Abstract

This report provides an in depth examination of the rate and extent of Islamic radicalisation in Australia. First discussed will be a brief overview of the history of Muslim immigration to the country, there will be an examination of the demographics of Muslims in Australia, including an analysis of Muslim political participation. Following this, the theoretical explanations of the causes and process of radicalisation will also be examined. The Australian government’s response to terrorism will also be explored. This report will also examine unfamiliar sources of Islamic radicalisation, including Indigenous Australians, as well as Saudi Arabia’s secret funding of Australian universities. Following this overview of the context and history of Islamic radicalisation in Australia, this report will survey numerous case studies of radical groups, individuals, incidents of violence, and the four planned terrorist attacks in Australia since 9/11. The report will conclude with a discussion on possible ways to prevent further incidents of radicalisation, as well as forecast future developments.
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Demographics and history of Islam in Australia

Muslim immigration to Australia

Although Muslims have had a long history with Australia, their presence in large numbers is a recent phenomenon. From as early as the 16th century Makassar fishermen from the eastern islands of Indonesia would travel to north and Western Australia for trade, however these Muslims played an extremely small role in Australian cultural and social life. However, a greater influx of Muslims came from the Indian subcontinent during exploration of the country in the 19th century. These migrants were known as ‘Ghans,’ and came from the area that is now referred to as Afghanistan. The Ghans used camels to explore the Australian deserts and open trade and communication routes. Living in small communities (known as ‘Ghantowns’), they built their first mosque in 1889 in Broken Hill, NSW, as well as mosques in Adelaide in 1890, Perth in 1904, and Brisbane in 1907.1 These mosques are considered the initial establishment of Islam in Australia. The next wave of Muslim immigration to Australia came during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Among these new arrivals were a high number of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish citizens, as well as migrants from Lebanon as a result of the Lebanese civil war in 1975.

The Battle of Broken Hill

The first incident of Islamic terrorism in Australia was in Broken Hill on New Year’s Day 1915, when two Muslim men from the Indian subcontinent, in the area now known as Pakistan, opened fire on a trainload of individuals travelling to a holiday picnic. The Battle of Broken Hill was initiated by 61 year old Mullah Abdullah and 41 year old Gool Mohamed, the latter of whom historians have targeted as being the main radicalising influence.2 The train to the picnic was carrying over one thousand people, when the two men positioned themselves behind an ice cream cart that was flying the flag of the Ottoman Empire. As the train went past, the two men opened fire, ultimately killing four and wounding several others.3 After withdrawing from the scene the two men were soon surrounded by a posse of armed locals, and after an hour long gun fight, were eventually killed. The bodies were offered to the local

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Muslim community for proper burial, but were refused, stating that they had disgraced their religion and people.

The motives of the men were political, religious, and personal. As Australia had been in a state of war with Turkey since the previous year, political tensions had likely been running high in the country. A suicide note found on Gool displayed his religious and political motive with a pronouncement of his dying support for the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, stating “I must kill your men and give my life for my faith by order of the Sultan (but) I have no enmity against anyone, nor have I consulted with anyone, nor informed anyone.” Conversely, Mullah had a grudge against a local policeman, which some claim had made him resent the people of the town. Nearly four months after this attack, Australia launched the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign in Western Turkey.

**Demographics of Australia**

**Australian demographic statistics (2013)**

Australia is a politically, economically, and socially, stable country, with a strong history of multiculturalism. The most recent statistics estimate that the resident population is approximately 23 million, which is a 1.7% growth from the previous year. Of this population, over 90% describe their cultural ancestry as Australian, British, or Irish. Regarding religion, 61% of Australians identify with the Christian faith, with the Catholic and Anglican denominations accounting for 25% and 17% respectively. 22% of Australians do not identify with any religious group, an increase of 7% from the previous census. This does not include a further 1.8 million Australians chose not to answer the question on religion.

**Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>23,014,509</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal and Torres</td>
<td>548,369</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait Islander People</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 Ibid.
Ancestry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancestry</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>7,238,533</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>7,098,486</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5,439,268</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>4,796,787</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>3,679,907</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

English usage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English usage</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households that only speak English</td>
<td>16,509,291</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households that speak two or more languages</td>
<td>1,579,949</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table below lists Australians that identify with all religions that are not Christianity. Of this table, Hinduism experienced the fastest growth since 2001, increasing by 189%, followed by Islam with a growth of 69%.

2011 Census- Religious Affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Christian</td>
<td>1,546.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>529.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>476.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>275.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Christian</td>
<td>168.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion born overseas %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Christian</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Christian</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table above shows, just over 2%, or less than half a million, of Australians identify as Muslim. This is a 39% increase from the 2006 census.

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Ibid.
Birthplace of Australian Muslims expressed as a percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the above table demonstrates, nearly 62%, or nearly three hundred thousand, of Australians that identify as Muslim were born overseas. Approximately one third of Australian Muslims report having Lebanese ancestry, and approximately 50% are under the age of 24.

The majority of Australia’s Muslim population live in urban areas. As the table below shows, over 80% of Australian Muslims live in New South Wales and Victoria, with the majority of these based in Sydney and Melbourne. Almost half of all Muslim Australians live in Sydney.

**Location of Australian Muslims**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/territory of residence</th>
<th>Muslim population</th>
<th>% of total Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>168 788</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>109 369</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>24 187</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>20 318</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>10 521</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>4 373</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>1 083</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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11 Ibid.
Immigration currently provides 54% of Australia’s population growth; however, government estimates claim that in the near future, immigration will be the only source of labour force growth. Based on these statistics, analysts estimate that the growth rates of the Muslim community in Australia will continue to rise. The Pew Research Center estimates that by 2030, the Australian Muslim community will have grown by 80% to approximately 700,000, or 2.8% of the total population.

### Political participation of Australian Muslims

A report by the Centre for Research on Social Inclusion, funded by the Department of Immigration, shows that Muslims have historically tended to vote for the Labor Party (the centrist-left leaning major political party), however the authors suggest that there is a potential future shift amongst Muslim youth to the Greens (the major far left political party). A possible reason for this shift is the difference in immigration policies between the parties, with the Greens favouring fewer restrictions on asylum seekers.

There are presently three Australians in any state or federal parliament that self-identify as Muslim, all representing the Labor Party. Most recently, the first Member of Federal Parliament to be openly Muslim was elected to the House of Representatives seat of Chifley in 2010. Ed Husic, of the Labor Party, is an Australian of Bosnian origin, and describes himself as a non-practicing Muslim. Adem Somyurek is an Australian of Turkish origin, and represents the Labor Party on the Victorian Legislative Council. Somyurek has been described as a politician that does not intentionally embellish upon his Islamic background when dealing with the Muslim community. Shaoquett Moselmane is a member of the upper house of the NSW Legislative Council for the Labor Party. Of Lebanese

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background, Moselmane was elected Mayor of Rockdale four times between 2001 and 2009.\textsuperscript{17}

In regards to political participation by the citizenry, Australia has remarkably high rates of voter turnout, primarily due to compulsory voting laws. Although Australia has compulsory voting laws, “informal votes,” that is, a voting ballot that is left blank, intentionally defaced, or otherwise improperly filled out, is somewhat prevalent, with a national average of nearly four per cent. However, this figure is disproportionately higher in Local Government Areas with high Muslim populations, ranging from six to nine per cent. For example, in the electorate of Werriwa (western Sydney), the rate of informal voting had increased from 8% in the 2004 federal election to 13% in the 2005 by-election.\textsuperscript{18}

Over 80% of Australian Muslims live within NSW and Victoria, with half of all Australian Muslims living in Sydney. An even higher number of Muslims are concentrated into certain Local Government Areas. The list below denotes the top ten councils in Australia with the highest numbers of Muslims residents, as of 2006.

