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Why the Nigerian Counter-Terrorism policy toward

Boko Haram has failed

A cause and effect relationship

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Abstract:

In early 2014 the abduction of 276 schoolgirls in Nigeria became the headline of every major news network. This abduction was just one attack in a series of attacks committed over the past decade by the Nigerian terror organization Boko Haram. Boko Haram mainly rose to attention by its attacks on the UN headquarter in Abuja and abduction of the schoolgirls.

Yet, its affiliation with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has turned Boko Haram not only into a regionally but also globally perceived threat. The Nigerian government has become the main target of Boko Haram on several occasions and has therefore decided to use military as well as law enforcement to win the battle against Boko Haram.

It has thereby targeted many civilians and has employed a collective punishment approach. However, the frequency of attacks has not decreased and animosity towards the Nigerian government seems to rise especially among the Muslim population. This paper attempts to explain the failure of the Nigerian Counter-Terrorism policy as a cause and effect relationship in the form of three dimensions.

On the first dimension the paper will argue that the Nigerian government has misclassified Boko Haram as solely an ideological terror organization disregarding its ethnic background and ties. The second dimension will show how this misassumption has led to a solely military response disregarding underlying inequalities as factors causing terror. The third and final dimension will then, through the usage of the indiscriminate violence principle of Kalyvas, explain how the use of military force has led to a collective punishment approach.

Why the Nigerian Counter-Terrorism Policy has failed

A cause and effect relationship

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Boko Haram- A regional group with global ties

Nigeria, a country situated in the Mid- West of the African continent, has become one of the main theaters of terrorism over the past years. Recent events such as the abduction of approximately 276 schoolgirls in the State of Borno, have put the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (The Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad) or in short Boko Haram (Western education is a sin) at the center of world attention (Mark, M., May 6, 2014). There are two events that scholars widely expect as having sparked the radicalization of Boko Haram, one being the murder of their leader Mohammed Yusuf in the ethnic riots of 2009 and the other being the imbalance of political power that occurred through the 2011 Nigerian national elections (Campbell, J., March 2012).

Since then, one has seen an increase in attacks and violence from Boko Haram. Boko Haram is a Salafy jihadi terrorist organization which is known for its links to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This affiliation makes it quite resourceful and therefore one has seen an ongoing battle between the Nigerian military and police Vis a Vis Boko Haram fighters. Boko Haram's main goal is the establishment of an Islamic State in Nigeria (Leigh, K., August 31, 2011). The fighting between government forces and Boko Haram has mainly injured the civilian population.

It seems that the Nigerian government has reacted to the threat with a collective punishment approach, which has fueled the animosity throughout the civilian population (Mazen, M., April 8, 2014). Therefore one has to ask oneself, whether the Nigerian government has determined the nature of Boko Haram correctly and if not, whether this misconception has led to a military based counter-terrorism approach which has turned into indiscriminate violence ?

In order to answer this question, this article will analyze the situation in Nigeria in a two- folded approach. It will firstly argue that the Nigerian Counter-Terrorism policy has failed because Boko Haram was viewed as solely an ideological terrorist group, disregarding the ethnical background of the group. This classification dimension will be discussed by using Byman's theory of differentiation between ethnic and ideological terrorism. Secondly, the paper will claim that because of the wrong classification by the Nigerian government of the mere nature of Boko Haram, the government has employed a strong military strategy which has led to the use of indiscriminate violence against the civilian population. This dimension will be discussed by using Kalyvas' theory of indiscriminate violence.

