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Jordan: In the Balance

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Abstract:

This paper explores the impact that Syria's civil war spillover and other local pressures are having on Jordan's stability, particularly in the areas of state capacity, legitimacy, and security. These critical areas have a bearing on the already fragile kingdom's functionality, which is of concern because Jordan plays an important role in helping to stabilize the volatile Middle East: a region that significantly affects global security. Properly discerning the extent of Jordan's fragility and how Syria's spillover and regional tensions affect the kingdom's stability could inform policymaking and counterterrorism strategies in a part of the world characterized by weak and failing states.

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Introduction

Could Syria's spillover tip Jordan over to failure in capacity, legitimacy, or security? The increased fragility of Jordan in light of the Syrian civil war spilling over to neighboring countries is of concern because the kingdom helps stabilize the Middle East, impacted by "Arab Spring" events sparked in December 2010.

Jordan is a strategic buffer for Israel and the Gulf states; failure in capacity, legitimacy, or security could set off destabilizing regional and global events. For instance, a capacity or security failure could, *inter alia*, provide enabling conditions for Iran's further expansion into Iraq, thus exacerbating regional Shi'a-Sunni tensions that could trigger large-scale Arab uprisings and Shi'ite rebellions. An Arab uprising in the territories in Israel could leave the

Jewish State open to external attacks from Iran and jihadists, and cause a spike in weapons trafficking east of the Jordan River. A major Shi'ite rebellion in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province could impede global oil flows and raise oil prices; and fuel another Shi'ite revolt in Bahrain that could hasten the fall of its Sunni monarchy. Ensuing power vacuums could enable Armed Non-State Actors (NSAs) to seize ungoverned spaces. The synergetic effects of such events could risk a regional "*cascade of state failure* (Magen, 2012, p. 15)."

Discerning the extent of Jordan's fragility, and how Syria's civil war spillover and other local pressures affect the kingdom's stability could help inform policymaking and counterterrorism strategies in this volatile region of weak and failing states.

This paper explores Jordan's fragility in five parts. The first part focuses on the phenomenon of state failure, and Jordan in its regional environment in the context of this phenomenon. This section also explains the research methodology. The second part touches on Jordan's geo-strategic position and natural resources; and introduces five dimensions of civil war spillover useful for examining pressures Syria's civil war spillover is placing on Jordan's stability, which is further affected by lingering spillovers from other countries. This section also contains a brief review of selective evolving transnational threats affecting Jordan. The third part reviews trends in Jordan's stability using indicator scores from the 2006 to 2013 Failed States Indices (FSI), which focus on 12 key indicators (Messner, 2013) that reveal normal pressures states face and pressures that push them to failure. The fourth part notes the fragility of selected states in the region, identifies an important regional trend on democracy, and considers the potential for a regional cascade of state failure. The fifth part concludes with a final assessment of the findings.

The phenomenon of state failure

A state's stability can be negatively affected by internal economic, social, political, and environmental pressures; and by exogenous regional pressures, like spillover from a nearby state embroiled in civil war (Byman & Pollack, 2012), roving armed NSAs in close proximity and on the hunt for territory, or neighboring militarily strong states expanding their reach. When a state is weakened by internal pressure, exogenous pressures can have a profound, erosive effect on its stability; and depending on its degree of fragility, the combination of factors could make it prone to failure in one or more critical areas.

Failing states have several attributes: most common are the loss of physical control over territory, or the loss of monopoly on the legitimate use of force; other attributes may include erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, inability to provide core public services, or inability to engage in transactions with other states (Fund for Peace, n.d.).

A state that fails may affect bordering states and other nearby states. The level of instability such states experience may impact regional stability. Magen informs that a region could undergo a "*cascade of state failure* (Magen, 2012, p. 15)" once destabilized by disintegrating weak and failing states deficient in any combination of capacity, legitimacy, or security. Wolff links state fragmentation with "*state failure region*," which, functionally, is a region beset by weak and failing states with enough military capability to make them threatening and from within whose borders NSAs operate with the wherewithal to challenge state sovereignty. A failing region threatens global security because ungoverned and undergoverned spaces arising from state failure therein foster the spread of terrorist networks and organized crime, which generate nodes along pipelines for illicit trafficking; enable the development and advancement of "*criminalized states* (Farah, 2011, p. 18)" and entities; and causes a rise in violence, sparking human flight.

Jordan and its environment in the context of the state failure phenomenon

Jordan is a weak state placed within the “*High Warning*” zone of the 2013 FSI (Messner, 2013, p. 4); it inched three notches closer to the “*Very High Warning*” zone since the 2012 FSI, having ranked 90 in 2012 and 87 in 2013. In general, the kingdom’s economic prosperity is frustrated by limited natural resources, inflation, an underdeveloped private sector, and small industrial base; its government beleaguered by political and national identity problems; its security forces absorbed with staving off the Arab Spring; it is heavily dependent on external aid, surrounded by weak and failing states and “*non-states* (Magen, 2011, p. 64),” impacted by Syria’s refugee spillover, and vulnerable to armed NSAs vying for control of under-governed spaces by its borders.

These and other factors contribute to Jordan’s instability. Yet, are they significant enough to drive Jordan to failure in capacity, legitimacy, or security when counter-balanced by stabilizing factors like foreign aid and assistance? Analyzing Jordan’s fragility and identifying major factors undermining and supporting its stability can help provide answers.

To this end, this paper explores plausible developments in Jordan’s stability that may contribute to an understanding of the potential for state failure in capacity, legitimacy, or security, which could affect regional stability.

Qualitative and quantitative approaches for well-rounded analyses

This research draws upon **qualitative** methodology, including journal articles, technical reports, books, news stories, blog posts, and indices to develop a conceptual analysis of Jordan’s fragility and factors affecting its stability; and to allow for relevant current events. It also employs **quantitative** methodology to facilitate an empirical analysis of Jordan’s fragility and factors affecting its stability. The empirical analysis entails a review of 12 key

indicators for the 2006 to 2013 FSIs, with the December 2010 Arab Spring debut as a reference point reflected in the 2011 FSI, which illuminates positive and negative trends affecting the kingdom's stability before and after this event. This approach is taken at the expense of broadening the scope of indicators had multiple indices and matrices been specifically employed, however the FSI uses a rigorous process to gather qualitative and quantitative products and data throughout a given year for the subsequent year's FSI by tapping a broad range of sources and institutions, which captures information from several robust indices and matrices. Such information is processed and compared with insights from a separate qualitative review of each indicator per country or territory for the year examined. The aggregated data are then normalized and scaled from 0-10 to get final scores for the 12 key indicators for the sampled countries and territories – in the case of the 2013 FSI, the N is 178. The higher a final score the greater the instability reflected in the indicator. The process yields reliable indicators that reveal normal pressures states face and pressures that push them to failure¹.

For the regional democracy trend discussion: Freedom House uses analytical reports and numerical ratings to measure political rights and civil liberties (Puddington, 2013).

Geographical snapshot of Jordan

Nearly landlocked but for 16 miles of coastline
(Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2013),

Jordan's geographic position and porous borders
leave it vulnerable to neighbors like Syria, with

which the kingdom has an unsettled border dispute pending demarcation since 2004 (Sharp, 2012). Jordan's residents share familial ties with Syrian families along its northern border

Jordan's land boundaries and coastline:
(Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2013)
Saudi Arabia – 744 kilometers or 462 miles
Syria – 375 kilometers or 233 miles
Israel – 238 kilometers or 148 miles
Iraq – 181 kilometers or 112 miles
Coastline – 26 kilometers or 16 miles

with Syria, creating tension that has resulted in skirmishes between Bashar al-Assad's army and Jordanian border guards.

Of all Arab states, Jordan shares the longest border with Israel, which places pressure on the monarchy to tow the pan-Arab party line in policies concerning the Jewish State.

The Port of Aqaba, Jordan's only seaport, is at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, and is a vital link to global markets for this import-dependent country (World Port Source website, n.d.).

Subject to desertification and droughts, Jordan is the fourth most water scarce country globally, with 1.97% of farmable land; other natural resources are also limited, and there are no known significant oil reserves except for oil shale too costly to extract (Associated Press, 2013 a; Terrill, 2010; The World Bank, 2013).

All these factors contribute to the country's poverty and aid-dependency.

Five archetypal patterns of spillover from civil wars applied to Jordan

In a 2006 study on recent civil wars, Byman and Pollack identified five archetypal patterns of spillover to explain how conflicts spread across borders: refugees, secessionism, intervention, radicalization, and terrorism (Byman & Pollack, 2006). Explanations of these spillover patterns are noted generally in this section; and since such patterns are manifesting in Jordan, it is useful to discuss them in the context of the kingdom in the section exploring the country's Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) indicator.

Refugees: Spillover from civil wars often starts with refugees – the goal of warring parties is typically to kill as many of the opponent's civilians as possible or to drive them from their homes. Refugees can create serious, or grave, problems for host countries, as they contribute to instability, international terrorism, and wars. Carriers of the conflict, refugee populations

are ideal recruitment pools for warring parties; and refugee camps frequently become bases to rest, plan, and stage subsequent combat operations.