**Local Government Areas with the highest numbers of Muslim residents\textsuperscript{19}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>Number of Muslim Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Bankstown (NSW)</td>
<td>25996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Hume (Vic)</td>
<td>19688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Canterbury (NSW)</td>
<td>17792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Auburn (NSW)</td>
<td>16111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Liverpool (NSW)</td>
<td>13740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Blacktown (NSW)</td>
<td>12463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Parramatta (NSW)</td>
<td>12120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Brisbane (QLD)</td>
<td>10868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Moreland (Vic)</td>
<td>10618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
The following list details which NSW electorates, and by extension which local government areas, supplied the most informal ballots during the 2007 federal election. There is a strong correlation between areas with a high Muslim population and electorates with many informal votes.

**Top ten NSW electorates with informal votes in the 2007 federal election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top ten electorate with informal votes</th>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>% of total votes that were informal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blaxland</td>
<td>Bankstown/Fairfield</td>
<td>9.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson</td>
<td>Bankstown/Canterbury</td>
<td>9.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chifley</td>
<td>Blacktown</td>
<td>7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospect</td>
<td>Holroyd</td>
<td>7.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fowler</td>
<td>Fairfield</td>
<td>7.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reid</td>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>7.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parramatta</td>
<td>Parramatta</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werriwa</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>6.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Bankstown/Canterbury</td>
<td>6.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennelong</td>
<td>(Eastwood area)</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grayndler</td>
<td>Canterbury</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A possible hindrance to Muslim political participation is a misunderstanding the Australian electoral system, which can lead to unintentionally defacing a ballot paper thereby making it invalid. There have also been claims that radical community members have claimed voting to be *haram* (literally meaning ‘forbidden’) as voting would imply that they are sanctioning a non halal government.\(^{21}\)

**Theories of radicalisation**

There is no single pathway to extremism, nor are there distinct timelines or stereotypes that give a clear view of those that are prone to this transformation. However, the psychological explanation exhort by Fathali Moghaddam, known

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\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
as the staircase to terrorism, \(^{22}\) describes a general understanding of the radicalisation process.

Moghaddam contends that there are five major phases that a person undertakes during the process of radicalisation which transforms them into a terrorist. At the ground floor is the individual’s psychological interpretation of the environment they live in, meaning one’s personal beliefs and opinions. The first floor is the perceived options to fight unfair treatment. In liberal democratic societies there are numerous legal channels through which groups can lobby for their cause, however should these be perceived to be inadequate; the next step will be taken, to displacement of aggression. On this level, anger is directed against a definable enemy. This leads on to the third floor, moral engagement, in which Moghaddam argues that the morals of the individual are warped into supporting violent actions. The fourth floor is perceived legitimacy of the group, meaning that they consider themselves a valid, legitimate group. Finally, the radical will commit a terrorist act, thus fulfilling the fifth step. This theory does not assume that violence is the ultimate end of this process, and notes that people often descend the staircase, preferring to use non-violent tactics to address their grievances.

Another theory of radicalisation comes from Ehud Sprinzak, who posits that no terrorist organisation emerges suddenly; rather, they use violence once they have come to the conclusion that non-violence is ineffective.\(^{23}\) Sprinzak contends that there are three behavioural stages in his delegitimation theory. First, is a crisis of confidence, in which the subject loses their trust of the ruling party (i.e. Government, society, etc.). A continuation of this is the conflict of legitimacy, in which the subject questions the validity of the entire system that they are a part of. Finally, the crisis of legitimacy involves the subject viewing all those that do not accept their beliefs as part of this illegitimate system, resulting in their dehumanisation, making it easier use violence.

Group polarisation refers to the tendency of people to radicalise after conversing with others holding similar views.\(^{24}\) This means that the people that one is surrounded by affect the views and decisions one makes. Some commentators have referred to this concept as an “echo chamber,”\(^{25}\) in which a group of people with radical views hear views similar to their own, which in turn makes them agree more strongly. An example of this comes from Marc Sageman, who argues


that websites that promote radical Islam are nowhere near as damaging as online discussion forums, as this is the arena where views are cemented.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
Radical Islam in Australia

Indigenous Australia and Islam

Although small, there are a growing number of Indigenous Australians converting to Islam. According to the 2011 census, Indigenous Australians (comprising of Aboriginal Australians and Torres Strait Islanders) number over five hundred thousand, or 2.5% of the total population. Of these, the most recent statistics place over one thousand Indigenous Australians as Muslim, a 60% rise from the previous census. By comparison, 73% of Indigenous Australians identify with a Christian denomination. The median age of the Indigenous population is 21, compared with a national average of 37. Among these Muslim Indigenous Australians is prominent champion boxer Anthony Mundine, who converted in 1999.

It is imperative to note that many of these Indigenous Australians converted to Islam whilst in prison. Studies have found a positive correlation between indigenous Australians involved in the criminal justice system and converts to Islam, with indications that it may be a fundamentalist branch of Islam. This is in keeping with reports from Aboriginal community leaders that have expressed their concern that there is a great risk that violent criminals are at greater risk than most of converting to militant Islam, and could create a potential national security issue further down the track.

The head of Redfern’s Aboriginal Youth Centre in Sydney and Muslim convert Rocky Davis claims that some imprisoned Indigenous Australians are Wahhabis, a fundamentalist branch of Islam. Davis states there are dozens of potential converted Islamic radicals, stating “Radical fanatics could convince my people to

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become killers ... they’re already prone to violence because they grew up in racist, violent society.”

Analysts estimate that Islam will continue to grow amongst Indigenous populations. Considering the high levels of alcohol and drug abuse within these communities, there is likely to be acceptance of promotion of a religion that prohibits consumption of these. Theorists argue that some indigenous Australians are attracted to Islam as a result of their frustration in having difficulties integrating into mainstream Australian society. Coupled with this, there are many parallels between indigenous beliefs and Islam, such as circumcision, arranged marriages, and the tradition of males being older than their wives.

### Saudi Arabia’s influence on Australian Islamist groups

The Saudi government has long been involved in promoting Wahhabism, a movement promoting a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, to the world. Wahhabism is defined as a fundamentalist form of Islam that is primarily practiced in Saudi Arabia, renowned for its dismissal of any innovations or practices that came after the seventh century teachings of Prophet Muhammad. By comparison, Salafism holds similar fundamentalist views; however is not a unified movement. Despite experts considering Wahhabism and Salafism as distinctly different, many use the term interchangeably. This report uses the term Wahhabism, rather than Salafism. One estimate claiming that of the USD$70 billion spent on “international aid” by the Saudis between 1979 and 2003, two thirds was used to help support Wahhabism and to spread anti-western and anti-Israel propaganda. By comparison, this is double the estimated USD$1 billion annually spent on propaganda by the Soviets during the

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33 Ibid.
Cold War.\textsuperscript{41} Saudi funding of foreign universities has seen exceptional spending internationally, with one estimate claiming that between 1995 and 2008 eight English universities (including Oxford and Cambridge) received over £233.5 million from Saudi sources.\textsuperscript{42}