Background of the Conflict

Nigeria is a country in the North- West of Africa. Its demography is very unique since it consists of 40 % Muslims, 50% Christians and 10% who are unaffiliated. Nigeria's history, as commonly found in African history, shows a long period of colonization by the British. After Nigeria received independence in the 1960s, it continued into almost thirty years of authoritarian rule. When in 1999 the first democratic leader was elected, the Nigerian government decided to rotate

presidency terms between the Muslim population and the Christian population in order to prevent further ethnic tension and civil war (Aborisade, O.& Mundt, R.J., 2002). Boko Haram was established as a Muslim youth organization in 1995 under the name „Shabab“. In 2002, the radical leader Mohammed Yusuf took leadership of the group and turned it into a radical Islamic group named Boko Haram (Oyewole, S., August 24, 2013). Until 2009, the organization was rather peaceful compared to their actions further along the way. Between 2002 and 2009, civilians were not the main target and the group mostly attacked police stations and government buildings (BBC, May 15, 2013). Scholars agree that two main events escalated the violence towards civilians and turned Boko Haram from a guerrilla group into a terrorist group. Firstly, in 2009 Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram, was killed by the Nigerian government during ethnic riots between Christians and Muslims. Secondly, in 2010 the Muslim President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua died and his Christian Vice President Jonathan took over until new elections could be set up. Jonathan was expected to not run in the new elections held in 2011 and let a Muslim President finish the term until 2015. Yet, Jonathan decided to run and won the elections (Campbell, J., March 2012). The Muslim population felt betrayed. Since then we have seen a number of attacks committed by Boko Haram mostly in the States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, which are located in the North- East of Nigeria. Borno is considered the home- base of Boko Haram and thus, the Jonathan administration has enacted a curfew in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa in May 2013 (BBC, May 17, 2013). Two of the most prominent attacks committed by Boko Haram were the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja in 2011 (BBC, May 15, 2013) and the abduction of 276 schoolgirls in 2014 (Mark, M. May 6, 2014).

The battle between government forces and Boko Haram has mainly injured the Muslim civilian population. Nigerian government forces are fighting Boko Haram on a daily basis and are using a

collective punishment approach. Thus, violence on a mass- scale against civilians is not only initiated by Boko Haram itself, but also by the Nigerian government (Mazen, M., April 8, 2014). Boko Haram's main targets are government affiliates, Christians and even Muslims which are considered to be *kufars* (non-believers) (Oyewole, S., August 24, 2013).

Ethnic or Ideological Terrorism- why must one distinguish?

Ethnic or ideological Terrorism- why must one distinguish? To answer this essential question, which is the basis for this article, Byman's theory of distinction was used. In his work, he argues that it is essential to make this distinction in order to respond to the different groups appropriately. Byman believes that there is an essential difference between ethnic and ideological terrorist groups, which is that ethnic groups have a much stronger tie to the local population than the ideological group. Thus, any military action against the ethnic terrorist group will create a backlash and will heighten animosity among the local population towards the government. Moreover, this will then increase support for the radical terrorist group and in addition, it will cause recruitment to the group. Byman, in his work attempts to prove his theory by using examples of ethnic terrorists groups in India, the ETA in the Basque region of Spain and the Irgun and the Stern group in the former British mandate of Palestine. Byman, in his theory puts much emphasis on how to counter ethnic terrorism. He explains that the government needs to work together with the moderate local population and initiate what he calls "in group" policing. He argues that the government has to give the local moderate population more legitimacy and concessions must be made in order to gain corporation from the local population. "In group" policing will show much more effect than government crackdowns, since on the one

hand the locals have much better intelligence as to where the radicals are located in their community and secondly, taking the local populations support away from the terrorists organization creates great harm for the terrorist organization and its cause receives less attention and therefore becomes delegitimized (Byman, D.L., Spring 1998).

Boko Haram- Ethnic or Ideological motivated Terrorism?

When one hears the name Boko Haram, one immediately thinks of a Jihadi-Militant group, which has the common Global Jihadi goal of establishing an Islamic State in Nigeria. The assumption that Boko Haram has a global agenda is mostly drawn from its links to the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) faction (Leigh, K., August 31, 2011) and several messages by the Boko Haram leadership threatening the United States. In addition, the ultimate goal of Boko Haram coincides with the ultimate goal of the Global Jihad movement, which is regaining and freeing Islamic lands from the occupiers (Youtube, August 13, 2013). The connection to the Al Qaeda ideology as well as its physical connection to AQIM, is the basis for what seems a very plausible classification of Boko Haram as a solely ideological terrorist group. Due to this assumption, the Nigerian government has created a counter- terrorism policy that disregards ethnic ties (Oyewole, S., August 24, 2013). One may ask why such a classification is even necessary. According to Byman, classifying a terrorist organization such as Boko Haram as either ideological or ethnic, is essential because it determines which counter-terrorism policy will show effectiveness. An ethnic terrorist group usually derives from a specific part of a countries' population. It most of the time fights against underlying inequalities within society such as discrimination, poverty or political and civil rights. The organization can have many different

goals among them the most common being independence from a state, territory or equality within their societal framework. Because they derive from a specific part of the population and fight for the rights of their group, they oftentimes find great support within their home population and their cause is oftentimes seen as a legitimate one by the group. This is especially the case if the population from which the group derives feels like their existence is threatened by the current societal order. An ideological group on the other hand, is usually based on an ideology shared by a few to change the political system within the respective country. In the beginning, when the group is still moderate, the group may have many followers but once the group turns radical and violent they lose a big share of supporters (example: The Red Army Faction in Germany). In most cases, the supporter's existence is not threatened by the current rule (Byman, D.L., Spring 1998).

According to Byman, ethnic terrorist groups are much harder to fight than ideological terrorist groups. Byman claims, that ideological groups usually do not have as much support from the population and therefore safe haven from the law enforcement or military is usually rare. In addition, the distinction between who belongs to the terrorist group and who is just a civilian is much easier to be made if the group is not intermingled with the local population. Therefore, ideological group members can be targeted more easily through intelligence and law enforcement personnel (Byman, D.L., Spring 1998). A good example for a successful fight against an ideological terrorist organization was the filtering system by the German government against the Red Army Faction in the 1970s (Hase&Koehler, 1972). In addition, in comparison to ethnic groups, there are usually much less underlying inequalities within the population. Therefore, once the ideological terrorist group is eradicated, the chances are much smaller that a

new terrorist organization fighting for the same cause will appear again. Ethnic groups on the other hand are much harder to fight and have to be approached in a different way, since there are underlying issues that cause the violence to escalate and because ethnic groups are oftentimes closely intermingled and connected to the population they represent. According to Daniel Byman, *“In contrast to an identity proposed by a state, ethnic terrorist strive for communal identity. They seek this identity through terrorist activities, which have a two- fold effect. First, terrorism creates communal bonds that result from the retaliation of the government or rival communities; secondly, the inevitable persecution that follows draws attention to their cause among the larger population, increasing their numbers and financial support”* (Byman, D.L., Spring 1998, pp. 150). The theory proposed by Byman claims, that it is absolutely essential to determine the mere nature of a terrorists group, in order to assess an effective counter-terrorism strategy. As understood from several statements by the Jonathan administration about Boko Haram over the years, the organization is seen as one driven by the ideology to establish an Islamic State in Nigeria (Vinograd, C., May 8, 2014). If Boko Haram were an Islamic militant group pursuing this goal for let’s say Germany, France or Belgium, Boko Haram would be a clear case of an ideological terrorist organization, since these countries do not have a history of Muslim rule and do not have Muslim minorities of the size that Nigeria has. However, there are several attributes that could easily classify Boko Haram as an ethnic terrorist group. These following indicated attributes do not suggest an exclusion of an ideological framework but rather intend explain that Boko Haram is both ethnical and ideologically driven.

As Byman proposes, ethnic terrorist groups try to establish a communal identity that stands in contrast to the identity proposed by the state. As mentioned beforehand Nigeria is

demographically divided into 50% Christians and 40% Muslims (CIA, 2014). Many scholars have agreed that one of the events that sparked Boko Haram's violence was the imbalance of political power through the 2011 elections (Campbell, J., March 2012). This imbalance could have been seen by Boko Haram as the emergence of a governmental Christian identity that was supposed to be forced onto the Muslim population. The reaction by Boko Haram towards the 2011 elections, therefore prove its connection to the local Muslim population and its stance towards social, political and economic inequalities between Muslims and Christians within Nigeria, which they feared would occur due to the newly created imbalance in political power. This fear of imposition and inequality was indeed, sparked by the 2011 elections however, there were previous underlying issues that produced a situation that could easily explode. As Nigeria has a clear Muslim North and Christian South, one has over the past decades seen many indicators for inequality between the North/South divide. Indicators for this would be access to education, unemployment and child mortality (this being an indicator for the standards of the health system). According to UNICEF, education is a major issue within Nigeria in total, as citizens below the age of 15 make up for 45% of the entire population. This means increased enrollment rates, causing one teacher to provide education for a class of 100 pupils. UNICEF also indicates a clear North/South divide regarding education, where it claims that the North of Nigeria has much lower standard of education due to lack of funds. Schools in the South get more funds than schools in the North (UNICEF, 2014). This underlying issue has caused many Islamic schools with Islamic fundamentalist curricula to open, which provide better learning conditions than the state funded moderate schools. These schools are a main recruitment opportunity for Boko Haram (Umar, M.S., 2003). The current leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar

Shenkau himself grew up in poverty as most Muslims do in the North of Nigeria. He lived in the slums of Maiduguri and then attended an Islamic school (McCoy, T., May 7, 2014).

When looking at unemployment rates in Nigeria, one can also see a clear difference between the North and the South. For instance, while the national unemployment rate was 21,1% in 2010, the Northern States of Nigeria in 2010 in comparison to the Southern States had much lower employment per household numbers. According to a report released by the Nigerian National Bureau for Statistics in 2010, for example the Northern State Yobe had 841,334 employed households whereas the Southern State Oyo (approximately the same size) had 2,372,968 employed households. Another example would be the Northern State of Gombe which had 840,037 employed households whereas the same sized Southern State of Ondo had 1,611,371 employed households (National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria, 2010). The government does not show any effort to better the situation and more people are suffering from poverty, especially since the government does not provide the local population with any sort of aid relief (Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, 2013). As the Muslim faith is known to be very traditional and patriarchal, and women usually stay at home to raise the children, the main population affected by the unemployment is young males (National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria, 2010). Young males are therefore very likely to look towards opportunities, which let them provide for their families and these are the men that Boko Haram targets for recruitment.

When looking at the last indicator, which is child mortality, one really looks at the difference in health services between the South and the North of Nigeria. The standard of Health services is always a clear indicator for social service provision and the functioning of state institutions.

According to UNICEF figures of the past year, there is an immense difference between the Nigerian North-West/North-East versus the South-West/South-East regions in regard to infant mortality rates under the age of five. On average, out of 1000 infants, in the South-West 176 have died under the age of five and in the South-East 103 children have died under the age of five. The numbers in the Northern part are significantly higher with the North-East region ranking at 260 infants on average and the North-West region ranking at 269 infants on average. These numbers clearly indicate a difference in health care provision between the North/South divide. Many may argue, that this has to do with higher birthrates among the Muslim population. Yet, as these numbers are taken out of an average of a thousand infants, birthrates among the respective populations are irrelevant to the statistic (UNICEF, 2014). Overall, one can say that there is a clear divide between the treatment of citizens in the North of the country and in the South of the country. These underlying cleavages have provided an ethnic tension that was ready to explode and in addition, it has left a vacuum for Boko Haram to fill. By solely looking at the current leader, one can see that underlying ethnic cleavages most definitely fuel Boko Haram's cause and increase recruitment. Although some might argue, that the current leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shenkai, is ideologically driven and is a radical Muslim and this has caused his active role in the terror organization. Yet, as mentioned beforehand, he came from poverty and witnessed the inequalities pre-existent in Nigeria and these inequalities have undoubtedly influenced his behavior and ideology (McCoy, T., May 7, 2014).

Many scholars will make the claim that Boko Haram is not fighting for an ethnic cause because they also attack many Muslims in the North. Yet, as one has seen in many Salafy Jihadist movements the principle of *takfir* being one of the main religious creed. Announcing fellow Muslims as *kufars* (non-believers) is a common feature in Salafy movements (Wiktorowitz, Q.,

2006). Muslims are attacked by Boko Haram, because in the eyes of the movement, these Muslims do not adhere to the Quran and are not true believers. This classification includes Nigerian Muslims that do not fight for the enforcement of Sharia Law or for example go to non-religious schools. The fact that Boko Haram fights fellow Muslims is not an indicator that they are purely ideological, it is an indicator that they relate to their Muslim population in a way of having to purify it of non-believers and the purification is another main feature found in the Salafy religious creed (Wiktorowitz, Q., 2006). Another indication for this purification process is that Nigeria has a rather small Shia population of approximately 5% (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2014). Therefore, this is not a clear case of Sunnis fighting Shias but actually that Boko Haram (Sunni Organization) mostly attacks fellow Sunnis in order to purify the Muslim population in Nigeria. In addition, one finds statements of Christians that were attacked by Boko Haram but were promised to be spared if they converted to Islam (Weinthal, B., November 19, 2013). This occurrence is another indicator, that they have a desire to turn the country into an Islamic state, which is a characteristic that fits both an ideological and ethnic claim.

Another attribute that could classify Boko Haram as an ethnic group is, that even before Boko Haram established ties with the Global Jihad movement it had the goal of establishing an Islamic State in Nigeria. The connection to the Global Jihad movement did not change the ultimate goal of Boko Haram; it just added the Global Jihad aspect to it. This means that their ultimate goal is still turning Nigeria into an Islamic state. By affiliating with AQIM they have agreed to become a puzzle piece of Al Qaeda's global agenda. This does not mean that they have necessarily taken over Al Qaeda's ideology but that they have made a cost/ benefit analysis, with the cost being

close to zero as Boko Haram just continues working towards taking over Nigeria and the benefit being immense, since they are provided with weapons and money for their cause by Al Qaeda. In addition, one has only seen Boko Haram link itself to AQIM and not Al Qaeda Central, which is a strong indicator for Boko Haram's cost and benefit analysis, since this means they do not have to provide for example foreign fighters to theaters of Global Jihad (Leigh, K, August 31, 2011). In addition, another indicator for no relationship between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda Central would be that although there are claims of Nigerian foreign fighters, the numbers are as low that they are not even listed by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization in their study on foreign fighters in Syria (The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, 2014). When looking at the large Muslim population within the country and considering that nowadays there are twelve states within Nigeria that are ruled by Sharia Law, the goal to establish an Islamic State in Nigeria, could easily be considered an ethnic claim rather than an ideological. Especially, because the process of enforcement of Sharia law happened right after the return to civil rule in 1999, thus much before Boko Haram turned violent (Igwe, L., December 24, 2013).

Ethnic strive is not always limited to attaining statehood or independence, it can also mean that a group wants to establish a new ethnic rule in the respective country. When comparing Byman's theory with the nature of Boko Haram, it is clear to see that Boko Haram does have ethnic ties towards the Muslim population of Nigeria. Within its ideology of purifying the Muslim population, it intends to establish a state that will benefit the purified Muslim population of Nigeria and not just itself. Therefore, it is safe to say that Boko Haram is both ideologically and ethnically driven.

The Illogic of Indiscriminate Violence

The use of a collective punishment approach or indiscriminate violence by a government against its population is not a new phenomenon. The world has, over the last century, witnessed the use of collective punishment as a government tactic in conflicts such as the Sri Lanka Civil War 1983-2009, where the Sinhalese government systematically deprived the Tamils of their civil rights, or as a tool for ethnic cleansing as it was seen in the Rwandan Genocide. This article will only discuss the use of the collective punishment approach as a government tactic. Therefore, it will analyze the conflict in Nigeria by using the theory of indiscriminate versus selective violence by Stathis N. Kalyvas. This theory will be used to explain the counter-terrorism reaction of the Nigerian government toward Boko Haram, based on the assertion that Boko Haram is solely an ideological terrorist group. Kalyvas in his theory makes a distinction between indiscriminate violence,, *this is a type of violence whereby the victims are selected on the basis of their membership in some group and irrespective of their individual actions*“(Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003, pp.97) and selective violence,, *selective violence personalizes threats and endows them with credibility, for if people are targeted on the basis of their actions, then refraining from such actions guarantees safety.*“ (Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003, pp.105). Kalyvas argues that indiscriminate violence is in most cases counter-productive, however is still used by political actors due to four distinct factors: truncated data, ignorance, cost, and institutional constraints. According to Kalyvas, political actors use indiscriminate violence, on the one hand in order to push civilians into compliance and on the other hand they believe that it creates a sort of domino effect. If the political actor cannot punish the one responsible for the violence himself, the

political actor can use collective punishment and the innocent will then put pressure on the responsible one to terminate his actions. According to Kalyvas, this is a misassumption and it only causes heightened animosity towards the political actor throughout the targeted population (Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003).

The Use of indiscriminate violence in Nigeria- Causes and Implications

The Use of indiscriminate instead of selective violence is seen daily in the Nigerian conflict with Boko Haram. A collective punishment approach is used by the military and police, which mainly hurts the civilian population. This collective punishment approach can be seen through three different aspects of human rights abuses: unlawful detainment, murder and torture (Amnesty International, 2009). Although, the Nigerian government claims that torture does not happen in the Nigerian prisons and that only terrorists are murdered as well as detained, the numbers provided by the Human Rights Organization Amnesty International speak a different language. Unlawful detainment has become a daily occurrence in the North- East of Nigeria. Young men that are suspected of aiding or having joined Boko Haram are picked up from their houses or of the street and brought to the Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, Borno state and Sector Alpha. These prisons are run by the Joint Task Force (JTF) and the detainees are not entitled to their basic rights of informing their family, requesting a lawyer and most importantly, they are held in the prisons for up to a year without a trial. In fact, according to Amnesty International not one single detained person has been put up for trial up to this very point. According to Amnesty International, in the first six months of the year 2013 alone, 950 men were detained unlawfully by the Nigerian government (Amnesty International, 2013). If and when, these men make it out

of prisons alive (many die of disease, starvation or torture), their animosity against the government has usually increased and they are easy targets for Boko Haram's recruitment efforts. Murder of the civilian population has also become common in the North-East of Nigeria. According to Amnesty International these murders either happen on the street during arrests of suspects or within the prisons. According to interviews with former detainees, these men were killed by systematic starvation and torture and many just bled to death in the overcrowded cells (Amnesty International, 2009). The most incredible instinct the human being has is to survive. The survival chance after being detained is very low therefore, many men join Boko Haram because they believe that at least then, they will be armed and can protect themselves and their families.

The last indicator, one shall look at is torture within the prisons. According to interviews conducted with former detainees, Amnesty International found out that torture is on the daily agenda in Nigerian prisons. Nigeria engages in these illegal activities to get information about Boko Haram. However, many of the detainees have no attachment to Boko Haram and thus, they are oftentimes tortured to death. These facts provided by Amnesty International clearly indicate that the Nigerian government uses indiscriminate violence against the civilian population and clearly the Muslim population is losing its trust in the government to protect them while Boko Haram is getting more violent and growing in numbers by the minute (Amnesty International, 2009). Therefore, the question arising is why does the Nigerian government not change their policy. Kalyvas' theory claims that if a political actor uses indiscriminate violence against the civilian population expecting the innocent ones to pressure the guilty to give up, this almost in all cases backfires. The reason for this can be that either the innocent are too weak to stop the ones

guilty of terrorism or they could also just be scared of retaliation from the guilty (Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003). Yet, especially in cases where the terrorist group has an ethnic background, there is almost always a large share of the population that the terrorist group derives from, which sees the fight of the terrorist group as a legitimate cause (Byman, D.L., Spring 1998). This share is even increased when violence is directed at the population from the government since joining or supporting the terrorist cause means being protected by the terrorist group (Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003). When classifying Boko Haram as solely ideological, the previous calculation is not being made by the Nigerian government. Through the wrong classification, the government is expecting the local population to give up the guilty in order to not suffer since they have no relation to Boko Haram anyway.

According to Kalyvas, a strong military response towards a terrorist group can easily turn into indiscriminate violence. He names four factors that lead to this transition: truncated data, ignorance, cost, and institutional constraints. When looking at the Nigerian government's response towards Boko Haram all four factors apply. By truncated data Kalyvas means that in many cases indiscriminate violence occurs and the authorities in charge oftentimes do not know about it (Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003). This can be due to individual actions, large territory or a weak command structure. Comparing this to the Nigerian case, one can definitely say that this applies. Amnesty International has released victim reports which indicate that Nigerian soldiers shot victims family members although they did not resist the arrest (Amnesty International, 2009). These individual actions within the International criminal law framework are punishable as war crimes (International Criminal Court, 2002). However, little accountability has been shown and Amnesty International has repeatedly called upon the government to bring the

perpetrators to justice (Osuyi, P., August 5, 2014). This indicates a weak command structure. Another indication for a weak command structure is that military officers and police personnel have publicly spoken out against the Nigerian government and it almost seems that the government is losing control of its military/law enforcement (Ahmed, I.& Eckel, M., May 30, 2014). In addition, Nigeria has a very large territory of 923,768 square kilometers and this makes it difficult for the government in Abuja to control actions in Maiduguri etc. (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2014). Secondly, Kalyvas mentions ignorance to be a main reason for indiscriminate violence. He claims that although the political actors know that indiscriminate violence causes counter- revolution and animosity within the target population, they still use it and he names two factors for this reasoning: cost and institutional constraints. Cost oftentimes plays a major role when a political actor decides whether to apply selective or indiscriminate violence. Selective violence means using intelligence to identify, localize and kill or detain the terrorist or its collaborators. This is oftentimes very costly and many political actors lack the resources to employ these measures. Therefore, they use indiscriminate violence and hope that among the many they detain and kill will be someone who was guilty (Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003). Many would say that for Nigeria the cost is not relevant since Nigeria is a wealthy country with a large amount of oil reserves and a very strong economy (Barungi, B., 2014). This is true indeed, however like in so many oil-wealthy countries not much of the resources are spent on the population and the money goes into the hands of few, which use it for personal benefit. There is simply no interest to spend the money in order to protect the civilian population.

One shall now regard the last factor, which Kalyvas claims being a cause for indiscriminate violence: institutional constraints. This means that different actors within the military campaign do not coordinate and communicate with each other (Kalyvas, S.N., July 22, 2003). Although,

Nigeria only employs the army (instead of Air force or Navy) in the conflict, there is still a separation between the military and law enforcement within the conflict (Campbell, J., March 2012). They do not coordinate their efforts and the Nigerian government in Abuja does not further such coordination to receive better results. Overall, one can see that the theory by Kalyvas has proven that a wrong classification of Boko Haram by the government has led to a military based counter-terrorism approach, which due to truncated data, ignorance, cost, and institutional constraints has led to the use of a collective punishment approach using indiscriminate violence.

Conclusion

Boko Haram fights both in the name of ethnicity and ideology. By analyzing the mere nature of Boko Haram, one has seen that their ethnicity is actually what has made them survive and grow. By using Byman's theory, it is clearly seen that Boko Haram has an ethnic background and relates to the local Muslim population. This factor makes them even more of a threat since the social and political conditions for the Muslim population are worsening and this is likely to cause more recruitment and followers to the organization. In addition, Kalyvas has provided an explanation for how a military hard power counter- terrorism policy can easily turn into the use of indiscriminate violence through truncated data, ignorance, costs and institutional constraints and Nigeria has proven to be a vivid example for this process. Through the analysis of this article, one has seen how the use of indiscriminate violence against the Nigerian Muslim population has caused even more animosity within the population and has likely even

strengthened Boko Haram. Overall, this article has illustrated a cause and effect relationship in which a false classification of Boko Haram has led to a wrong counter-terrorism approach which has further led towards a collective punishment approach with the use of indiscriminate violence. This vicious cycle has benefited Boko Haram over the years and made them even stronger. A new counter-terrorism approach is needed which focuses on Boko Haram as an ethnic and ideological terror group, in order to end the bloodshed.

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