Secessionism: Secessionist bids can set off a domino effect, prompting declarations of independence by separatist or nationalist groups engaged in self-determination struggles; sometimes subgroups in a state break away, triggering civil war; other times, groups vie for state control, but as fighting persists, one or more decide the only recourse is secession.

Intervention: Arguably the most dangerous form of spillover, intervention by a neighboring state in a civil war elevates a local conflict to a regional one; even limited intervention can worsen the problem. Intervention may involve strategies to shut down the civil war, to help one side be victorious over the other, to eliminate the source of spillover, or to grab resources or territory. Strategies may employ diplomacy, covert action, proxy support, incursions, or invasions. Intervention by a regional power may invite blocking intervention by another regional power that supports the opposing side. Super-powers may be compelled to intervene in the conflict if they believe their interests or allies are threatened.

Radicalization: One of the most potent manifestations of spillover is the tendency for a civil war in one country to galvanize and radicalize populations in neighboring countries. Radicalization occurs when a group within a neighboring state identifies with a related group caught up in the civil war across the border: a result of pre-existing tribal, ethnic, and sectarian feelings. Such radicalization can spur civil wars in neighboring countries.

Terrorism: Civil wars are breeding grounds for budding terrorist groups and sanctuaries for existing ones to train, recruit, and mount operations; they increase rebel capability, and make a region's terrorism problem worse because they rarely remain confined in a country's borders. Terrorist groups shelter amid refugee populations to recruit, plan operations, and execute attacks against the country embroiled in the civil war, which invites reprisal attacks

against the refugee centers hosting them. These groups may launch attacks on neighboring regimes or segments of their societies for aiding the adversary.

Noting spillover from the Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen conflicts, and 1 million plus Syrians who fled their country's civil war or are displaced therein, Byman and Pollack warn the Syrian spillover may worsen and spread: "... *If past informs present, the intensity of the war effect typically correlates strongly to the intensity of the spillover, often with devastating consequences. At their worst, civil wars in one country can cause civil wars in neighboring states or can metastasize into regional war* (Byman & Pollack, 2012, para. 4). "

Emerging transnational threats to Jordan

Jabhat al-Nusra, a hard-line Salafi-jihadi group that emerged by January 2012 in the Damascus countryside and Homs on the heels of Syria's March 2011 Arab Spring is determined to establish an Islamist state in Syria and a Caliphate in the Levant (Benotman & Blake, n.d.). The group is an effective, sophisticated force, even infiltrating Syrian government institutions, including the security apparatus, and is considered the principal force against al-Assad and the Shabiha pro-regime militia. Among its ranks are seasoned cadres from the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Iraq-based jihadist network. The group's operations include high-level assassinations, seizing a military base, destroying checkpoints, and overrunning towns by major highways to control transport. Since early 2013, it claimed responsibility for 14 of 17 suicide attacks in Syria (Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, 2013). The US government in December 2012 designated Al-Nusra Front a terrorist organization (TO); in early 2013 it reported the group has 10,000 fighters (Reuters, 2013 c; Roggio, 2013 c). Al Nusra and its jihadi allies have been fighting for control over the Euphrates River Valley, enforcing sharia law in cities and towns it commandeers; having even established a "*Sharia Committee for the Eastern Region* (Roggio, 2013 a, para. 1)." The Front gained

control of an ungoverned area bordering Jordan and Israel's Golan Heights (Roggio, 2013 b). Al Nusra is strengthening as fighters and units leave the disorganized, poorly equipped Free Syrian Army to join its ranks – a destabilizing trend that creates dilemmas for the US, Britain, and others arming anti-Assad rebels (Mahmood & Black, 2013).

The Sinai Peninsula has emerged as a new jihadi frontier where a growing number of terrorist networks have expanded their presence, especially since the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's regime in 2011 (Yaari, 2012). The networks are made up of old smuggling gangs dabbling in terrorism; newly formed Salafi jihadist Bedouin factions; and affiliates of Gaza-based Arab "palestinian" terrorist groups (TGs), including HAMAS; its splinter and rival group, the Dughmush clan's Army of Islam; Muslim Brotherhood (MB) offshoot Palestinian Islamic Jihad; and the Popular Resistance Committees with members from several groups in its ranks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism website, 2005). Hizb'allah has also penetrated the Sinai, as has an Al-Qaeda network of loosely affiliated TOs, and the US linked the latter to recent terrorist acts there (Simcox, 2011). Safe haven for heavily armed roving NSAs, the wild Sinai frontier has dense smuggling networks, and weapons trafficking flows to and from Gaza, and from Libya. The Egyptian Army since July 2013 has been engaged in a major offensive in the Sinai against jihadists fighting at the behest of deposed President Mohammad Morsi (DEBKAFfile, 2013). Recent attacks emanating from the Sinai include repeated sabotaging since 2011 of a pipeline that runs via the Sinai to Jordan; October 2010 missile attacks on the Jordanian town, Aqaba, and the Israeli port, Eilat; and attacks from 2004 to 2006 on Gulf of Aqaba resorts, including in Taba, an Egyptian town a few miles from Jordan. Cross-border attacks like the August 2012 incursion into Israel may also become a problem for Jordan. Karmon called security in the Sinai "*collapsed*" and said it is "*on the way to becoming a failed region*" (Associated Foreign Press, 2013; Reuters, 2012; Simcox, 2011, para. 8)."

Jordan's fragility per the Failed States Index – An examination of the indicators

This section is an overview of Jordan's stability trends, as seen in **Table 1**, explained below.

Table 1: Jordan's Ranking and Indicator Scores Per Failed States Indices 2006 to 2013

FSI Year	Rank													Total
		DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	FE	EXT	
2013	87th	6.7	7.8	7.1	4.2	6.5	6.5	6.5	4.3	7.4	5.8	6.8	6.2	75.7
2012	90th	6.5	7.3	7.0	4.4	6.8	6.4	6.3	4.6	7.1	5.7	6.3	6.5	74.8
2011	96th	6.4	7.6	6.7	4.7	6.9	5.8	5.7	4.9	6.8	6.0	6.3	6.8	74.5
2010	90th	6.8	7.9	6.9	4.8	7.2	6.2	5.9	5.2	7.0	5.9	6.5	6.7	77.0
2009	86th	6.7	7.9	6.8	5.0	7.4	6.5	6.0	5.4	6.9	6.0	6.5	6.8	77.9
2008	82nd	6.7	7.8	6.5	4.7	7.5	6.6	6.0	5.6	6.7	6.0	6.5	6.7	77.3
2007	82nd	6.2	6.8	6.5	5.0	7.7	6.6	6.2	5.6	6.2	6.4	6.5	6.9	76.6
2006	74th	6.0	6.8	6.0	5.0	7.6	6.5	6.8	5.8	6.1	6.8	6.6	7.0	77.0

Table 1: The Table depicts the 2006 to 2013 FSI years per the 12 key FSI indicators.

12 Icon Indicators: The 12 icon indicators in Table 1 represent the following pressures that Jordan is experiencing, with each key category discussed in detail throughout this section: (1)

DP: Demographic Pressures (2) REF: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (3) GG:

Group Grievance (4) HF: Brain Drain and Human Flight (5) UED: Uneven Economic

Development (6) ECO: Poverty and Economic Decline (7) SL: State Legitimacy (8) PS:

Public Services (9) HR: Human Rights and Rule of Law (10) SEC: Security Apparatus (11) FE: Factionalized Elites (12) EXT: External Intervention

Indicator Scores: The score or rating per key indicator ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 reflecting the most stability Jordan is experiencing in that particular category, while 10 is a reflection of the least stability in that area.

Sum of the Indicators: The sum of the 12 key indicator scores is Jordan's total score for a given FSI Year, with the total score ranging from 0 to 120. The closer Jordan's total score is to 0 the more stable the kingdom, while a 120 score indicates a potential for collapse, or a significant conflict in all categories.

Arrows: A red arrow indicates a worsening trend for the kingdom, while a green arrow indicates an improving trend, and a red or green line indicates that there has been no change in status for that particular FSI Year.

State Ranking Order: Of 178 states examined for the FSI 2013 – other years have different size samples – the range is from 1 to 178, with the #1 slot representing the least stable state, and the #178 slot representing the most stable state.

FSI Years: A Failed States Index Year reflects data collected from the year before, so 2013 scores are based on data collected from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012, and so forth.

For a breakdown of all FSI Yearly Rankings, please see the Reference section: (Fund for Peace Failed States Index Rankings webpage, 2005-2013)

Broadly speaking: Table 1 shows Jordan is #87 in state rankings for FSI 2013, slipping from #90 for FSI 2012, and from #96 for FSI 2011, indicating a turnabout from a positive stability trend from FSI 2006 to FSI 2010, which is likely from Arab Spring effects. This trend is seen in the total 2011 FSI score of 74.5, reflecting a marked improvement over previous FSI

years from 2006 to 2010. Yet, as the Arab Spring set in, total scores from FSI 2011 to 2013 show a worsening drift from overall stability: slippage from 74.5 to 74.8 to 75.7, respectively.

Table 2: This Table, seen below, shows Jordan’s 12 key indicator scores only for the 2013 FSI Year. Scores are arranged from least stable to most stable, with accompanying and assigned gap(s) in capacity, legitimacy, and/or security; and notes on related state pressures.