Regarding Australia, there have been confirmed reports that extremist Islamic groups have been funding Australian organisations with the intention of disseminating fundamentalist ideals. Estimates have placed Saudi funding on religious studies in Australia between the 1970’s and 2005 at AUD$120 million.\textsuperscript{43} The most famous example of this is the 2007 revelation that the government of Saudi Arabia were in talks with Griffith University to donate $1.3 million for an Islamic campus, as well as create a $2.7 billion scholarship fund for Saudi students to study in Australia.\textsuperscript{44} This incident attracted harsh criticism from many sections, with Queensland District Court Judge Clive Wall accusing Griffith of becoming a Saudi stooge, likening the university to Pakistani ‘madrassas.’\textsuperscript{45}

**Muslim Australians fighting abroad**

The ongoing conflict in Syria has led to an increase in young Australian Muslims entering the country to aid the rebels. Initial estimates place approximately two hundred Australian fighters within the country, the majority of who are Lebanese-Australian dual citizens with strong links to north Lebanon, particularly the area around Tripoli.\textsuperscript{46} It is also estimated that there are one hundred Australians possibly fighting for the radical al Qaeda offshoot group Jabhat al-Nusra.\textsuperscript{47} These estimates have doubled from the previous year. Jabhat al-Nusra officially merged with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of April 2013, with AQI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stating, “It is time to announce to the Levantine


\textsuperscript{44}Mervyn Bendle, *How to be a useful idiot: Saudi funding in Australia*, The Drum, [http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/32626.html](http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/32626.html), 13/10/08, Accessed: 04/04/13.


people and the whole world that Jabhat al-Nusra is merely an extension and part of the Islamic State of Iraq.  

These young radicals present a significant long term threat to Australian security, in terms of their potential as a radical influence on their return home. ASIO have confirmed that they are conducting investigations into the influx of Australians fighting in Syria, with Director-General David Irvine stating that a long term fear are “people who do develop the sort of skills that terrorists can use and more importantly the commitment that drives terrorism.” Reports also indicate that ASIO are concerned that fighters will return equipped with combat experience and a large number of radical contacts.

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48 Ibid.
Radical Australian Muslim Organisations and Individuals

Hizb ut-Tahrir

The most infamous radical Islamist group in Australia, Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international Sunni political religious organisation that has stated goals of creating a unified pan Islamic state incorporating all countries with a Muslim majority.\(^{51}\) Active in forty countries, and with an estimated worldwide membership of over one million, Hizb ut-Tahrir is rumoured to be headquartered in London.\(^{52}\)

Not only do the group explicitly reject democracy as a viable form of government, they have also written a draft constitution for a future pan Islamic state. This constitution would see a Caliph, that is, a supreme religious leader, as the head of state, and would not be directly accountable to the people, nor would there be any checks or balances between branches of government. As a result of these stated aims, many have viewed Hizb ut-Tahrir as being openly opposed to democratic governments, and have called for their proscription. They are banned in several Middle Eastern countries; however, they are presently legally permitted to operate in several countries, including Australia, the US, and the UK.

There is a strong likelihood that Hizb ut-Tahrir will be allowed to continue to operate within Australia. Analysts have claimed that the organisation presents a direct threat to Australia’s socio cultural stability, and may possibly serve to instigate terrorist attacks and divide community sentiment in the long term.\(^{53}\) Although Hizb ut-Tahrir repeatedly rejects violence,\(^{54}\) literature disseminated by the group may sponsor vitriolic actions against various sectors of the community, particularly Jewish targets.\(^{55}\)

Main points of the overall strategy of Hizb ut-Tahrir include:

- The membership and prominence of well-spoken intellectuals as spokespersons.

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• Membership drives targeting Muslim youths that are active in politics.
• Empathy of the use of jihad for "justified" causes.

Based on these main facets, there is a strong likelihood that the Australian membership of the organisation will increase in the long term. Considering reports that cells within the organisation operate with membership between five to eight people, it is highly probably that a radicalised group (similar in size and ideology to the Hamburg Cell that was responsible for the 9/11 attacks) could eventually form that may seek to use violence in support of their aims.

Jemaah Islamiyah in Australia

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is an Indonesian based terrorist organisation that violently lobbies for the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state that would encompass Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and parts of the Philippines. Formed in Malaysia in 1985 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir as a recruitment centre to despatch volunteers to join the mujahideen in Afghanistan, the group relocated to Indonesia in 1998. Initially a peaceful organisation, radical factions soon gained prominence, giving JI a more global agenda. These radical factions became associated with Al Qaeda. Indonesian analysts claim that presently, JI is split into two broad factions; violent radicals and preachers of violence.

Among their extensive list of terrorist attacks, JI has a history of targeting Australian areas of interest, including the September 2004 suicide car bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta that killed three people and wounded over one hundred, and more famously, the October 2002 bombing of a nightclub frequently patronised by Australian tourists on the predominantly Hindu island of Bali, killing 202 people.

There is increasing evidence that the militant Islamist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has direct connections to members living in Australia. In October 2012, former deputy leader of JI in Australia Abdul Rahman revealed that there may potentially be a cell of up to thirty militant jihadists currently operating in Australia. Rahman and his twin brother Abdul Rahim were leaders of Mantiqi IV, described as the Australian chapter of JI, and in 1997 were tasked by Abu

Bakar Bashir to train radicals in the way of jihad. At least one of the estimated one hundred people educated by the brothers in violent jihad was successfully radicalised, with Jack Roche formulating a plot to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra in 2000.

However, critics have posited that JI may not pose a direct threat to Australia, but rather only threaten Australian political and economic interests in Indonesia and the wider South East Asian region. Christopher Michaelsen argues that JI’s fundamental goal of establishing a fundamentalist Islamic government would not be furthered by targeting Australia, and although the proposed caliphate may stretch across to Thailand and Malaysia, there is no direct evidence that this would encompass parts of Northern Australia. Nonetheless, JI could be involved in the recruitment of Australians to an extremist ideology that may pose a future threat.

Analysts have predicted that future trends of JI indicate a strong likelihood that the core of JI will continue to function till at least 2025, though splinter cells are highly likely to have disbanded by this stage. Despite impressive Indonesian counter-terrorism operations targeting the organisation, there are an estimated fifty schools associated with JI preaching its ideology, recruiting new members, and maintaining its social network. However, current negotiations in neighbouring Philippines between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) could possibly result in a peaceful settlement, meaning that this area may become more hostile to JI.

The Al-Furqan Islamic Centre and Harun Mehicevic

Harun Mehicevic, AKA Abu Talha, is the radical Muslim leader of the Al-Furqan Islamic Information Centre in Springvale South, Melbourne. Of Bosnian heritage, Mehicevic moved to Australia in the mid 1990’s and adopted the conservative Salafist ideology. During this time he was also associated with convicted terrorist Abdul Benbrika. Al-Furqan was founded the week after 9/11, and is

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62 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
estimated to have approximately 30 members, all between the ages of 18 to 40.\textsuperscript{68}

Attempts by the Muslim community to dissuade new members to join Al-Furqan have been made by the Australian Bosnian Herzegovinian Organisation (ABHO). ABHO member Seneda Softic stated “Al-Furqan has not been welcomed; their members have a different theory and interpretation of Islamic life.”\textsuperscript{69} In one instance, the organisation successfully engaged with four youths involved with Al-Furqan, convincing them to cease their involvement.\textsuperscript{70}

On 12\textsuperscript{th} September, 2012, counter terrorism raids were carried out on Al-Furqan Centre, with a total of twelve properties raided by ASIO.\textsuperscript{71} The raids were conducted as a result of information given by a member of Al-Furqan that for at least three months was also an ASIO informant; however, there has also been speculation that the raids were conducted as a result of the outing of this informant, rather than any concrete evidence.\textsuperscript{72} When the informant’s phone was obtained by Al-Furqan members, the group posted photos of the text messages between the informant and the ASIO officer on their Facebook page.\textsuperscript{73} Charges were laid against Adnan Karabegovic for collecting the Al Qaeda magazine \textit{Inspire}, which lists potential terrorist targets.\textsuperscript{74}

The response from Al-Furqan was predictably critical of the government’s actions, accusing the authorities of entrapment, and insinuating the evidence was planted.\textsuperscript{75} The press release also criticised the media for unbalanced reporting, stating that the centre “has never propagated violence against the Australian public or called on people to carry out terrorist attacks,”\textsuperscript{76} and do not, nor have ever sought, “to violently overthrow the Australian government and implement Sharia Law.”\textsuperscript{77}

It can be hypothesised that the raids could have an effect of making the group further mistrustful of outsiders and more secretive, as well as create even closer unity between group members. Consequently, Al-Furqan Islamic Centre runs a


\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid, p4.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
high risk of being a base for radical Muslims, particularly of Bosnian heritage, in Melbourne.

**Ibrahim Siddiq-Conlon**

Ibrahim Siddiq-Conlon is a radical Islamic preacher based in Sydney that actively and vocally opposes democracy. Raised in a religiously observant Christian family in rural NSW, Siddiq-Conlon gained a Masters’ degree in architecture from the University of Technology, Sydney. During his university years he converted to Islam and studied under the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Association, which has since distanced themselves from his seditious comments. Such comments discuss his contempt for Australia’s political system, and when asked if he would like to bring down the government, responded, “Well, that's the aim of every Muslim essentially. Every Muslim has been commanded to, as I say, hate any other system except Islam and work for it.”

Siddiq-Conlon founded Sharia4Australia in 2010, which stridently opposes democracy and through careful use of wording so as to avoid conviction for inciting violence, justifies the use of force in bringing Sharia law to Australia. While actively denouncing democracy, Siddiq-Conlon simultaneously practices his right to freedom of speech, stating “I’m not inciting violence, it's just words. Obviously under freedom of expression, I can say words.” He believes that Sharia law will soon come to Australia, and non-Muslims will be unable “to drink their beer, they won't be able to eat their pork and they won't be able to do their homosexual acts, because one day they know they will be controlled.”

In 2012, Siddiq-Conlon made a hoax terror threat against the Sydney gay and lesbian Mardi Gras. The threat was written on a Facebook page of a popular radio show that warned, “Attention, high possible risk of a terrorist attack. Spread the word. Imminent danger.” The resulting arrest and search by police revealed child pornography on a laptop, for which he was also charged. Siddiq-Conlon was ultimately sentenced to nine months for the hoax threat and six months for the child pornography, for which he was released into the community for time already served.

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81 Ibid.
Australian Muslim leaders have stated that Siddiq-Conlon is not representative of the Muslim population, such as editor of Muslimvillage.com Ahmed Kilani stating “He is rather considered by Australian Muslims to be a self-promoting media created phenomena that has no Islamic qualifications, zero credibility and no influence over the affairs of the Australian Muslim community. To use the Australian vernacular, he is a “Neville Nobody”. Nonetheless, Siddiq-Conlon’s statements may reverberate with fringe elements of the Islamic community.

Sheik Feiz Mohamed

Based in Sydney, Feiz Mohamed, of Lebanese background, was born in 1970 into a non-observant Muslim family. After going through a stage during his teen years of alcoholism and drug abuse, Mohamed studied many religions before becoming a devout fundamentalist Muslim. In the early 1990’s he travelled to Saudi Arabia and studied Islamic law at the University of Medina for four years, after which he returned to Sydney to found the Global Islamic Youth Centre. This centre has since expanded and is now part of a larger network of Salafi Islamic centres called the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah, currently headed by Mohamed’s former mentor Mohammad Omran.

Feiz Mohamed has been described as Australia’s most radical dangerous sheik, with few contenders claiming as many connections to Islamic extremists in the country. Mohamed’s extremist connections are abundant, including Australia’s first convicted terrorist Jack Roche, founders of Jemmah Islamiyah in Australia the Ayub brothers, and controversial Sheikh Mohammad Omran, among many others.

Mohamed’s teachings and statements are extremely controversial, such as comments that jihad is the pinnacle of Islam, Jews are pigs that will be killed at the end of the world, and that women that dress provocatively deserve to be raped. Among his shocking statements is the propagation of the idea that children should die for jihad, stating

85 Ibid, p3.
87 Ibid.
“We want to have children and offer them as soldiers defending Islam. Teach them this: there is nothing more beloved to me than wanting to die as a mujahid (holy warrior). Put in their soft, tender hearts the zeal of jihad and a love of martyrdom.”

Mohamed has been described as a potentially radicalising influence for Australian Muslims for many reasons, including his strong Australian accent coupled with fluent Arabic, Saudi Arabian education, and well-spoken delivery of his extremist views. His primary method of communication is through the internet, with hundreds of web sites containing his videos, Youtube videos of his lectures, and a Facebook fan page with nearly 10 000 ‘likes.’ With such a large following that perceives him as a credible source of information and able to preach to anyone with access to the internet, Feiz Mohamed presents a high possibility of radicalising fringe elements of the Australian Muslim community.

Sheikh Mohammed Omran and Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah

Mohammed Omran is the former head of the fundamentalist Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASJW) and has close connections to convicted terrorists, including the former head of Jemaah Islamiyah Abu Bakar Bashir and attempted Israeli embassy bomber Jack Roche. He has also been described by experts as at one stage being “Australia’s most controversial, and possibly most extreme, Muslim cleric.”

Born and raised in Jordan, Omran moved to Australia with his wife in 1985. In 1989, he founded the ASJW in Sydney, which some in the Islamic community have accused of attempting to recruit young, disaffected Muslims away from the mainstream. Experts claim that Omran is well connected to international Salafi circles, as evidenced by his hosting of al Qaeda member Abu Qatada in 1994 at his home on his visit to Australia.

There is also evidence that ASJW were at one stage connected to Jemaah Islamiyah. In 2001, Omran travelled to Indonesia, and whilst giving sermons and lectures in mosques and universities, met with head of JI Abu Bashir

89 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
frequently in his spare time. Moreover, Omran’s Sydney deputy Abdul Salam Zoud has also been found to have connections to Abu Bashir.95

Mass violence involving Australian Muslims

Riots in Australia caused by racial tensions have not historically been linked with any single group. One of the first incidents of race riots in Australia came during the gold rush. The 1860-1861 Lambing Flat Riots emerged as a result of tensions between white gold miners and Chinese immigrants, eventually culminating in an attack on the Chinese quarter of the settlement. Although the military restored order, six months after the initial attack, another, more severe riot broke out, killing and wounding many Chinese immigrants. The response from the NSW government was to pass the Chinese Immigration Act 1861, severely limiting the rate of Chinese immigration.96

Another incident of race riots came in 1942, between Australians and American soldiers. Known as the Battle of Brisbane, the two days of rioting between the allies had various causes. These causes included resentment and embarrassment by Australians over losing control of their own city, difference in pay between the two militaries, and most importantly, the treatment of Australian women by American soldiers.97 In the weeks leading up to the riots, one estimate claims that military police were breaking up an average of twenty fights per night in south Brisbane alone.98 A heavy military and civilian police presence quelled the violence after two days, during which dozens were injured, and one Australian private killed.99

Violent incidents such as these show that riots in Australia have not historically targeted any particular ethnicity or religion. Moreover, they are rarely caused solely by one event; rather, they are the culmination of prolonged tensions between different sectors in society over a broad period. The two case studies presented below are no different, in that the immediate causes of the riots are only one aspect, and that mass violence between two ethnic groups is representative of a deep divide in society.

95 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
2005 Cronulla Riots

The 2005 Cronulla Riots were a series of mob violence incidents between white Australians and Australians of Middle Eastern, predominately Lebanese, descent. In essence, the timeline of the 2005 Cronulla Riots are widely agreed upon; however the causes of the riots are not. The initial event that sparked the riots occurred on the 4th of December; however, it was not until a week later when, following much commentary from the media and politicians, the riots began.

On the 4th of December an altercation on Cronulla beach occurred between three volunteer surf lifesavers and four Lebanese-Australian young men, culminating in a fight that left one of the lifesavers unconscious. Over the course of the next week, national media outlets began fanning the flames. Rupert Murdoch’s Daily Telegraph deemed the event “the battle of the beach,” demanding a government crackdown on “middle eastern” hooligans. However, the tabloid newspapers’ incitement of violence was relatively small scale compared with the radio presenters. Steve Price of 2UE called for a “community show of force,” while Alan Jones infamously called Sydney’s Lebanese Muslims “vermin” who "infest our shores" and "rape" and "pillage” Australia. The latter resulted in a court case ruling that Jones would have to apologise on air for his remarks. On a similar level, NSW Premier Morris Iemma proposed increasing sentences for attacks on life savers to a maximum 25 years imprisonment, implying that the fray was caused by the Lebanese-Australians.

In the few days prior to the beginning of the riots, text messages began spreading on a mass scale organising violent demonstrations, with one example stating,

“Aussies: This Sunday every fucking Aussie in the shire, get down to North Cronulla to help support Leb and Wog bashing day. Bring your mates down and let's show them that this is our beach and their (sic) never welcome back.”

101 Scott Poynting, “What caused the Cronulla riot?” Race and Class, Published by Sage, No.48, 2006, p86.
104 N. Wilson, Cronulla riot a long time in the making, Herald Sun, 13/12/05.
NSW Police estimate that 270,000 of these messages were circulated. Messages such as these were published in newspapers, including the Daily Telegraph, detailing the location and time to meet.

On Sunday, 11th of December 2005, approximately five thousand young, Australian males of Anglo-Celtic background gathered at Cronulla beach for a rally to “reclaim the shire.” The alcohol fuelled crowd began chanting anti-Lebanese slogans, and despite a high police presence, began attacking anyone of Middle Eastern appearance. In this initial stage of the riot, estimates gauge approximately thirteen people were injured. That evening, between 100-150 young men of Middle Eastern appearance gathered in Maroubra, an area near Cronulla, and began vandalising cars and property in revenge, until police eventually gained control of the situation. The next day the media was awash with statements from politicians discussing whether the riots were caused by racism or were just alcohol fuelled hysteria.

On the evening of December 12th, approximately 3000 people gathered at Lakemba Mosque, and at 8:45 a convoy of approximately 70 cars left for Sydney’s western suburbs for revenge attacks. Throughout the night, reports indicate that up to 600 young men of Middle Eastern origin fired shots in the air, attacked women, and used weapons to vandalise property. Many were stabbed, and people with no connection to the riots were targeted and beaten. In the days after, NSW Parliament held an emergency session to grant emergency police powers not seen since the 2000 Sydney Olympics. With a dramatically increased police presence, the rioters were eventually subdued. Overall, 285 charges were laid against 104 people. Of these, 51 were involved in the initial confrontations, and 53 in the retaliatory attacks.

A theory presented by Scott Poynting suggests that the media had the greatest impact in causing the Cronulla Riots by inciting populist views against minorities. However, some have dismissed this theory for being overly simplistic in scapegoating the media into being an all-powerful machine that can control people’s actions at will. Another theory is that multiculturalism is a failed experiment, and that non Anglo-Celtic groups in Australia are not assimilated. This argument is completely invalid and without substance. Until these riots, Sydney, a city comprised of 58% first or second generation

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108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
immigrants and the seventh largest immigrant city in the world,\textsuperscript{113} has avoided any displays of mass racial violence. Other theories also cite inadequate police intelligence regarding the numbers attending the demonstrations, and the effect of alcohol combined with the December heat.

However, the most debated theory as to the cause of the Cronulla Riots is whether Australian’s are inherently racist. Media reports around the world described the event as representative of ethnic tensions in Australia, and authorities in Britain, Canada, and Indonesia warned their citizens in the area to take precaution against potential racist attacks.\textsuperscript{114} Australian authorities, however, attempted to quarantine Cronulla as a one off incident, with Prime Minister John Howard stating "I do not accept that there is underlying racism in this country."\textsuperscript{115} Nonetheless, it is widely regarded that these riots were the result of years of racial tensions between Lebanese-Australians and Anglo-Australians.

\textbf{2012 Sydney ‘Innocence of Muslims’ film protest}

In 2012 Muslims globally protested against a 13 minute YouTube video titled “Innocence of Muslims.” In Sydney on 15 September 2012, a planned protest against the film began at Sydney’s Town Hall, eventually making its way to the US consulate. Although the Sydney protests initially began as a peaceful demonstration against racism, the protests soon turned violent. As the estimated three hundred protestors descended on the US consulate, police pushed back the demonstrators, who eventually decided to gather in nearby Hyde Park.\textsuperscript{116} Members of the demonstration shouted chants of “down, down, USA,” and carried signs that said "Behead all those who insult the prophet."\textsuperscript{117} Reports indicate that notable extremist Muslims were on site during the protests, including al Qaeda sympathisers.\textsuperscript{118} Some protestors were also wearing shirts with the words “Sixth Pillar,” a reference to some Islamic teachings that jihad is an important tenet of Islam.\textsuperscript{119} Among those wearing this shirt was champion

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
boxer Ahmed Elomar, who was charged with beating an officer with a two metre pole.

After hours of violent demonstrations, police eventually dispersed the crowd, with the final tally resulting in six police officers and nineteen protestors injured, and nine protesters charged.\textsuperscript{120} Although authorities were fearful of reprise attacks\textsuperscript{121}, as was the case with the Cronulla Riots, no further mass protests were conducted. One reason for this is that police were well prepared to prevent revenge attacks, and were in strong numbers in the days and weeks after the protests. This included extra uniformed police outside the US consulate and increased monitoring of social media sites.\textsuperscript{122}

Muslim leaders were quick to denounce the actions of those present, with Australian National Imams Council Secretary Sheik Mohamadu Saleem stating that he would personally discourage those in his community from further unrest.\textsuperscript{123} In fact, both hard-line and moderate Islamic groups around Australia called for peace, contradicting the statements put out by the radical Islamic political group Hizb ut Tahrir. Hizb ut Tahrir accused the Australian government of using the protests as a way to oppress Muslims, and stated “The Australian government thus seeks to incite fear within the community, to break her noble rank by pitting some Muslims against others and to isolate and target the youth.”\textsuperscript{124} These comments drew criticism from many sides, including Lebanese Muslim Association spokesman Samier Dandan who referred to the group as “lunatics.”\textsuperscript{125}

**Attempted terrorist plots in Australia since 9/11**

In the decade since 9/11, there have been four major terrorist plots in Australia, all of which were foiled by authorities in their preliminary stages. Thirty seven of the thirty eight people prosecuted for these plots were Australian citizens or permanent residents, with twenty one of these people born in Australia. Many were Lebanese-Australians, a demographic that accounts for almost 9% of

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
Australian Muslims, the vast majority of which are estimated to adhere to Sunni Islam.\textsuperscript{126} Twenty two were convicted.

**Faheem Khalid Lodhi**

In 2004 Faheem Khalid Lodhi became the second person charged with, and ultimately the first person convicted of, terrorism offences in Australia. Born in Pakistan, Lodhi earned a degree in architecture before migrating to Australia in 1998.\textsuperscript{127} An ASIO raid on Lodhi’s home in October 2003 found incriminating documents, including recipes for explosives and poisons, maps and photographs of the national electricity grid and various defence bases, and DVD’s and CD’s of jihadist doctrine.\textsuperscript{128} The jury were not convinced of Lodhi’s defence that the documents were for various entrepreneurship abroad (including a venture to sell electrical generators in Pakistan and a company that exports chemicals), or that the maps and photographs of the sites were for his resume (Lodhi had previously worked at these locations). He was ultimately sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, including a 15 year non-parole period.

**The Benbrika Group - Operation Pendennis**

In November 2005, Abdul Benbrika (AKA Abu Bakr) and 16 others were arrested in Sydney and Melbourne under terrorism related offences. From July 2004 a joint taskforce, comprising of the AFP, ASIO, and Victoria Police, initially placed thirteen men, all Muslims living in Melbourne, under investigation. Soon after, nine were arrested in Sydney and eight in Melbourne, the majority of which were young Muslim men of Lebanese background. The taskforce, codenamed Operation Pendennis, was at the time the largest counter terrorism operation in Australian history. It involved 626 eight hour surveillance shifts by policing agencies and intelligence services, interception of 97 480 phone calls, as well as 26 gigabytes of internet traffic.\textsuperscript{129} Many of these phone calls exhibit the motives of the group, for example, the following exchange between 23 year old Abdulla Merhi and Benbrika:


Merhi: ‘If for example John Howard kills innocent family, Muslim... Do we, we will make transgress back to him? Do we have to kill him and his family or can we just kill his people like people at the football.’

Benbrika: ‘If they kill our kids we kill little kids.

Merhi: ‘The innocent ones?’

Benbrika: ‘The innocent ones. Because he kills our innocent ones.’

The Crown Prosecutor of the case, Richard Maidment stated in court that the men had aims that were “directed at violent jihad which has no respect for human life and embracing the notion that it's permitted, in certain circumstances, to kill innocent women and children.”

Although no distinct targets were planned, analysts consider that possibilities included Melbourne’s West Gate Bridge, Crown Casino and Australia’s biggest sports stadium the Melbourne Cricket Ground.

The charges laid against the spiritual leader of the group, Abdul Benbrika, was intentionally being the leader and a member of a terrorist organisation, with the resulting conviction giving him a 15 year prison sentence, including a non-parole period of 12 years. Although the defence of those charged was that they were simply attending meetings to practice the teachings of Islam, raids on the properties found bomb instruction manuals, videos of beheadings, and various Jihadi literature. Of those eventually charged, six of the defendants were found guilty, including Benbrika, and four were acquitted.

The Benbrika Cell is a perfect example of homegrown terrorism in Australia. The entire operation, from the formation of the group to its planning of targets was conveyed by the group themselves, not an overarching authority. Furthermore, the Benbrika Cell was similar to other cases of homegrown terrorism in other Western countries, in that the members heralded from an immigrant family background, indicating that they may have had difficulties adjusting to society. Similarly, they were not impoverished or oppressed, and were primarily motivated by political grievances, namely Australia’s commitment to the war in Iraq.


2005 Sydney Terrorist Plot

Five Australian Muslim men were discovered to have been plotting a terrorist attack on an unknown location in Sydney between July 2004 and November 2005. Their main motivation was stated to be Australia’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Khaled Cheikho, Moustafa Cheikho, Mohamed Ali Elomar, Abdul Rakib Hasan, and Mohammed Omar Jamal were arrested in South-West Sydney in 2005 and pled guilty to plotting a terrorist attack. Although there was no direct evidence linking the men to the terrorist plot, the home of the ringleader contained enough weapons and ammunition to keep firing for 37 hours. The jury listened to 18 hours of phone intercepts, watched 30 days of surveillance tapes, and heard from 300 witnesses, and after deliberating for 23 days (one of the longest deliberation periods in Australian legal history), found the accused guilty.

2009 Holsworthy Barracks Terror Plot- Operation Neath

The August 2009 Holsworthy Barracks Terror Plot was a foiled terrorist plan to attack Holsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney, home to Australia’s elite Parachute Battalion and Commando Regiment. The plan was to have a group of young Islamic men entering the compound and commit a mass shooting until they were either killed or captured. Of the five men originally charged, at the conclusion of the trial in December 2011, three were charged, each receiving 18 years imprisonment.

The three convicted men, Wissam Fattal (Lebanese-Australian), Saney Edow Aweys (Lebanese-Australian) and Nayef el-Sayed (Somali-Australian), conducted reconnaissance of Holsworthy Barracks, located the weapons that were to be used, and requested permission for the attack from senior religious leaders in Somalia. According to transcripts of an intercepted phone call involving would-be attacker Aweys, the plan was to forcibly enter the army base, and “fan out as much as they could until they would be hit...Six of them once they enter inside the place for 10 minutes, the specified place, for about 20 minutes to 30 minutes

135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
until they will use up their weapons.” This approach is highly similar to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which suicide attackers fired as many shots as possible until they were killed in action.

The discovery of the terrorist plot was initially discovered by Australian security agencies when Fattal, one of the plotters who was already under investigation for championing radical views at his mosque in Melbourne’s north late 2008, called Aweys and requested assistance to travel to Somalia. Consequently, Operation Neath was initiated, jointly run by ASIO, the AFP and Victorian Police, consisted of approximately 150 police, intelligence operatives, and officials.139

This plot is notable for the involvement of the Somali terrorist organisation al-Shabab, which has not committed any attacks in the West.140 In recent years, al-Shabab has come to the attention of the international community due to a recent merger between the group and al-Qaeda in February 2012.141 The Holsworthy Barracks Terror Plot was estranged from al-Shabab’s *modus operandi*, which typically involved suicide bombings and targeted killings of opponents,142 however it is important to note that the plot was not instigated or directed by al-Shabab.143 Furthermore, some analysts believe that al-Shabab’s relation to this plot does not necessarily mean a change in the group’s profile, and may not be seeking to source Western targets.144 Al-Shabab has been officially listed as a terrorist organisation in Australia since 22 August, 2009.145

**Jack Roche**

In 2004 Jack Roche was convicted of terrorism offences for conspiring to blow up the Israeli embassy in Canberra.146 Roche converted to Islam in 1992, and by the mid 1990’s was acting as the unofficial translator of JI.147 In 2000 he met

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142 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
with JI’s chief of operations Hambali, the mastermind of the Bali Bombings, and from there travelled to Afghanistan to meet with Osama bin Laden’s military commander Mohammed Atef. At this meeting, Roche agreed with Atef that he would attempt to recruit other Australians to join a cell to carry out terrorist attacks in Australia, with targets including the Israeli embassy and Australian Jewish mining magnate Joe Gutnick.148 Roche also wrote in his travel diary that Hambali had suggested "the possibility to do something in Sydney during the Olympic Games."149 The entire conspiracy between Roche and al Qaeda occurred between the 15th of February and the 30th of September 2000. Roche was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for the Israeli embassy plot, of which he served four and half years before his release in 2007.

148 Ibid.
Government Responses to Terrorism

Definitions of terrorism

Foremost, there is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism, or what constitutes a terrorist action. However, many counter-terrorism experts have proposed their own definitions of terrorism that may help to allow for easier international action and academic research. Dr Boaz Ganor posits a proposed definition of terrorism that states,

"Terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims."\(^{50}\)

The Australian government has legally defined terrorism to be,

"An action or threat of action where the action causes certain defined forms of harm or interference and the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause."\(^{51}\)

More specifically, The Criminal Code Act 1995 stipulates that the threat must be made with the intention of,

i. coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or

ii. intimidating the public or a section of the public;

and where the action

(a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or

(b) causes serious damage to property; or

(c) causes a person's death; or

(d) endangers a person's life, other than the life of the person taking the action; or

(e) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or

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(f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system including, but not limited to: (i) an information system; or (ii) a telecommunications system; or (iii) a financial system; or (iv) a system used for the delivery of essential government services; or (v) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility; or (vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system.\textsuperscript{152}

Furthermore, under Australian law it is also a terrorist offence to provide or receive training associated with terrorism, collect or distribute information that will contribute to a terrorist act, or any assistance in preparing a terrorist act. The penalty for these offences ranges from ten years to life imprisonment. For engaging in a terrorist act the penalty is life imprisonment.

**Proscribed terrorist organisations**

Following 9/11, the Australian government introduced the *Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act of 2002*. These new laws had four facets:

- Defined ‘terrorist’ act.
- Criminalised acts supporting the planning and committing of a terrorist act.
- Criminalised involvement with a terrorist organisation.
- Gave the Attorney-General the power to ban a terrorist organisation.

Regarding the final point, since 2004, the government is held unaccountable in its decisions to initially proscribe terrorist organisations.\textsuperscript{153} As of 2009, Australia now has an independent reviewer of terrorism laws, however, it has been criticised for only being able to react to new legislation, rather than give input during the policy making process.\textsuperscript{154} Although the list of banned terrorist organisations is made public,\textsuperscript{155} the Attorney-General has the final say on the list. The Australian Human Rights Commission argue that the current arrangement for proscribing terrorist organisations in Australia is undemocratic, with too few opportunities for groups to oppose the designation coupled with little chance of an independent review.\textsuperscript{156}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{152}{Ibid.}
\footnote{153}{Lynch and Williams, *What price security?*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2006, p22.}
\end{footnotes}
All seventeen of the banned terrorist organisations are Islamic.\textsuperscript{157} The full list includes:

- Al-Qa'idah (AQ) - Listed 21 October 2002, re-listed 1 September 2004, 26 August 2006, 8 August 2008 and 22 July 2010
- Al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - Listed 26 November 2010
- Al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) (formerly listed as Al-Zarqawi and TQJBR) - Listed 2 March 2005, re-listed 17 February 2007, 1 November 2008 and 29 October 2010
- Al-Shabaab - Listed 22 August 2009 and 18 August 2012
- Jamiat ul-Ansar (formerly known as Harakat Ul-Mujahideen) - Listed 14 November 2002, re-listed 5 November 2004, 3 November 2006, 1 November 2008 and 29 October 2010

Critics argue that the options available to a proscribed organisation in removing this label are very limited. Once an organisation has been listed as a terrorist group, representatives of that group may lobby the Parliamentary Joint

Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS). If PJCIS deem their case valid, they may review the organisation and provide a recommendation to Parliament.\(^{158}\) Another option in reviewing the labelling as a terrorist organisation is through the use of the judiciary. Under the *Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977*, section 75(v) of the Constitution and section 39B of the *Judiciary Act 1903*, the court may dismiss the proscription if it is ruled that the Minister’s decision was not made “on the basis of logically probative evidence.”\(^{159}\)

Similarly, although criminalising involvement with terrorist organisations is understandable, critics also argue that the laws are written in such a broad context that they could be used to prosecute for less serious offences.\(^{160}\) Guilt by association breaks fundamental rights implied in the Australian constitution,\(^{161}\) namely, communication on political matters should remain free. Although the Security Legislation Review Committee recommended to the Attorney-General to define more clearly what is meant by “involvement” and “association,”\(^{162}\) these recommendations were rejected.

## Government Efforts

Contemporary Australian government efforts in fighting radicalisation and terrorism began in 1978, following an attack on the Hilton Hotel in Sydney, during a meeting of Commonwealth heads of government. The targets were Indian officials attending the CHOGM meeting, and resulted in Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser to create a committee that would combine all federal and state government agencies that were tasked with responding to threats or acts of politically motivated violence.\(^{163}\) The following year, the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth and State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) provided the basis for counter terrorism cooperation in the years to follow.

\(^{158}\) Attorney General’s Department, *Protocol: Listing terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code*, Commonwealth of Australia,  

\(^{159}\) Ibid.


\(^{163}\) Australian National Security, *What governments are doing: National Counter-Terrorism Committee*, Commonwealth of Australia,  
Last updated: 10/10/12, Accessed: 21/03/13.
Following 9/11 the Australian government realised the need for a modernised version of a counter terrorism committee. However it was not until after the Bali Bombings in Indonesia, that killed 88 Australians and shocked the country, that the National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC) was established. In 2002, the Prime Minister, Premiers, and Chief Ministers each signed the Inter-Governmental Agreement that would allow for enhanced communication between the states and territories, as well as New Zealand senior officials.

The federal government is represented by Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Attorney-General’s Department, the Department of Transport and Regional Services, the Australian Federal Police, ASIO, the Department of Defence, the Department of Finance and Administration, Emergency Management Australia and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, whilst the state and territory governments are represented by senior officials of the Premiers’ and Chief Ministers’ departments, and deputy police commissioners.164

The NCTC have set out Australia’s strategic method of combating terrorism, divided into four sections; Preparedness, Prevention, Response, Recovery.165

1. Preparedness

Ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to help to prevent, or deal with the impact of, a terrorist attack. A major point of preparedness is administering roles and responsibilities between various stakeholders.

The Commonwealth Government is responsible for specified criteria, including:

- Leading the coordination of intelligence.
- Responsible for whole of government coordination of cyber security.
- Determining policy and strategy in the event of a national terrorist situation.

The State and Territory Governments are responsible for specified criteria, including:

- Operational response to a terrorist incident in their jurisdiction.
- Maintenance of counter-terrorism policies, legislation, and plans within their jurisdiction.
- In the event of a national terrorist incident, contributing to the national strategy.

164 Ibid.
Since its inception in 2003, the National Terrorism Public Alert System has been consistently at the “Medium” level. Australian governments are able to change the alert level for one or more impacted communities, locations, or sectors, as opposed to a “one in, all in” approach.

2. Prevention

Measures taken to avert or lessen a terrorist attack. This stage is primarily concerned with the analysis, collection, and dissemination of intelligence, investigations by security agencies, implementation of strategies, and disruption of terrorist attacks.

Counter Terrorism Control Centre (CTCC)

- Located within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Australia’s domestic intelligence agency), the CTCC is the key commonwealth body for counter-terrorism intelligence. It sets and manages whole of government counter-terrorism priorities and identifies intelligence requirements.

National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC)

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Provides a senior mechanism for whole of government intelligence coordination across the Australian intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. The following agencies are members of the NICC:

- Attorney-General's Department
- Australian Crime Commission
- Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
- Australian Federal Police
- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
- Australian Secret Intelligence Service
- Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation
- Defence Signals Directorate
- Department of Defence
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Department of Immigration and Citizenship
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
- Office of National Assessments

National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC)
- Located within ASIO, the NTAC prepares assessments on the likelihood of terrorism in Australia and against Australians abroad.

Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams (JCTT)
- Established in each state and territory, JCTT comprise of local police forces, the Australian Federal Police, and ASIO.

3. Response

Actions taken in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident to diminish possibility of death and/or injury. This stage is primarily focused on dealing with current dangerous situations and the prevention of escalation.

Operational Response
- Police and emergency services will be the first responders to a terrorist incident. Once the incident is reasonably suspected to be a terrorist attack, the police will assume control and notify the Crisis Control Centre. A Joint Intelligence Group will be established by the affected State/Territory. Correspondingly, an inquiry will be led by a Senior Investigative Officer, who will coordinate all aspects of the investigation.
• Although Australia’s policy is to negotiate in order to minimise loss of life, “Australia will not make concessions in response to terrorist demands.”
• In extreme circumstances, the Australian Defence Forces may be called upon to assist civil authorities in the event of a terrorist attack.

4. Recovery

Supporting affected communities following a terrorist incident with the restoration of physical infrastructure, as well as psychological well-being, economic stability, and social cohesion.

• Existing frameworks for emergency relief may be used in the event of a terrorist incident; however, the government may alter this in regards to the individual situation.

Commonwealth Level Recovery

• The Attorney General’s Department will develop policy and coordinate recovery at the commonwealth level, as well as oversee the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Arrangements.

State/Territory Recovery

• Recovery coordination will typically replicate procedures applied to other emergency responses.

Local Community Recovery

• Where recovery services are administered on a regional basis, local governments will coordinate and administer recovery operations.

Community Groups

The federal government also works indirectly with community groups by funding programs that examine the radicalisation process. The Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation (BIRR) Initiative is a community project located in south-west Sydney that is funded by the Department of Immigration. BIRR targets Muslim youth at high risk of influence from extremist ideology, and offers a counter narrative. BIRR states that,

"With leadership development being the cornerstone of the BIRR Initiative, our objective is to equip youth with the knowledge and skills – as derived from Islamic values and virtues – necessary to resist the
negative influences of social disengagement that lead to extremist views and criminal behaviour."\textsuperscript{167}

Using a team of predominately Muslim researchers, the BIRR Initiative gathered data from approximately 210 Muslim participants from various backgrounds. The overall aim of the project was to examine the operations of extremist groups in the Muslim community, and to provide a counter-narrative for Muslim youths at risk of radicalisation.\textsuperscript{168} The findings of the research team concluded that factors among at-risk youth that could potentially lead to radicalisation include perceptions of justice, a sense of persecution, a feeling of rejection by the community (either Australian or Muslim), and difficulties integrating being Muslim and Australian. The research also found that these factors themselves do not by themselves lead to extremism; rather, they are factors that may make at-risk youth vulnerable to extremist ideologies.\textsuperscript{169}


\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, p16.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid, p14.
Conclusion

There have been no successful terrorist attacks in Australia in the post 9/11 world. All four of the planned Islamist attacks in Australia since 9/11 have been disrupted and foiled in their preliminary stages. Nonetheless, the research presented has attempted to show that there are still many potential sources of radicalisation within the Australian Muslim community, which could potentially lead to future incidents of violence. The intent of this research was to also demonstrate the broad spectrum of the Islamic community in Australia, including many Muslim leaders that denounce terrorism and political violence. As stated earlier, the Muslim population of Australia is expected to rise by 80% in the next twenty years to 700 000, compared to a non-Muslim population increase of 18%. As these statistics show, it is imperative to address the issue of Islamic radicalisation so as to prevent further attacks.

The four planned Islamist attacks were self-starting plots, with no direct links to al Qaeda; rather, they were inspired by al Qaeda, as opposed to being directed by them. These findings suggest that Australian counter terrorism efforts would be more valuable if they were to focus primarily on homegrown terrorism. Former Prime Minister John Howard agrees with this sentiment, stating “The idea that terrorists are people that are flown in from another country to do their wicked deeds and then flown out is completely altered.” This is in keeping with the current Australian counter terrorism strategy (Preparedness, Prevention, Respond, Recovery), which strongly emphasises the importance of prevention.

Australian Islamic radicals are typical of the archetype of Jihadists in other developed countries, in that they are typically young men that are citizens, or long term residents. 60% of those arrested on terrorism charges were of Lebanese origin, leading some analysts to believe that they are overrepresented in Australian terrorism statistics. However, considering that one third of Australian Muslims identify their heritage as Lebanese, as well as being the birthplace of 9% of Australian Muslims, this statistic is understandable. Moreover, there is a strong trend of extremists having not been particularly religious prior to their radicalisation. Many of the examined radicals became more entrenched in Islam later in life (late teenage years to early twenties), or converted to Islam at this age. The case study of the radical group headed by Abdul Benbrika contained all of these elements.

Analysts have also claimed that the ongoing civil war in Syria may potentially create conflict in Australia. As the report mentioned, most recent estimates place

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approximately two hundred Australian fighters in Syria. Upon their return to Australia, these fighters may present a potentially radicalising influence. Furthermore, analysts also posit that if al Qaeda, or a like-minded group, were to take power in Syria, this could also pose a threat to Australia as a result of the high number of Lebanese Australians.\(^{173}\) For these reasons, it is understandable that ASIO will continue to monitor these returned fighters, as well as any contacts and associates of theirs.

One method of preventing Islamic radicalisation is by boosting levels of Muslim political participation through greater resources and education for political lobby groups. As the statistics presented earlier in the report demonstrate, areas that have a high number of Muslims also have a disproportionately high number of invalid votes. In the past, groups such as the Islamic Council of Victoria have hosted events “Advocacy and Lobbying Workshops” to “help strengthen the capacity of Muslim young people to advocate for positive change in the community.”\(^{174}\) This workshop, run by The Change Agency, and others like it, could serve as a powerful tool to promote peaceful activism and prevent future radicalism.

Australia remains at risk. Having been mentioned specifically in speeches by Osama bin Laden and other prominent Islamic terrorists, as well as featuring on the cover page of the al Qaeda magazine \textit{Inspire} on two occasions, there is still a very high chance of an attack on Australia by extremists. In particular, Islamic groups operating in Australia that propagate violence and racism, namely Hizbut-Tahrir, also raise the chances of a homegrown terrorist attack. Nonetheless, Australia’s intelligence, policing, and security services have done a remarkable job in preventing an attack in Australia in the post 9/11 world. Likewise, government policies that have attempted to open up dialogue with the Muslim community have also served as a powerful anti-radicalisation tool. Thus, Australia is in a position that requires constant vigilance. This is captured perfectly in Australia’s first national anti-terrorism campaign, which despite having been launched over a decade ago, it’s original catchphrase of “Be alert, not alarmed,” will likely remain applicable for many years to come.

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Appendix

Government organisations
AGD- Attorney-General's Department
ACC- Australian Crime Commission
AFP- Australian Federal Police
ASIO- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ASIS- Australian Secret Intelligence Service
DFAT- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Australian states and territories
ACT- Australian Capital Territory
NSW- New South Wales
NT- Northern Territory
QLD- Queensland
TAS- Tasmania
VIC- Victoria
WA- Western Australia

CTCC- Counter Terrorism Control Centre
NICC- National Intelligence Coordination Committee
NTAC- National Threat Assessment Centre
JCTT- Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams