP\\_pub/UCDP\\_dyadic\\_dataset\\_1.0\\_Online\\_appendix.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP_dyadic_dataset_1.0_Online_appendix.pdf)

viii James Hackett, *The Military Balance 2007* (London 2007) pp. 422-438.

ix Haaretz Newspaper, April 27<sup>th</sup> 2010, *Gates: Hezbollah has more rockets than most governments in the world today* (available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/gates-hezbollah-has-more-rockets-than-most-governments-in-the-world-1.285021>).

x David Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux" *Survival*, vol. 48 no. 4 (winter 2006-2007) pp. 111-130 at p. 114.

xi Ibid.

xii See Amichai Magen, "Land of the Clenched Fist", *Hoover Digest* (Summer 2009), pp. 93-101.

xiii Address of the Head of IDF Military Intelligence Branch (Aman) at the Annual Conference of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), Tel-Aviv University, December 15 2009. [Translation by author].

xiv Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v Uganda (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo), 2005 I.C.J. 116. For a critique of the judgment see Suzanne A. Barbour and Zoe A. Salzman, "The Tangled Web: The Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors in the Armed Activities Case" vol. 40 *International Law and Politics* (2008) pp. 53-106.

xv See NGO Monitor, *International Law Series: The Right to Self Defense* (January 10, 2010).

xvi Valuable destroyable assets include: military bases, ammunition storage facilities, command and control centers, and military industrial complexes.

xvii Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from January 21 2006 to July 18 2006) (S/2006/560), paragraph 28 (available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/437/22/IMG/N0643722.pdf?OpenElement>).

xviii See The Reut Institute, "Eroding Israel's Legitimacy in the International Arena", January 2010, (available at: <http://www.reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=3766>).

xix Novak is quoted by Ruth Wisse in Ruth Wisse, "The Delegation of Israel", *Commentary*, July 1982, p. 30.

xx See Anne Herzberg, "NGO Lawfare: Exploitation of Courts in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", *NGO Monitor Monograph Series* (available at: <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/data/images/File/lawfare-monograph.pdf>).

xxi David Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux" *Survival*, vol. 48 no. 4 (winter 2006-2007) pp. 111-130 at 117

xxii On "global surveillance" see: Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War* (Polity, 2005) pp. 56.

xxiii See in particular: Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* vol. 12 (1983); Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations* (Norton, 2001). For critics see:

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<sup>xxiv</sup> David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War", *American Political Science Review* vol. 86 (1992) pp. 24-37.

<sup>xxv</sup> Azar Gat, *Victorious and Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and How It is Still Imperiled* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2010) p. 182-3.

<sup>xxvi</sup> Azar Gat, *Ibid.* at p. 185.