Table 2: Ranking of Jordan's Indicator Scores Per Failed States Index 2013; Gaps and State Pressures

Indicator	Score	Gap(s)	State Pressures
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons	7.8	Capacity gap (assigned) Security gap	High number of refugees from Israel, Iraq, and now Syria – a mounting problem; there are more refugees than there are ethnic Jordanians in kingdom
Human Rights	7.4	Legitimacy gap	Civil liberties curtailed, protests repressed, arbitrary arrests, government abuses rarely investigated, demand for meaningful democratic freedoms
Group Grievance	7.1	Capacity gap (assigned) Legitimacy gap Security gap	Grievances over inflation, unpopular austerity measures, unemployment, lack of genuine political reform, too much power of king; tensions rising
Fractionalized Elites	6.8	Legitimacy gap	Power struggles, Muslim Brotherhood a rising concern, monarchy losing traditional support base, youth movement reenergizing efforts of activists
Demographic Pressures	6.7	Capacity gap	Pressures: water scarcity, population growth, youth bulge, jobs; ethnic Jordanians a shrinking minority
State Legitimacy	6.5	Legitimacy gap	A variety of groups lack government representation; corruption charges; demands: meaningful political

			reform, parliamentary system, less power for king
Poverty and Economic Decline	6.5	Capacity gap	Among the poorer Arab states, aid-dependent Jordan suffers from chronic poverty, high unemployment, energy shortages, inflation, mounting public debt
Uneven Economic Development	6.5	Capacity gap	Economic grievances major concern, economic liberalization reforms exacerbate inequalities; broad discrimination against Arab “palestinians”
External Intervention	6.2	Capacity gap	External actors: the US and Europe, the Gulf states, the IMF, World Bank, UNHRC grant aid to Jordan; Israel gives low-key aid: water, port access, refugees
Security Apparatus	5.8	Security gap	Riots, protests, rising militancy, potential for internal refugee Sunni-Shi’ite rift; external rebel activity, potential for reprisal and bombing attacks
Public Services	4.3	Capacity gap	Basic provision of water, sanitation, energy, health-care and education problematic, compounded by Syrian refugees; USAAID, other external aid helps
Human Flight	4.2	Capacity gap	Jordan experiences brain drain of most talented workers; government struggles to develop incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled home

Capacity gap

A capacity gap exists where state institutions are incapable of delivering, or regulating the provision of, core public goods and services to the population, such as defense, law and order, public health, macroeconomic management, and disaster relief (Call, 2010). A few caveats here are that minimal state functions can vary from society to society due to choice,

tradition, and resource scarcity; capacity does not exclude non-state or private actors from providing services, as long as they are state-regulated; and gaps can overlap.

Refugees and IDPs (score 7.8)

This indicator involves pressures from population displacement, which strains public services and can pose a security threat². Pressures and measures include displacement, disease related to displacement, refugee camps, absorption capacity, and refugees per capita.

The Refugee (REF) indicator scored the highest at 7.8 in FSI 2013, up from 7.3 in FSI 2012, reflecting the largest negative trend compared to the other indicators in the 7.0 category spanning FSI 2012 to FSI 2013. This can be attributed to refugee spillover from Israel, Iraq, and now Syria: a growing problem, arguably in crisis proportions, for stability in the kingdom. There was a short-lived improvement from FSI 2011 at 7.6 to FSI 2012 at 7.3, likely a result of initial aid from donor countries earmarked to offset refugee absorption, however a higher than expected Syrian refugee influx made long-term planning challenging and caused donor assistance to come up short (Lynch, 2013; Phillips, 2012; UNHCR, 2013 a; UNHCR, 2013 b). Political tension is likely to rise if funding shortfalls remain.

Arab “palestinian refugees”: There is a purported 1.9 million Arab “palestinian refugees” from Israel “proper,” including from Judea and Samaria, the so-called “west bank,” registered with the UN in the kingdom from the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel (Sharp, 2012)³.

Fearing Arab “palestinian” refugees fleeing Syria may tip the delicate demographic balance in favor of Jordan’s majority Arab “palestinian” population, which ranges from 51% to 65%, the government announced October 2012 it was implementing a policy of turning away those among this group who do not hold Jordanian identification; some must return to Syria and others end up in Cyber City by the border city, Ramtha, to determine if they will be granted

asylum (Miller, 2013; Ram, 2013; Terrill, 2010). Most Arab “palestinians” are citizens of Jordan, but those with refugee status shelter in 13 camps (Terrill, 2010).

King Abdullah II and the Hashemite family, which are of Arab Bedouin descent, are keen to keep happy their political support base of privileged East Bank (Hashemite) Bedouin tribal families that view the “west bank” Arab “palestinian refugees” as a fifth column (Sharp, 2012). The fear is that these refugees may want Jordan for an alternative national homeland if Israel does not give up its ancestral heartland, Judea and Samaria, to form “palestine” – a fear stemming from the Arab “palestinian” challenge to Jordanian authority that led to the 1970 Black September civil war (Terrill, 2010).

There is also concern about radicalization. About 300,000 Arab “palestinians” from the Gaza Strip who are not Jordanian citizens took refuge in Jordan in 1967 (Chatelard, 2010). The government is concerned about the potential rising influence of the Gaza-based Arab “palestinian” nationalist jihadist group HAMAS in the kingdom, which may radicalize refugees in the 13 camps; and the humanitarian fallout that could result from a HAMAS/Fatah power struggle over Israel’s liberated territories⁴, which could trigger a new wave of Arab “palestinian” refugees fleeing to the kingdom.

Iraqi refugees: The Iraqi refugee spillover to Jordan includes official estimates of 450,000 to 500,000 from the 1980s Iran-Iraq War and from Iraq’s 2005-2007 civil war – a number that may actually top 1 million because many avoid official registration due to deportation or other legal problems (Terrill, 2008; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2011; United Press International [UPI], 2012). The influx of Iraqi refugees from the latter wave is considered the driver behind major distortions in Jordan’s economy⁵ (Terrill, 2010). Jordan’s Iraqi refugees strain health care, education, and other services.

The government applies to all Iraqi refugees lacking residency permits an Arab customary, non-legally binding framework of “*hosts-and-guests*” relations (Chatelard, El-Abed, & Washington, 2011, section 2), so they are considered temporary.

Iraqi migration is mixed⁶: involuntary Iraqi migrants arrived as refugees alongside voluntary migrants who willingly came. Voluntary Iraqi migrants are “*guests*” and do not benefit from government resettlement programs or enjoy rights Iraqi refugees have per the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, like the right to medical assistance, daily bread, and clean water (Golder, 2008). Many depleted their resources, and the government limited the refugees’ ability to get permits to work legally (Terrill, 2010). These conditions can drive instability.

Jordanian officials are bracing for a sectarian war that may send fresh waves of Iraqi refugees across the Trebil border between Jordan and Iraq, as Sunni protestors face off with Shi’ite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government forces (Al-Samadi, 2013 a). Jordan hosts Sunnis and Shi’ites from Iraq, many with overstayed visas. Most of Jordan’s Iraqi refugees were absorbed in population centers, especially in Amman; most are Sunnis from Baghdad and western Iraq, but there are around 200,000 Shi’ites (Byman & Pollack, 2006; Lynch, 2013; Terrill, 2008). Amman has deep social and security ties with influential Sunni tribal figures in western Iraq, who can live in Jordan, but King Abdullah II has also been trying to maintain stable ties with al-Maliki (Al-Samadi, 2013 a). He may be called to task over the conflicting considerations because sectarian discord in Iraq has risen over a spate of deadly Sunni and Shi’a bombings there targeting each other’s groups (Yacoub & Associated Press, 2013). Iraq’s sectarian tensions can set off Sunni-Shi’ite strife in Jordan and the region because the Sunni-Shi’a rift has deepened over funerals in Iraq for Iraqi Shi’ite fighters killed in Syria. Several thousand fighters from two Iranian-backed Shi’a militia groups poured across the Iraq-Syrian border to support Assad’s war against Sunni anti-regime rebels (DEBKAFfile, 2013; Harari, 2010). The latest wave of Iraq bombings recalls Sunni and

Shi'ite retaliatory strikes that spurred Iraq's 2005-2007 civil war, which galvanized Sunnis in Jordan and in other countries, leading to demands on their governments to do more to support Iraqi Sunni groups and to treat harshly their Shi'ite populations (Byman & Pollack, 2012).

Syrian refugees: Still fluid, Syrian refugee numbers in Jordan vary. Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh said 375,000 Syrians fled to Jordan since March 2011, with up to 5,000 arriving nightly (Lynch, 2013). *The Jordan Times*, citing Jordan Armed Forces, said in March 2013 that 1,800 new arrivals joined more than 465,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan (Luck, 2013): in line with UN estimates of 432,500 total Syrian refugees there (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2013 b).

Two-thirds of these refugees squatted in Jordanian towns by the northern border, among the poorest of the country's regions, or settled therein with relatives and charities, where they impact water distribution and treatment systems and compete for other resources. Jordan's largest Syrian refugee camp, the cramped nine-square-mile desert Zaatari camp that opened in July 2012 seven miles from the Syrian-Jordanian border, shelters most of the remaining one-third Syrian refugees, some 150,000, which puts it at capacity. The refugees therein wrangle over trucked-in water and live in conditions so bad, and dangerous, that some return to Syria (Associated Press, 2013 b; Rudoren, 2013 a; Rudoren, 2013 b; Phillips, 2012; Saglam & Al-Mafraq, 2013). The refugees that stay tap into the casual job market⁷ (Phillips, 2012; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2013 d.). More camps are under consideration to keep up with the Syrian refugee flow (UNHCR, 2013 a).

Security concerns loom over Syrian opposition factions with tribal and familial ties to Jordanians who have reportedly provided them with funding and weapons (DEBKAfile, 2011). US officials warned King Abdullah that Jordanian branches of the tribes are collecting weapons and explosives, and organizing for an armed revolt against his throne.

The Syrian army has clashed with Jordanian border patrol forces over Jordanians helping Syrian refugees (Byman & Pollack, 2012; Gordon & Bumiller, 2012). Jordanian jihadists have also joined Syrian opposition groups to help bring down Assad's regime (Sharp, 2012).

Jordanian political analyst Labib Kamhawi, in an *Associated Press* article, informed that the kingdom is “*deeply concerned*” over Syrian sleeper cells, and warned of a potential for serious border clashes and incursions emanating from Syria into Jordan (Halaby, 2013, para. 7); although in an interview with *Al-Hayat*, Jordanian Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour said cell members were arrested, but the numbers were small and did not represent a sizable force (Al-Samadi, 2013).

Jordanian officials also worry about Syrian regime agents operating in the kingdom to hunt down opponents and intimidate Syrians who fled Syria's civil war, per the *Associated Press* article, which reported a string of incidents in Jordan where such agents were alleged to be behind attacks on Syrian anti-regime activists and refugees, and behind an attempted bombing of a Jordanian housing Syrian refugees. Officials fear a larger campaign of assassinations or bombings targeting Syrians and Jordanians is in the works⁸.

Regional and extra-regional powers are weighing in the Syrian conflict, their divisions on opposing sides sharpening as the US is poised to strike the Assad regime, at the time of this article, over unleashing chemical weapons on its citizens (Reuters, 2013 d). Concerned that Syria will lose control over its chemical and biological weapons, the US is bracing for the eventuality that the Syrian civil war will turn into a regional conflagration (Reuters, 2013 b).

Per **World Bank** 2011 statistics⁹, Jordan topped the list for total refugee population by country, with 2,430,589 refugees, a figure that excludes Arab “palestinians” from the 1967 War. As a small, resource-poor, arid, aid- and energy-dependent country of 6.5 million with a refugee population larger than its ethnic population, Jordan is poorly equipped to absorb

more Syrian refugees (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2013; Phillips, 2012; Sharp, 2012). This problem is offset by foreign aid packages. See the External Intervention indicator.

Group Grievance (score 7.1)

This indicator involves pressures associated with tension and violence between groups, which undermine the state's ability to provide security, thus creating an atmosphere of elevated fear and a potential for further violence. Pressures and measures include: powerlessness, discrimination, and ethnic, communal, sectarian, and religious violence.

The Group Grievance (GG) indicator shows a worsening trend and is at an all time high since the Arab Spring, scoring 7.1 in FSI 2013, a steady increase from 6.7 in FSI 2011 to 7.0 in FSI 2012. Widespread discontent, bouts of unrest, and escalation of protests, some violent, suggest a need for meaningful political and economic reforms, and a populace frustrated by a feeling of powerlessness. Protesters have come out, sometimes in large numbers, from among the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamists, tribal and political activists, secularists, leftists, trade unionists, youth, elderly, rural Jordanians, East Bankers, Arab "palestinians," Christians, and Circassians; they are decrying lack of genuine, comprehensive political reform, especially changes to the electoral law that curbs power of opposition parties in the legislature; authoritarian rule; insufficient democratic freedoms; economic liberalization; a worsening economic situation; rising food and fuel prices; the inflation rate; economic austerity measures; high unemployment; and government corruption; with protests in Amman, small towns and villages, and in the rural tribal areas in the south that once were a bedrock of government support (Country Watch, Inc., 2012; Luck, 2013 a; (Moon, 2012) (Ryan, 2011); Sharp, 2012; Tobin, 2012).

Demographic Pressures (score 6.7)

This indicator involves pressures on the population, such as disease and natural disasters, which make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens. Pressures include water scarcity, population growth, and youth bulge.

The Demographic Pressures (DP) indicator reflects an overall worsening trend since FSI 2006, with the exception of FSI 2011 having scored 6.4, an improvement over the FSI 2010 score of 6.8. The kingdom's rapid absorption of large waves of refugees – nearly 3 million – severely strains the scarce natural freshwater supply and other resources and services, and creates jobs competition, which has led to demands for improvements in **living conditions**, and has left fewer job and social advancement opportunities for the bulging under 30 sector that makes up more than half the populace, with nearly 35% under 14, and 20% between 15-24 (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2013; Eran, 2012; MacKenzie, 2012; The World Bank, 2013; Tobin, 2012). A frustrated youth sector with too much time on its collective hands can be destabilizing, as can be refugees clamoring for a meager existence.

The **shrinking ethnic Jordanian minority** can be juxtaposed with the clear Arab “palestinian” majority formed out of the 1948, 1967, and 1991 refugee waves to the kingdom (Eran, 2012). Not only are most of these Arab “palestinians” Jordanian citizens with full political and civil rights, many dominate the private sector of the economy (Terrill, 2010). This may become a problem for the monarchy and its East Bank Hashemite Bedouin support base if Arab “palestinians” look to Jordan as an alternative homeland.

Poverty and Economic Decline (score 6.5)

Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens who cannot provide for themselves, which can create class friction.

The Poverty and Economic Decline (ECO) indicator shows a worsening trend from FSI 2011 to current, with scores climbing from 5.8 to 6.5; previously there was an improving trend from FSI 2008 to FSI 2010. Although economic restructuring in the 1990s under The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) brought notable improvements, during the most recent decade, reforms have yet to solve chronic poverty, high unemployment, mounting public debt, and heavy dependency on foreign aid (Moon, 2012). These problems are compounded by Jordan's refugee crisis, which contributes to major setbacks in the economy.

The World Bank classifies Jordan as an upper middle-income country with one of the most open economies in the region, and reports that the kingdom is well integrated with its neighbors via trade, remittances, foreign direct investment, and tourism (The World Bank, 2013). The open economy and high integration leaves Jordan vulnerable to external events.

Poverty: The World Bank lists Jordan's rural poverty rate in 2006 at 19% and the urban poverty rate at 12%, with 13% of the population living below the national poverty line (The World Bank website, n.d.). From 2007 to 2009, Jordan showed no significant reduction in multi-dimensional poverty, an assessment of how many things poor people go without per health, education, and living standards (Alkire, Roche, & Seth, 2013).

According to *Global Finance* magazine concerning IMF statistics, Jordan ranks 71 among 184 countries in terms of Gross Domestic Product Purchasing Power Parity – GDP converted to international dollars – an adjustment that removes price level differences between countries to permit comparisons of economies and living standards across countries ("The poorest," 2009-2013). Lack of opportunities and meager living standards for those living on the edge fosters resentment, and has led to friction, like in the impoverished Jordanian town Maan. See Security gap section.

Agricultural growth is about 2.5 times more efficient at reducing poverty than growth within other sectors, and Jordan's share of agriculture in GDP is a modest 3%, however impediments to progress in this sector include the Syrian crisis disrupting trade routes and stalling export traffic, a highly protected agricultural trade, and high EU tariffs on agricultural goods (Chauffour, 2013; The World Bank, 2013). These impediments contribute to Jordan's trade imbalance while its energy and food imports surge. The stalled exports problem is offset by Israel availing the use of its Haifa port (Siryoti, Yalon, & Israel Hayom staff, 2013).

With few natural resources, an underdeveloped private sector, and a small industrial base, Jordan's economy is dependent upon expatriate worker remittances from Gulf economies, tourism, the service sector, and external aid (Sharp, 2012; Terrill, 2010).

Unemployment: Jordan's chronic high unemployment rate – around 13% to 14%, but many analysts place the level at 25% to 30% – is intensified by a culture that places a stigma on menial labor jobs, with the Jordanian Employment Ministry reporting Egyptians make up 68% of the foreign workforce, which helps fill what is considered shameful positions (Sharp, 2012). The large youth sector has an unemployment rate of nearly 30% (CIA, 2013). When widespread corruption is added to high unemployment, it gives rise to social and economic mobility problems that drive thousands of Jordanians abroad in search of better opportunities.

Energy: Jordan is vulnerable to fluctuations in the global oil market, for it is highly dependent on energy imports, including diesel and fuel oil; and it has been grappling with two years of energy price hikes while its decades-old oil refinery lacks a modernization program to increase the kingdom's ability to refine high-quality diesel to ease its energy crisis (Reuters, 2013 a).

Economic shocks have been jolting Jordan after a sharp drop in gas supplies from Egypt brought about by the Egyptian uprising in early 2011 that led to the repeated sabotaging of a

pipeline which runs via the under-governed Sinai to the kingdom (Reuters, 2012; The World Bank, 2013). The pipeline came under renewed attack July 2013, after the Egyptian Army deposed President Mohammad Morsi and his MB supporters called for an intifada (Associated Foreign Press, 2013). Egyptian gas covers 80% of Jordan's electricity generation. The repeated attacks forced the Jordanian government to rely on expensive fuel imports from other sources to generate electricity, resulting in deterioration of the kingdom's balance of payments and fiscal positions in 2012: and the Syrian refugee influx further strained Jordan's fiscal position (Reuters, 2013 a; The World Bank, 2013).

Inflation: Jordan's sluggish economic growth is exacerbated by its 7.25 % inflation rate at the end of 2012, which was driven by the elimination of petroleum product price subsidies, rising public sector wages, and high food prices.

Jordan spent about 9.6 billion in 2012, with \$2.3 billion of that money going to subsidies, and public sector salaries accounting for the rest of the budget expenditures (Sharp, 2012; The World Bank, 2013). Food prices are expected to rise even higher, along with inflation, because major grain exporters are contending with drought conditions, and the kingdom imports 87% of its food.

Debt: Jordan faced a record deficit of \$2 billion USD in 2012; its external debt, which was 22% of its GDP that year, reached \$11 billion USD (Moon, 2012). The World Bank projected this debt would remain sustainable under the most adverse scenario; but a debt sustainability analysis of Jordan's public debt warns of a destabilizing situation over the medium-term should it experience several more external shocks (The World Bank, 2013).

According to The World Bank's *Investment Climate Survey* and the World Economic Forum's *Global Competitiveness Report Executive Opinion Survey*, Jordan has trouble accessing financing, which is a leading economic constraint (Chauffour, 2013).

Aid: The kingdom's economic and fiscal conditions have shown a slight improvement in early 2013, a situation helped along by policy measures and external assistance, including \$1.2 billion USD in grants during that period. As discussed previously, Jordan is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The country receives particularly large annual loans and grants from the US, Europe and the Arab Gulf states (Sharp, 2012).

Uneven Economic Development (score 6.5)

This involves pressures associated with ethnic, religious, or regional disparities where the government commitment to the social contract is uneven, such as with urban-rural service distribution, access to improved services, slum population, and income share.

The Uneven Economic Development (UED) indicator reflects steady improvement since 2007. Yet, economic grievances remain the overriding concern in Jordan (Sharp, 2012). The kingdom has instituted "*Washington consensus-style economic reforms* (Game III, 2011, para. 15)," which exacerbated inequalities and made life more difficult for the poor while it opened up opportunities for local entrepreneurs and allowed the upper classes to enjoy greater consumer choice via liberalized trade regimes. However, the **politically driven privatization measures** may not bolster regime stability, as was demonstrated by Egypt and Tunisia where some state-bred upper-middle class members became revolutionary leaders.

As for access to basic state-provided services: The US State Department reported widespread societal and legal discrimination against Arab "palestinians"¹⁰. Those from Gaza who entered Jordan following the 1967 War cannot access public assistance, public higher education, and public medical services, which are available to those holding actual refugee status (United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2012). Arab "palestinians" in general are discriminated against in housing, employment, health services, marriage, birth registration, access to courts, and land ownership. Jordanian

society has been polarizing since 1971 over those identifying as Jordanian and those identifying as Arab “palestinian,” and there is increasing pressure to unambiguously express one’s political allegiance¹¹ in order to access public jobs and resources (Chatelard, 2010).

External Intervention (score 6.2)

When a state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.

The External Intervention (EXT) indicator shows a somewhat mixed but overall improving trend since FSI 2006, and especially after FSI 2011, as external aid to the kingdom increased. In addition to the aforementioned assistance from international organizations like The World Bank, the IMF, and the UNHCR, Jordan receives hefty help from many countries: Total **US aid** to Jordan through FY2012 was about \$13.1 billion, which includes cash transfers, as well as USAID programs that focus on water preservation and distribution, waste treatment, education, and macroeconomic stability (Sharp, 2012). The US also helps with food aid; in FY2012 it agreed to give Jordan 50,000 metric tons of wheat valued at \$17 million. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, aid to Jordan has increased, averaging more than \$760 million annually (Terrill, 2010). In FY2011, annual aid was increased to around \$840 million, and in FY2012 the Obama Administration promised that “*hundreds of millions of dollars* (Rosenberg & The Media Line, 2012, para. 11)” would be forthcoming. The US agreed to provide \$660 million in annual foreign assistance from FY2010 to FY2014, to include Economic Support Funds and Foreign Military Financing.

The **European Union aid package** includes a pledged 3 billion euros (\$4 billion USD) to Jordan from 2013 to 2015, bolstered by a start-up free-trade agreement, affordable lending programs, and the consideration of radical debt relief.

Saudi Arabia's aid to Jordan in 2011 was \$1.4 billion USD, and it extended an invitation to its fellow monarchy to join the Gulf Cooperation Council, which could lead to more aid and economic ties.

Israel's low-key aid includes stepped-up water transfers, and, as mentioned, the use of its Haifa port (Siryoti, Yalon, & Israel Hayom staff, 2013).

Canada's pledge of aid in 2013 is around \$13 million for humanitarian and security needs arising from Syria's civil war (Associated Press, 2013 c).

Public Services (score 4.3)

This indicator involves state provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among other services, including energy, that the populace deems important.

The Public Services (PS) indicator showed a consistent improving trend since 2006 to current, attributable to injections of foreign assistance, such as the USAID program, which provides economic assistance to optimize the management of the kingdom's scarce water resources; and Israel's water transfers (Sharp, 2012; Siryoti et al., 2013).

Water shortages are a worsening problem despite external aid and resource management techniques, with water demand outstripping supply, the endangered Azraq aquifer often over-pumped, and illegal wells feeding sparse farmland repeatedly stricken by drought; a situation aggravated by the sudden influx of Syrian refugees requiring showers, toilets, and fresh potable water, thus taxing water supplies and waste management systems (MacKenzie, 2012; UPI, 2012).

Electricity shortages are also a problem further aggravated by the large refugee presence (Reuters, 2013 a). Jordan imports 97% of its energy.

Syrian children attend Jordanian **schools forced into double shifts** to accommodate the extra student load; and those living outside refugee camps tap into **strained health care services** (Associated Press, 2013 a; Phillips, 2012; (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2013 d). Jordanian Health Minister Abdul Latif Wreikat warned the pressure is beyond the strength of the state's health sector to cope with (Ya'ar, 2013). **Chronic diseases** were discovered among the Syrian refugees, nearly every family suffers from disease or injury that requires immediate attention, and there is not enough medicine to go around. Jordan's Iraqi refugees also place a heavy strain on health care and education services. Foreign aid, although not enough, does help offset this burden.

Human Flight (score 4.2)

When there is lack of opportunity in a state, people therein migrate to other lands to broaden their opportunities. Pressures for this indicator include emigration and brain drain.

The Human Flight (HF) indicator showed an overall improving trend for Jordan since FSI 2006, with the exception of a slight setback in FSI 2009.

Despite the positive trend, Jordan has experienced brain drain of its most talent workers and the government has been struggling to develop incentives to keep its educated, highly skilled citizens from going abroad in search of better opportunities (Sharp, 2012).

Legitimacy gap

A state experiences a legitimacy gap when a significant portion of its political elites and society rejects the rules that regulate the exercise of power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth (Call, 2010). Call's legitimacy gap refers only to internal legitimacy, and indicators include whether the regime's rule and/or its processes are sufficiently transparent and accountable to allow for popular free expression and participation.

Human Rights (score 7.4)

This indicator deals with human rights violations, and uneven protection of such rights. Pressures associated with this indicator include the curtailment of civil liberties, the repression of protests, and popular demand for more democratic freedoms.

The Human Rights (HR) indicator, scoring 7.4 in FSI 2013, has been a worsening trend in the kingdom throughout all the years represented except for FSI 2011, which may reflect a disquieted society unable to change its government via peaceful demonstrations, as noted by the US State Department. A **new low in human rights** in Jordan since the advent of the Arab Spring, this trend was marked in recent history by an unpermitted March 2011 rally ending in clashes between activists and security forces in the kingdom, whose monarchy limits the ability of its citizens and media to criticize its policies and officials; and whose government and security apparatuses are alleged to be mistreating and torturing detainees and inmates with impunity (Dudley, 2012; Luck, 2013 a; Terrill, 2010; Tobin, 2012; United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2012).

The **Political Terror Scale**, which measures and rates state-sanctioned political violence, placed Jordan for 2011 in Level 3, depicting an elevation of violence by the state since the 2006 rating of Level 2: with Level 3 indicating extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such, where execution or political murders and brutality may be common, and unlimited detention for political views is endured; while Level 2 indicates a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity (Gibney, Cornett, & Wood, 2011).

Citing local and global Non-government Organizations (NGO), the US State Department reported in 2012 that the Jordanian government rarely investigated allegations of abuse or corruption, and there were several reported instances of security forces using excessive force with impunity or failing to protect demonstrators from societal violence (United States

Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2012). The department noted arbitrary arrests and denial of due process via administrative detention, prolonged detention, infringement on citizens' privacy rights, government interference in the work of the media and its pressuring media outlets to censor themselves under threats of fines or detention, and its continued restriction on freedom of assembly and association.

Freedom House decried the arrests of two Jordanian activists July 4, 2013 after they attended a debate on the impact of Jordan's Press and Publications Law, amended in 2012 to restrict online free speech and expression (Freedom House, 2013). The organization said the arrests were illustrative of an ongoing **crackdown on free expression** by Jordanian authorities, and pointed to several other previous arrests of activists in the kingdom, as well as several occasions Jordanian police violently dispersed protestors. Freedom House said activists and human rights organizations called the law an "*unprecedented assault on freedom of expression*" (Freedom House, 2013, para. 14)." The *Freedom House Index* rated Jordan as "*Not Free*" from 2010 to 2013 because it scored 6 in Political Rights and 5 in Civil Liberties throughout this period, for an overall rating of 5.5 out of 7 possible points, with 7 indicating the least free, which shows a declining trend in political freedoms in comparison to the kingdom's previous status as "*Partially Free*" (Freedom House, 1972). Citing Jordan's dismal record, Freedom House urged the Millennium Challenge Corporation to disqualify it from receiving \$25 million in funding that had been approved in FY2006 (Sharp, 2012).

Fractionalized Elites (score 6.8)

This indicator involves pressures due to local and national leaders engaging in deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain, which undermines the social contract. These include, *inter alia*, power struggles, political competition, and flawed elections.

The Fractionalized Elites (FE) indicator showed the largest negative trend compared to other indicators from the previous year in the 6.0 category, scoring 6.8 in FSI 2013, up from 6.3 in FSI 2012 and FSI 2011.

Power struggles have been largely via peaceful democratic means, with popular calls for genuine reform and greater democratization and pluralism rather than for full regime change, as Jordanians want to avoid descent into social chaos, such as what occurred in other countries since the Arab Spring, and so they are exercising forbearance as the monarchy makes incremental reforms (Ryan, 2011). Reforms historically have been designed to prevent democracy from delivering power to Islamists.

As the monarchy's traditional East Bank tribal support base erodes, it is sizing up a threat posed by the **Jordanian MB**. Traditionally a loyalist opposition group, the MB began calling for an end to authoritarian rule during the January 2011 protests, and may be inspired to revolt due to the rise of fellow Islamists across the Middle East (Country Watch, Inc., 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2013; Ryan, 2013; Tobin, 2012). The **Islamic Action Front (IAF)**, the MB political arm, is the most important political party in Jordan, and is a key opponent of many government policies, challenging strong Jordanian ties with the West and normalization with Israel, rejecting Western and secular influences, and promoting Islamic values (Terrill, 2010). The IAF has been pressuring the government via legislative action, boycotts of elections, charges of rigged voting procedures, and appeals to international organizations and to the media, as it calls for opening the political system to genuine power sharing. The IAF is divided over pro- and anti-monarchical factions, over how aggressively it should confront the monarchy with policies it dislikes, and over how extensive its ties to HAMAS should be.

The monarchy is also eyeing the expanding politicized and technically savvy **youth movement** energizing longstanding efforts of reform and democracy activists (Ryan, 2011).

Legitimacy of the State (score 6.5)

This indicator involves pressures associated with corruption and a lack of representativeness in the government, which directly undermines the social contract. These include, *inter alia*, corruption, government effectiveness, political participation, electoral process, level of democracy, protests and demonstrations, and power struggles.

The State Legitimacy (SL) indicator shows a decline in the legitimacy of the government since the Arab Spring, with scores climbing from 5.7 in FSI 2011 to 6.3 in FSI 2012 to 6.5 in FSI 2013; which is a reversal of an overall positive trend from FSI 2006 to FSI 2010.

Recently introduced **FSI Capacities by Countries Indicators**¹² rate Jordan on a moderate level for political and social capacities, but its leadership capacity is rated as weak.

Although there are serious political and economic problems that have the potential to spur an Arab Spring-inspired revolution, at least for now most citizens, who historically have engaged in dialogue with the government, are not rising up against the monarchy (Sky, 2013; Tobin, 2012). To be sure, though, opposition to the king has grown more openly critical in recent years with small-scale protests a regular feature in Amman, and in the more rural tribal areas in the south, once a bedrock of support for the Jordanian government (Sharp, 2012). Low-scale, persistent demonstrations since 2011 have been challenging the Jordanian government to initiate **political reforms** and address **economic governance**. These protests gathered momentum, such that by the time “A Day of Anger” roared into its 8th week by February 2011 the crowds swelled to 6,000; the MB and other opposition groups expanded their demands; and, among other grievances, popular calls went out to end **corruption**,

increase democratic freedom, denounce the government of Prime Minister Samir Rifai, and return to the original formulation of Jordan's 1952 Constitution minus the amendments, granting **less power to the king** and more to parliament¹³ (Kadri & Kershner, 2011; Terrill, 2010). By April 2013, protests were still ongoing, even among the tribes despite their privileged status, but some activist groups, like the national youth movement, Hirak, became disillusioned (Sweis, 2013).

Jordanian Al-Quds Center for Political Studies Director Oraib al-Rantawi said there is a growing sense the political **leadership lost its way**: *“The regime and the government are facing a credibility problem among Jordanians, who are growing increasingly apathetic. There is a deep loss of confidence right now between the government, the regime and the people* (Sweis, 2013, para. 17).

The monarchy has responded to pre-approved, carefully contained protests¹⁴ – a safety valve to publically vent anger – by meeting with the MB; sacking prime ministers and parliament, appointing new government representatives, holding impromptu elections, and passing temporary laws; increasing the salaries for government employees; providing subsidies for food staples and fuel; and publically calling for more reforms (Dudley, 2012; Luck, 2013 a; Tobin, 2012).

The different governments implemented **gradual reforms**¹⁵ that include constitutional changes to strengthen the independence and integrity of the judiciary to improve public accountability; and the government is pursuing reforms in transparency, accountability, public finance management, and private sector development (The World Bank, 2013).

Transparency International **Corruption Perception Index** for 2012 ranks Jordan 58th among 176 countries and territories surveyed, with the #1 slot representing the country or territory with the lowest level of perceived administrative and political corruption; the kingdom's

score was 48 of a possible 100 points, with 100 reflecting a perfect record, and scores below 50 indicating a serious corruption problem (Transparency International, 2012). Jordan has an **Anti-Corruption Commission** to investigate corruption and refers cases for legal action, and the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate is well-placed and has a corruption fighting role, but some of its activities are not transparent; also, *Ishki.com* is a **complaint brokerage** in Jordan that processes complaints from local citizens concerning the public and private sector, a service which enhances citizen participation in the discourse and practice of governance (Dokeniya, 2011; Terrill, 2010).

Tobin calls the gradual reforms **window dressing** and argues that they are distractions from deep societal and political divisions, and that they rebrand the monarchy rather than make it more genuinely democratic (Tobin, 2012). The monarchy aims to unify the country by preserving the fragile middle class and aspiring cosmopolitans in Amman, Tobin argues, which bolsters prioritization of economic, political, and cultural forms that prevent revolution. Tobin informs that King Abdullah II is keen to remind his subjects about the cost of instability by skillfully employing comparisons of life in the kingdom versus life in other countries in the region wracked with violence and civil war. Hence, a strong sentiment among Jordan's populace to overlook internal divisions and difficulties that may threaten the security and stability of the kingdom – that is, so long as the political and economic situations in such countries continue to be worse than the political and economic situation in Jordan.

The monarchy is walking a thin line, however, because protestors are dissatisfied with the limited reforms and replacements within the executive branch, and are challenging the king's handpicking of the government, which **hamstrings the legislature** and curtails its powers.

A legitimate mandate to rule Jordan, as seen in the eyes of the people, would be a government derived from a parliamentary majority that results from free and fair elections, which would restore power to them and limit the king's powers (Moon, 2012).

There may be more unrest to come because during a March 18, 2013 interview with *The Atlantic*, the king criticized a wide range of Jordanians and stirred up **fresh anger in the streets** among a populace that is losing confidence in the regime and government, and is viewing them as lacking in credibility (Kirkpatrick, 2013; Sweis, 2013).

Security gap

A security gap exists where a state fails to provide minimal levels of security for its population from organized armed groups (Call, 2010). A country experiencing a security gap is typically either in the midst of an armed conflict or just emerging from warfare; and the gap reflects the state's inability to resolve conflicts between social groups. Whether in pockets of its territory, or throughout its entire national territory, there are portions of its population that perceive insecurity as stemming from either the state forces or the insurgent forces.

Security Apparatus (score 5.8)

The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force, but the social contract is weakened when groups vie for power within a state. Pressures associated with this indicator include riots, protests, militancy, external rebel activity that threatens the state, and the potential for bombings and reprisal attacks.

The Security Apparatus (SEC) indicator showed for the most part an improving trend before FSI 2012, but since then there has been a worsening trend.

On the internal front: Riots resulting in bloody clashes with Jordanian police broke out in the city of **Maan**, 200 miles south of Jordan's capital, Amman, in June 2013, as armed youth torched shops and government buildings in response to a call by tribal leaders for civil disobedience after the alleged failure of police to arrest suspects in the killing of two men who belonged to influential local tribes ("Jordan arrests 13," 2013; The Media Line, 2013). This impoverished, well-positioned southern city, **site of the Great Arab Revolt** that crushed the Ottoman rule, has long simmered with tensions between residents and authorities because the townsmen feel betrayed by King Abdullah II after they helped the royal family establish Jordan and have since been reduced to subsisting on government-subsidized bread.

There is also unrest – with militant undertones – among **Salafi-jihadist demonstrators**, who reportedly were demanding in April 2013 that the Jordanian government “*release prisoners* (Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, 2013, Section Al-Sham)” within 30 days; notable among the protestors was Salafi-jihadist leader Abu Sayyaf al-‘Urduni. Notable among mujahideen arrested en route to Syria by Jordanian authorities was Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, spiritual leader of Jordan's Salafi-jihadist movement.

As mentioned, the monarchy is also troubled over the growing influence of **HAMAS**, particularly that the Arab “palestinians” living in refugee camps in the kingdom may become radicalized, and this extremism may spread to Jordan's Arab “palestinian” citizens, many who live in Amman (Terrill, 2010). The HAMAS-Fatah power struggle in Israel, and the Syrian and Iraq conflicts would be likely contributors to this radicalization.

On the external front: Jordan closed its main border crossing with Syria in March 2013 due to clashes between Syrian troops and rebel fighters: the first such **closure** since the Syrian revolt two years ago (Al-Khalidi & Reuters, 2013). The US sent a task force to help the kingdom with the humanitarian crisis and to prepare for security events resulting from waves

of Syrian refugees and the civil war in Syria (Lubold, 2012). Counter-terrorism analysts described the condition along the Syria-Iraq border April 2013 as “*rampant lawlessness* (Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, 2013, Section Iraq).” As mentioned, Jordanian officials are also concerned that by hosting Syrian refugees, they could be **inviting reprisal attacks** by Syria, and they fear a widening campaign of attacks on Syrians and Jordanians in the kingdom (Halaby, 2013).

Brief overview of select states in the Greater Middle East

State fragility

Per selected FSI 2013 state rankings in **Table 3**, seen on the right, this section provides a glance of Jordan in the context of its neighborhood in the Greater Middle East (GME), with a focus on alert zones. Rankings are from most to least severe: the #1 slot taken by the most unstable nation among the 178 nations sampled. As mentioned, a total score of 120 indicates a state’s vulnerability to collapse, or conflict in all FSI Indicator categories; and zones range in severity from “Very High Alert” to “Very Sustainable.”

Table 3: FSI Rankings 2013 – GME

Ranking	Country	Total Score
VERY HIGH ALERT		
HIGH ALERT		
6	Yemen	107.0
7	Afghanistan	106.7
11	Iraq	103.9
13	Pakistan	102.9
ALERT		
21	Syria	97.4
34	Egypt	90.6
VERY HIGH WARNING		
37	Iran	89.7
46	Lebanon	86.3
50	Djibouti	85.5
67	Israel	80.8
HIGH WARNING		
86	Turkey	75.9
87	Jordan	75.8
102	Saudi Arabia	72.7
WARNING		
124	Bahrain	62.9
LESS STABLE		
127	Kuwait	59.6
STABLE		
142	United Arab Emirates	47.3
143	Qatar	47.1
VERY STABLE		
SUSTAINABLE		
VERY SUSTAINABLE		

High Alert Zone: None of the states fall into the most severe zone: “Very High Alert,” where total scores range from 110-120. However, several failed states do fall into the “High Alert” zone, per Wolff’s following failed state criteria: “...states that cannot successfully claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory and over a given population ... state failure is a function of the contest of power and occurs where the

state incumbents are challenged by rivals to such an extent that for parts or all of a state's territory the holders of empirical sovereignty cannot be determined or are not synonymous with those that claim juridical sovereignty ... (Wolff, 2011, p. 961-962)." The failed states in the "High Alert" zone are Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.

Battle-torn **Yemen**, which began a national dialogue March 2013 amid a fractured military, growing armed tribal factions, al-Qa'ida attacks, Huthi territorial gains in the North, and rising violence in the separatist South, is among the FSI's "*Most Worsened for 2013*," its total score spiked from 104.8 in 2012 to 107.0 in 2013 (International Crisis Group, 2013). Yemen also is on the FSI's "*Top 10 Lists, 2005-2013*" of the most unstable countries in the world; along with **Afghanistan**, which faces government collapse and recurring civil war due to insurgency there driven by key groups¹⁶ with the wherewithal and will to fight long after the U.S.-led NATO forces complete their 2014 drawdown, until a fundamentalist Islamic government returns (Garfield & Boyd, 2013; Ressler & Brown, 2011).

Iraq, although improving .4 points over last year's total score of 104.3 and dropping in the ranks from #9 to #11, likely due to negotiations between some protestors and political figures that prevented all-out violence, nevertheless is experiencing an overlapping Sunni insurgency with abutting Syria and a persistent heightened level of sectarian violence, and is facing potential violent fragmentation and recurring civil war (Knights, Pollack, Kubba, & Cochrane-Sullivan, 2012; Reese, 2013). Iraq is arguably collapsed, having lost control over state coercive powers including the armed forces, police, security, and intelligence (Olson, 2008).

Nuclear-armed **Pakistan**, whose total score worsened by 1.3 points, from 101.6 in FSI 2012 to 102.9 in 2013, gives safe haven to militant groups, uses Afghan insurgents as proxies to secure strategic depth¹⁷ in Afghanistan, and fights its own militants like Tehrik-i-Taliban

Pakistan to which it has effectively ceded large areas to their control (Dressler, 2011; Institute for the Study of War [ISW], n.d.).

Alert Zone: Armed with a large stockpile of chemical weapons, and topping 100,000 deaths in its civil war at the time of this report, **Syria**, by Wolff's definition, is a failed state, which slipped 2.9 points since FSI 2012. The 2.9-point slip follows a slippage of 8.6 points from FSI 2011 to FSI 2012 that ranked Syria as having the fourth-most significant decline in the index's history (Henderson, 2013; Manning, 2012; Nikitin, Feickert, & Kerr, 2013).

Egypt is failing, having slipped 7 points since FSI 2012, from 90.4 then to 97.4 in FSI 2013, moving up 10 slots in rank from #31 to #21, with President Mohammed Morsi having lost his grip on power, and the country tumbling from violent revolution into civil war (Winer, 2013).

Other Zones: States in the **three warning zones** in Table 3 – Iran, Lebanon, Djibouti, Israel; Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia; Bahrain – contend with restive minorities and protests that at times turn violent. States in the **three stable zones** in the Table – Kuwait; United Arab Emirates, Qatar – experience rare or low frequency protests, typically tightly controlled and non-violent; but these states host large foreign labor pools drawn from states in the region, which increases the possibility that unrest in the workers' native countries could impact security in these host countries (United States Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council website, 1985).

Although not all **Arab monarchies**¹⁸ appear in the Table, overall they demonstrated resiliency amid the Arab Spring, falling within range of the more stable “High Warning” to “Stable” zones, and half improved from FSI 2012 to FSI 2013, but Jordan fared the worst, slipping in rank from #90 to #87 and gaining 1 point in its total score. Jordan's monarchy enjoys heritage-based legitimacy, as the Hashemite family is directly descended from Islam's prophet Mohammed – a stabilizing force counterbalanced by the destabilizing refugee

problem (Terrill, 2010). Discussion on the durability of Arab monarchies is in the final section.

A notable regional trend

According to the Freedom House *Freedom in the World 2011-2013* report on the Middle East and North Africa, four countries are experiencing **declining trends in freedom**: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. Jordan registered a decline in freedom of assembly due to repression of protests against the new electoral law and because of the lack of meaningful reform. The others who made the short list were noted for, *inter alia*, attacks and restrictions on journalist, activists, and refugees; mass arrests of activists, lawyers, and reform-minded judges; dismissal and deportation of academics critical of government policies; and passage of restrictive Internet laws. Iraq and Turkey had status changes and registered declines; and Egypt and Libya had status changes and registered improvements. Overall, **repression** in the Middle East and North Africa intensified.

Potential for regional cascade of state failure.

Quaking by the ongoing Arab Spring, five states depicted in Table 3 are tumbling into, fully involved in, or climbing out of, **civil wars**; there are five **failed states**, and one **failing state** that were discussed, and several **weak states** not discussed.

The GME region is destabilizing from disintegrating states, adverse regime change, looming WMD threats, genocidal civil wars, rising sectarian violence, a resurgence of tribalism, protracted insurgencies, roving armed non-state actors, threat networks, a burgeoning youth bulge, struggling economies, a region-wide security gap, a proliferation of under-governed spaces, and rejection of Western-style democracy and influence. A major triggering event under these conditions could set off Magen's aforementioned "*cascade of state failure*."

Donor countries that help stabilize countries in this region are tightening their fiscal belts in this difficult global economy, and this is likely to have a trickle-down effect in the form of diminishing foreign aid, which will also diminish the stabilizing affects such assistance brings. The potential is high for this region to experience a cascade of state failure, which will likely be accompanied by an amalgamation of state borders spanning, even if partially at first, the Asian and African continents, and from this process there is likely to arise a restored caliphate that will radically alter the global balance of power and erode security worldwide.

Final assessment

Could Syria's spillover tip Jordan over to failure in capacity, legitimacy, or security?

Based on the examination of the 12 key indicators of normal pressures and pressures that could push Jordan to failure, the kingdom is experiencing its **most significant gap in capacity** with weaknesses in several critical areas, followed by a notable gap in legitimacy, and only a slight gap in security at this time.

Among the major drivers of instability affecting capacity are the large enduring and new refugee populations, with the Jordanian government bracing for a potential new wave of Iraqi refugees fleeing escalating sectarian violence; frequent resource and service shortages; chronic poverty and high unemployment; rising inflation and shrinking state subsidies; serious government corruption; politically-driven economic liberalization policies that benefit a few; and a lack of meaningful political reforms.

Although foreign assistance has been retarding these destabilizing forces, financial donations are lagging behind the kingdom's critical needs, and **more external shocks could push the capacity gap to failure** – something quite possible considering the fragility of the region.

A widening of the capacity gap would likely bring with it a rise in protests and civil unrest, which could result in a widening of the legitimacy gap, and the security gap.

The legitimacy gap is weak in the area of human rights due to government repression and curtailment of civil liberties, and in the area of fractionalized elites due to power struggles and erosion of the king's traditional support base. Should more protests and civil unrest present, human rights abuses would likely rise, as would power struggles, and the king's support base would further erode. Such eventualities would, indeed, impact the security gap.

Yet, thus far, the **Arab monarchies** have weathered the stormy Arab Spring. Why? Will this curious run of good fortune last?

Monarchy durability has a mixed record¹⁹, but since the 17th century, there has been a revival of hereditary rule during times of upheaval²⁰ largely because consolidated monarchies are a symbol of respect and national unity (Ludger, 2012). The strongest source of authority of monarchies in the Arab world today is the traditional legitimacy attributed to their rule, but not all Arab monarchies enjoy the same level of legitimacy.

In a qualitative comparative analysis on 13 Middle Eastern monarchies, Bank, Richter, and Sunik found that the **linchpin monarchies**, Jordan and Morocco, rely on strong historical-religious claims to legitimate their rule, which has a stabilizing effect in the face of adversity; not so with the **Gulf monarchies**²¹, which must rely on high rent revenues and family participation in political decision-making for survival, (Bank, Richter, & Sunik, 2013).

Seen within the context of the need to attach legitimacy to monarchical rule for regime survival, it is telling that the Gulf monarchies in May 2011 extended unprecedented invitations to the poor kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco to join the **Gulf Cooperation Council** (GCC), which was transformed from a largely exclusive economic club into a

political and military alliance that presents a social contract for member states to hold out to their subjects: stability and economic success in exchange for foregoing political rights (Helfont & Helfont, 2012; Middle East Policy Council, 2011). Will the Syrian example be enough to impel the subjects of these monarchies to buy into the social contract? Such may depend on just how convincing the monarchies could be that they are worthy of respect and have the wherewithal to hold together national unity.

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Endnotes

¹ In order to detail pressures faced by the 178 countries examined from January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012, the Failed States Index process taps into a large pool of information, including several indices and matrices, employs a rigorous social science framework, and uses a proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool guided by 12 primary social, economic and political indicators to collect and analyze thousands of information products worldwide daily. The 12 primary indicators include more than 100 sub-indicators. The content analysis is converted into scores and triangulated with other quantitative analysis and qualitative inputs from institutions covering major events in the countries, and then compared with insights from a separate qualitative review of each indicator for each country.

² The Refugees and IDPs Indicator primarily falls into the Capacity Gap because the aid-dependent, resource-scarce kingdom, a known haven for refugees, is having difficulties absorbing the large influx of Syrian refugees and delivering basic services, and international agencies have been slow in delivery of aid. Also, the kingdom's resources are stretched, creating shortages. There are growing security concerns over Jordan's refugee populations, but such concerns have not reached levels that would place the Refugee and IDPs Indicator squarely within the Security Gap because Jordan has been taking adequate security measures in securing borders and camps. Nevertheless, security concerns remain over: (1) the unfolding humanitarian crisis involving Syrian refugees, particularly in the Zaatari refugee camp (2) the potential for radicalization among the Arab "palestinian" refugees in Jordan's 13 refugee camps, for rising HAMAS' influence within the kingdom, and for a humanitarian fallout from the HAMAS/Fatah power struggle (3) the probability that Jordan will contend with new waves of Iraqi refugees as Iraq slides into a civil war over Sunni-Shi'a rivalry.

³ For a well-documented report on the elaborate scheme on how Arab "palestinians" came about, and how their refugee numbers were artificially inflated by British and UN officials, see historian Joan Peters' book, entitled: *"From Time Immemorial."*

⁴ The PLO/PA asserts UN Res. 242 requires Israel to give up "west bank" territories acquired in 1967. The original 1964 Palestine National Charter, Article 24, disclaims the PLO's exercise of territorial sovereignty over the "west bank." A legitimized "palestinian" entity did not exist with Res. 242. Jordan's belligerent occupation of the territories from 1948 to 1967 was illegal. Israel liberated the land in self-defense against an Arab-Muslim military alliance that threatened to obliterate the Jewish presence from the region, and thus was in her legal right to acquire the territories under such conditions. Article 51 of the UN Charter underscores the right of a state to take anticipatory defense measures. Nothing in international law requires territory to be returned to a state that carries out aggression, per Article 5 (3) of UNGA Res. 3314. Israel has superior, arguably the only, legal title to the territories, dating back 4000 years, and there has been a continual Jewish presence in the land since 70 C.E. The Jewish claim to this land was official and legally recognized via the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the 1920 San Remo Conference, and the 1922 Mandate for "palestine."

⁵ Housing is an acute problem in Jordan; rent costs spiked due to increased demand for housing and widespread real estate speculation spurred by an influx of Iraqis (Terrill, 2010).

⁶ A large number of Iraqis in Jordan are transit migrants, which may entail stays of several months before returning to Iraq, or may involve stays of several years before migrating to

another country, usually in the West. Those who overstay their visit permits become irregulars and trapped inside the kingdom. These self-settled and traumatized so-called “*urban refugees* (Chatelard et al., 2011, section 1)” come largely from Iraq’s elite and settle in Amman, but they cannot durably return to their conflict-ridden country, so they try to stay under the radar fearing expulsion or denial of re-entry into the kingdom.

⁷ Syrians do not require a visa, they do not have to establish Jordanian residency, and they have access to the labor market per Jordanian law (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2013 a).

⁸ The article cited precedent for such eventualities: In 1982, Syria cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, whose activists took refuge in Jordan, which resulted in a wave of assassinations targeting the group; and in 1970, the Syrian military invaded northern Jordan to protect Arab “palestinians” during a Jordanian crackdown on Arab “palestinian” factions.

⁹ See The World Bank data on Refugee population by country or territory of asylum: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?order=wbapi_data_value_2011+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc

¹⁰ The US State Department informs there are three groups of Arab “palestinians” in Jordan: those from the 1948 and 1967 wars who received citizenship, those who still reside in Judea and Samaria and are not eligible to claim full citizenship, and those who fled Gaza after 1967 and were not entitled to citizenship. Many within these groups are discriminated against.

¹¹ Political integration of the Arab “palestinians” in Jordan was made conditional upon their allegiance to the monarchy, which concerns itself first with protecting its stability. Many of these families, which are mainly from the upper middle class and above sectors, accepted the terms of the pact with the Hashemites and are thriving in the kingdom (Chatelard, 2010).

¹² The FSI Capacities by Countries Indicators is the newest project. Its ratings are as follows: poor, weak, moderate, good, and excellent.

¹³ Jordan’s first attempt to hold multiparty elections for a national legislature, or parliament, recognizable by Western observers was in 1956, and the result was that the king was nearly overthrown and Jordan’s existence as an independent state was jeopardized; thereafter, Jordanian kings have been cautious about allocating significant powers to the parliament (Terrill, 2010).

¹⁴ Since 1989, the Jordanian government has required protestors to obtain a permit, and outline where their protests will be held, the expected turnout, the topic, and the forms of protest (Tobin, 2012). And since the March 24-25, 2011 unpermitted protest that turned violent and was put down by anti-riot police, which served as an underlying threat of strong government response to unacceptable demonstrations, the regime’s military and police power have been acknowledged by the populace.

¹⁵ The Jordanian government has been showcasing its image as a democratic reformer in order to align with U.S. post-9-11 demands for increased democracy in the Middle East. However, it must be careful to address this concern of a major donor while at the same time

meeting public expectations to ensure regime survival, so it implements as a part of an overall strategy carefully managed and halting political reform (Terrill, 2010).

¹⁶ Key insurgency groups operating in Afghanistan are Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hizb-l Islami, and al-Qa'ida

¹⁷ In the 1990s, the center of Pakistan's Afghan policy was to secure strategic depth in Afghanistan in the event of military conflict with India (Institute for the Study of War [ISW], n.d.).

¹⁸ The Arab monarchies are Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain

¹⁹ Examples of authoritarian monarchies that broke down are Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, North Yemen in 1962, Libya in 1969, and Iran in 1979 (Bank, Richter, & Sunik, 2013). For examples of surviving monarchies, see endnote 18.

²⁰ Examples of the revival of hereditary rule in times of tumult include: restorations in Great Britain in the 17th century, Spain in the 20th century, and the transformation of imperial rule in Japan after 1947 (Ludger, 2012)

²¹ There are five Gulf monarchies: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates