ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the process of radicalization amongst British Muslims in the United Kingdom. It begins with a review of the Muslim population, demographics and community structure. Further presenting several internal and external indicators that influenced and led to radicalization of Muslim youth in Britain. The paper concludes that there is no one certainty for what causes radicalization amongst Muslims in United Kingdom. However, it is certain that Islamic radicalization and the emergence of a homegrown threat is a growing trend that jeopardizes the countries security, peace and stability. Radicalization in the United Kingdom is an existing concern that needs to be addressed and acted upon immediately. Misunderstanding or underestimating the threat may lead to further and long term consequences.
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I. Introduction

The September 11th 2001 terrorist attack on American soil triggered an international discussion regarding terrorism as a new global security threat. As a result of the attack many countries adopted new domestic and international counter-terrorism laws and raised concerns regarding the Muslim presence in the United States and Europe. Before 9/11, the United Kingdom was not on major alert regarding possible terrorist attacks nor was it focused on the issue of Islamic radicalization until the 7 July 2005 bombings in London. The attack had not only an enormous impact on the country’s perception of domestic security, but further influenced the continuation of the rise of radicalization amongst the British Muslim community. There is no one reason or explanation for why certain individuals are prone to radicalization. However, the fundamental factor in the recruitment and radicalization process is the organizations ideology and the individual’s belief that violence is the legitimate tool towards solving problems. Islamic ideologies create security risks and cause tensions between communities. Radical Islam is widely considered to be in conflict with democratic principles and has largely overtaken British traditional values by imposing its own. Organizations and individuals responsible for radicalization only became apparent and emerged into the public domain after the 7/7 attacks. The attack caused psychological distress to UK citizens. For the officials, the problem of domestic radicalization as primary trigger of terrorism became evident. It is equally important to mention that despite the homegrown Islamic terror threat and growing radicalization in the United Kingdom, the majority of British Muslims are upstanding citizens, who feel a part of the British community and oppose terrorist attacks.

The following paper examines the radicalization and rise of Islamic extremism amongst a significant number of British Muslims, whose extreme vision of Islam has led to their disintegration and isolation from British society. Although the United Kingdom is comprised of four different nations – England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland – the primary focus of this paper is on England, where the main radicalization takes place. The first part of the paper presents an overview of the history and structure of the Muslim population and approach of British society towards the Muslim community. The second part focuses on radical social organizations that engage or support terrorist activities and furthermore, on the internal aspects of the Muslim community, which play an important role in Muslim radicalization. The third section details the radicalization process and examines radical groups, movements and leaders in the United Kingdom, as well as the international sources influencing the radicalization of Muslim society. The forth part presents case studies of Islamic terrorist activity and plots in Britain over the last twelve
years. The fifth section describes the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism steps over the past several years. The final section concludes the paper by evaluating the implications of the main findings.

II. Background

History of the Muslim Community in the UK

Muslim presence in the United Kingdom (UK) is not a new phenomenon. It dates back more than one hundred years back and has deep roots in British history. However, there is little awareness amongst today’s population that Muslims are not foreigners in British society. They influenced the growth of Britain and contributed to the country’s growth and reconstruction of after World War II.

The first interaction between the British and Muslims dates back to the eighth century and the trade links between Mercia, Islamic Spain and Portugal. Former Christian territories gradually became influenced by the Islamic world in the tenth century. This influenced the expanding perception of Muslims as spiritually deviant and anti-Christian, which led to religious sanctions and further to military and material Crusades against such influence. Intermarriages were known to have taken place between Muslims and non-Muslim Britons during the Crusades. The first Muslims to arrive to England’s shores were mainly North Africans and Turks. As a result of British colonization of Muslim territories in the 1800s, many Africans, South Asians and Middle Easterners resided in Britain. Although the Lebanese arrived in the 1860s, the first large groups of Muslims to arrive, settle and form one of the country’s first Muslim communities were the Yemeni sailors in the late 1800s to areas such as Cardiff, South Shields and Liverpool. They settled in British port towns and through the years became part of the immigrant labor force in industrial cities. Furthermore, they established the first Islamic schools and the first mosques, which had commercial and mercantile interests, and printed the first British Muslim-Arabic newspaper in Western Europe, Al Salam from the Nur al-Islam Mosque. The first mosque created in the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland was Masjid-e-Abu-Harairah in Cardiff in the year 1860; the second was the 1889 Shah Jahan Mosque in Woking. During the nineteenth century, many Brits converted to Islam. The most prominent and early British Muslim convert was solicitor William Henry

2 H. A. Hellyer, Muslims of Europe. The 'Other' Europeans, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 145
4 H. A. Hellyer, Muslims of Europe. The 'Other' Europeans, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 148
5 Ibid., p. 148
6 Fred Halliday, Britain’s First Muslims. Portrait of an Arab Community, I.B. Tauris, 2010, p. x
7 Stefano Allievi, Why a solution has become a problem, Alliance Publishing Trust in NEF Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe, 2010, p.18
Quilliam, who was directly connected to the emergence of the Muslim community in Liverpool. He helped build the first mosque, Islamic center and orphanage in Liverpool where Christian orphans were raised as Muslims. The arrival of Abdullah Ali al-Hakimi to South Shields brought the practice of Islam into the streets and public consciousness. Even though at this time the Muslim community was still small, it had an immense number of supporters and grew through local converts, many of whom were well known in their communities and part of the expanding Yemeni population. With the British Empire’s rule ending in South Asia, sections of India were divided and Pakistan was created in 1947. The partition caused ongoing fights and consequently many Muslims from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh arrived to Britain in search of a better life. As a result of World War II, Britain faced a shortage of labor due to deaths and the immigration of its citizens. In order to restore and stabilize the economy, the British government encouraged migration and advertised jobs in its former colonies, mainly the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean. The legislations of 1948, which altered the status of all colonial British migrants into citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, stated their right to enter, and entitled them to social, political and economic advantages.

Between 1940 and 1960, what is known as the “golden era” of Muslim migration, those from East Africa and South Asia dominated the immigration to Britain. The rising number of immigrants resulted in the government’s legislative measures and unrestricted immigration ended with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act on 30 June 1962, which outlined the conditions for entry into Britain. During the 1970s and 1980s, Arab migration expanded from North Africa and it is estimated that half a million people of Arab descent were living in the UK. As a result, further restrictions were taken by the government, which bought immigration to a stop. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s – due to political unrest, social challenges and economic hardship in the Middle East and Africa – Britain has accepted Muslim refugees and asylum seekers. The liberal political asylum policy (the Covenant of Security) guaranteed freedoms that British authorities claimed were denied to the Islamic migrants – many of whom were convicted for crimes in their

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18 The Covenant of Security was an operation between radical Islamists in Britain and the security services. “It longstanding British habit of providing refuge and welfare to Islamist extremists on the unspoken assumption that if we give them a safe haven here they will not attack on these shores”. Mark Curtis, *Secret Affairs: Britain’s collusion with Radical Islam*, Profile Books, London, 2010, p. 257
native countries – who faced torture or death sentences in their countries. The British government’s stance and guarantee of not being extradited proved to be the ideal opportunity for Islamic extremists who freely preached their hate, plotted attacks and called to kill innocent people in other countries. Amongst radicals who have been granted asylum despite major convictions were: Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza al-Masri, Omar Bakri Muammad.\(^{19}\)

Several phases of migration to the UK resulted in a visible growth of Muslims currently living in Britain and increased the number of mosques, religious centers and Muslim communities.

The Population

As of mid-2010 the official total of the resident population in the UK was estimated to be 62.3 million\(^{20}\) of which 2.9 million were Muslims - an equivalent of 4.6% of the whole UK population.\(^{21}\) Within the population of 62.3 million there were 52,234,000 in England; 3,006,000 in Wales, 5,333,000 in Scotland and 1,799,000 in Northern Ireland.\(^{22}\) According to the Pew Research Foundation, Britain has the third largest Muslim community in Europe, after Germany (4.1million) and France (4.7 million) and there are more Muslims in Britain than there are in Lebanon.\(^{23}\) Over a decade, there has been an increase of 74% of Muslims in Britain based on the previous figure of 1.6 million from the UK 2001 census.\(^{24}\)\(^{25}\) It is estimated that by 2030, with the current rate of expansion, the size of the Muslim population will increase to 5.6 million.\(^{26}\) However, the census may not have recorded the precise figures as statistics exclude unreported illegal Islamic immigrants and converts to Islam. Although British citizens by law are obligated to complete the census, the question regarding religious affiliation is voluntary. Furthermore, the census data did


\(^{24}\) It is important to take into consideration the fact that at the time of writing this paper the Office for National Statistics had released only partial publications of the 2001 census. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that data provided based on the 2001 census regarding the United Kingdom is subject to change and facts provided throughout the paper are a combination of information from various years and surveys.


not differentiate between whether a person converted to a new faith or was born into it. According to scholar Sophie Gilliat-Ray, the increase in the Muslim population maybe a result of several attributes: recent immigration, growing birth rate, some conversion to Islam, and increased willingness to self-identify as “Muslim” on account of the “war on terror.”

Geographical Concentration of Muslims

Muslim immigration to the UK is geographically diverse and includes immigrants from various countries. The largest British Muslim communities are found in the metropolitan/industrial areas offering better opportunities for employment. The Muslim capital of the UK is London, which has served as a center of immigration and a safe-haven for refugees from all over the world since the nineteenth century. Furthermore, Muslims and other faith communities are located in the East and West Midlands, Eastern Lancashire, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire. The Muslim population of London remains highly diverse. However in northern England, the Muslim community mainly consists of Pakistanis with a smaller population of Indian and Bangladeshi. Table 1 presents Muslim geographical concentration in the UK based on the 2001 Census. Graph 1 shows information regarding the concentration of Muslims in England’s regions in 2001.

Table 1: Muslim Geographical Concentration in the UK based on 2001 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Principal Cities</th>
<th>Muslim Population</th>
<th>% Muslim Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENGLAND (EN)</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>607,083</td>
<td>38.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>140,033</td>
<td>8.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>75,188</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>35,806</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Oldham</td>
<td>24,039</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>23,819</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>21,394</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Rochdale</td>
<td>19,248</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Bolton</td>
<td>18,444</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Coventry</td>
<td>11,686</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALES</td>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>11,261</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>6,759</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Bury</td>
<td>6,756</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>5,945</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Ibid.
31 Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale, Muslims in Britain. Race, place and identities, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 8
As demonstrated in Table 1, London holds the biggest Muslim population in the United Kingdom. Birmingham is the biggest city with the largest Muslim population outside of London.

**Graph 1: Distribution of the Muslim population by English Government Region, 2001 Census**

As shown in Graph 1, people with Muslim backgrounds in 2001 were mostly concentrated in London with nearly 40% (607,083 of whole London population and dispersed within the other regions from 1.5-14 percent). Despite the figures, Muslims contribute a smaller percentage across regions in comparison to Christianity, which continues to dominate in the UK. Table 2 shows the allocation of the highest numbers of Muslim population in Local Authority Districts in which the highest percentage of Muslims remained in two London boroughs Tower of Hamlets (36%) and Newham (24%).

**Table 2: Highest Muslim Population in Local Authority Districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local authority districts</th>
<th>Muslim population</th>
<th>% of Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luton</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Ibid.
Birmingham 140,000 14%
Hackney 28,000 14%
Pendle 12,000 13%
Slough 16,000 13%
Brent 32,000 12%
Redbridge 29,000 12%
Westminster 21,000 12%
Camden 23,000 12%
Haringey 24,000 11%

**Ethnic Background**

The United Kingdom is characterized as a diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. The Muslims who have settled in Britain are less ethnically homogeneous than any other of the UK minorities.\(^{35}\) The majority of today’s UK Muslims are from the Indian Subcontinent (Pakistan (43%); India (9%); Bangladesh (17%)).\(^ {36}\) Up to 12% were White Muslims (recent converts or descendants of fairly recent converts), 6% other Asian, 7% of Black African origin (61.9% African born Muslims were from south and east Africa, especially Somali, Nigerian, and other North and West African countries), 4% “Other” ethnic groups and 4% had one white parent. Other included Turkish Cypriots, other Turks, Bosnian, Kosovan, former Yugoslav refugees, North African and Middle Easterners.\(^ {37}\) According to Gilliat-Ray at least 50% of the current British Muslim population was born in the UK and a large majority, regardless of their country of origin hold British citizenship.\(^ {38}\)

In 2007, the England and Wales Citizenship Survey data released information regarding the percentages of British National Identity by Ethnicity, as seen in Table 3.

**Table 3: Percentages reporting a British National Identity by Ethnicity**\(^ {39}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>UK-born</th>
<th>Foreign-born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{36}\) Sophie Gilliat-Ray and Jonathan Birt, A mosque too far? Islam and the limits of British multiculturalism, in Stefano Allievi, Why a solution has become a problem; Alliance Publishing Trust in NEF Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe, 2010, p.135


As shown in Table 3, all white Brits reported their national identity to be British. However, the percentages are lower for those from ethnic minorities. One must note that in general foreign-born individuals are less likely than UK-born individuals to identify themselves, as British and minorities are more likely to be foreign-born. There are very little differences between whites and non-whites for the UK-born, and despite differences, the overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistanis and Bangladeshis do not stand out as having much lower levels of British national identity.  

Age estimate

British Muslims are unique in terms of age distribution in comparison with the rest of the UK population. They are demographically young and are the most quickly expanding religion in England. The UK census in 2001 showed that 34% of Muslims were under the age 16 and less than one in ten was aged 65 or older. Table 4 presents the age distribution amongst the three biggest minorities in the UK.

Table 4: Distribution of age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-14 years</th>
<th>15-29 years</th>
<th>30-44 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2002 data by the UK Office of National Statistics demonstrated that one third of the Bangladeshi Muslim population was under 16, presenting the highest proportion for any age group. The birth rate among Muslim immigrants in Britain was far higher than amongst white Brits. In 2003, 33.8% of Muslims were aged 0-15 years (national average was 20.2%); 18.2% was aged 16-24 (national average was 10.9%). The 2001 Census indicated that men, to some extent, outnumbered women by a ratio of 48% to 52%, but among younger Muslims, there was a more equal proportion of male and female. Approximately half of the Muslims in Britain were born in

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44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
the UK, but regardless of their birthplace, the vast majority of British Muslims held UK citizenship.46

**Occupation & Socio-economic Conditions**

The Muslim community is more likely than other minorities to be disadvantaged based on the following factors: high levels of male unemployment, low levels of qualification (percentage of working in blue-collar occupations is high), low home ownership, large families, higher percentage in social housing, incidence of over-crowding and high percentage of residence in deprived localities.47

Ethnic and national communities, which are of Muslim faith, are among the most deprived groups in Britain.48 Levels of unemployment among British Muslims vary. Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities that make up 90% of Muslims were the poorest groups in the country and had the highest levels of unemployment in comparison to British Muslims of Indian descent.49

The Muslim Council of Britain included the following information on its site: 37% of Bangladeshi Muslims are from London’s poorest borough – Tower Hamlets. Pakistani and Bangladeshi men earn £150 per week less than white men, while the difference is significantly less for other ethnic minorities. They are three times more likely to be unemployed than Hindus and Indian Muslims. Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than Caucasians and nearly three times more likely to be in low-paying jobs.50 In 2004, 13% of Muslim men in Britain were unemployed, which was over three times the rate for Christian men (4%).51

Nearly 28% of Muslims aged 16-24 were unemployed compared to 11% for Christian males from the same age group.52 In 2001 over 11% of Muslims over the age of 25 were unemployed.53 The 2004 Annual Population Survey, the Office for National Statistics in Britain further concluded that “men and women of working age from the Muslim faith are...more likely than other groups in Great Britain to be economically inactive, that is, not available for work and/or not actively seeking

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48 H. A. Hellyer, Muslims of Europe. The ‘Other’ Europeans, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, pp. 154-155


52 ibid.

work.” Muslim women in the UK, as a result of religious beliefs, represent a low number in the official workforce: less than 30% aged 25+ were economically active compared with 60% for all women that age of which many were involved in low paid home working (example: Bangladeshi women from Tower Hamlets working in the clothing industry). Evidently, the strong attitude and sense of importance towards family changes women’s and men’s perception of work. Pakistani men are expected to support the family whereas women are perceived as caregivers and reproducers. Many women have a strong belief that parenting is the main responsibility and personal career expectations are second priority. In 2004, 33% of working-age Muslims had no qualifications (highest amongst all religious groups) and 12% were least likely to have degrees or equivalent qualifications. The same year, one-fifth of Muslims were self-employed, 37% of Muslim men and a quarter of Muslim women were working in the distribution, hotel and restaurant industry. Between 16-20% of Muslim women worked in sales and customer service jobs. One in seven men worked in the transport and communication industry, less than a third worked in managerial or professional occupations, and almost one in ten worked as a taxi driver or chauffeur in 2004. As revealed by the 2001 census, Muslims in the UK are disproportionately likely to live in poor quality accommodations with the highest percentage of overcrowding in comparison with other religious groups. Fifty-one percent of Muslim households in the UK were home owners (of which two thirds were likely to own their home with a loan or mortgage) compared with 69% of households nationally. Surveys further revealed that Muslims had the highest disability rates, with 24% of men and 21% of women claiming a disability and therefore not actively seeking employment due to illness. The majority of Muslims in Britain speak English. However, as a result of the community’s enormous ethnic and cultural diversity, Muslims speak Urdu, Bengali,
Arabic, Turkish and Somali. Subsequently, a relative number working and living in enclosed communities do not require English.

Religious and Cultural Aspects

Defining Islam and what it means to be a British Muslim based primarily on the basis of observations of a Muslim community does not provide a fully accurate description as to the existing diversity within and outside Muslim communities. Nevertheless, as stated by Gilliat-Ray, British Muslims should be defined as a social group, based on a generally shared set of core religious beliefs. Although the majority of Muslims in Britain share a common religious identity, their faith is shaped by their ethnic or national origins.

The UK welcomed Muslim immigrants and the practice of Islam in Britain was legalized by the Trinitarian Act 1812. The first generations arriving in the 50s and 60s followed, and they obtained the designation of prayer facilities in the work place, public broadcasting of their call for prayer, time off for Muslims to enjoy their holiday, and provision of halal food in public institutions. The first and second generation of Muslim immigrants became familiar with British life and focused their political interests on British society and institutions more than their countries of origin. With the abolishment of the Blasphemy law (whose purpose was to protect the beliefs of the Church of England) by the Act of Parliament in 2008, the Muslim population received more religious freedoms that led to further expansion of faith throughout the United Kingdom. Young Muslims, unlike the majority of their parents, aimed to interpret Islam as relevant to their lives outside of the home and ethno-religious enclave, with an emphasis placed on being British Muslims. Such an approach however, collided with the true beliefs of first generation Muslims and preachers who had identified Islam “as a perfect system that should not be expected to adapt to changing situations; it is the situations that must adapt to Islam (...).” The view, which continues to be stressed by radicals that the Islamic community is “living in the land of the infidel” created a greater gap between the societies. Furthermore, Islamic laws create confusion amongst the young British Muslim population, who finds it difficult to relate to their parents and elders.

66 Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain. An introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. xii, 121
69 Ibid.
71 Philip Lewis, Young British and Muslims, Continuum, 2007, p. 44
72 Ibid., pp. 44, 53
With the rise of the Muslim population, an increase in the number of mosques, religious centers and organizations has been recorded. Mosques are closely connected to social and cultural identities of Muslims. The number of officially registered mosques in the United Kingdom is disputed as not all are officially registered. As of December 2011, there were a total of 1,642 active mosques (masjids) and prayer rooms in the UK.\(^{73}\) Based on the finding of The Charity Commission, approximately 600 mosques were registered as charities.\(^{74}\) From the actual 1,529 mosques, 1499 were located in England; a further 40 in Wales; 57 in Scotland; 2 in Northern Ireland; 2 Offshore Island and 30 in Republic of Ireland.\(^{75}\) The majority of mosques in the UK were established from converted houses or non-residential conversions, approximately 200 were purpose-built. The Salaam’s mosque directory database on the 18 August 2012 had a total of 1446 mosques\(^{76}\) and 100 charities registered.\(^{77}\) Another source counts 500 mosques in the UK with official registration granting tax benefits and rights to perform recognized marriage ceremonies.\(^{78}\) The establishment of mosques in majority countries in Europe is linked to Muslim immigrant workers as was presented earlier in the history of Muslim community in the UK. Findings of the 2010 report by the Network of European Foundation regarding mosques in Europe concluded that in capital cities in particular, mosques and Islamic centers are built based on finance from external resources and support of the Muslim World League under Saudi control.\(^{79}\) (King Fahad bin Abdul Aziz from Saudi Arabia funded the creation of mosques, colleges, and schools in non-Islamic countries including Britain). Cleary, based on geographical location, mosques have moreover been located in industrial suburbs.\(^{80}\) In May 2008, *Religious Trends* reported that more than 50% of Muslims regularly attended mosques.\(^{81}\) Table 5 demonstrates the concentration of mosques in major areas in the United Kingdom. Further, for information regarding Britain’s biggest mosques please see appendix section.

*Table 5: Concentration of mosques in United Kingdom*\(^ {82}\)


\(^{74}\) Ibid.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.

\(^{76}\) Sala@m. Mosque directory, http://www.salaam.co.uk/mosques/index.php, Accessed 18 August 2012

\(^{77}\) Sala@m, Charity directory, http://www.salaam.co.uk/charities/list.php, Accessed 18 August 2012


\(^{80}\) Ibid.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number of Mosques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accrington</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batley</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedford</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnley</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewsbury</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudley</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huddersfield</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Leeds</td>
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<td>Leicester</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>London</td>
<td>352</td>
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<td>Luton</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Manchester</td>
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<td>Newcastle Upon Tyne</td>
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<td>Nottingham</td>
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<td>Oldham</td>
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<td>Oxford</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>
The majority of mosques in the UK are Sunni and the division of mosques in 2010 was as follows: 44.6% Deobandi, 25.4% Bareilvi, 5.8% Salafi, 3.1% Maudoodi, 4.2% Shia, 2.8% other.\(^{83}\) According to a report on the 2009-10 Citizenship Survey, the percentage of Muslims who actively practiced their faith was 79% (6% increase since 2005) and the rise was especially observed amongst the population aged 16-29 (from 68% to 80%).\(^{84}\) By gender, Muslim women (83%) are more likely than men (76%) to practice their religion.\(^{85}\) Immense numbers of British Muslims, especially South Asians are influence by traditions of Islam that affects their everyday life. Muslims primarily base their laws on the holy books the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which is believed to be the practical example of Prophet Muhammad. Secondly, Islam is based on five basic Pillars of Islam (faith, praying, charity, fasting and pilgrimage), which are mandatory for all Muslims.\(^{86}\)

The 2006 data by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the pilgrimage practices showed that a minimum of 25,000 British Muslims travel to Mecca (sic) and Madinah (sic) every year.\(^{87}\) Marriage plays a very important role in Islamic culture as well. It has been suggested that arranged marriages amongst the Muslim community form a constant growth of population in areas where Muslims dominate.\(^{88}\) A high number of marriages occur especially within the South Asian Muslim communities in UK, most likely amongst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Many of these are marriages between first cousins or other relatives, as permitted by the Islamic faith, cultural

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\(^{85}\) Ibid., p.22  
practices and traditions. It is important to mention that family and group ties are a significant part of the Muslim culture, as every individual becomes a part of a community.

**Multiculturalism**

The United Kingdom and several other countries implemented a policy of multiculturalism, which has influenced how the government engages with minorities and manages cultural diversity. There are various definitions and understandings of what multiculturalism is. However, mainly it has been perceived as a step towards integrating immigrants, accepting all cultural differences, achieving equality, and expanding opportunities for minorities in order to create a sense of belonging.

![Table 6: Sense of belonging by ethnicity](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Fairly or very strongly feeling they belong to Britain</th>
<th>Fairly or very strongly feeling they belong to the local area</th>
<th>Agreeing one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate/religious identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 7, ethnic minorities in 2007 showed similar levels of belonging as white British, to Brits and their local area. When minorities connect to Britain they feel there is no conflict between their cultural and religious identity in incorporating into the British society (as presented in the last table column). However, one-third of White Brits do not agree with the perception that one can belong to Britain while having a minority religious or cultural identity.

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81 Ibid.
An immense number of Muslims see themselves both as British and Muslim and wish to take active part as citizens supporting the idea of multiculturalism. The 2005 BBC/MORI multiculturalism poll\textsuperscript{92} reported that 82\% of Muslims and 62\% of the majority of the British population felt that multiculturalism made Britain a better place.\textsuperscript{93} Thirty-two percent of the national responders thought that multiculturalism threatened the British way of life: only 8\% Muslims responded to the concern. Further, 54\% stated “parts of the country don’t feel like Britain any more because of immigration.”\textsuperscript{94} The survey suggested that the 7/7 bombings had not led to an increase in racial intolerance and the majority of British Muslims rejected the idea that the country was becoming less racially tolerant. This was quite surprising considering the widely held perception of rising intolerance towards Muslims after the terrorist bombings. There was a general agreement between groups that immigrants were obligated to learn English and accept the authority of British institutions despite the divided answer regarding “people who come to live in Britain should adopt the values of and tradition of British culture.” Fifty-eight percent of national responders agreed in comparison to 28\% of Muslims.\textsuperscript{95}

As a result of UK policy aimed at achieving equality, minority languages, religions and cultural practices were encouraged. With the encouragement of integration into the British community, many mosques, Islamic organizations and schools with Islamic curriculum were established. Before the Rushdie affair, which was a milestone in the evolution of race relations in the UK, members of the majority population had mainly led the debate about how multiculturalism was best achieved, while minorities were mainly passive.\textsuperscript{96} The integration of minorities was perceived in effect as assimilation, which meant complete adjustment to the dominant society. Subsequently, the discussion regarding Muslims, British identity and the future of multiculturalism became a more mutual process after the Rushdie affair (the majority population needed to adapt to the changing role of the British minorities which argued their rights).\textsuperscript{97} Ultimately, today there is a disagreement over the role Islam should play in the public’s life; an example of such is the controversial statement of Rowan Williams (Archbishop of Canterbury) who favored the incorporation of certain Shari’a law into UK law.\textsuperscript{98} 2006 polls revealed that 40\% of Muslims wanted Shari’a law as a majority of the British Muslim were becoming more radical and felt

\textsuperscript{92}The survey was based on a nationally representative sample of 1,004 Britain’s
\textsuperscript{94}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98}Ibid.
alienated from society. As of 2009, there were 85 Shari’a courts in operation. A survey conducted by Washington-based Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2006 found that despite a generally good relationship between British majorities and minorities, British Muslims had a more negative view towards westerners than Islamic minorities elsewhere in Europe. The British Muslims accused westerners for problems between groups, describing them as selfish, arrogant, greedy and immoral. Half of respondents described westerners as violent.

Since 9/11, and especially since the July 2005 London attack (7/7 attack), multiculturalism as a UK policy has been severely criticized and put into question. Several experts, institutions and media have suggested that British multiculturalism created a sense of betrayal amongst the minority. The minority realized that British culture was not prepared to fully accept Islam with its traditions of alleged forced marriages and with the possible dominance of shari’a law over UK law. It is believed that multiculturalism has been responsible for acts of terrorism in the UK, and for accepting Muslims’ “(...) culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands.”

The problem that derives from British multiculturalism is that it encourages minorities to foster their culture and own identity, reinforcing therefore, Islamist tendencies to separateness and isolation. This was clearly stated by British Prime Minister David Cameron who criticized the failed policy of multiculturalism, by blaming it for Islamic extremism. The debate regarding the capability of Muslim integration into British community continues.

Islamophobia

Islamophobia is society’s social apprehension towards Muslims and Islamic culture. It is defined by the Open Society Institute as an “irrational hostility, fear and hatred to Islam, Muslims and Islamic culture, and active discrimination towards this group as individuals or collectively.”

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102 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
It creates a challenge to the Muslim community that wishes to be integrated into British society. The term Islamophobia, which was used for the first time in a 1997 report created by the Runnymede Trust regarding the anti-Muslim approaches in the UK,\(^{107}\) is negatively related to multiculturalism. It has been suggested that hostility towards Muslims has risen amongst British society after 9/11 and that it fully developed after the 7/7 bombings.

A 2005 survey conducted after the 7/7 attacks showed that Muslim students felt isolated and witnessed a series of extremist acts on campus. It was revealed that 47% of Muslim students have experienced Islamophobia.\(^{108}\) Before the attacks, 5% were reported to feel uncomfortable being Muslim in Britain. However in the wake of 7/7, the number rose to 31%. Eighty-five percent of responders condemned the attacks, 4% did not and 11% did not respond.\(^{109}\) The Institute of Race Relations (IRR), in the aftermath of the bombings recorded a rise in attacks on Muslims across the UK (at least one incident a day from 7/7 onwards).\(^{110}\) Data released in the Hate Crime Report 2007-2008 showed a 10% increase in crimes, involving racial or religious aggravation, from 1,300 to 13,008 (68% increase since 2005-2006).\(^{111}\) In 2009, 11% of Muslims surveyed (1 in 10) were victims of an assault, threat or harassment, at least once during twelve months. A further 34% of men and 26% of women claimed they experienced discrimination. The Muslims experiencing more discrimination than others were aged between 16-24.\(^{112}\) The 2009-2010 Citizenship Survey regarding race reported that Muslims accounted for 17% of the groups that were most likely to be the subject of increased racial prejudice.\(^{113}\) The levels of concern regarding harassment based on skin color, race and religion was highly recorded amongst Black African (32%), Indian (29%) and other Asian groups (29%), of which religious discrimination\(^{26}\) was the highest amongst Muslim 26%.\(^{114}\) Data conducted by Gallup Coexist found that nearly 49% of British did not perceive Muslims to be loyal citizens, although their loyalty and trust was the highest than other groups in

\(^{109}\) Ibid.
Continued surveys found that attitudes towards Muslim people are based on information provided by the media. In 2010 the YouGov poll found that 53% of Britons associated Islam with extremism. Society’s negative outlook towards the minorities may have been an outcome of the enhanced racial profiling after the 7/7 attacks that led to further alienation of the minority groups.

British Muslims have faced more scrutiny, criticism and analysis than any other religious community after the rise of violent Islamism. However, despite the negative depiction, thousands of Britons are converting every year.

Converts

There has been a growing number of Muslim converts in the United Kingdom. Data provided by the Scottish Census in 2001 showed that there were 60,669 converts in the UK (59,445 converts from England and Wales; 1,224 from Scotland, Northern Ireland converts were not included). However, as result of lack of differentiation between a person being born into a religion or adapting a new faith in the census, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of converts.

In 2001, 55% of converts were from the White British ethnic group. Kevin Brice, on behalf of the organization Faith Matters, estimated that a decade later (since 2001) the number had risen to approximately 100,000 (4% of the British Muslim community) with 5,200 coverts in 2010 alone. Forty-four percent had converted in 2001 or before and 56% subsequently. Fifty-six percent of Muslim converts were White British; 16% Other Whites, 29% non-Whites, 7% were actually of Pakistani origins. Further research suggested that the percentage of female converts was 62% higher than male (38%) and the average age of conversion for both was 27.5 years. Twelve percent of converts changed their name, with the majority adopting a Muslim name. The majority of converts see themselves as both British and Muslim; however, 39% of converts identified

118 ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., p. 10
themselves firstly as Muslims and secondly as British.\(^{121}\) For help and information when converting, converts received information from books, Internet, media and Muslim acquaintances. The following problems that individuals witnessed when converting to Islam were: lack of support networks for converts, feeling of isolation, rejection and pressure from individuals born as Muslims. Further, opinions made by media that converts are linked to extremism, terrorism, and encourage the repression of women.\(^{122}\) In conclusion, the number of British converts from various ethnic backgrounds has doubled in the past decade with a leading and growing number of white women accepting the Islamic faith.

**Case studies**

**London**

London is home to the highest number of Muslims in England and the most divers of any Muslim community in Europe in terms of history, language, ethnic origin, politics and social class. In the mid-1800s, as a maritime port city and an international center for manufacturing, trade, diplomacy and politics it attracted hundreds of Muslims.\(^{123}\) From the nineteenth century, London became the center of immigration and a safe-haven for Central Asian refuges in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. During this time, the city became a host to a large number of radical Muslims who arrived to the UK after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Further, Muslim refugees, who arrived from Algeria, Chechnya and Bosnia after the Civil War in former Yugoslavia, joined the growing Muslim community of Jihadists in London.\(^{124}\) In 2001 it had the highest proportion of Muslims (38.2%), which made up nearly 8% of the overall London population.\(^{125}\) As of 2001 there were 607,083 (38.2%) of Muslims living in London.\(^{126}\)

The Muslim population of London remains highly diverse, and majorities originate from: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Further from Turkey, Cyprus, Algeria, Morocco, sub-Saharan West Africa, Horn of African, Egypt and Indonesia (Malaysia, Singapore).\(^{127}\) Amongst thirty-three London boroughs the highest percentage of Muslims in 2001 remained in Tower of Hamlets and

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\(^{122}\) Ibid., pp. 9,13, 20


\(^{126}\) Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale, *Muslims in Britain. Race, place and identities*, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 8

Newham. In regards to age, Muslims (of all religious groups), in London had the youngest Muslim population: one-third below 15 years of age and 17% were aged between 16-24. In 2010 London accounted for almost 40% of total Muslim population in the UK, of which over 50% were White British Muslims and Black Caribbean Muslims. During twelve months approximately 1,4000 conversions took place in London in 2010 (this made up close to one-third of conversions in whole of UK that year). As of 2012 there are 352 mosques, various charities, schools and Islamic organizations.

Due to the enormous emigration of Muslims from Central Asia, the capital of England has been described as Londonistan – the new land/country for Islamic radicals and central hub of Islamic terror in Europe. The term originated in the late 1990s and was used by the French to describe the growing presence of Islamist radicals in London. The British government through its support of democratic values and tradition of civil liberties has failed to act towards the developing Islamic groups in London. Over the years London has been a base for preaching extremists such as Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammed, Abu Hamza al-Masri and masterminds of terrorist attacks in different parts of Europe. For example Mustafa Setmarian Nasar who operated in London for years before the Madrid bombings.

Further, a crossroad and safe haven for would-be terrorists where they could raise money, a destination for men willing to carry out their threats, recruit members and draw inspiration towards militant actions against the West.

Birmingham

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131 Ibid.
In the early 1800s Birmingham was a maritime port and attractive manufacturing city for Muslims.\textsuperscript{134} After the First World War, Birmingham as a result of its developing industry, attracted former seafarers and dock laborers. After the Second World War it became an attraction for further Muslim immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India,\textsuperscript{135} and refugees from Somalia, Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{136} In 2001 Birmingham was the biggest city with the largest concentration of Muslims outside of London 140,000 (14%)\textsuperscript{137} with majority of Muslims from Pakistan 69.6% and Bangladesh 13.8%.\textsuperscript{138} Amongst the total population of Muslims, 54.4% were born in UK, further 28% in Pakistan and 7.2% in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{139} However, Pakistani minority represented the largest single ethnic group (7% of total city population) with biggest concentration in two wards of Birmingham – Small Heath 50.6% and Sparkbrook 40.5%.\textsuperscript{140} According to 2001 census, 5.6% of Muslims were of pensionable age, 57.2% included working age (from 16 to pensionable age) and 37.2% were children.\textsuperscript{141}

In relation to the labor market it has been noted, that there is a strong correlation between the areas of Birmingham, which contain the highest unemployment rates.\textsuperscript{142} In terms of occupation 27,455 people were actively employed in 2001, with majority of 20% (5,501) working in process, plant and machine operatives, 17.9% (4,916) in elementary occupations and 11.2% (3,062) in sales and customer services.\textsuperscript{143}

Amongst the Bangladeshi minority, there was a slightly higher percentage of unemployment 22%, than amongst Pakistanis 21%.\textsuperscript{144} However, employment amongst women of both groups was

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., pp. 43-44
\textsuperscript{136} Tahi Abbas, Dr., \textit{Muslims in Birmingham, UK}, COMPAS, University of Oxford, pp. 4-5, Available: http://fatih.academia.edu/TahirAbbas/Papers/259068/Muslims_In_Birmingham_UK, Accessed 19 August 2012
\textsuperscript{140} Tahi Abbas, Dr., \textit{Muslims in Birmingham, UK}, COMPAS, University of Oxford, pp. 5-6, 9, Available: http://fatih.academia.edu/TahirAbbas/Papers/259068/Muslims_In_Birmingham_UK, Accessed 19 August 2012
very low.\textsuperscript{145} Despite the low economic level, the two largest ethnic groups had a higher level of house ownership than the white majority.\textsuperscript{146}

Currently there are nearly 200 mosques in the city. The major mosques and Islamic Centers are: Central Jamia Masjid Ghamkor Sharif, Jamli Msajid & Islamic Center, Coventry Road Mosque, Green Lane Mosque with its headquarters of Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK. The number of converts in Birmingham is estimated to be near 50\% of the total Muslim population. In 2005 Birmingham was under the medias watchful eye when a high profile arrest took place of Yasin Hassan Omar from his Small Heath home on 27 July 2005. Omar was arrested for the failed terrorist attack in London 21 July and charged with four criminal charges.\textsuperscript{147}

Bradford

Bradford is an industrial city in West Yorkshire in which the majority of Muslims have roots in rural areas.\textsuperscript{148} As a metropolitan manufacturing city, it has attracted Moroccan and Arab traders since the 1830s.\textsuperscript{149} Further, with the developing wool textiles industry in the 1960s, it attracted immigrants mainly from Bangladesh and Pakistan. The city was given a negative image during the Rushdie Affair in 1989 (protest against the novel The Satanic Verses), further as results of riots in 1995 and 2001 involving the Pakistani minorities.\textsuperscript{150} During the 7 July 2001 riots the Muslims in Bradford were presented as militant and violent as hundreds of police officers were left injured, many citizens traumatized, further causing millions of pounds in damage.\textsuperscript{151}

In 2001 it was estimated, that 25\% (75,000) of whole population were Muslims, with majority of Pakistani origin.\textsuperscript{152} In 2000, more than 80\% of Muslims (mainly Pakistanis, Kashmiris and Bangladeshis) were living in areas described as struggling (especially in inner city areas) and only 10\% in the suburban areas.\textsuperscript{153} This was a result of a collapse in Bradford main industry


\textsuperscript{147} Tahi Abbas, Dr., Muslims in Birmingham, UK, COMPAS, University of Oxford, p. 16, Available: http://fatih.academia.edu/TahirAbbas/Papers/259068/Muslims_In_Birmingham_UK, Accessed 19 August 2012

\textsuperscript{148} Philip Lewis, Young British and Muslims, Continuum, 2007, p. 25

\textsuperscript{149} Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain. An introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 42

\textsuperscript{150} Philip Lewis, Young British and Muslims, Continuum, 2007, p.25

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 29


In 2001 the biggest ethno-religious concentration of Bradford Muslims was in the Toller district (64%). The 2001 Census predicted that by 2020 there would be nearly 130,000 Muslims in Bradford.

Riots in the 1990s and early 2000s have put into question the role of multiculturalism, which created segregation between Pakistani and local white communities. Further, the gap between the level of education between the white majority and Asian Muslims minimized the Pakistani’s youth chances for employment. There are no official statistics available regarding Muslim worshippers in Bradford, however surveys have shown that at least a quarter of Muslims attend prayers during the week, which was double the number of Anglicans. It was estimated that Muslim believers provided a yearly turnover of £60,000. The segregation in regards to race, faith, education and employment specifically amongst the young Muslim population of Bradford created opportunities for extreme radical Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Leeds

Leeds is a diverse city and metropolitan borough in West Yorkshire with the Muslim community sharing a similar background as Bradford (see above). In 2011 the general population was estimated to be 798,800, which included 17.4% of Black, Asian and minority ethnic groups. Detailed information regarding specified ethnic groups in 2011 was not available. Despite the boroughs development the city has over 150,000 people living in deprived areas, amongst which 30,000 children under the age of 16 live in poverty. The British Pakistani minority, which in 2001 accounted for 15,064 people, was often disregarded.

With unemployment of up to 7.8%, low social status, low education and difficulties integrating with the majority the young population became targets of Islamist terrorists who

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154 Philip Lewis, Young British and Muslims, Continuum, 2007, p.25
155 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Philip Lewis, Young British and Muslims, Continuum, 2007, pp. 25-26
159 Jonathan Petre, Facing the axe: Diocese that has twice as many Muslim worshipper as Anglicans, in Mail Online, 24 October 2010, Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1323237/Facing-axe-Diocese-twice-Muslim-worshippers-Anglicans.html, Accessed 19 August 2012
160 Ibid., p. 3
exploited the youth’s disappointment.\textsuperscript{162} Beeston extremist mosques (Hardy Street mosque, Stratford Street mosque and Bengali mosque), youth clubs, gyms (the Al Qaeda gym) and Islamic bookshop served as the “extremist incubators” for three of the four 7/7 attackers, who adopted Salafi Islam.\textsuperscript{163} Young British Pakistanis presented an identity crisis due to the generation gap between them and their parents, who strongly held traditions and were religiously conservative. On the other side, due to the rejection they felt from British society, which did not want them, they would be stuck between tradition and modernization. This provided a strong grounds for extremism in which Salafi Jihadism would become an alternative identity.\textsuperscript{164}

**Leicester**

Leicester has a diverse ethnic minority population with one of the oldest Asian communities in Britain. The first Muslims of Pakistani and Indian origin to settle in Leicester arrived in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The largest immigration of Asians occurred between 1961 and 1981.\textsuperscript{165} Despite the fact the Muslim community was still small, by the start of the twenty-century, the numbers of supporters grew rapidly and Leicester became the center for Muslim community activity. In 2001 Leicester’s population was 279,921, of which 30,000 (11%) were Muslims with mainly Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Somali and Turkish backgrounds.\textsuperscript{166} Despite the city’s growing economy, the city’s status as a beacon for community cohesion and the majority of immigrants’ strong sense of belonging to the city and country, the minorities faced socio-economic deprivation and high levels of unemployment, particularly amongst the Muslim population.\textsuperscript{167} It was estimated that 52% of Muslims were economically inactive in comparison to other faiths. The main reason for this trend was limited educational qualifications, discrimination due to their appearance (women wearing the hijab), beliefs or lack of proficiency in English.\textsuperscript{168}

With the growing migration of South Asians to the UK, the Deobandi movement established its branches in various parts of Britain including Leicester. In 2005 it was estimated that the Deobandis influenced half the twenty mosques and three daru’–ul’um (house of knowledge), in

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\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 28


\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., pp. 69-74
which teachings were based strictly on Deobandi curriculum. In 2007, controversy surrounded the spiritual leader of Britain’s Deobandi adherents and head of the Leicester Islamic Academy, Riyadh ul Haq, who officially preached contempt for non-Muslims and, the West, and supported militant Islam (for more information refer to Deobandism). Within the city there were three Islamic schools and 28 mosques, two of which were Shia mosques. Muslims children accounted for 26% of the city’s school population. In regards to socio-economic status amongst all ethnic minorities, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population live in the highest levels of poverty and deprivation.

III. Organizations

Organizations within the UK

British Muslim organizations play a key role in religion and politics, as both are closely intertwined. As a result of growing numbers of Muslims in Britain and the need for representative bodies promoting Muslim interests, unity, coordination and the protection of minority rights, a vast amount of organizations were created. It is estimated that there are 3,000 permanent Muslim organizations in the UK, half of which are involved mainly in running mosques (masjids) and community centers. However, a number of organizations provide financial and political support to various terrorist groups around the world. As revealed by journalist Melanie Phillips (author of Londonistan), hundreds of thousands of pounds that were destined for countering Islamic extremism, in reality went to supporting groups or individuals promoting an ideology of intolerance, separatism and extremism. The following section presents the main organizations, mosques and schools in the UK with additional information regarding potential links of the organizations or their members to Islamic radicals.

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)

The MCB is an independent body that was created in 1997 and is considered to be one of the largest Muslim organizations in the UK with over 400 affiliate organizations. It is an umbrella body for national, regional, and local organizations, mosques, charities and schools. The organization’s primary mandate is to help the Muslim community fully integrate and participate in British public life and promote Muslim affairs in the UK.\(^{174}\) The MCB condemns indiscriminate acts of terror, (especially the 7/7 bombings), by Muslims and non-Muslims, urging its communities to fight against terrorism.\(^{175}\) Despite the anti-terrorism stance, however, the organization has employed individuals with connections to Al Qaeda (AQ) and supporters of terrorist activities. Yusuf Islam was a MCB treasurer in 1998 and a fundraiser for Bosnian Muslims.\(^{176}\) The formal advisor on Business and Economic Affairs to the Secretary General of the MCB, Iqbal Asaria had been a source of controversy. He was an Al Qaeda operative and webmaster of jihadi websites (jihad.org and Ummah.org), which were associated with extremist groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun. Furthermore, he served as the webmaster for the International Institute of Islamic Political Thought – a Hamas front think tank that was associated with major Muslim organizations in the UK.\(^{177}\)

**Muslim Aid**

Muslim Aid is a UK non-governmental organization with its main headquarters in London’s Tower Hamlet. The international relief and development agency was founded in 1985, as a response to the famine in Ethiopia. During this time eleven leading British Muslim organizations responded to the growing humanitarian crises in Africa.\(^{178}\) Its main focus, guided by the teaching of Islam is to alleviate poverty worldwide, through sustainable, local and practical solutions that empower individuals and strengthen communities.\(^{179}\) With developing programs in over seventy countries in the world a majority of field offices are based in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa in countries such as Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh, Sudan, Lebanon, and Somalia.\(^{180}\) Its first chairman and founder, Yusuf Islam (formerly singer Cat Stevens), claimed that the organization

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became a tool in the hand of extremists in 1999 after he had left, and continues as such under the representation of its current chairman Sir Iqbal Sacranie (who also is the Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain). It has been noted that most of the trustees of Muslim Aid are board members of the Muslim Council of Britain.\(^{181}\) The Spanish media reported that in 2002 Muslim Aid was linked by Spanish police to Al Qaeda (AQ) terrorist activities with suspicions of providing funding for recruiting AQ fighters (mujahadeen) for Bosnia in 2002.\(^{182}\)

**Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)**

The Islamic organization was founded by Kemal el-Helbawy (a senior member of MB and official spokesman in Europe) in 1997.\(^ {183}\) It has twelve branches in Britain’s main cities. According to its website, it is “dedicated to serving society through promoting Islam in its spiritual teachings, ideological and civilizing concepts and moral and human values”, for which it uses several elements including Dawah, media and education.\(^ {184}\) MAB is furthermore, a British arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) front organization. It was investigated by British security services for possible involvement in the 9/11 attacks and controversial associations with Anwar Al-Awlaki, extremist and member of Al Qaeda that has been linked to the 7/7 bombings in London.\(^ {185}\) The MAB objected to the US and UK military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. The spokesman and then President of the organization, Anas Altikriti, co-organized and led fifteen demonstrations against the wars and against the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The MAB was the initiator of the biggest demonstration against the war in Iraq in Central London, which took place 15 February 2003 and gathered two million people.\(^ {186}\) Today it is considered to be the main British representative of the Muslim Brotherhood’s global network. As a political activist organization it promotes Islamist political thought among British Muslims through Islamic Dawah and in close relation with the teachings of Hasan al-Banna.\(^ {187}\)

**Muslim Welfare House (MWH)**


MWH was founded in 1970, with the original aim of assisting foreign Muslim students in Britain. Over the years it has changed its purpose and was registered in 1975 as one of UK’s first charity bodies. Today its official purpose is to minimize the bridge between communities and encourage minorities to integrate with society. The MWH acts both as a mosque and community center, as well as a social, cultural, education and counseling center for more than fifteen nationalities, such as Algerians, Somalis, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.\(^{188}\) Subsequently, over the years MWH as a member of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), became one of the central MB bodies in Britain and developed extensive connections. Until 2007 the relations between MHW and MB were very strong. Three of the five registered owners of the MWH were parallel directors of the Muslim Association of Britain.\(^{189}\) It has been reported that Dar al-Ri’aya (Muslim Welfare House) was involved in transferring MB funds to Egypt and in January 2011 a criminal court in Giza reopened a case in this matter.\(^{190}\)

**Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW)**

The IRW is an international, UK based organization established in Birmingham in 1984 by co-founder and president Dr Hany El-Banna. It describes itself as an independent non-governmental organization, and “an international aid and development charity, which aims to alleviate the suffering of the world’s poorest people.”\(^{191}\) As stated on their website, the majority of income comes from global donations, of which 90% directly helps people in need, 4% supports the delivery of relief worldwide, 3% goes to campaigns on essential issues, and 3% to generating future income.\(^{192}\)

Though a charity orientated towards delivering help, it has been directly associated with the Saudi Arabian government who has funded AQ’s operations and donated money to suicide bombers’ families. Since the 1990s, tens of millions of dollars have been transferred to bank accounts of organizations linked to Osama bin Laden. “It was reported that IRW’s main office in UK, received $50,000 from a Canadian group that the U.S. Treasury Department called ‘a(n Osama) bin Laden front (…) IRW has collected and funneled millions of dollars to the Chechen terrorist rebels in Russia, who have ties to al Qaeda.’”\(^{193}\) In 2002, the Spanish police reported that

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192 Jeffrey Imm, *CNN promotion of Islamic Relief Worldwide Group linked to jihadist organizations*, in Counterterrorism Blog, 1 August 2006 Available: http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/08/cnn_promotion_of_islamic_relie.php,
the Islamic Relief was one of several charities that deposited money and other support for AQ.\textsuperscript{194} The families of the 9/11 victims have sued the charity, which raised money worldwide after 9/11 with the pretext of helping victims. The organization-established branches in Gaza and Ramallah, where it has been reported it provided support and assistance to Hamas infrastructure, transfer of goods and funds.\textsuperscript{195}

**Interpal**

Interpal, also known as the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund is the largest British charity and one of the leading Islamic charities in Europe. It was established in 1994 in Cricklewood, London. Due to its expansion it now has branches in Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford and Leicester. It describes itself as a non-political, non-profit charity to alleviate problems faced by the Palestinian people through providing relief and development to those in need. Since its establishment it has supported humanitarian, education, medical and community development projects for Palestinians in need.\textsuperscript{196}

In 1996 it faced its first accusations regarding funding and supporting terrorism. In 1997, the group was outlawed in Israel and designated as a terrorist-organization in 1998. By 2001, it was estimated that the charity raised 4 million pounds, raising further suspicions.\textsuperscript{197}

In August 2003 the charity was designated a terrorist entity by the Unites States – “a principal charity utilized to hide the flow of money to Hamas.”\textsuperscript{198} Interpal became one of five Europe based groups that had its accounts frozen after a suicide bombing in Jerusalem. The British government’s Charity Commission for England and Wales, for the second time, found no evidence supporting such allegations. A short time after, the Board of Deputies of British Jews claimed that the charity was linked to Hamas. The accusation was dropped when Interpal sued the Board.\textsuperscript{199} In 2009, for the third time, the Charity Commission cleared Interpal of any accusations. In 2010 the charity won a High Court case against the British Sunday Express’s claims of terror links to Hamas. The ruling ordered the newspaper’s official apologies and £60.000 payment to the charity’s

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\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.

trustees (Ibrahim Hewitt, Essam Mustafa (sic), Shahan Husain, Ghassan Faour, Ismail Ginwalla and Mohammed Rafiq Vindhani). Though a leading non-political and non-profitable charity, it supports Hamas. It has been reported that the managing trustee of Interpal, Issam Mustafa, met with a representative of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in connection with a land convoy in June 2011. US officials continue to appeal to the UK government to take relevant steps against Interpal, however, the British government position has not changed over the years possibly, in efforts to avoid antagonizing the Muslim community.

**Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB)**

MINAB is a Shia organization that was formed in 2006 mainly as a result of recommendations presented by members of the Muslim community who had participated in the Home Office’s Preventing Extremism Together Initiative after the 7/7 bombings. Members include delegates from major mosques under the joint support of the MCB, MAB, BMF and Al Khoie Foundation (sic). The organization, functioning as a “watchdog for UK mosques”, presented recommendations for imams and masjid committees to follow in order to combat violent extremism. MINAB was created to modernize and open up religious institutions with British-born or educated preachers that understand western culture and can easily relate to young Muslims in England. The understanding was that foreign, non-speaking preachers have limited means to communicate with the youth, which leaves them subject to manipulation, for example, by English speaking Al Qaeda operatives.

**The UK Islamic Mission (UKIM)**

The UKIM was established in October 1962 and is one of the oldest, single Islamic organizations in the UK. It was created as an offshoot of the Jamaat-e-Islami with the aim of establishing the party and its ideology as a political and social force. It holds forty-five branches and circles across the country and over thirty-five mosques and Islamic schools. Today the main

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The goal of UKIM is to serve Muslim society, promote Islam in Britain as "a comprehensive way of life which must be translated into action in all spheres of human life" with the aim to “(...) mold the entire human life according to Allah’s revealed Guidance, following the life example of his Last Messenger Mohammed” and creating an "Islamic social order in the United Kingdom in order to seek the pleasure of Allah.”

The organization further states its involvement in various areas from building new mosques, relief work, to Dawah on the Internet and youth work. Until this day it follows and promotes the work of Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (Jamaat-e-Islami) and Jamal Badawi (Muslim Brotherhood).

The Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE)

The organization was founded in the 1970s with the aim of bringing together Muslims in all parts of Europe. As stated on the website, their main goals are encouraging social and spiritual renewal, developing mosques, establishing schools and community centers, raising funds for humanitarian relief, participating in local, national and global issues affecting the Ummah and creating a new generation of leaders dedicated to serving the community. As of today, the IFE has nine branches in UK major cities and is a subsidiary organization of East London Mosque (ELM).

In 2010, after a six-month investigation of IFE and ELM involving secret filming by the Daily Telegraph and Channel 4, reporters’ recordings showed IFE leaders expressing opposition to democracy and, support for shari’a law. The reporters uncovered that IFE organized a meeting with extremists, including Taliban allies – a man named by the American government as an “unindicted co-conspirator” in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and a second man claimed to be under FBI investigations for links to the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, the program revealed a detailed indoctrination program based on the teaching of Maududi. The British government revealed that the Jamaati-e-Islami in the UK, Germany, Italy and France have been operating under Islamic Forum Europe.
Mosques, Islamic Centers and Koranic Schools

With the expanding Muslim population in the UK, there has been a rise in the concentration of mosques in urban areas. Mosques, Islamic Centers and Koranic schools are a clear and identifiable marker of Muslim presence in UK, with much of the architecture replicating the Middle Eastern models. As of December 2011, there were a total of 1,642 active mosques (masjids) and prayer rooms in the UK. In 2010 it was estimated that there were nearly seventy Shia mosques in Britain. Many Shia organizations and over half of mosques are members of Shia organization MINAB.

Muslims are required to read the Koran in Arabic to the best of their capabilities; therefore, the majority of masjids offer to teach children in Islamic schools the basic beliefs and practices of Islam, reading of Arabic script and recitation of Koran. On several occasions, as a result of low standards of education available for minorities from inner city schools in Britain, a fair amount of British Muslim youth travel to Pakistan to study in madressahs (sic). In numerous cases these young British Muslims are an easy target for organizations that present their radical ideologies and promote hatred towards western society.

Mosques, Islamic schools and Islamic culture centers have been financed by donations received from Saudi Arabia, which has influenced the teaching of the Islamic faith. The growing radicalism in mainstream mosques is based on the interpretation of the faith known as Wahhabism by Imams who have studied in Medina Mosque in Saudi Arabia. A majority of mainstream mosques in the UK have taken on the Saudi Arabian interpretation of shari’a law from official Saudi books. It is estimated that 25% of extremist literature that supports stoning of adulterers and waging violent jihad are being sold in UK mosques and mainstream institutions. In 2006, controversy arose after 100 Islamic private schools turned out to be "little more than places where the Koran is recited." The schools were due for review in 2010.

Islamic Cultural Centers and London Central Mosque (ICCUK)

The London Central Mosque, also known as the Regent Park Mosque, is the most important and influential mosque in Britain. It was established in 1944 and fully completed in 1977 to represent British Muslim in the UK. There are several links between the mosque and Saudi Arabia. The most important include funds from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (£2 million of funding donated by His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud).\(^{218}\) Officially it promotes tolerance and teaches understanding and respect for Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the UK with the aim of helping Muslims integrate into society.\(^{219}\) However, as revealed in an investigation concluded by Channel 4 in a January 2007 documentary program, “Dispatches. Undercover mosque” and September 2008 “Undercover Mosque: The Return,” the teachings in the ICCUK were based on the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and shari’a law from official Saudi books. Sheikh Fazan, a senior member of the official Saudi Establishment, influences the teachings. Members of the mosque were taught that who rejects Islam or leaves his faith should be killed. Furthermore, British Muslims should separate from non-Muslims and the society. “You have to hate what displeases Allah, especially when living in this country (Britain) with that non-Muslim.”\(^{220}\) The Central London Mosque promoted a message of segregation and clear infiltration of Wahhabism ideology into schools and mosques. Further links between the mosque and Saudi Arabia are evident through the mosque’s director general and public face since 2000 - doctor Ahmed Abdul Bayan. Bayan is not an Imam but a Saudi diplomat closely involved in Islamic affairs and connected to the Saudi embassy in London.\(^{221}\) In addition, he is a member of the board of trustees in the King Fahad Academy in West London, which was founded by Saudi Arabia and under the supervision of the Saudi Arabian Embassy. When investigated in 1998, the academy taught a Saudi-based curriculum in Arabic.\(^{222}\) In 2011, The Sunday Express suggested that the Academy “had been infiltrated by fanatics and was teaching an extreme form of Islam and anti-Semitic and racist doctrines”. Accusations have not been confirmed and the paper was ordered to pay an undisclosed amount in damages to the school.\(^{223}\)


The North London Central Mosque (NLCM)

The North London Mosque, known also as the Finsbury Park Mosque, was founded as a charity in 1988 and in 1994 was transferred into a mosque. Today, the mosque’s main mission is to enhance the development of the Muslim community in Britain and help the Muslim community to successfully integrate into British society.\(^{224}\) Despite its peaceful declaration, it has been suspected of supporting Islamic extremism since the late 1990s and has developed a reputation of being associated with radical Islamism in London. The members of the mosque were inspired by the preaching’s of the mosque’s radical cleric and imam, Abu Hamza al-Masri who since 1997 – played the role of mediator between North African and South African groups and served as the official mosque imam since 2000.\(^{225}\) He promoted a militant interpretation of Islam and heavily influenced members of the mosque. The mosque eventually became known as “The Suicide Factory” and served as the primary hub for making contact with individuals linked to AQ.\(^{226}\)

In 2002, the *Guardian* reported that Abu Hamza sent several members of the Finsbury mosque to training camps in Afghanistan. Others obtained AK-47 training for British Islamic extremists held on the mosque premises.\(^{227}\) The mosque was investigated for allegations related to terrorism by British officials due to suspicions of links with Al Qaeda, as well as the mosque’s role in promoting radicalization and Islamic Jihad amongst its followers. Several AQ operatives, detained by officials, either attended the mosque or were indoctrinated in the mosque, including: Richard Reid (shoe-bomber), Zacarias Moussaoui (suspect of the 9/11 attacks), Kamel Bourgass a.k.a Nadir Habra (police killer), Feroz Abbasi (enemy combatant of the United States of America), Amar Makhulif a.k.a Abu Doha (suspect of the millennium plot to blow up airport in Los Angeles), Rabah Kadre a.k.a “Toufik” (involvement in the Doha network and plot to blow up a Christmas market in Strasbourg), Djamel Beghal (recruiter of suicide bombers), Nizar Trabelsi (Kleine Brogel Nato airbase plot)\(^{228}\), Jerome Courtiller (alleged plot to blow up the US embassy in Paris) and Muktar Said Ibrahim (Eritrean immigrant involved in 21 July 2005 second transport bomb plot in the UK). The London Central Mosque became a safe haven for Islamic radicals from all over Europe.\(^{229}\) The police raided it in 2003, arresting Abu Hamza and closing the mosque for two

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years. It reopened in 2005. In 2007 the mosque received £20,000 from the government’s Preventing Violent fund, aimed at preventing young Muslims from being victims of extremism.

**Brixton Mosque and Islamic Cultural Center**

Brixton Mosque, located in South London was founded in 1990 by a group of Muslims led by its future chairman Abdul Malik Baker, an adherent of Salafism (a form of Islam seen as in conflict with liberal democracy). He was given an unspecified amount of money from the Lambeth Council financing the STREET project, which aimed to help young Muslims who were subject to violent extremism. The mosque focuses on its multi-national community by providing religious, social and financial support to its members. As an organization it consolidates the foundation of Islam and provides education its followers.

The mosque became the focus of media attention and official scrutiny due to the fact that some of its members were suspected of extremism and terrorist actions (Richard Reid the shoe bomber and Zacarious Moussaoui the twentieth 9/11 hijacker). The Brixton mosque’s young worshippers, including ex-convicts that it helped rehabilitate, were vulnerable to extremist propaganda. It was identified as the key connection for the proliferation of and interpretation of Islam that promoted military jihad as a means to defend Islam, restore the Caliphate and fight the West. Since 2001, the Brixton mosque has been a target of extremist groups, firstly by leafleting members of the mosque outside the building and secondly by inviting people to discussions regarding Islam and jihad.

**East London Mosque & London Muslim Center (ELM-LMC)**

The East London Mosque was completed in 1985 and became the landmark of London’s East End. In 2004, the 10.5 million-pound project to develop the LMC by His Royal Highness Prince

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Charles and His Royal Prince Mohamed Al-Faisal was completed. It was estimated that half of the funding was raised through donations from worshippers in the UK, 23% from public and charitable sources, and 10% from foreign sources including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia. ELM-LMC, located in Tower Hamlets, London, is an independent organization that provides help and guidance to Muslim citizens in Britain. It promotes peaceful integration into society and programs supporting women’s development.237 The main objectives stated by the organization are serving the community, working in partnership with Muslims and non-Muslims, promoting tolerance, opposing extremism and helping the Muslim community integrate into society.238

Throughout the years the mosque has become the center of controversy due to regular hosting of extremist speakers such as Al-Awlaki who was identified as the spiritual advisor of 9/11, was involved in recruiting Muslims to fight in the name of jihad; and was connected to terrorist acts such as the Roshonara Choudhry attacks on MP Stephen Timms; Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab, the Detroit Christmas bomber; and Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter.239 Awlaki first visited in 2003, delivering a speech, described as a lecture on “Stopping Police Terror”240 and secondly in 2009.241 Furthermore, the mosque attempted to advance their Islamist agenda through manipulation of the British political system.242

The ELM and the LMC have been viewed as one of the most extreme Islamic institutions with identified links to Jamaati-e-Islami.243

**Birmingham Central Mosque**

Birmingham Central Mosque was established in 1975 and is one of the largest mosques in Western Europe and a central point for the Muslim community in Birmingham.244 It was originally named after Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq, who provided money for its construction.

However, after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the mosque was renamed to Birmingham Central Mosque. The mosque has been described as a source of jihad recruitment, a place for meetings of Al-Muhajiroun, a base for recruitment of the 2003 Tel Aviv suicide bombers, and furthermore one of many centers of fundraising for Islamic Relief Worldwide (accused of ties with AQ and Hamas).²⁴⁵

In 2007 the Birmingham Mosque came under severe criticism from David Cameron, who accused the mosque of spreading jihadist violence and Islamic extremism in the UK. The chairman of the Birmingham Mosque, Dr Mohammad Naseem, a nationally recognized and sometimes controversial Muslim leader promised legal actions.²⁴⁶

Koranic Schools

As previously mentioned, mosques and Islamic centers offer teaching of the Koran. Every Muslim is obligated to recite the Koran, which is the backbone of Muslim education. A number of Islamic radicals teach extremist ideology at these schools and centers.

It is crucial to understand the difference between a Koranic school (Maktab) and Islamic school (Madrassa). Both are characterized by the teaching of Koran. Madrassas, which are mostly linked to the mosque, are religious schools with an Islamic curriculum in Arabic in which they study Koran, saying of the Prophet, history, and literature. Maktabs offer lower education in which children learn to read and recite the Koran only. They have been viewed as the breeding grounds for jihadists. While the schools are critical of the Western culture, only a minor number of them preach violence.²⁴⁷

It is estimated that there are over 2,000 Islamic schools in Britain,²⁴⁸ attended by more than 250,000 Muslim children for Koran lessons.²⁴⁹ Those with extreme views have promoted fundamentalism, taught children religious apartheid, anti-British, anti-Western views and Shari’a punishments. Unprovoked beatings of children have been captured on camera in Yorkshire.

in madrassa and Darul Ullom Islamic High School in Birmingham. In 2009, investigations conducted by Civitas social policy think-tank found that websites of over 166 of the UK’s Muslim schools were spreading extreme teachings. Few had links to sites promoting jihad or holy war. The Saudi-sponsored weekend schools delivered books with messages of segregation. The teachings from the translated Koran, produced under the supervision of the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, promoted intolerance and aimed to widen the gap between British society and Muslims in Britain. The majority of Muslim schools teach true tolerance and integration into society, however there are a handful of schools that promote extremism and have become a base for future radicals.

Student Groups

With the rapidly growing Muslim population in the UK there has been a rise in the needs for Islamic schools, universities and student groups. As of today, it is difficult to identify the exact number of Muslim institutions and students in the UK. In 2001 it was estimated that amongst the whole student population 167,763 (6%) were Muslims. With the estimate increasing by more than a half over the past years, several bodies have been established to help Muslim students integrate in Britain.

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

WAMY defines itself as a non-governmental youth and student organization associated with the United Nations. Its mission is to support young Muslim personal and social development while further encouraging engagement and integration into British society. The organization aims to build understating and working partnerships between Muslim organizations and western society.

Through various projects, organized conferences, symposia, and workshops, it aims to address students' issues and protect Muslim youth from extremism.\textsuperscript{254}

The organization has been closely linked to the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its royal family, as well as to the Muslim Brotherhood. It has been under official surveillance due to suspicions of promoting Islamic extremism and terrorist financing in India, Israel, and Bosnia. WAMY has been linked to AQ, through the umbrella charity Al Haramain, and supported its affiliate the European Council for Fatwa and Research (EDFR), which aimed to spread fundamentalist Islam and promote shari’a worldwide. The EDFR’s (established in 1997) leading cleric was Yusuf al-Qaradawi, whose views are very controversial in the West, especially known for his fatwa authorizing female suicide bombers.\textsuperscript{255} Despite being perceived as a humanitarian and relief organization, WAMY held conferences and distributed literature promoting Islam, jihad and anti-Semitism. It further raised funds for Hamas.\textsuperscript{256}

\textit{The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS)}

FOSIS, the oldest student organization, was founded in 1962 and was considered to be one the first organization relatively free of factionalism. As a national umbrella organization that represents most Islamic Societies, it focuses on supporting and representing Islamic students at colleges and Universities in the UK and Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{257} The official partners supporting FOSIS are Muslim Student Trust, Islamic Relief, Human Appeal International and Muslim Aid.

FOSIS caused controversy when its speakers promoted racial hatred in London’s leading universities (Queen Mary, School of Oriental and African Studies, University College London). Invited speakers included individuals from the extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, supporters of the Taliban and Muslim convert Abdur Raheem Green, who claimed that “a permanent state of war exists between the people of Islam and the people who oppose Islam.” In 2005, Green gave a speech in the University College London (UCL) with reference to bin Laden, including statements of hatred towards western society and claims that terrorism works.\textsuperscript{258} Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab (the Detroit bomber/underwear bomber) was a student and president of the USL Islamic society during that time, and may have been influenced by the talks. The organization has been described

\textsuperscript{256}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{257}Federation of Student Islamic Societies, Available: http://fosis.org.uk/about, Accessed 23 August 2012
as a “conveyor belt” for extremism and terrorism. FOSIS continues to claim it has no connection with Islamic extremists nor does it take part in the radicalization of young Muslims.

**AhlulBayt Islamic Mission (AIM)**

AIM describes itself as an independent, non-profit organization set up in 2003 by a group of Muslim activists and thinkers with the aim of educating Shia, Sunni, and non-Muslim students about Islam. It organizes several events, conferences, seminars and educational courses. In 2007 it gave out more than 10,000 Islamic books for free in the UK and countries such as the USA, Canada, Germany, Malaysia and Nigeria.

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center has identified AIM as “an Iranian organization dealing with spreading Shi’ite Islam and the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini to dozens of countries around the globe.” The organization, headed by cleric and Hezbollah’s co-founder Hojjat al-Islam Muhammad Hassam Akhtari, is a supporter of the campaign to delegitimize Israel. Furthermore, it cooperates with groups and networks affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The main figure of the British AIM is Sheikh Shabbir Hassanally (supporter of the idea of an Islamic Revolution and hatred for Israel and the West).

**Noor Youth**

Noor Youth, is part of the East London, charity Noor Ul Islam Trust. The Shia organization established in 2008 is run by students that focus on young Muslim’s living in the UK. It encourages scholars and individuals to help deal with topics ranging from abortion to drug abuse, from the Shia point of view.

**Islamic Websites and TV**

259 “Convey belt” theory states that young, liberal-minded Muslims enrol to universities, only to be indoctrinated by Islamic extremists and turned into insular, backward-thinking, conservative Muslims. Terrorist recruiters can easily use these students for suicide bombings.


There are a variety of websites and TV channels that are easily accessible in the UK. The official channels available through satellite – such as the Islam Channel, Peace TV, IQRAA TV and Al Resalah – offer information regarding events, current affairs, education, daily news, movies, music and documentaries. The Salafi TV networks available for British Muslims are funded by Saudi Arabia. Less available Muslim TV channels are accessible online where everyone may obtain a variety of information regarding Islam, education, entertainment and current events. Such include: Al Jazeera (broadcast from Qatar), Al Arabiya (United Arab Emirates), Al Hiwar (UK), Peace TV (UK), Al Ekhbariya (Saudi Arabia), Al Majd Holy Quran, Cordoba TV (Spain), Express News (Pakistan), Noor TV (Europe), and SN TV (Somalia).

IV. Radicalization in the United Kingdom

Theoretical Background and Causes of Radicalization

Since the London 7/7 attacks the topic of Islamic radicalization and extremism has been one of the main concerns in the UK. Although radicalization has been present in Britain for years, it has not been discussed or viewed as a threat to homeland security. Public awareness grew out of the event itself. After 7/7, London became the subject of much scrutiny and the problem of homegrown terrorism and radicalization became a prominent concern. The UK, as a multicultural and multiethnic country with a large Muslim population, became an ideal base for Wahhabi radicalization formed in mosques, schools and cultural centers financed and influenced by Saudi Arabia’s government and its charities. Furthermore, foreign radicals who immigrated to the UK in the 1980s and 1990s in search of political asylum – such as Abu Hamza al Masri, Omar Bakri Mohammad, and Abu Qataba – provided the base for radicalization with a rejectionist Islamic message in Britain.

The term radicalization has not been internationally defined. Radicalization, as defined by the UK’s Home Office, in its CONTEST counterterrorism strategy, is “the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism, and in some cases, then to join terrorist groups.” The governments Prevent Strategy report further adds that “(...) radicalization is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons,

make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling."

Common locations where radicalization occurs include university campuses, mosques, religious schools, and private locations such as homes, cafes and bookstores.

The table below, by The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, presents the most popular recruitment grounds:

**Table 7. Typology of “Recruitment Grounds”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significance/function</th>
<th>Places of congregation</th>
<th>Places of vulnerability</th>
<th>Recruitment ‘magnets’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No particular significance other than Muslims meeting</td>
<td>Taking advantage of individuals crises or lack of orientation</td>
<td>Attracting ‘seekers’ from a wider area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples</td>
<td>• Mosques</td>
<td>• Prisons</td>
<td>• ‘Radical mosques’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Internet cafes</td>
<td>• Refugee centers</td>
<td>• ‘Radical bookshops’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cafeterias</td>
<td>• Welfare agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gyms</td>
<td>• Universities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Summer camps</td>
<td>• Etc.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individuals who hold radical ideas do not necessarily engage in terrorism. However, “terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy.” Radicalization can occur due to many factors and influences. It is not limited to one single ethnic or interest group, however it is most often discussed with reference to young Muslims who have carried out or plotted attacks in Europe and North America since 9/11. Such attacks include the Theo Van Gogh killing and the “Hofstad Plot” in the Netherlands; the Madrid bombings; the 7/7 bombings and their aftermath, Operation OVERT (“Heathrow Plot”), the 2007 firebombing of Glasgow Airport and the failed terrorist attacks in Central London. Regardless of their national or cultural origins, two common factors were present: most were native-born citizens or residents of the attacked country and most underwent the process of radicalization. In 2006, the British Security Service MI5 identified 200 terrorist networks and monitored 1,600 terror

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suspects and 30 terror plots with links to Al Qaeda. In 2007, MI5 increased the number of suspects by 400.

There is no one explanation for which individuals are prone to radicalization or engage in Islamic extremism. Over the years following 7/7 attacks, there have been several domestic and international events that may have contributed to the growing radicalization of British Muslims: the reaction to the 1988 publication of the *The Satanic Verses* (Salman Rushdie affair), the 1991 Gulf War, 1992-1995 Bosnian War, conflicts in Algeria, Kashmir, and Chechnya, the 7 July 2001 northern riots (Bradford, Oldham, Burnley), British contribution in Afghanistan and Iraq, 9/11 and “the war on terror”. Furthermore, the Danish *Jylland-Posten* Muhammad cartoons controversy, from 30 September 2005, also played a role. Despite occurring after 7/7, it had a profound impact on anti-Western protests in all of Europe, as it was found insulting to Muslim society, religion and values. Amongst the long-term domestic factors are poverty and alienation, failure of multiculturalism and integration, Islamophobia and accusations against the British government for engaging in the war against Islam. As presented in chapter two, Muslim minorities that are young, underpaid, unemployed, religious and poorly integrated into society are ideal for terrorist organization theories and Islamic radicalization. However, domestically radicalized terrorists are not necessarily members of the deprived society. Examples of such are suspects of the 2007 London and Glasgow international airport plots, who were physicians, medical research scientists and an engineer. Two-thirds of terror suspects in the UK have been from middle class backgrounds, were married and 90% were identified as sociable with a number of friends. MI5 reported that individuals who became suicide bombers were often highly educated.

“*It is an inherent aspect of contemporary terrorism that society faces neighbor terrorism and not terrorism from easily identifiable and culturally distinct outsiders or aliens.*”

The security service recognized four factors that cause radicalization first, a personal trauma

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279 Ibid.  
such as death. It was estimated that 10% of terror suspects were radicalized as a result of such. Second, migration—a third of all extremists migrated to Britain alone. Third, criminal activity, in which two-thirds of suspects had criminal records and so forth, as resulting in prison sentences. The prison experience and time in prison can lead some individuals closer to religion as it helps them cope. Many however are not fully informed about their religion and become vulnerable to suggestions from radicalizers. The estimate “mean age” for when a Muslim becomes radicalized is 21.6 years and anyone between 16 and 32 is regarded as vulnerable. Other suggestions for why radicalization takes place include the search for identity, meaning and community occurring among the second and third generation of Muslims. Furthermore, other factors are group bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination, which are necessary to encourage violence as a legitimate response to perceived injustice. The 2012 report by the House of Commons stated:

“We suspect that violent radicalization is declining within the Muslims community. There may be growing support for nonviolent extremism, fed by feelings of alienation, and while this may not lead to a specific terrorist threat or be a staging post for violent extremism, it is nevertheless a major challenge for society in general and for the police in particular. There also appears to be a growth in more extreme and violent forms of far-right ideology. Indeed it is clear that individuals from many different backgrounds are vulnerable, with no typical profile or pathway to radicalization.”

Recruitment and Radicalization: Overlook

In order for terrorist organizations to exist, all groups need to radicalize and recruit people to their cause. How, where and to what extent will vary amongst organizations. AQ, which aimed to expand its membership, would have recruited people in large numbers in Britain and internationally to advance its militant Islamist ideologies with the aim of a single Islamic

caliphate. After the process of radicalization, vulnerable individuals could be drawn into taking part in terrorist activities.

A range of factors similar to causes of Islamic radicalization drive recruitment for terrorist organizations. The fundamental factor in the radicalization process is ideology. Groups such as AQ cleverly incorporate their ideologies with beliefs of larger society in order to garner support. Justifying their actions through religious and ideological motives that appeal to people, promising rewards (money for families), cultivating the death of a martyr with symbols and rituals assuring support and a constant flux of new members for the organizations. Secondly, organizations today promote their views on the Internet. It is a tool for publicity, propaganda, terrorist planning, coordination, radicalization and recruitment. Furthermore, the Internet is used as a tool for dissemination of radical Islam, motivation, fundraising, psychological warfare, sharing information and networking. The third important tool in recruitment and radicalization are videos and clips presenting terrorist attacks and Muslim suffering as ways of provoking fury and hate. Moreover such video clips enhance the reputation and credibility of the terrorist organization and provide justification of what they do. A MI5 report concluded that “virtual social interaction drives radicalization in the virtual world, books, DVD’s, pamphlets and music all feature in the experiences of British terrorists but their emotional content – for example images of atrocities against Muslims – is often more important than their factual content.” Violence exploited through videotaped sermons calling for killing the infidels and Jews, leaflets encouraging Muslims to travel to various hotspots worldwide to wage Jihad, the preaching of imams to take up arms against the Crusaders and the Jews all play an important part in radical propaganda and recruitment. Forth, recruitment is often personality-driven, based on family ties or local allegiances. Furthermore, it is based on peer pressure, promise of status, financial rewards, social-economic factors, social injustice and dysfunction.

One of the most concerning grounds for UK extremism and terrorism recruitment reported in 2011 were young universities students. According to officials, 40 universities were under the risk

288 Ibid., pp. 8, 44
291 Ibid., p. 42
of radicalization or recruitment on campus.\textsuperscript{295} Research has shown that over 30\% of individuals in the UK convicted of Al Qaeda associated terrorist offences between 1999 and 2009 attended university or a higher education institution. Fifteen percent achieved vocational or further educational qualifications.\textsuperscript{296} Terrorists who have attended Britain’s most prestigious universities include Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, the Stockholm suicide bomber who had a BSc in sports therapy from the University of Luton, now the University of Bedfordshire. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Detriot underpants bomber, studied mechanical engineering at University College London between 2005 and 2008. Abid Naseer, the leader of the transatlantic liquid bomb plot, attended computer studies in Liverpool John Moores University. Abdulla Ahmed Ali and Assad Sarwar, convicted of the transatlantic liquid plot, attended City and Brunel Universities.\textsuperscript{297}

In a survey conducted by FOSIS in 2005, 1 in 5 Muslim students in Britain (18\%) would not report a fellow Muslim planning a terror attack and 52\% did not think organizations accused of extremism should be shut down. In 2006, 12\% of young Muslims in Britain (and 12\% overall) believed that suicide attacks against civilians in Britain were justified.\textsuperscript{298} In 2009, one third of British Muslim students supported killing for Islam and 40\% were in favor of Shari’a law in Britain.\textsuperscript{299}

“Violent radicalization is clearly a problem within the UK but it takes place within an international context.”\textsuperscript{300} The radicalization process has important overseas aspects. It is related to considerable numbers of individuals who engaged in terrorism in Britain and arrived from overseas, mainly Muslim countries affected by conflict and instability. Young British Muslims would travel to countries where classical Islamic educational methods are still taught in Egypt, Syria, Yemen\textsuperscript{301} or trained and operated in Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to plan and conduct terrorist operations in the UK.\textsuperscript{302} Many would return radicalized. Between 1999 and 2009, most of

\textsuperscript{301} H. A. Hellyer, \textit{Muslims of Europe. The ‘Other’ Europeans}, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 157
\textsuperscript{302} U.K. Home Office, \textit{CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering}
the convicted were British nationals but less than half were born in the UK. Furthermore, recruitment, radicalization and terrorist attacks planned in the UK have often occurred due to the ideology and influence of leaders and preachers from abroad, international financing and training.\textsuperscript{303}

\textbf{Radicalization Process}

After the 9/11 attacks, Europe, Australia and Canada witnessed new forms of attacks planned by local residents/citizens who sought to attack their own country, relying on AQ as inspiration and ideology. Such cases in Europe include the 2004 Madrid attack, the 7/7 London attack, Amsterdam’s Hofstad Groups, the Toronto 18 Case in Canada and in Australia the Operation Pendennis.\textsuperscript{304} With the process occurring rapidly after 9/11 and the need to counter such attacks emerging, understanding the process of radicalization became a top priority.

As previously indicated the fundamental aspect in the radicalization process is ideology. As reported by the Nork York Police Department (NYPD), “Jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out “autonomous jihad” via acts of terrorism against their host countries. It guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is the basis for action.”\textsuperscript{305}

“Terrorists do not all fall from the sky. They emerge from a set of strongly held beliefs. They are radicalized. Then they become terrorists.”\textsuperscript{306} As previously presented in the paper, there are various indicators that are a cause or foundation for radicalization. Although a person may pass through the process of radicalization, it does not mean that they will commit an act of terrorism.\textsuperscript{307} Individuals at any time and given any circumstance may enter, exit, and re-enter the radicalization process. It is described as a fluid process that has no timetable, nor does it necessarily lead to action.\textsuperscript{308} According to the NYPD, the radicalization process may take anywhere from a few months to a few years. Despite the different circumstances and facts from case to case, there appear...
to be a certain trend in behavior throughout all stages. The individuals who conclude the entire process are most likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist attack.  

The NYPD Report distinguishes between four main parts of the process with their own key indicators and triggers:

Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization  
Stage 2: Self-Identification  
Stage 3: Indoctrination  
Stage 4: Jihadization

**Pre-Radicalization**

Pre-radicalization is the individual’s ordinary life prior to radicalization – the starting point from where individuals begin their exposure to extreme ideology and progression towards radicalization. The key indicators are the individual’s background and environment, higher education, being a second or third generation immigrant, and being a recent convert to Islam.  

**Self-Identification**

In this stage the individuals come to identify with radical movements and embrace radical Islam. Both internal and external factors influence changes in the person’s personal behavior. By gravitating from their old identity, they formulate a new one and begin to associate themselves with like-minded people, further adopting Salafi ideology as their own. A trigger for entering into this stage maybe an event, crisis, social-economic conditions, or political and personal conflicts in which an individuals’ mind is set on a new perception or view of the world, looking for new meaning in life. Progression towards radicalization in the self-identification stage is movement towards Salafi Islam or regular attendance to a Salafi mosque.

**Indoctrination**

During indoctrination, one fully commits to the cause, intensifies and focuses on jihadi-Salafi ideology and beliefs. The individual takes on the political worldview and relates to Salafi Islam and its teachings. The individual identifies that action in the form of militant jihad, is the only way to support and further the cause. This phase is typically facilitated and driven by a “spiritual sanctioner.” The stage is characterized by a withdrawal from the mosque and movement towards a

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311 Ibid., pp. 6-7, 30-31
small group where radical ideas are adopted, shared and politicization of new beliefs occurs.\textsuperscript{312}

\textit{Jihadization}

The final phase of the radicalization process is the stage where the individual starts to take actions based on their beliefs. The individual, belonging to a group, acts according to the demands of the authority figure and takes part in preparations for combat or attacks by: travel abroad for training, Internet research, visiting jihadi websites, or physical surveillance of potential targets. Only small numbers of people pass to this phase, which can last for as little as a couple of weeks. The ultimate end of this phase is an attack.\textsuperscript{313}

Equally during the second and third stage certain behaviors may occur. The individual trusts only select religious authorities and ideologically rigid sets of authorities.\textsuperscript{314} Secondly, low tolerance occurs towards those who follow a different interpretation of Islam than they do. Third, an individual may impose his/her religious beliefs on others.\textsuperscript{315}

In June 2008 a MI5 report, of which sections appeared in \textit{The Guardian}, recognized several paths that can lead an individual to being radicalized. The report concluded that there is no single pathway to extremism. Individuals take very different paths of radicalization. The timeframe of the radicalization process can take months or even years but is always driven by contact with others who share extremist views. People who do enter the radicalization process and engage in extremist ideologies have some vulnerability. Furthermore, extremist groups may act as “fictive kin” for individuals who have lost ties with their families and community.\textsuperscript{316}

\textit{Forms of Financing Terrorist Activities}

Over the years the UK has been portrayed not only as the hub for radicalization but furthermore as a hub for Islamic finance. Sources of financing terrorist activities vary domestically and internationally. Amongst funds from legitimate sources are charities, legitimate businesses or self-financing by terrorist themselves. Funds from criminal sources include low-level crime, organized fraud, narcotics smuggling, state sponsors, activities in failed states and other safe-

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., p. 13
A number of organizations raise funds in order to support terrorists activities, while others intend to promote Islam through legitimate programs but become employed by jihadists that use their funds for their own radical needs. One of the five pillars in Islam is zakat – charity. Muslims are obligated to annually donate money, which becomes a source of income for Islamic charities and organizations with their own objectives. The main sources of Islamic terror funding structure are charities, wealthy individuals and state funding. Saudi Arabia has been one of the biggest financers of Islamic institutions and Muslim causes in the UK and a major source of financing for Islamic terrorist organizations. It has had a huge effect on British-Muslim life in Britain and has been able to propagate its ideology all over the UK. The collection of funds occurs in and outside mosques, during religious gatherings or through the direct approach of individuals and families. Islamic radicals use the same methods. In 2004, members of extreme Islamist groups such as Al-Muhajiroun collected finances for terrorist purposes during speeches made in London Central Mosque.

Forms of financing are profits from legitimate businesses that can be used as a front for money laundering. The possibility that a business will finance terrorist activities appears when the relation between sales reported and actual sales is difficult to verify. Further, banks have been used as a legitimate source for money laundering with the aim of financing terror groups and countries suspected of anti-Western activities. The 7/7 attacks highlighted a new development in terrorist finance: the domestic sources (self-funding) of planning and funding the attack where only cash was used and no proof of financial activity was available.

The use of criminal activity by terrorists to raise money ranges from low-level fraud to organized crime. Drug trafficking is one of the best sources of funding as it enables terrorist groups to raise large amounts of money. Credit card fraud is based on illegal purchases with a different

individual’s credit card details mostly through Internet and phone, as these are the easiest. Cheque fraud in which bank accounts are opened using false identity documents and fraudulent deposits, is another method. Once numbers of cheque books have been accumulated they are used to purchase items from department stores under the amounts that would not trigger security checks. The purchased good would be returned for a cash refund. This is considered to be another fast way of raising money quickly and efficiently.\textsuperscript{324} Safe-havens, failed states and state sponsors have the ability to fund terrorist activity due to the lack of effective jurisdictional control, tolerance of terrorist organizations and active support to the organizations. Such include Somalia, Iraq and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.\textsuperscript{325}

Further forms of financing are the Internet were individuals may launder money through gambling sites, TV stations,\textsuperscript{326} travel agencies, cell phone distributors, video pirating and extortion.

\textit{Radical Groups and Movements in the UK}

In a 2011 Prevent Strategy report, the British government acknowledged that the UK faced a series of terrorist threats of which the most serious were from AQ, its affiliates and likeminded organizations inspired by violent Islamism.\textsuperscript{327} In 2011, in England and Wales there were 115 terrorist offenders in custody of which 79 were associated with AQ or its affiliates.\textsuperscript{328} The latest reports by the House of Commons estimates that there are 48 proscribed international terrorist organizations in the UK in addition to 14 organizations proscribed in relation to Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{329} Amongst domestic groups openly operating in the UK, there are international organizations such as the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armée, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Gamma al-Islamiya or the Palestinian Hamas and Hizballah, that do not operate openly in UK and use links with more visible outfits that function as recruiting centers in London. Militant groups from Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria and Turkey all raise funds, forge links and disseminate propaganda in the UK.\textsuperscript{330}

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid., p. 19
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., p. 13
The organizations that have clearly influenced young British Muslims, played a main role in shaping radical views and supported militant Islam are presented below.

*Hizb al-Tahrir (HT)*

A revolutionary Islamist party, also known as Liberation Party was established in Jerusalem in 1952 by Taqi al-Din al Nabhani with the aim of uniting Muslims under a single Islamic state or caliphate with shari’a law and saving them from the corrupted Western influences. It established a strong position in the UK amongst the second and third generation of Muslims who felt alienated and lacked a sense of belonging. The organization established a London branch in 1986 under the leadership of Omar Bakri Mohammed after his deportation from Saudi Arabia and officially being banned from the organization in Saudi Kingdom. It was considered the leading organization in the UK, with an operational base in Croydon Mosque. HT gained followers especially amongst the young student community and obtained a strong position in students’ campuses where it promoted an anti-Zionist, homophobic and an anti-Hindu approach. Officially it is a non-violent party, however it defends the right to self-defense and endorses protests and political organizing through violence with statements such as: “Britain will be an Islamic state by the year 2020!” Its main purpose was the re-establishment of the Caliphate and return to the true Muslim society. With the lack of clarity on this issue it has been open to accusations of promoting violence. In the late 1990s the organization seemed to fade and was subject to government scrutiny due to its combative debates on campuses. Omar Bakri left HT in 1996 to establish a more radical organization, Al-Muhajiroun because of differences in policy and methods of action.

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331 The agreeable date varies among sources. Many identify 1952 as the founding date of Hizb-ut Tahrir, other 1953.

After the London 7/7 attacks, Tony Blair sought to ban HT on suspicion of ties to violent extremism, however investigations showed no evidence of HT ties with terrorism. Although banned by the National Union of Students’ No Platform Policy in a number of university campuses in the UK, it continues to operate secretly.\footnote{Rachel Briggs and Jonathan Birdwell, *Radicalisation among Muslims in the UK*, in Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe. Typologies of radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim communities, Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels, 2009, p. 126, Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/32616/1/55._Ethno-Religious_Conflict_in_Europe.pdf, Accessed 24 September 2012} To this day the organization continues to be very active in targeting students by speaking on campuses, using the Internet and social media such as Twitter and Facebook, and through organizing events and conferences.\footnote{Student promotion of Hizb ut-Tahrir highlights the group’s influence on campus, Available: http://www.studentrights.org.uk/article/1934/student_promotion_of_hizb_ut_tahrir_highlights_the_group_s_influence_on_campus, Accessed 12 August 2012} In 2007 the organization came under further scrutiny when several senior members left and a BBC *Panorama* program published a memoir of a former member who revealed information about his time in HT.\footnote{Peter Walker, *Anti-US protesters in London condemn controversial film*, The Guardian, 16 September 2012, Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/sep/16/anti-us-protesters-london, Accessed 18 September 2012} HT, as a result of the British governments pledges to ban the organization and further accusations, referred to itself as the “victim” of Western oppression. At present it is focusing on changing its image of an extremist organization.\footnote{Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, *Hizb ut-Tahrir. Ideology and strategy*, The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2009, p. 67, Available: http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1301651409_1.pdf, Accessed 12 August 2012} Over the years the HT in the UK has organized several protests against local and international events, which they saw as being insults against Islam and Muslims. The most recent include anti-US protests in London condemning a US-made anti-Islam film.\footnote{Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, *Hizb ut-Tahrir. Ideology and strategy*, The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2009, p. 67, Available: http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1301651409_1.pdf, Accessed 12 August 2012}

*Al-Muhajiroun (The Emigrants)*

Self-styled Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammad, who left Hizb-ut Tahrir, and Anjem Choudary, created the British independent branch of Al-Muhajiroun (AM) in 1996. The London based group publicly supported terrorism abroad, held public rallies with terrorist sympathizers, and organized
university events. Its main purpose was the establishment of the Islamic state by providing the basis for violent activities in Britain and legitimizing violent activities abroad. The AM was known for its anti-Western demonstrations, support of shari’a law, praise of the 9/11 terrorists describing them as the “Magnificent 19,” and recruitment for operations with specific focus on university campuses. Furthermore, it called Muslims and non-Muslims to follow their fundamentalist beliefs, which called for those practicing homosexuality, adultery, fornication and bestiality to be stoned to death. The official number of members was unknown, however in 2004 the group claimed officially 700 members. The organization was legitimately disbanded in 2004 and succeeded by two separate groups, The Savior Sect and Al-Ghurabaa. In 2005, Al-Ghurabaa took credit for the Muslim protests in London against the Danish Prophet Mohammad cartoons. The group’s website openly praised Osama bin Laden, warned of death punishments for those who insult the prophet, and like its mother organization (al-Muhajiroun), was homophobic. Despite being banned in 2006 under the British Terrorism Act for “the glorification” of terrorism, supporters of Al-Ghurabba with numbers of front organizations in Britain, reorganized themselves under new names: as al-Firqat un-Naajiyah and Ahl al Sunnah Wal Jama’ah: the Saved Sect, and the Messenger and his Companions. Controversies surrounding the group involved the 2001 claim that Omar Bakri called for the assassination of Tony Blair for the British support of the war in Afghanistan, and its links to the April 2003 suicide bombing in Mikes Bar in Israel. The bomber Asif Hanif, a twenty-one year old from West London, was a regular visitor of al-Muhajiroun meetings. Further, AM, links to violence include British and international members

who have committed acts of terrorism or suspected of such, including: Mohammed Siddique Khan (leader of 7/7), Omar Kyan (ringleader of the fertilizer bombers), allegedly Richard Reid (shoe bomber) and Haroon Rasheed Aswad (arrested in 2005 for attempting to start a MA training camp for UK and USA jihadists in Oregon).  

In June 2009, Al-Muhajiroun attempted to re-launch in Holborn, where Choudary presented an anti-British and anti-Semitic approach, referring to British society as “dirty.” The Center for Social Cohesion reported that between 1999 and 2009, 15% of individuals convicted for terrorist related offences were connected to AM.

**Deobandism**

Deobandism is a Sunni Islamic movement that was established in 1867 in Deoband, India, by two Islamic scholars (Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohias) against British colonialism. The role of the Deoband seminary was to shape individual’s mindset, purify their character, teach Hanafi law and guide them through spiritual practice. It is estimated that over a century it established nearly nine thousand Deobandi centers of learning in the Indian subcontinent.

The Deobandi movement arrived to the UK with the migration of South Asians in the 1960s and 1970s. They created main centers in the North-West (Bolton, Preston and Blackburn, Leicester and West Yorkshire) with a network of mosques across Britain and most importantly for the movement, Islamic seminaries (daru’l-ulum). Seminaries, such as the one at Bury in the north of England are replicas of the original Indian institution in which a new generation of British born would learn ulama. Deobandism teachings encourage the return to a traditional interpretation of Islam and are associated with Tablighi Jamaat and some argue with AQ and the Taliban. In 2007 it was reported, that the movement’s leading UK imam, Riyadh ul Haq (former imam at Birmingham Central Mosque) urged Muslims to reject western values and segregate from non-Muslims. He preached anti-Semitism, urged Muslims to “shed blood for Allah,” openly supported

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359 Ibid.
363 Ibid., pp. 85-86
armed jihad, praised the Taliban and expressed passion for martyrdom.\textsuperscript{366} Since the nineties, Deobandism has become an influential movement overtaking, as estimated by police, in 2007 more than 600 of Britain’s 1,350 mosques, though 170 of London mosques have been officially classified as Deobandi. Furthermore, it was estimated that out of 26 Islamic seminaries in Britain, the movement ran 17, producing 80\% of clerics trained there.\textsuperscript{367}

\textit{Tablighi Jamaat (The Preaching Party)}

Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) is an offshoot of the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam, which was established in the 1920s by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi. The group, although based on traditions, followed its own methods of preaching, self-discipline and service among members.\textsuperscript{368} Over the years it has developed influence in nearly 150 countries by offering preaching tours and encouraging Muslims to be more religiously observant.\textsuperscript{369} With its teachings, TJ has not avoided criticism due to promoting the separation of religion and politics, which is against the nature of Islam.\textsuperscript{370}

Britain first came to contact with TJ through a preaching tour in 1945. However, it was not until the 1960s that the group established its activities in mosques and madrassas with a focus on teaching basics of Islam to migrants from South Asia. With the growing acceptance from the Muslim community and popularity in 1982, the TJ created a center with a nearby mosque and Institute of Islamic Education.\textsuperscript{371} Despite the group being highly decentralized, the Dewsbury Central Mosque in West Yorkshire, has been its European headquarters.\textsuperscript{372} It is estimated that the number of followers worldwide ranges from 12 to 80 million.\textsuperscript{373} In the UK its followers include professionals, business owners, political leaders and those who search for a sense in life, especially


\textsuperscript{367} Ibid.


young Muslims who are disillusioned with modern society and search for a sense of belonging are easily influenced.\textsuperscript{374}

Since 9/11 there have been claims that due to the “group’s missionary activities and loose organizational structure [it] can be exploited by radical elements.”\textsuperscript{375} It has been claimed that terrorists might have used the TJ as a cover. Although the majority of members are interested in self-renewal and religiosity, some have been accused of having ties to radical networks. Individuals who have been involved in terrorism and suspected of being part of the group in Britain are Richard Reid, Mohammed Sidique Khan, Kafeel and Sabeel Ahmed.\textsuperscript{376}

\textit{Jama’at-I Islami (The Islamic Society, Islamic Party)}

This political movement established in Pakistan by Abu Ala Mawdudi in 1941,\textsuperscript{377} is recognized as one of the most influential parties in South Asia. It has developed a strong position in Europe, especially the UK, where in 2001 over two-thirds of Muslims were from South Asia.\textsuperscript{378} The main aim was to “transform all social, economic and political structures according to the teachings of Islam.”\textsuperscript{379} Officially it was recognized in Europe with the establishment of the UK Islamic Mission and its affiliate Dawatul Islam, which until today promotes Islamic education with a specific focus on Jama’at-I Islami thinkers. The movement inspired several groups in the UK, including the Islamic Society of Britain and Young Muslims UK, which work to help Muslims in Britain.\textsuperscript{380}

Despite the limited information available and the need for further research, it has been suggested that Jama’at-i-Islami is connected to terrorism. The movement and groups affiliated with it have ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Jama’at-i-Islami has been recognized as a radical


political movement in South Asia with fascist tendencies and possible connections to AQ, it has strong support in the UK through NGOs and charities such as Muslim Aid.\textsuperscript{381} The British state and main banks have been suspected of financing Jama`at politicians in Pakistan. Furthermore, Islamic Foundation UK, East London Mosque, Muslim Aid UK, Dawatul Islam and the UK Islamic Mission are known to have provided support of Jama’at's anti-secularism and anti-western literature and ideals.\textsuperscript{382}

\textit{Islam4UK}

Islam4UK founded by Anjem Choudary, was an offshoot of al-Muhajiroun. After the British government banned The Savior Sect and Al Ghurabaa in 2006, its members continued to operate under Islam4UK. It was estimated that the group had no more than 1,500 members, however due to the controversy surrounding the group, it received heavy media attention.\textsuperscript{383} The group offered a platform for Omar Bakri for his lectures over the Internet. It officially supported al-Muhajiroun with plans to create an Islamic state and introduce shari’a law.\textsuperscript{384} Its website introduced a picture of Buckingham Palace converted to a mosque.\textsuperscript{385}

In 2010, Islam4UK received media attention when it announced a march through Wooton Bassett – the town came to symbolize the fatalities sustained by British forces in Afghanistan. It was canceled when the group was included in terrorism legislation and banned in January 2010.\textsuperscript{386}

\textit{Supporters of Sharia (SOS)}

The group was formed in 1994 by Abu Hamza al-Masri and, as stated on its website, by “(...) brothers involved in jihad in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and to give the message to the average Muslims - message which is being hindered by non-Muslims and also by Muslims who like to give the point of view of Islam which does not oppose the enemies of Islam.”\textsuperscript{387} It openly states its objectives to defend Shari’a law through jihad of Islamic groups and re-establish the Caliphate. Its agenda includes the fight against Western society, which they see as anti-Islamic, and the creation of an

\textsuperscript{382} Ibid.
Islamic state. The leader himself encourages Muslims not to integrate into British society.\textsuperscript{388} The site offers anti-Western information including fatwaa on American-Zionists, currently unavailable for viewing.\textsuperscript{389}

**Influential Leaders**

The majority of radical leaders in the UK share one common characteristic. In order to avoid prosecution in their country of origin, they arrived to the UK in the 1980s and 1990s in search of political asylum. As set out earlier, the British government’s belief was that acceptance and tolerance towards the radicals would secure the UK from any Islamic attacks at home. *Londonistan* accepted jihadi refugees from Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Egypt and other countries, who, under the protection of British law, financed and plotted attacks globally.\textsuperscript{390} Before 9/11 and following the 7/7 terrorist attacks, officials monitored radical activity in the UK, however never arrested or extradited leaders despite evidence of their activities. The British support of “the right of racial individuals to orchestrate the eradication of the rights of their opponents” guaranteed – “individuals were protected from prosecution in their countries of origin by British legislation that inhibits the extradition of suspects.”\textsuperscript{391} With lax immigration and asylum laws, flaws in the border control system, a liberal approach, support of democratic values and little but existing anti-terrorists policies before 2001, the UK was the ideal hub and safe-house for radicals and the development of terrorist activity.

**Abu Hamza al Masri**

Abu Hamza al Marsi, originally Mustafa Kamel Mustafa,\textsuperscript{392} was described as Britain’s most notorious and outspoken Muslim cleric, who spread anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, praised Osama bin Laden, defended shari’a law, supported jihad, urged supporters to kill, favored re-establishing the Caliphate, and recruited, influenced and financed terrorists.

He initially emigrated from Egypt to the UK in 1979. In 1984 he married a British citizen named – Valerie Fleming. From what could have appeared to be integration into British society, he

\textsuperscript{389} ibid.
turned towards a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran. After his divorce in 1990, he returned to Egypt where he became a self-taught Sheikh. He traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan during the period of civil war. Abu Hamza stated he lost his eye and hands while fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After his return to the UK, he formed Supporters of Sharia in 1994, and further established a strong position amongst the Muslim community when he took over the Finsbury Park Mosque in 1996. He became known as the radical cleric and imam who created a training ground for extremist Islamists. As part of a counter-terrorism operation the police raided the mosque in 2003 and seized replica guns and CS gas canisters. In 2004, Abu Hamza was convicted by US officials on 11 counts of criminal conduct related to the 1998 hostage taking of sixteen individuals in Yemen, supporting Afghanistan in 2001 and collaborating to establish a jihad-training camp in Bly, Oregon between June 2000 and December 2001.

Charged in 2006, by British officials for soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred, he was sentenced to seven years in prison. After years of battling his extradition in 2008, the UK’s Home Secretary approved his extradition to the USA. He was extradited to the USA on 5 October 2012 and faced a trial on 26 August 2012, after pleading not guilty to terrorism charges. For the full timeline of Abu Hamza’s battle to stay in the UK since 2001, refer to the appendix.

**Anwar al-Alwaki**

Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Alwaki was a propagandist leader for radical Islam and the main figure in the propagation of AQ messages. Well-educated (PhD in Human Resource Development) and understanding of both Middle Eastern and Western culture, he spread the ideology of violent extremism and established his position as a mentor to numbers of young people.

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Muslims globally. His extremist views were influenced by the teachings of Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam. In a brochure, “44 Ways to Support Jihad,” he encouraged Muslims to take part in jihad either personally, by funding or by “jihad of the word.” During his time in the USA, al-Alwaki faced several arrests for his activities and was suspected of links to the 9/11 attacks. Due to lack of evidence he was released. He left the USA in 2001 and settled in London, where he became very active. With the aim of influencing young people, he found followers in Islamic centers and student societies, and amongst British Muslims who suffered identity problems, and were anti-western due to conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine. He became involved with the Muslim Association of Britain – the British arm of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies. Al-Alwaki’s videos, posted in South Bank University in London, attracted thousands of viewers, who perceived him as an authority on religious and political matters.

In 2004 he left for Yemen. In 2006 he was charged which kidnapping and terrorism and imprisoned for one year. After his release he continued his propaganda activities from Yemen through the usage of new media. He influenced and mentored potential attackers and groups including Nidal Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood Shooter; Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber; and Roshonara Choudry, a British student who stabbed Labour MP Stephen Timms in 2010. It has been reported that Al-Alwaki’s lectures further influenced British Muslims who plotted bombings of the London Stock Exchange, Big Ben, the Houses of Parliament, the US Embassy, the home of London Mayor Boris Johnson and two Jewish synagogues.

Anwar al-Alwaki died in a US military drone operation in Yemen on 30 September 2011.

Omar Bakri Muhammed

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400 Ibid.
402 Ibid.
Omar Bakri Muhhamed is a Syrian born, Sunni cleric and religious extremist that called for holy war against Britain; encouraged young Muslims to join insurgency in Iraq; supported the holocaust, AQ, and jihad; and is a believer in the superiority of Islam.\textsuperscript{406}

He moved to the UK in January 1986 after being expelled from Saudi Arabia for challenging the Saudi regime and his membership in Hizb al Tahrir. He immediately established the UK branch of Hizb al Tahrir (1986-1996) and secondly, the London based Al-Muhajiroun (1996-2004).\textsuperscript{407} Between 1994 and 1998 he spoke in Trafalgar Square and Wembley Stadium during Islamist rallies.\textsuperscript{408} Bakri, and Abu Qataba provided the base for radicalization with a rejectionist Islamic message in Britain and were considered to be the spiritual leaders of Muslim Brotherhood with links to AQ. It was claimed in 2002, that “every Al-Qaeda operative recently arrested or identified in Europe came into contact with Bakri at some time or other.”\textsuperscript{409}

In May 2004, he led a demonstration outside the USA Embassy in London during which they chanted “Osama bin Laden” and burned an American flag.\textsuperscript{410} The cleric sparked several controversies during which he confirmed his anti-British views. He referred to the London bombers as “the fantastic four”, claimed that the British people were to blame for the London terror attacks, since they “did not make enough effort to stop its own government committing its own atrocities in Iraq and Afghanistan,” and did not inform the officials if he knew about the planned attack.\textsuperscript{411} After 7/7, the police raided his home in Luton. Omar Bakri fled Britain to Lebanon, in August and was denied return to Britain on the basis of supporting terrorism. During his years in the UK, he received social benefits from the British government, claiming that Islam allowed him to benefit from what the system offered.\textsuperscript{412} In 2007 he was arrested and convicted to life imprisonment in Lebanon for his membership in an armed group aiming to kill Lebanese soldiers and commit terrorist acts.\textsuperscript{413}

\textit{Anjem Choudary}

\textsuperscript{411} \textit{Ibid.}
Choudary was born in 1967 in Welling, Kent. He studied medicine before switching to law after which he became qualified in the Society of Muslim Lawyers.414 After his degree he moved to London in 1991, married in 1996 and started a family. He was what one could describe to be a “normal” young British citizen, who enjoyed drinking and partying, which are forbidden under Islamic law. It was not until 1996, when he met Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammed in Woolwich mosque, that he fully focused on his extremism. He became the co-founder of Al-Muhajiroun, founder of Islam4UK, a leading figure in al-Ghurabaa and spiritual advisor to the British group Muslims Against Crusades.415 Anjem Choudary believes in the superiority of Islam, a life based on shari’a and its implementation in the UK, and the practice of dawah and jihad against the kuffar (unbeliever). He praised Osama bin Laden and Al-Alwaki, called his followers to fight against the USA and UK and return to the Caliphate.416 The supporter of terrorism regarded the 9/11 attackers as the “magnificent martyrs” and encouraged young British Muslims to follow such attacks. He focused on variety of issues in order to attract a broad range of Muslims, most importantly topics that he defined as oppressing Muslims. Choudary was the organizer of a number of anti-western events, including demonstrations in which he was arrested for preaching hatred. In July 2006, as the organizer of the February protest outside the Danish Embassy, he was found guilty and fined for a total of eight hundred pounds for holding unauthorized public demonstrations.417 The same year, he spoke outside Westminster Cathedral and called for the execution of Pope Benedict XVI and the death of those who dared to insult the message of Mohammed.418 In 2011, once again he attracted media attention when he launched a poster campaign across the UK declaring shari’a-controlled zones with enforced Islamic rules. The leaflets distributed to the public ordered no gambling, music or concerts, porn or prostitution, drugs, smoking or alcohol. Despite Islam4UK being banned, the group members continue to be active and spread extremist views amongst the British Muslim society.419 Choudary fully took advantage of the British system, its liberal laws and freedom of speech. Despite being well

416 Ibid.
educated and capable of work he received housing benefits and income support from the government amounting to nearly two thousand pounds a month.\textsuperscript{420}

\textit{Abdullah el-Faisal}

The Jamaican, Islamic cleric was born in 1964 into a Christian family. Originally born Trevor William Forrest, he converted to Islam in 1980, changed his name and moved to Saudi Arabia where he studied Islamic Studies in Riyadh for eight years.\textsuperscript{421} After his degree, he migrated to the UK where he married a British citizen. In the nineties el-Faisal established study circles in London’s Tower Hamlets and traveled the UK preaching racial hatred. He followed a similar ideology as al-Muhajiroun and became known for his radical preaching and, anti-Semitic sermons in which he encouraged young British Muslims to kill Jews, Hindus, Americans and Christians in order to receive a place in paradise and become heroes. He called on Muslim youth to learn how to use rifles, fly planes and use missiles to kill non-believers. Through his lecture tapes available in Islamic bookstores, he encouraged women to raise their children “with the jihad mentality.”\textsuperscript{422} It was reported that he influenced Germaine Lindsay and Richard Reid. In 2000 he was stopped by Heathrow border patrol for the possession of Arabic lecture notes but only arrested after police found tape lectures while investigating AQ links to the UK after 9/11.\textsuperscript{423}

In 2003, he was sentenced to nine years in prison for religious hatred, the usage of threatening, insulting recordings and soliciting the murder of Jews and Hindus. After seven years of his sentence he was deported to Jamaica. It has been reported that el-Faisal continues to spread his extremist views to British youth through the Internet, encouraging jihad in order to conquer nations.\textsuperscript{424}

\textit{Abu Qatada}

Abu Qatada, formerly Omar Otham, is a Palestinian-Jordanian. He is described as an important theologian of global jihad and an AQ operative in Europe. Qatada arrived in the UK seeking asylum from Jordan in September 1993. In 1994, he began preaching at the Fourth Feather

community, near Regent’s Park, and held meetings in his home. Qatada became well known amongst the British Muslim community and the Algerian and Egyptian armed Islamists. Through his religious rulings he supported an Islamic government on Muslim lands and justified arm actions against enemies of Islam.\(^\text{425}\) Abu Qatada came under government’s scrutiny, when he openly spoke about rulings justifying suicide attacks during a BBC \textit{Panorama} interview in 2001. While questioned for his alleged connections to a German cell, police found £170,000 in his home, with additional £805 in an envelope labeled “For the mujahedeen in Chechnya.” He was released without charges and disappeared. In 2002, at the age of forty-two, Qatada was detained as a suspect terrorist with links to Bin Laden under the new Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.\(^\text{426}\) He was suspected of influencing and advising several individuals who where arrested in connection with terrorism, including Richard Reidand and Zacarias Moussaoui.\(^\text{427}\) He was referred to as “Osama bin Laden’s ambassador in Europe” and “spiritual head of the mujahideen in Britain.” The US, Spain, France and Algeria accused Qatada of being a key influence in the 9/11 attacks.\(^\text{428}\) After his arrest in 2002, he spent two-and-a-half years in special security units of Belmarsh. Released in March 2005, he again returned to detention, after Britain signed a “memorandum of understanding” with Jordan, enabling his deportation under the reassurance of fair trial. He was released in 2008 after an appeal and ordered a twenty-two hour curfew. The court of appeal blocked his deportation.\(^\text{429}\) After years of trials the British government has officially lost in its efforts to deport the Muslim cleric. On 12 November 2012, the court upheld its decision against Qatada’s extradition to Jordan and once again he was released on bail from Long Lartin prison in Worcestershire. He faces a re-trial for conspiring to cause explosions on Western and Israeli targets in 1998 and 1999.\(^\text{430}\)

\textbf{Inspiration and Influence from abroad}

Muslims are divided into two branches: Sunni (between 85%-90%) and Shia (10%-15%,


minority in most Islamic countries).\textsuperscript{431} Of the total Muslim population in Britain, the majority are Sunni. There is a noticeable lack of accurate information regarding the percentage of Shia and Sunni in the UK. The 2001 statistics suggested that of the 1.6 million British Muslims, Shia’s made up 10% (up to 40,000) with a large population located in London, Birmingham, Manchester and the Midlands.\textsuperscript{432} In 2009 it was estimated that the Shia Muslim population was 100,000-300,000, (approximately 10-15%).\textsuperscript{433} The presented data confirmed that the majority of Shia in the UK are Pakistanis, Iranians, Iraqis, Bahrainis, Lebanese, Afghans, East African Indians and Yemenis.\textsuperscript{434}

The split in Islam took place after Mohammad’s death in 632, when there was no agreement regarding who was to be the Prophet’s successor. Sunnis believed that Abu Bakr, Mohammad’s closest companion and one of the earliest converts to Islam should have been the next leader. Shia (the party of Ali) accepted Ali, Mohammad’s son-in-law, as the rightful successor on the basis of descent.\textsuperscript{435}

As the majority of Muslims in the UK are Sunni, there has been immense influence on radicalization in Britain from Saudi Arabia through its financing of organizations involved in radical forms of Islam and Pakistan as the ground for training young British Muslims and birth of Islamic ideologies present in the UK.

\textit{Sunni}

\textit{Saudi Arabia}

Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, home to Wahhabism, a strict puritanical form of Sunni Islam created in the eighteenth century by Muhammad Inb Abd Al-Wahhab and place of pilgrimage to Mecca by Muslims from all over the world. Islam rules over all levels of Saudi citizens’ lives and further influences Muslims abroad.\textsuperscript{436} Today, Wahhabism, a strand of salafism is closely connected to the Saudi ruling family. It is understood as a Sunni Islamic movement with the goal of purifying Islam of any innovations or practices that defer from the teaching of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[435] Ibid., p. 60
\end{footnotes}
It is “the religion of the Saudi royals, the state bureaucracy, the army and air force and, of course, Osama bin Laden.” Wahhabism influenced Osama bin Laden and various extremist groups. Imams study in Medina Mosque in Saudi Arabia, which is considered to be the second holiest mosque in Islam. Clerics, imams and teachers (85% of available places have been reserved for foreigners) follow a strict, intolerant and militant Wahhabi interpretation of the Koran. Saudi Arabia has funded a number of radical teachers and clerics who arrived to the West through Islamic charitable organizations. They have been known to preach misinterpretations of the faith to young British Muslims.

Saudi Arabia is the financer of Islamic activities worldwide. The country finances mosques, Islamic centers, and charities; and sends missionaries and Islamic literature promoting Wahhabi thought throughout the world, with a focus on Muslim minorities in the West. It was estimated that Saudi Arabia spent between two and three billion dollars per year abroad since 1975 for religious causes. Over the years the Saudi Royal family funded 1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centers and dozens of Muslim academies and schools. Several books that have been used in the West, including in the UK, have taught, “hate ideology.” In 2007, it was reported that a quarter of Britain’s mosques owned hateful literature that was published in English and distributed by agencies linked to the government of Saudi Arabia. Books, leaflets, DVDs and journals spread anti-Western messages and hatred towards Jews and Christians and warned about the consequences of being homosexual and a believer of faiths other than Islam. In 2007, the CNN Dispatches reported that the translated Koran for Britain, published in 2006, with King Abdullah’s seal of approval and, produced under the supervision of the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs contained footnotes in which it told the readers to disregard the number of verses preaching peace and tolerance. The comments suggested that they were no longer true and modern Muslims should not

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follow the narrow interpretation. The Saudi Government has been known to have direct and indirect ties to several main stream institutions, leading mosques and madrassas in the UK that have been suspected of supporting and spreading extremist ideology of the Salafist-Jihadi movements.

**Pakistan**

Radicalization and fundamentalism in Britain have been influenced by Islamic ideologies that have appeared in Pakistan and spread in the UK by Saudi-finance preachers in mosques. The problem of violent religious radicalization has been present in Pakistan for years and has affected its relations with other nations.

There are over 174 million Muslims in Pakistan, which is 96.3% of the population. Pakistan is the second largest Muslim country in the world, with 11.1% of the world’s Muslims. Despite Pakistan being dominated by Sunni Islam, it is the second country in the world with the largest Shia population. The majority of people follow the “Sunni Moslem” tradition closely associated with the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam, however many are also influenced by Sufism – “a more mystical form of Islam.” “Although Islam plays a central role in the life of most Pakistanis it was not subverted by violent extremists because of its Hanafi and Sufi influences.”

Since its formation, Pakistan has been under the influence of clergy and the power of Islam, which in the state serves as a basis for extremist and violent versions of Islam based on Wahhabi and Deobandi brands of fundamentalism. Furthermore, due to its strategic location, it played an important role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where it supported and trained the Taliban ideologically and militarily through its Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and help from Saudi Arabia. After the war, militant and extremist groups established their positions in the northwestern regions of Pakistan. Many Afghan Mujahideen formed new Jihadist outfits such as the Taliban and AQ in the early 1990s. Since then, Pakistan has become a haven and supporter of Islamic Terrorist Organizations such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Jama‘at-I Islami which received financing from local private donors, from the Muslim Diaspora in the US, from Saudi

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449 Ibid., 14

450 Ibid., p. 15
Arabia, the UK and the United Arab Emirates.\footnote{Rubina Saigol, \textit{Radicalization of state and society in Pakistan}, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, p. 18, Available: \url{http://www.pk.boell.org/downloads/Chapter_Rubina_Final.pdf}, Accessed 20 October 2012} Pakistan, along with Afghanistan, has been recognized as a regional base and training center for Islamic Army activities supporting insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Kashmir region and Chechnya. Furthermore, it has assisted in running training camps for the Taliban, AQ and individuals preparing for terrorist attacks, such as members of 7/7 attacks.\footnote{Al-Qaeda had training camps in Pakistan, reveal CIA documents, 20 January 2012, Available: \url{http://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/al-qaeda-had-training-camps-in-pakistan-reveal-cia-documents--8080.html?page=2}, Accessed 20 October 2012} In November 2008, according to UK Security Services, over 4,000 British Muslims trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.\footnote{Kim Sengupta, \textit{British Muslims have become a mainstay of the global ‘jihad’}, The Independent, 29 November 2008, Available: \url{http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/british-muslims-have-become-a-mainstay-of-the-global-jihad-1040232.html}, Accessed 15 October 2012} Since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia has provided relief and humanitarian assistance to Pakistan. It has furthermore sponsored, either directly or through a network of charities, thousands of madrassas in Pakistan where teachings of Wahhabi Islam take place until today. “Over time, these schools became the breeding grounds for fanatical ideologies espoused by extremist groups (notably Al Qaeda and the Taliban) in the region of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, and other parts of the country.”\footnote{Akram Elias, \textit{Pakistan: a failed state?}, Security Debrief, 29 April 2009, Available: \url{http://securitydebrief.com/2009/04/29/pakistan-a-failed-state/}, Accessed 20 October 2012}454

\textbf{Shia}

\textbf{Iraq}

In 2009 it was estimated that 19-22 million Shia lived in Iraq, close to 70\% of the whole country’s population.\footnote{Mapping the global Muslim population, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Pew Research Center, October 2009, p. 10, Available: \url{http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_Content/Muslimpopulation.pdf}, Accessed 21 October 2012} The country has been dominated by the Sunni minority, which has left the country in a long-term Sunni-Shi’ite conflict for political domination in Iraq. The Shia population has lived under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship.\footnote{Bobby Ghosh, \textit{Behind the Sunni-Shi’ite Divide}, The Magazine, 5 March 2007, Available: \url{http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1592849-2,00.html}, Accessed 20 October 2012} In 1991, during the Iraqi revolt against him, thousands of Shi’its were killed. Local tensions have further spread as a result of the US invasion in 2003. After Sadam’s fall in April 2003, Iraq became the central point for global jihad, gaining new recruits from the Muslim world and different jihadists from other fronts.\footnote{Patrick Sokhdeo, \textit{Global Jihad. The future in the face of militant Islam}, Issac Publishing, USA, 2007, p. 299} Sunni jihadi groups such as Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi’s Al-Qaeda began a bombing campaign against Shia
However, due to the anti-American approach, a number of Shia joined the insurgency against the USA and its allies, which caused more discussion regarding Sunni-Shia relations. Since 2003, both Sunni and Shia rebels have attacked the coalition, Iraqi government forces and civilians. Between 2005 and 2006, intra-Shiite political rivalries have led to an eruption of violence, mainly in the southern Iraq. In the years 2006 and 2008, Sunni Iraqis in Baghdad, al Anbar province fought primarily against Sunni rebels, foreign fighters and AQ operatives, who they sought responsible for violence in their communities. The fear of the possibility of Shia expanding its powers through the region served as a useful fund-raising tool and recruitment propaganda for terrorist groups.

Patrick Sookhedeo has written the following regarding the Iraq conflict and the growth and thinking of extremist groups:

“The continuing struggle in Iraq has strengthened the jihadi concept of the total struggle, in which politics and media are as important as the military battle. It has also encouraged their psychological warfare doctrine, whose aim is to dominate the enemy’s imagination and mold the way he thinks about the war. They realize that the main battlefield is in the minds of the Western public and the weakening of resolve in Europe and in part of the American public has vindicated their strategies and encouraged them to redouble their efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. They have become convinced that the very ferocity and barbarity of their actions, the powerful imagery of Muslims as victims and as victors now broadcast on all the modern media channels, furthers their cause, weakens the enemy and gains them sympathizers and recruits in the Muslim world.”

V. Islamic Terrorist activity in the UK (2000-2012)

Terrorist Attacks and Plots: Case Studies

London 7 July 2005 (7/7)

On 7 July 2005, fifty-two people lost their lives and over seven hundred were injured in a terrorist attack on London’s city transport. This was the first and only successful plot to date conducted by homegrown, Salafi-Jihadi, suicide bombers in the UK.

At 8:50 a.m. three explosions took place in London’s Underground in a Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate Station, in a Circle Line just outside Edgware Road, and in a
Piccadilly Line tunnel, between King’s Cross and Russell Square. At 9:47 a.m., a bomb exploded in a London bus, number 30 in Tavistock Square. The four bombers, who died during the attacks, were Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shehzaad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay, and Hasib Mir Hussein.\textsuperscript{464}

After the London 7/7 attacks the Muslim community came under suspicion when it was revealed that three of the suspected suicide bombers came from Pakistani families living in Leeds, specifically from a working-class, poor and racially mixed neighborhood called Beeston. Khan, Tanweer and Hussein were neither poor nor underprivileged. Investigations concluded that the London bombers’ background was “largely unexceptional” and that there was no clear profile of a “British Islamist terrorist”, with the partial exception of Lindsay.\textsuperscript{465} There is no one explanation of the motives. The background of the attackers, however suggests, that it was not poverty or unemployment but rather a severe identity crisis typical to second and third generation immigrants that served as the main factor behind their decision to turn towards terrorism.\textsuperscript{466} Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy of bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of AQ. The extent of its involvement in planning the 7/7 attacks is unclear. Some suspects included homegrown-based extremists in the UK, who were inspired by AQ.\textsuperscript{467} It is likely, that the 7/7 attacks were carried out as part of al-Zawahiri’s 2002 campaign, where he announced that allies supporting the USA in Iraq would suffer severe consequences.\textsuperscript{468}

Mohammed Siddique Khan the ringleader of the cell, detonated his explosives outside Edgware Road. He was thirty-years-old and the eldest of the attackers. He lived in Beeston, Leeds with his pregnant wife and eighteen-month old daughter. Khan was very known and respected in his community. He was described as a father figure and was employed as a learning mentor at a local primary school until December 2004, where he guided children with social problems. In the mid-1990s, he was part of a group known as the Mullah Boys (a group of young generation Britons of Pakistani origin), which focused on helping drug addicts. The group turned religious after 9/11. It is unclear when Khan developed his affinity for extreme Islamism. Apparently, he attended a local mosque in Beeston where the clerics spoke Urdu. With poor understanding of the language, he referred to Wahhabi literature, which was translated into English. The main problem that occurred in Khans life, as reported by his brother, was that he and his wife were from different


Islamic backgrounds. Khan was from a Barelvi Islamic background and his wife was a Deobandi Muslim. Khan’s relationship with his family was destroyed as he disobeyed his family and married. At this moment Khan accepted a more radical salafi version of Islam that was dismissive of traditional Islam and considered all Salafi groups equal. Over time, Khan became more devoted to Islam, less talkative, more introverted and slightly more intolerant about dissenting views. However, overall he was seen as a good citizen.469

Shehzad Tanweer was responsible for the attack between Liverpool Street and Aldgate Station. The twenty-two-year-old grew up in a respected, well-off Pakistani family in Leeds, where his father—a self-made businessman, was seen as a pillar of the community. Tanweer was a friend of Khan from an early age but lost contact with him until they met coincidentally in a gym a few years prior to 2005. Tanweer attended Leeds Metropolitan University and enjoyed a life that many could not afford in Beeston. He grew up in a religious but not extremist environment. It was not until the 9/11 attacks that he became more religious and began socializing more radical individuals. Apparently a fair amount of young Muslims returned to Islam after September 11. With Islam as the main focus of his life, he lost interest in his studies and spent his time with Khan and Hussein in a local Islamic bookstore. Without employment his father supported him. In December 2004, Tanweer and Khan traveled to Lahore, where they stayed for a couple of months. It is suspected that both received terrorist training at a madrassa run by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).470 Before the attack, Khan taped a film (last will), which was broadcast on the al-Jazeera network. He identified himself as a soldier at war, speaking about the need to sacrifice in order to be heard and Muslims to be free. He blamed British society for oppressing his people in Iraq and all around the world, for which they needed to be held responsible for.471

The British authorities obtained the majority of information regarding the London bombings after the attacks. It appeared that the British domestic intelligence agency MI5 and government officials received warnings regarding possible terrorist activity before the unfortunate attacks in 2005. Prior to the London bombings, the MI5 conducted surveillance of Khan and Tanweer after their travel to Pakistan, with suspicions of terrorist activity and connections to Al Qaeda members, who were planning a series of attacks across South-East Britain with fertilizer bombs.472 Despite several leads, months before the bombings, officials failed to keep tabs or link them to the 7/7

conspiracies. MI5 claimed that they could not identify Khan, although during eighteen months of surveillance and investigation under codenamed Operation CREVICE, they made inquiries about a telephone registered in his name, recorded his conversations (they included jihadi activity in Pakistan, support of the Taliban and UK foreign policy), followed him and had photographs of him, amongst other information.

Germaine Lindsay detonated himself in the Piccadilly tunnel. He was a nineteen-year-old, Jamaican-born convert to Islam, who had a difficult childhood. He did not know his biological father and was beaten by his stepfather. Khan was described as a bright person, and talented individual in sports, arts and music. His path to extreme Islam started about four years before 7/7. After his conversion he referred to himself as Jamal, turned away from friends, stopped listening to music and playing sports, started wearing the traditional white thobe, learned Arabic and attended Omar Mosque and then Leeds Grand Mosque. He was disciplined for distributing leaflets in support of AQ. After his mom traveled to the USA he was left alone. In 2002 he married a Muslim convert, Samantha Lewthwaite and became a father. In November 2004 he went through a new transformation. He became once again very modern in his views, shaved his beard, wore western clothes, associated with petty criminals and became closely acquainted with other women.

Hasib Mir Hussein was the youngest member of the Beeston-based Islamists (eighteen). He failed to detonate his bomb on the Underground and detonated himself on bus number 30 in Tavistock Square. Hussein was described as “docile, until provoked” with a tendency of becoming violent. He attended college, however was a poor student. Around 2003 he became extremely religious after his pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca. After hajj he became openly supportive of AQ and praised the 9/11 attackers as martyrs. In 2004, he became westernized once again, and just before the London attack, he shaved, assumingly not to draw suspicion.

The four young British Muslims spent time in mosques, youth clubs, gyms and an Islamic bookstore in Beeston. They all were second or third generation immigrants that went through an identity crisis feeling trapped between tradition and modernization. Young, educated, unemployed with a lack of clear identity, they became influenced by Salafi-Jihadists ideology that offered an

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alternative identity. Khan, the ringleader of the group encouraged the process of radicalization and the group provided each other with emotional support. Through the course of the radicalization process, Islamic preachers such as Abdullah al-Faisal and Omar Bakri Muhhamad influenced the individuals. According to a 7/7 report, the “bombs were homemade and the ingredients used were all readily commercially available and not particularly expensive. Each device appears to have consisted of around 2-5kg of home made explosive (…) current indications are that group was self-financed. There is no evidence of external sources of income. Our best estimate is that the overall cost is less than £8,000. The overseas trips, bomb making equipment, rent, car hire and UK travel being the main cost elements.”

A year before the 7/7 attacks, British intelligence concluded “al Qaeda was secretly recruiting…Muslims in British universities and colleges to carry out terrorist attacks.” Despite the government’s awareness of developing radicalization in the UK and intelligence surveillance of terrorist suspects, the British Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) informed policymakers three weeks before bombings that “at present there is not a group with both the current intent and the capability to attack the UK.” That reassuring message from the country’s intelligence agencies and law enforcement officials, prompted the British government to lower its terror alert despite the upcoming G-8 summit in Scotland and anticipation of potential attacks due to earlier bombings in Europe (Madrid train bombings in March 2004).

Before the 7/7 attacks, there were several warning that the British intelligence failed to understand or respond to in order to deter the attacks. Long before the bombings, British officials predicted a terrorist attack. In 2003, Eliza Manningham-Buller, director general of MI5, stated that she saw "no prospect of a significant reduction in the threat posed to the UK and its interests from Islamist terrorism over the next five years, and I fear for a considerable number of years thereafter." In April 2004, Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammed, an extremist cleric living in Britain, warned in a press interview “a very well organized London-based group, Al Qaeda Europe, was on the verge of launching a big operation here.” The majority of alerts regarding possible attack in London came from foreign governments. In December 2004 British MI6 and US authorities (CIA, 477 Ibid., pp. 197-198
478 Ibid., pp. 212, 219
482 Ibid.
FBI) were warned by Saudi intelligence of an attack by four people on the London Underground within six months.\(^{483}\) In June 2005, French intelligence warned about a likely terror attack.\(^{484}\) Just hours before the bombings occurred, Scotland Yard informed the Israeli Embassy in London about possible attacks in the city and ordered that Foreign Minister Benyamin Netanyahu remain in his hotel and not make his way to Liverpool Street (one of the explosion sites) where he was to address an economic summit.\(^{485}\)

**Wood Green Ricin Plot**

Seven individuals of North African origin, mostly from Algeria in their twenties and thirties,\(^{486}\) were arrested in January 2003 for plotting an attempted bioterrorism attack on the London Underground with ricin poison. Ingredients and equipment required for the production of ricin were discovered in a flat in Wood Green.\(^{487}\) Supposedly, the plot was connected to AQ,\(^{488}\) however the lack of evidence and no presence of ricin on analyzed objects, led to the release of the four suspects without charge and conviction.\(^{489}\) These were Samir Feddag (26), Mouloud Feddag, (18), Mustapha Taleb (33) and 17-year-old who could not be named for legal reasons. Masreddine Fekhadji was charged with two offences under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act.\(^{490}\) Mohamed Meguerba jumped bail and fled Britain to Algeria.\(^{491}\) Kamel Bourgass, the mastermind of the plot was imprisoned for seventeen years for conspiring “together with other persons unknown to commit public nuisance by the use of poisons and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury.” The verdict was reached based on his hand-written notes on how to make ricin, cyanide and botulinum.\(^{492}\) Further, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the stabbing to death of detective


Stephen Oake during his arrest in Manchester on January 2003, and stabbing of three other police offers at that time.493

Details regarding Kamer Bourgass’ background have been unknown to the police. He has been described by MI5 as a “sleeper,” an AQ operative waiting to be activated at the right time in the UK. The officials believe he spent time in Afghanistan, where he learned how to use and make poison and entered the UK illegally as Nadir Habra in the back of a lorry through the port of Dover in January 2000.494 In December 2001, he lost his appeal to grant him asylum in the UK. Two months later the police found a false passport of Bourgass during a search conducted in a storage depot in Wembley in North London.495 After his conviction in 2003, he was imprisoned at Wakefield, West Yorkshire. In July 2009, he was transferred to Whitemoor prison in Cambridgeshire due to “escalation of violence [in the prison] for faith-related reasons.” Bourgass was suspected of bullying and intimidating fellow prisoners. In an attempt to convert other prisoners he pressured them to attend prayers, and told them what they should eat and read. Furthermore, he aimed to convince others not to operate with staff, especially the female prison staff. In 2010, Bourgass was accused of prompting a murder on an unnamed fellow prisoner who assaulted him in March that year.496

21 July 2005 Bomb Plot (21/7)

Two weeks after the 7/7 attacks, Muktar Ibrahim (29), Yassin Omar (26), Ramzi Mohammed (25), and Hussain Osman (28), attempted to detonate explosives on three London tube trains and a bus. The attack was unsuccessful due to faulty explosives. They were convicted of conspiracy to murder and sentenced for life in July 2007.497 Manfo Asiedu (35), possibly from Ghanian, was believed to be the fifth bomber, who abandoned his bomb and returned to Ibrahim’s apartment to defuse a booby-trap bomb.498 He was charged for conspiring to cause explosions and sentenced to 33 years.499

Ibrahim, the ringleader of the group boarded a bus in Shoreditch (East London). Mohammed targeted a train at Oval Station (South London), Omar entered a train at Warren Street (Central London) and Osma traveled on a Hammersmith and City line service to Sheperd’s Bush (West London).  

The bombers were of East African origin and arrived in the UK in the 1990s. In their teens and early twenties, all four attackers were influenced and guided by radical clerics Abu Hamza and Abdullah el-Faisal. They read radical literature and watched videos of beheadings, the 9/11 attacks and murder of Daniel Pearl.

Muktar Ibrahim born in Eritrea experienced the war of independence against Ethiopia. He arrived in the UK in 1990, worked as a market trailer and received British citizenship in 2004. In the early 1990s, Muktar Ibrahim was involved in criminal gang related activity for which he was detained for five years. After his release in 1998, he showed signs of effort to change his life, however such enthusiasm did not last for long as he became interested in the Islamist political scene in London and attended Finsbury Park Mosque. It has been suggested that Ibrahim, known as “emir” attended training camps in Pakistan, and trained for jihad in Sudan in 2003. He was under surveillance in May 2004. When traveling to Pakistan in December that year, he was held for questioning by British authorities at Heathrow airport, however was released to continue his travel despite suspicious behavior and possession of a substantial amount of money.

Yassin Omar from Somalia arrived in the UK with his sisters and spent most of his childhood in foster care. From an early age Omar did not like authority and had no interest in education. It was in 2000 that he became interested in Islam, which he demonstrated by wearing a robe instead of western clothing and by spoking about his support for the Taliban and the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan. He openly expressed his support of the 9/11 attacks and anti-Western views. The production of the bombs took place in Omar’s flat in new Southgate, where they

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501 Ibid.
stocked large quantities of hydrogen peroxide from hairdressing suppliers before the 21/7 attacks. The attackers relying on the 7/7 successful plot, used a similar hydrogen peroxide mixture.\footnote{Four guilty over 21/7 bomb plot, BBC News, 10 July 2007, Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6284350.stm, Accessed 20 October 2012}

Ramzi Mohammed a Somali born lived in a refugee camp as a result of the civil war and witnessed his father being forced to fight in one of the warring militia. In order to secure a better life his mother sent him away. He arrived in the UK in 1998 and was put in the care of Slough social services. Mohammed led a Western lifestyle and enjoyed his youth until 2003, when he started attending the Finsbury Park Mosque and listening to speakers talk about religion and politics at Hyde Park Corner. In 2004 he associated with Ibrahim and Omar and attended Abu Hamza preaching’s. When police raided his apartment they found extremist literature, and a suicide note to his girlfriend and two children. He was described as a “Jekyll and Hyde character.”\footnote{Profile: Ramzi Mohammed, BBC News, 9 July 2007, Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm, Accessed 20 October 2012}

Hussain Osman, whose real name was Hamdi Isaac Adus, originated from Ethiopia. Before traveling to the UK in 1996 under the name Osman, he lived in Italy for fourteen years with his brother. In order to claim asylum he presented himself as a citizen of war-torn Somalia. He was married with children and lived in Stockwell. From this moment on there is little information available regarding Osman’s life and when and how he met Ibrahim and Omar. After the attack he escaped to Italy where he was arrested on 29 July 2005.\footnote{Profile: Hussain Osman, BBC News, 9 July 2007, Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm#map, Accessed 20 October 2012}

A number of individuals have been convicted on the basis of giving assistance and protection to the 21/7 bombers: Wahbi Mohammed (25), from Stockwell, brother of Ramzi Mohammed sentenced for 17 years. Siraj Ali (33), from Enfield, failed to release information about Ibrahim and Omar, and was sentenced for 12 years. Ali was fostered by the same family as Omar and lived in the same block of flats as him in Southgate. Abdul Sherif (30), from Stockwell, brother of Hussain Osman, was sentenced to 10 years. Osman traveled to Italy with Sherif’s passport. Ismail Abduraham (25), from Lambeth was sentenced to 10 years for not disclosing information about Said and Osman. Muhedin Ali (29), from Ladbroke Grove, received a 7-year sentence (police found in his possession extremist material and a suicide note belonging to Mohammed).\footnote{The accomplices to terror, BBC News, 4 February 2008, Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7226715.stm, Accessed 20 October 2012}

Further convictions of individuals guilty of supporting Osman included: Yeshi Girma, Hussain Osman’s wife, who was jailed for 15 years, her brother Esayas Girma and sister Mulu Girma were jailed for 10 years. Mohamed Kabashi (Mulu's boyfriend) who was jailed for 10 years.


\footnote{Further convictions of individuals guilty of supporting Osman included: Yeshi Girma, Hussain Osman's wife, who was jailed for 15 years, her brother Esayas Girma and sister Mulu Girma who were jailed for 10 years. Mohamed Kabashi (Mulu's boyfriend) who was jailed for 10 years.}
Fardosa Abdullahi, Yassin Omar’s fiancée, who was jailed for three years.\(^{511}\)

**Dhiren Barot – Plots to Attack US and UK**

Dhiren Barot was the mastermind behind a series of plans to attack British and US targets. He was under MI5 surveillance and arrested in London in August 2004. Barot pleaded guilty and was jailed for life in November 2006.\(^ {512}\) Seven other men who were individually recruited by Barot were jailed for up to twenty-six years for conspiring in terror plans, which included blowing apart a London Underground tunnel and, bombings using an explosive-packed limousine and a dirty radiation device.\(^ {513}\) Targets in the USA included IMF and the World Bank in Washington, the Stock Exchange and Citigroup headquarters in New York, and the Prudential Building in Newark, New Jersey. Supposedly he presented his plans to AQ leadership with the aim of getting the permission and the resources to mount attacks in the UK.\(^ {514}\)


Barot was born in India in 1971 and immigrated with his family a year later to Kingsbury, UK. Following his studies he worked as an airline ticket clerk in Piccadilly from 1991-1995. He allegedly he traveled to Pakistan in October 1995 and obtained training at a terrorist camp. In 1999 he published a book titled *The Army of Madniah* under the name Esa al-Hindu in which he revealed he converted to Islam at the age of twenty. During an investigation police found detailed notes about weapons, grenades, chemicals for bomb making and bomb-making instructions.\(^ {515}\)

The members of Barot cell were: Mohammed Naveed Bhatti (27), of Harrow in North London, sentenced to 20 years; Junade Feroze (31), of Blackburn, who received 22 years; and Zia Ul Haq (28), of Wembley in North London, who was convicted for 18 years. Abdul Aziz Jalil (24), of Luton, was jailed for 26 years; Omar Abdur Rehman (23), of Bushey in Hertfordshire, was jailed for 15 years; and Nadeem Tarmohamed (29) from Wembley, received 20 years. Qaisar Shaffi (28), of Willesden, North-West London, was sentenced to 15 years.\(^ {516}\)

**Fertilizer Bomb Plot**

In April 2007, five British Muslims in their twenties and thirties were sentenced to life

\(^{511}\) [21 July plotter’s fiancée jailed](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7501870.stm), BBC News, 11 July 2008
\(^{512}\) [Muslim convert who plotted terror](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6121084.stm), BBC News, 7 November 2006
\(^{513}\) [UK al-Qaeda cell members jailed](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6755797.stm), BBC News, 15 June 2007
\(^{514}\) [Muslim convert who plotted terror](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6121084.stm)
\(^{515}\) [Ibid.](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6755797.stm)
\(^{516}\) [UK al-Qaeda cell members jailed](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6755797.stm)
imprisonment for planning a plot on a number of targets across Britain. Potential targets included London’s Ministry of Sound nightclub, Houses of Parliament and Bluewater shopping centre in Kent. The 600 kg of ammonium nitrate that was purchased to construct a bomb was kept in Access self-storage in Hanwall, West London.\textsuperscript{517} The AQ sympathizers traveled to Pakistan to support jihadi groups such as al-Muhajiroun and their armed campaigns. As a result of frustration and anger towards the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the group began planning an attack in 2003. It was directed towards Britain, who, as a supporter of the US, was said to have supported the war against Muslims.\textsuperscript{518}

Omar Khyam, the group ringleader, was born and raised in Crawley, West Sussex in a largely secular Muslim household. In his early teens, while growing up without a father, his interest in both religion and politics led him to perceive violence as the answer to all problems, with religion justifying his actions. At the age of eighteen he got involved with al-Muhajiroun and attended lectures by Omar Bakri Mohammed, Abu Hamza al-Masri and Abduall Faisal. His views corresponded with the preachers belief of no “compatibility between Islam and life in Britain.” In 2000 he traveled to Pakistan to train in a Mujahideen training camp to fight in Kashmir. It was here where Khan received military training that became useful for 21/7. In 2001 he traveled to Afghanistan were he met members of the Taliban. Next, he returned to Pakistan, where he allegedly met Abdul Hadi (an AQ senior figure) and began planning the attacks in the UK. For his trip to Pakistan he took a bank loan of £16,000.\textsuperscript{519}

Jawad Akbar was born in Pakistan, spent his early years in Italy, and at the age of eight move to Crawly. Interested in mathematics and technology, he studied at Brunel University and during this time worked part-time at Gatwick Airport with clearance to work airside. He became involved in a radical Islamist political group at the university. Akbar, although he was perceived as a good member of society, never felt fully integrated and “nursed a sense of resentment and hatred towards the society in which he lived”.\textsuperscript{520} He developed an open sense of hatred towards non-Muslims, referring to them as kuffars. Akbar met Khyam through another suspect, Nabeel Hussain, who was cleared of charges and traveled with him to Pakistan in 2003. During investigations it was revealed that MI5 monitored Akbar and they became aware of his plots to attack a nightclub.\textsuperscript{521

\begin{footnotes}
\item[518] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Salahuddin Amin, was born in Britain and his family left to Pakistan when he was four. He returned to Luton, Bedfordshire in 1991, when he was 16-years-old and only spoke Urdu. He apparently experienced culture shock after his return. Over time he quickly learned English and received a degree in product design engineering. Every year he returned to Pakistan for a holiday, and it was during one trip that he became a sympathizer the perceived suffering of Muslims in Kashmir. After his return he began to donate half of his wages towards the cause and attended Al-Muhajiroun meetings in Luton where he met individuals who attempted to develop a jihadi support network between the UK and groups abroad. Through the network, which included Crawley, he met Khyam. Amin returned permanently to Pakistan after raising £21,000 from dishonest bank loans. UK officials claim that it was in Pakistan where Amin served as a facilitator between the UK and extremists in Pakistan such as AQ.\(^{522}\)

Wahhed Mahmood was a British Muslim from Crawley (details about his background are not well known) met Khyam in a local mosque and participated in al-Muhajiroun meetings in Luton. Both were known for their expressed anger over how they saw Muslims being treated in the world. In 2003 the plotters met in the Mahmood family home in Pakistan where they decided to launch an attack in the UK. The police reported that during the search conducted of his flat, little evidence was found, as he had removed his computer hard drive. Evidence against Mahmood was based on the testimony of Mohammed Babar, an American who met the plotters in the UK and Pakistan, and on a tape in which he praised the Madrid bombings and discussed the possibility of bombings in the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent.\(^{523}\)

Anthony Garcia, born Rahman Benouis in Algeria, moved to Leyton, UK at the age of five. He was the only member of the group that was not of Pakistani origin and who adapted well in British society. He left school at the age sixteen with the dream of becoming a male model. His father changed the family name to Adam, as “it sounded more English.” During Garcia’s teenage years, Islam played no part in his life. Only when his older brother developed an interest in Islam did he follow. The first step towards radicalization started between 1998 and 1999 when they attended Islamist political meetings. The turning point for Garcia was when he saw videos of atrocities in Kashmir and became a supporter of the cause. In 2003, he traveled to Pakistan and attended the same training camp as Khyam. Upon his return he bought fertilizer from an agricultural merchant and with Khyam and Nabeel Hussain he hired a unit in Access self-storage


for the ammonium nitrate.\textsuperscript{524}

Mohammed Khawaja a computer programmer of Pakistani origin who lived in Canada, was found guilty of designing the detonators for the 21/7 attacks. He was accused of supplying money to the Crawly group, whose members he met in a training camp in Pakistan. In February 2004 he flew to Heathrow to present the remote control needed to set off the bomb.\textsuperscript{525}

Mohammed Babar, an American of Pakistani origin acted as witness for the prosecution of the 21/7 group. He traveled to Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks to “fight jihad in neighboring Afghanistan” where he met the other defendants in the case in 2003.\textsuperscript{526} He received immunity from prosecution in Britain after pleading guilty for terrorism offences in a New York federal court.\textsuperscript{527} Babar, as a member of AQ, provided senior members with money and equipment, supplied weapons, trained individuals in training camps he had set up in Pakistan, and planned two attempts to assassinate General Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan. He attracted the attention of US officials when he declared his loyalty to his fellow Muslims and would not hesitate to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan. His cooperation in court granted him a reduced sentence in prison. Despite his convictions on five terrorism offences that carried a maximum seventy-year term, after four years and eight months he was released in 2008.\textsuperscript{528}

\textit{London and Glasgow International Airport Plots (20-30 June 2007)}

In the early hours of 29 June 2007, the police defused two cars in Central London containing petrol, gas cylinders and nails. One was left in front of the Tiger Tiger club on Haymarket. The second containing a bomb was towed from nearby Cockspur Street, where it was parked illegally and left in a car compound on Park Lane, which is the location where a second device was later found. The following day, 30 June 2007, after the failed car bomb attacks in London, a burning car containing gas cylinders was driven into the entrance of Glasgow’s international airport. The two men who drove the car were Kafeel Ahmed and doctor Bilal Abdullah. Officials connected the plot with the failed car bombings in London.\textsuperscript{529} Iraqi Bilal Abdullah, a doctor registered to work in the

UK, was charged with conspiracy to cause explosions. Kafeel Ahmed, a twenty-seven-year-old engineer from India, suffered burns to 90% of his body during the explosion and died in the hospital.\textsuperscript{530} Dr. Mohhammed Asha, a doctor from Jordan with Palestinian origins was scheduled to stand trial for conspiracy to cause explosions with Ahmed in October 2008.\textsuperscript{531}

There were five more suspects involved in the London-Glasgow plots of which three, including Dr. Asha’s wife, were released shortly after arrest. The fourth suspect, Dr. Mohammed Hannef was arrested in Australia and charged with providing support to a terrorist organization. The fifth suspect, Dr Sabeel Ahmed, brother of Kafeel Ahmed, was arrested and charged under the Terrorism Act on 14 July.\textsuperscript{532} He pleaded guilty for withholding information about a terrorist act and was jailed for eighteen months. However, he left prison immediately due to time spent in custody.\textsuperscript{533}

After the Glasgow Airport attack, the UK was placed on its highest level of terrorism alert, which meant that further attacks were imminent.\textsuperscript{534}

\textit{Transatlantic Aircraft Plot}

The transatlantic aircraft plot was a 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board several airlines traveling from the UK to the USA. The foiled attack by British police led to the arrest of a numbers of suspects throughout London in August 2006. Individuals arrested and convicted for life of conspiring to activate bombs in order to murder, included plot ringleader Abdulla Ahmed Ali (28), from Walthamstow, Tanvir Hussain (28), from Leyton, and the “quartermaster” Assad Sarwar (29) from High Wycombe. The three individuals were considered to be the main masterminds of the attack. Also convicted of conspiracy to murder was Umar Islam, 31 from Plaistow. Three others, Ibrahim Savat (28), Arafat Khan (28), and Wahedd Zaman, (25) were arrested but not convicted. The eighth suspect, British convert, Donald Stewart-Whyte (23) of High Wycombe was cleared of charges.\textsuperscript{535}

Abdulla Ahmed Ali, a British-born citizen from Newham, London studied engineering in City University, following which he “pursued business opportunities in Pakistan.” He became

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
politically and religiously active in his teenage years. In 2003, when the USA invaded Afghanistan, a charity shop, Islamic Medical Association in Clapton, East London, raised money and collected equipment for refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ali became associated with the charity and traveled to Pakistan, where he felt that aid work was ineffective and violence was the solution to fighting the root of the problem – the West. Anger from what he had witnessed turned him towards radical Islam. In January 2004 he traveled to Mecca for hajj, and in August to Pakistan for refugee work. It has been suggested that at the time he attended training camps and learned his bomb-making skills. He was there at the same time as the 7/7 attackers and the 21/7 plotters. He traveled back to Pakistan twice more, in June 2005 and May 2006. Upon his arrival in May at Heathrow airport, he was investigated and asked to open his luggage, where security discovered a suspected powdered soft drink and large number of batteries. He was released, however under suspicion, and the MI5 and the police mounted a surveillance operation. Ali and Sarwar sent emails with coded messages to jihadi contacts in Pakistan, which gave them guidance regarding the plot. Security surveillance operations of Ahmed Ali and Hussain secured video evidence of individuals preparing devices and jihadist suicide videos in their Walthamstow property.

Tanvir Hussain was described as “a fashion-conscious person” who enjoyed his youth. He appeared in an AQ-style militant video, however denied it was a set of martyrdom films produced by the plot group. Husain knew Ali from college and through their friendship became part of the plot.

Assad Sarwar, was described as the “quartermaster,” and had hidden the bomb ingredients – such as hydrogen peroxide (hair bleach) – in his home and stored bomb parts in a suitcase in the woods, which were used in the bomb production in a flat in Walthamstow that became the plotters’ bomb factory. British-born Sarwar lived in High Wycombe. Despite being accepted to university in Chichester, he did not attend because he became homesick. His second attempt at Brunel University was unsuccessful as he found the work too difficult. Sarwar described himself as shy, with low self-esteem, and felt he was useless. In 2003 he traveled to Pakistan to help in an Afghan refugee camp, where he met Ahmed Ali. After returning to the UK, they met at an East London

school and spoke about the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq.  

Rashid Rauf, a Birmingham-born British-Pakistani was raised in a wealthy family. Starting from his teenage years he considered religion an important part of his life. He attended Portsmouth University, which he left in 2002, and was reported to have moved to Pakistan, Punjab province after the murder of his uncle Mohammed Saeed. Details regarding his life in Pakistan are unclear, however, it is known that he married into the family of Maulana Masood Azhar, founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed – the most powerful Islamic organization involved in attacks against India over the dispute of Kashmir. In the UK, Azhar’s preaching influenced militant British-Pakistani campaigners involved in Kashmir and through his personal appearances he raised funds for Mujahideen. The British officials believed that Rashid Rauf was the facilitator, connecting radicalized young British Muslim with the Mujahideen in Pakistan. He was arrested in Pakistan in August 2006 and allegedly escaped prison in 2007.

The reasons for that the group of men decided to conduct a violent plot were found in their writings and martyrdom videos, in which they expressed anger over British and American foreign policy, and expressed a belief that Muslims were oppressed and helpless victims of Western dominance.

*Plot to behead a British Muslim Soldier*

On 31 January 2007, the West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit and police arrested Parviz Khan and eight other individuals of Pakistani origin for plotting a kidnapping and beheading of a British Muslim Soldier who served in Afghanistan. The plot was identified as an "Iraqi-style" abduction. Five people have been charged for supplying equipment and funding for a terrorism act between 30 March 2006 and 31 January 2007. These were: Amjad Mahmood (31), Mohammed Irfan (30), Zahoor Iqbal (29), Hamid Elasmar (43), and the leader of the group, Parviz Khan. The police also arrested Basiru Gassama (29), who was accused of withholding information about a potential act of terrorism. Abu Izzadeen was arrested in London in August 2007. He encouraged his audience in a Birmingham speech in 2006 to behead Muslim recruits to the British army. Abu

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Bakr (38), was released without charge and accused the British government of making the UK “a police state for Muslims.”

Parviz Khan, an unemployed charity worker from Birmingham, was the mastermind of the attack. Khan intended to use drug dealers to kidnap the Muslim soldier during his night out and release footage of his beheading from a garage. Khan was described as a “fanatic” with very extreme views. With the aim of persuading Gassama to take part in the plot, Khan showed him videos of beheadings. As a member of an Islamist terrorist cell, he supported terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan and was planning to supply them with computer hard drives, range-finders and night-vision equipment that he had collected.

**Exeter Bombing Plot (22 May 2008)**

Mohammed Abdul Saeed formally Nicky Reilly, is the twenty-two year old “nail bomber” who accidentally detonated an explosive device in a restaurant toilet in Exeter, Plymouth, while preparing to carry out a terrorist attack. The bomb was constructed from sodium hydroxide, paraffin, strips of aluminum foil and nails. The bomber, who was the only injured, pleaded guilty and was imprisoned for life.

Reilly lived with his mother in King Street, which was considered to be one of the toughest areas in the city. During the investigation it appeared that Reilly had a history of mental illness and through militant influences on the Internet he became a victim of radicalization. Internet chatrooms and websites were the root of his constructed hate towards the West and source of information on how to create volatile caustic soda and paraffin bottle bombs. He was known as a calm individual, who converted to Islam and spent most of his time in his room searching the Internet. Many described him as a quiet and vulnerable person who was persuaded by others to conduct the attack.

The failed plot was thought to have been linked to Pakistan, however, due to lack of evidence, such has not been confirmed. Furthermore, it is more likely that while he was “encouraged by literature and individuals via the internet, Reilly was self-radicalized.” In a note he wrote prior to his failed suicide bombing he stated that he was not brainwashed, indoctrinated, or insane. He followed what God expected from mujahideen. The attack was a protest against...
Britain’s, Israel’s and America’s brutality towards Muslims in the world and objection against the unacceptable Western way of life that opposed the true religion – Islam.\textsuperscript{551}

\textit{Assessment}

The cases of the most prominent attacks and plots in the UK share some similarities. First, the age group of the terrorists ranges from 18 to 43 years old, with the majority of attackers being very young – aged 25 to 31. Secondly, the majority of individuals were British citizens and of South Asian origin, mostly from Pakistan. Third, the young British Muslims were from middle-class backgrounds, mostly with high level degrees and employed. Fourthly, mosques, influence from abroad, training and ties with Pakistan, further the Internet had influenced and shaped their radical Islamic views. All the incidences conducted in the UK were motivated by the US and UK presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the countries foreign policies, the dispute over Kashmir and the perceived Western oppression of Muslims in the world.

\textit{Lists of Arrests, Charges and Extraditions of Terrorist Suspects}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|p{0.7	extwidth}|}
\hline
\textbf{2000} &  &  \\
\hline
October & Iftikhar Ali & Convicted for distributing leaflets advertising an al-Muhajiroun event in Whitechapel – which called for a holy war against Jews – with the intention of stirring up racial hatred.\textsuperscript{552} \\
\hline
\textbf{2002} &  &  \\
\hline
February & Abu Qatada & Detained at the age of forty-two as a suspect terrorist with links to Bin Laden under the new Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.\textsuperscript{553} Released on bail from prison November 2012, after the court upheld his appeal against extradition to Jordan.\textsuperscript{554} \\
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\end{tabular}

February
Moinul Abedin
First individual to have been convicted in the UK for planning an AQ inspired terrorist attack. Jailed for twenty years.  

April
Iftikhar Ali
The first individual arrested in the UK for inciting racial hatred with an Islamic religious text and holy war against Jews with leaflets promoting Al Mahajiroun. Fined £3,000, ordered to pay £1,200 in costs and received 200 hours community service.  

Brahim Benmerzouga, Baghdad Meziane
First to be convicted of funding Islamist-related terrorism through conspiracy to defraud. They raised funds for terrorist organizations such as AQ. Both were jailed for eleven years.

2003
January
Kamel Bourgass
Kamel Bourgass the mastermind of Wood Green Ricin Plot, was imprisoned for seventeen years for conspiring “together with other persons unknown to commit public nuisance by the use of poisons and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury”. And life imprisonment for the stabbing to death detective Stephen Oake.

March
Mohammed Abdullah Azam
Charged under section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for possessing documents or records with information that could have been used to plan a terrorist attack.

Abduallah el-Faisal
Sentenced to nine years of jail for religious hatred, the usage of threatening, insulting recordings and soliciting the murder of Jews and Hindus. After seven years deported to Jamaica.

2005
April
Saajid Badat
The shoe bomber plotter was arrested in November 2003. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to blow up an aircraft with a shoe bomb like Richard Reid. He did not pursue with the attack. Badat was given thirteen years in jail.

August
Omar Bakri Muhammed
Denied return to Britain on basis of supporting terrorism after fleeing to Lebanon after the 7/7 attacks. In 2007 he was arrested and convicted to life imprisonment in Lebanon.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Abbas Boutrab</td>
<td>First individual convicted of extremist related terrorism in Northern Ireland. The Algerian with suspected AQ links was found guilty of downloading information on how to blow up a passenger jet and forging of false identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>February Abu Hamza</td>
<td>Convicted of incitement to murder and sentenced to 7 years. On the 5 October 2012 Abu Hamza lost his appeal, and by the High courts decision the self-taught cleric was extradited to the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Anjem Choudary</td>
<td>Organizer of the February protest outside Danish Embassy, he was found guilty and fined for total of eight hundred pounds for holding unauthorized public demonstration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Abdulla Ahmed Ali, Tanvir Hussain, Assad Sarwar</td>
<td>The transatlantic aircraft plotters were convicted for life for conspiring to activate bombs in order to murder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Umar Islam, Ibrahim Savat, Wahhed Zaman, Donald Steward-Whyte</td>
<td>Members of the transatlantic aircraft group. Convicted of conspiracy to murder. Arrested but not convicted Savat, Khan, Zaman, Stewart-Whyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Dhiren Barot</td>
<td>AQ operative sentenced to life in prison after pleading guilty of plotting to attack UK and US targets using a dirty bomb and gas-filled limousines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>April Omar Khyam, Jawad Akbar, Salahuddin Amin, Wahhed Mahmood, Anthony Garcia</td>
<td>A group of five men were convicted of plotting an attack on shopping centers and nightclubs using fertilizer-based explosive. Five were sentenced to life two others were acquitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammed Babar</td>
<td>Connected to the fertilizer plot. Received immunity from prosecution in Britain after pleading guilty for terrorism offences in a New York federal court. Despite his convictions on five terrorism offences that carried a maximum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Syed Hashmi</td>
<td>Arrested in the UK in 2006 and held in solitary confinement. First extradited individual from UK to the USA on Islamism related terrorism charges. Known to have connections with AQ and Al Muhajiroun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Fifty-seven-year term, after four years and eight months he was released in 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, Junade Feroze, Zia Ul Haq, Abdul Aziz Jalil, Omar Abdur Rehman, Nadeem Tarmohamed, Qaisar Shaffi</td>
<td>Seven men were jailed for a total of 136 years for their involvement in Dhiren Barot’s dirty bomb plot and Gas Limos project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Mizanur Rahman, Umran Javed, Abdul Muhid, Abdul Saleem</td>
<td>Three individuals jailed for six years for inciting racial hatred during protests at the Danish embassy in London against cartoons satirizing the Prophet Muhammad. Saleem jailed for four years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Muktar Ibrahim, Yassin Omar, Ramzi Mohammed, Hussain Osman</td>
<td>21/7 plotters were convicted of conspiracy to murder and sentenced for life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Tariq Al-Daour, Younes Tsooui, Waseem Mughal</td>
<td>Arrested in 2005. The first people in the UK to be convicted of inciting terrorist murder through the internet. The group was in close relation with AQ. Mughal received seven-and-a-half years and lengthened to 12, Al-Daour six-and-a-half years increased to 10 and Tsooli ten, increased to 16 years.</td>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Five students</td>
<td>Five students were convicted on charges of possessing material for terrorist purposes with the intention of going to terrorist training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Mohhamed Atif Siddique</td>
<td>In 2007, twenty-year-old Scottish student charged with collecting terrorist related information. He was guilty for two charges under Terrorism Act 2000, one under Terrorism Act 2006 and a breach of the peace. He was sentenced to eight years. After an appeal in 2010 his conviction was overturned. The rest of the three remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Abdul Rahman</td>
<td>First person in Britain to be convicted of disseminating terrorist information under the 2006 Terrorism Act. Part of a gang of radical young Muslims who recruited and trained jihadists. Jailed for six years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Sohail Anjum Qureshi</td>
<td>AQ trained terrorist who planned on carrying out an act of terrorism overseas. He was jailed for four-and-a-half years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Parviz Khan, Amjad Mahmood, Mohammed Irfan, Zahoor Iqbal, Hamid Elasmar</td>
<td>Individuals of Pakistani origin arrested for plotting a kidnapping and beheading of a British Muslim soldier who served in Afghanistan. Mahmood, Irfan, Iqbal, Elasmar, Khan charged for supplying equipment and funding for a terrorism act. Sentenced to terms between two years and life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Malcolm Hodges</td>
<td>Hodges was sentenced for publishing statements intending to encourage terrorism. In November 2006 he sent letters to dozens of mosques in the UK stating his support of Osama bin Laden, encouraging jihad and spread anti-Semitic views. He was jailed for two years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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February

Mohammed Hamid, Kibley da Costa, Mohammed Al-Figari, Atilla Ahmet, Kader Ahmed, Yassin Mutegombwa, Mohammed Kyriacou

First convictions for providing or attending terrorist training in the UK under the Terrorism Act 2006. The court sentences varied amongst individuals: Hamid seven-and-a-half years, Ahmet and da Costa 11 months, Al-Figari 4 years 2 months, Ahmed, 3 years and 8 months, Mutegombwa 3 years and 5 months, Kyriacou 10 years.

March

Bilal Mohammed

First individual that was convicted for disseminating terrorist material under a section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This is the first time the section has been used independently. Sentenced for three years.

March

Rizwan Ditta

Accomplices of Bilal Mohammed, responsible for disseminating radical DVDs in the country. Jailed for four years.

April

Abu Izzadeen, Shah Jala Hussain, Simon Keeler Abdul Saleem Ibrahim Hassan, Abdul Muhid

All men were members of Al-Muhajiroun. Most accused of terrorist fundraising. Simon Keeler was the first British Muslim convert to be convicted over the support of terrorism. He received two-and-half-years for terrorism fundraising and four-and-a-half-years for inciting terror overseas. Izzadeen received four-and-a-half years. Hussain 2 years and 3 months, Saleem 3 years and 9 months for inciting terrorism overseas, Hassan received 2 years 9 months for inciting terrorism. Muhid received 2 years.

May

Mohammed Abdul Saeed

Mohammed Abdul Saeed the twenty-two year old “nail bomber” from Exeter, Plymouth, pleaded guilty and was imprisoned for life.

June

Yeshi Girma

Partner of Hussain Osman (21/7 plotter) was sentenced to fifteen years of jail for assisting an offender by failing to disclose information following the attack.

Esaya Girma, Mulu Girma

Brother and sister of Yeshi Girma. Jailed for ten years each for assisting an offender and failing to disclose information.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Hammaad Munshi</td>
<td>Arrested at the age of sixteen and convicted at eighteen. He became the youngest British citizen to be charged for terrorist activities under the Terrorism Act. He was sentenced for two years in a young offenders’ institution for making a record of information possibly used for terrorist purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Aabid Khan, Sultan Muhammad</td>
<td>Khan described as key player in radicalization through the internet, recruited Mushi at the age of 15. He was sentenced for 12 years for possessing or making documents promoting terrorism. Mohammad his cousin was sentenced for similar offences for 10 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Shahid Ali, Mohammed Nadim, Shabir Mohammed, Abdul Raheem</td>
<td>Four individuals in Birmingham were accused of terror offences including supply of equipment to Afghanistan and Pakistan for use in fighting against British forces. Ali, Nadim and Shabir were charged with engaging in conduct with the intention of assisting in the commission of acts of terrorism. Raheem was charged with failure to disclose information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Dr Bilal Abdulla</td>
<td>Sentenced to 32 years for his role in terrorist plots carried out in London and Glasgow International Airport in June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Rangzieb Ahmed, Habib Ahmed</td>
<td>First two individuals in the UK to be convicted of membership of proscribed Islamist organization, which were AQ and Harakut ul-Mujahideen. Rangzieb who was jailed for life Habib sentenced to ten years were granted leave to appeal in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Shella Roma</td>
<td>Was the first woman in the UK to be convicted of distributing terrorist publications under Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. The publications encouraged readers to travel abroad to fight a jihad. Roma pleaded guilty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Nineteen individuals in a counter-terrorism operation after being stopped on a motorway, M65, by anti-terror police.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

597 Ibid.
Six were released without charges, three remained in custody.  

### April

**Abbas Taj, Ali Beheshti, Abrar Mirza**  
Convicted for conspiracy to recklessly damage property and endanger life of Martin Rynja, the publisher was preparing to release a novel about the Prophet and the life of his child bride Aisha. They received for-and-a-half years imprisonment.

### 2010

#### July

**Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Khan, Wahhed Zaman**  
Convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to murder persons unknown. Until 2010 a total of twelve people had been convicted in seven trials for terrorism-related offences in connection with the 2006 aircraft bomb plot.

#### November

**Roshonara Choudhry**  
Student convicted of attempting to murder the MP Stephen Timms after being inspired by extremist sermons she had watched on the Internet.

### 2011

#### March

**Rajib Karim**  
IT worker for British Airways, was convicted and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment for supplying information about airlines to AQ terrorists in Yemen.

#### September

**Irfan Nasser, Irfan Khalid, Ashik Ali, Rahin Ahmed, Bahader Ali, Mohammed Rizwan**  
Six men from Birmingham ages 25 to 32 have been charged for planning an act of terrorism in the UK. Four were charged with “preparing for an act of terrorism in the UK,” and the other two were charged with failing to disclose information.

### 2012

#### February

**Shah Rahman, Gurukanth Desai, Abdul Miah, Omar Latif, Usman Khan, Mohammed Shahjahan, Mohibur Rahman, Nazam Hussain**  
Arrested in December 2010, nine men who were members of a terrorist network in England and Wales were sentenced to between five and 17 years' imprisonment for offences including plotting to attack the London Stock Exchange, Big Ben, Westminster Abbey, the Palace of Westminster, London Eye, and seeking terrorist training overseas.

#### July

**Mohammed Sajid Khan, Shasta Khan**  
The couple planned a terror attack on a Jewish community in Northwest England. Mohammed who pleaded guilty for terrorism charges received an indeterminate sentence with a

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607 Ibid.  
minimum of seven-and-a-half years. Shasta Khan who was found guilty of engaging in preparation for terrorism and two counts of possessing information useful for terrorism was jailed for eight years.\(^{611}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>July</th>
<th>Richard Dart, Khalid Baqa, Imran Mahmood, Jahangir Alom, Rukhsana Begum</th>
<th>Six individuals including Richard Dart, who vowed to disrupt the wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton, were arrested over alleged plot to carry out major terrorists attacks before the Olympics.(^{612}) They were charged with offences involving traveling to Pakistan for training in terrorism between July 2010 and July 2012.(^{613})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Two individuals arrested at American embassy in London during demonstrations against an anti-Muslim film. An estimated of 150 individuals including radical leader Choudary burned USA and Israeli flags and called for shari’a law in Britain.(^{614})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the 9/11 attacks a rise in radical Islam was recorded. As a consequence, several anti-terrorism policies were put into place in the UK. As a result, Muslim communities have faced a major rise in scrutiny. Between 2001 and 2003, there was a 302% increase in ‘stop and search’ incidents among Asian people, compared to 118% among white people.\(^{615}\) After the 2005 bombings, a number of Muslims living in London have been arrested on terrorism related allegations and several Islamic preachers and mosques have been under government surveillance. Between February 2001 and July 2010, 543,400 people were stopped and searched under the Terrorism Act 2000. Two-hundred-eighty-three individuals were arrested for terrorism offences, of which 19% were of Asian origin.\(^{616}\) In February 2012, the UK Terrorism Analysis reported that less than 20% of convicted terrorists are serving life or indeterminate sentences and a further 20% have been convicted for more than ten years. The largest single proportion (32%) has been serving sentences of between eight months and four years for their offences. Meanwhile, the Muslim prison

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\(^{611}\) [Jewish community terrorist attack plan couple jailed](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-18892693), Accessed 24 October 2012

\(^{612}\) [White Muslim convert who threatened to disrupt Royal Wedding among six held as police swoop in raids across London to stop 'major terrorist attack'](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2169193/London-2012-Olympics-Former-Blunkett-bobby-held-terror-swoops.html), Accessed 24 October 2012


\(^{614}\) [As a wave of anti-American riots erupts across the Islamic world...Muslims’ U.S. flag burning protests spread to Britain](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2203381/As-wave-anti-American-riots-erupts-Islamic-world-Muslims-U-S-flag-burning-protests-spread-Britain.html), Accessed 24 October 2012


population in the UK convicted of offences not related to terrorism has grown by over 540% since 1991. At the end of 2010 it stood at 10,400, which was 12% of the total prison population.\textsuperscript{617} Statistics of the Home Office released in October 2012 revealed that the number of people arrested for terrorism offences in 2010/2011 had fallen to 121 from 178 the previous year. This was below the annual average of 206 registered since April 2002. Amongst the 121 individuals forty-five suspects were charged, of which only nineteen were for terrorism-related offences.\textsuperscript{618} Furthermore, there has been a great decrease since January 2009 and December 2010, when 650 arrests on suspicions of terrorism took place in the UK and Northern Ireland. During this time the UK had the biggest number of terrorist-related arrests in comparison to any other country in Europe.\textsuperscript{619} The Home Office statistics on the use of counter-terrorism powers confirmed a 90% decline of the use of anti-terror stop and search powers. Between 2010 and 2011, there were 9,645 individuals stopped and searched in comparison to 102,504 in the previous year. Since 9/11, of the total of 1,963 people arrested in Britain as part of the war on terror, 1,070 were released without charge and 701 were charged with offences, including 208 for crimes that were not terrorist related.\textsuperscript{620} Until 31 March 2010, 102 prisoners were classified as terrorists, 73% of whom were UK nationals.\textsuperscript{621}

\textbf{VI. United Kingdom Responses}

The UK government has introduced a variety of measures against terrorism. The counterterrorism policies are brought together under the CONTEST strategy. The strategy for countering international terrorism covers a four-step plan, called the “four P’s”: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare.\textsuperscript{622} The strategy focuses on:

\textit{Prevent} terrorism by reducing the number of individuals inspired to support Islamist terrorism or become terrorists, and work to \textit{Pursue} terrorists and those who assist them in order to disrupt potential attacks. Reducing vulnerability involves work streams to \textit{Protect} potential targets (buildings, for example) in the UK and abroad and to \textit{Prepare} for the consequences of an attack.

through resilience and contingency planning.\textsuperscript{623}

The main legislation introduced before the 7/7 attacks and modified over the years was the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. The aim of the \textit{Terrorism Act 2000} is "to make provisions about terrorism and to make temporary provisions for Northern Ireland about the prosecution and punishment of certain offences, the preservation of peace and the maintenance of order." It widened and expended the definition of terrorism, outlawed terrorist groups, and enhanced police powers, including stop and search and pre-charge detention for seven days.\textsuperscript{624} \textit{The Ant-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001} was introduced by Tony Blair’s government after the 9/11 attacks. Its aim was to amend the Terrorism Act 2000 in order to provide provisions in terrorism and security policies with a focus on steps to deal with foreign nationals who have been suspected of committing, organizing or supporting terrorism. It focuses to “amend or extend the criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law; to make provision about the control of pathogens and toxins and to provide for the retention of communications data.”\textsuperscript{625}

After the 7/7 attacks, the UK government introduced new anti-terrorism policies, tightened security legislations, increased passenger profiling, and increased the number of arrests. The most significant terrorism legislation following Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-terrorism and Crime and Security Act 2001 are: \textit{Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005}, with the aim "to provide for the making of ‘control orders imposing obligations on individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism-related activity. These are preventative orders which are designed to restrict or prevent the further involvement by individuals in such activity.”\textsuperscript{626} \textit{Terrorism Act 2006} aims "to make provision for and about offences relating to conduct carried out, or capable of being carried out, for purposes connected with terrorism.” The legislation extends the pre-charge detention period from 14 to 28 days.\textsuperscript{627} The purpose of the \textit{Counter-Terrorism Act 2008} is “to create new powers to gather and share information for counter-terrorism; to make further provision about the detention and questioning of terrorist suspects and the prosecution and punishment of terrorist offences; to impose notification requirements on persons convicted of such offences; and to confer further

\textsuperscript{623} Ibid.
powers to act against terrorist financing.” The act enables post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects and allows police to take fingerprints and DNA samples for further investigation.628 Further steps were taken by increasing British surveillance and infiltration. British intelligence established internal security units to monitor Muslims suspected of sympathy towards Al Qaeda. The most controversial part of the British counter-terrorism strategy was the police ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy of terrorism suspects, which spared discussion and criticism after the mistaken killing of a Brazilian immigrant, Jean Charles de Menezes.629

In 2008, the UK government made two important changes to its policy. It increased emphasis on “prevent” and underlined the importance of language and communication.630 The commitment to the prevent agenda by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, was reflected in new funding for the course of three years. Between 2008 and 2011, an additional £240 million was contributed to the Home Office towards counter-terrorism policing, £400 million towards tackling radicalization and promoting understanding overseas by the Foreign Office, Department for International Development, and the British Council. In addition, £70 million went towards community projects for tackling violent extremism.631 The changes in regards to language and communication were an important aspect. The Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU), a unit within the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office, aimed to improve government language in order to avoid playing into the hands of the violent extremists and to appeal to Britain’s Muslim communities. Ministers were instructed not to use for example the phrase ‘war on terror’, to speak about a ‘struggle’ rather than a ‘battle,’ and were advised to stop talking about the “Muslim problem.”632

The UK domestic homeland security budget, including the funding for countering terrorism, had a 250 percent increase between 2001 and 2011. The government’s budget spending increased from £1 billion in 2001 to £3.5 billion in 2010, with the police alone receiving in three years after the 7/7 attacks, a 30% increase in their counter-terrorism budget.633

631 Ibid., p. 134
VII. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to analyze Islamic radicalization exclusively in the United Kingdom, through presenting a vast amount of information, factors and processes that take place amongst the Muslim population in Britain. As underlined throughout, internal and external factors contribute to the rise of radical Islam amongst British-born and immigrants. The UK is home to an enormously diverse Muslim community. The minorities are distinct from the majority because of their religious belief, cultural identities, and ethnic roots. As a result of socio-economic differences, feelings of alienation in Western society, and difficulties of assimilation, Muslims, especially the young generation, are vulnerable to extreme Islamic ideologies that originate abroad and developed in the UK. London – the home of the highest numbers of Muslims in England and the most diverse of any Muslim community in Europe in terms of history, language, ethnic origin, politics and social class has become the base for recruitment, mobilization and financing of militant Islam. Furthermore, it has served as a safe haven for radical leaders and organizations for decades. Although in general the majority of Muslims are recognized as peaceful, an enormous number are supporters of violent Islam, influenced by radical ideologies of preachers such as Abu Hamza or Omar Bakri Mohammed, Islamic websites and social media. Radical Islamists arrived to the UK and lived as ordinary citizens, however operated as sleeper cells under the watch of British authorities. The governments misunderstanding or underestimation of the threat of radical Islam led to a culmination of radicalization in 2005. It was only after the 7 July, 2005 attacks that the UK realized the consequences of the developing extremism in Britain and its continuing influence amongst British Muslim society. The attacks brought awareness to society that terrorism exists and that radicalization is a major security threat in the UK. Furthermore, there developed a new trend of homegrown terrorists, which raised concerns of the possibility of future attacks and widened the existing gap between the British societies.

Despite the British government’s effort to counter radicalization through various policies, radical ideologies and organizations continue to develop and gain supporters through various grounds, such as mosques, koranic schools, Islamic centers and new media. Radicalization in the UK is an existing concern that needs to be addressed and acted upon immediately. Short-term measures, such as policies do influence the recruitment and therefore the radicalization process. However, they do not affect the factors that contribute to recruitment and lead to the radicalization of an individual. In order for the government to be successful, it should be consistent in its counter-terrorism efforts and intolerant of any forms of extremism. It should focus on understanding the complexities of community politics and establish a working relationship with Muslim society in
order to build trust. Further, it should minimize the gap between the British minorities and majorities, encourage assimilation with equal opportunities and rights for Muslims such as South Asian minorities who have been mostly prone to radicalization.

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**APPENDIX**

*Table 8: Britain’s Biggest Mosques*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mosque Name</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suffa-tul-Islam Central Masjid, Horton Park Avenue</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Jamia Mosque Ghamkol Sharif, 150 Golden Hillock Road</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Cultural Centre, 146 Park Road</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>5400</td>
<td>Arabic mainstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat Tabligh-ul-Islam, circa 177 Barkerend Road</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi - Qadria Naushahia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds Islamic Centre, 46-48 Spencer Place</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia al-Akbaria, 241 Selbourne Road</td>
<td>Luton</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Masjid</td>
<td>Town</td>
<td>Postcode</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid-e-Jamia Al Madina, 133a Waterloo Road</td>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Masjid Ghousia, 2-10 Westbourne Road</td>
<td>Luton</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London Mosque &amp; London Muslim Centre, 46-92 Whitechapel Road</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>Maudoodi-ist management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham Central Mosque, 180 Belgrave Middleway or 148-154</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid-al-Farooq, Berners Street</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markazi Masjid, South Street (south end)</td>
<td>Dewsbury</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madni Jamia Masjid, 101 Thornbury Road</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Masjid Ghosia, 439-451 Lea Bridge Road</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husseini Islamic Centre, 50 Wood Lane</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>Shia - Twelvers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam Mosque, 9 Darfield Street</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi - Qadria Naushahia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolverhampton Mosque Trust, 197 Waterloo Road</td>
<td>Wolverhampton</td>
<td>3600</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makki Masjid, Wimberley Street</td>
<td>Blackburn</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Masjid, 30-32 Howard Street</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markazi Jamia Masjid Bilal, Conway Road and Harehills Lane</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Mosque, 51 Asfordby Street</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Masjid, 59 Brick Lane</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>Sufi - Fultoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich Islamic Centre, 131 Plumstead Road</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>Salafi and Shafi’i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid Ilyas, Riverine Centre Abbey Mills, Canning Road</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Central Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre, 20 Upper Park</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Denomination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keighley Markazi Jamia Mosque, 75 Emily Street</td>
<td>Keighley</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Masjid Bilal, Bulwer Street</td>
<td>Rochdale</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hounslow Jamia Masjid &amp; Islamic Centre, Wellington Road South</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faidhan-e-Madina, 169-175 Gladstone Street</td>
<td>Peterborough</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Sufi - Bareilvi - Qadri Dawat-e-Islami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croydon Masjid and Islamic Centre, 525 London Road</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Mosque Lanarkshire, 1-3 and 5 Clydesdale Street</td>
<td>Motherwell</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baitul Futuh (Qadiani world headquarters), 181 London Road</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Qadiani</td>
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**Timeline of Abu Hamza’s battle to stay in the UK:**

Hamza, who was born Mustafa Kamel Mustafa in Alexandria, Egypt, in April 1958, came to the UK to study in the early 1980s. He met and married an English woman, Valerie Fleming, and received British citizenship, but the couple divorced years later.

He suffered injuries to his hands and eye in Afghanistan, where he travelled to fight a jihad against Soviet occupation. On his return to the UK, Hamza started preaching radical anti-Western sermons at Finsbury Park Mosque in north London.

Over the last eight years he has fought extradition to the U.S. to face numerous terror-related charges.
Here is a timeline of key events in his case:

2001:

September - Following the 9/11 attacks, Hamza’s comments in support of Osama bin Laden spark outrage.

2002:

April - Hamza is formally suspended by the Charity Commission from his position at Finsbury Park Mosque over his inflammatory speeches.

September 11 - Hamza speaks at a controversial conference at the mosque titled A Towering Day In History.

2003:

January - Armed police arrest seven people at the mosque in a dawn raid. A stun gun, replica firearms and CS gas canisters are among the items seized.

February - Hamza again causes outrage when he describes the ill-fated Columbia space shuttle, which contained Christians, Hindus and a Jew, as a ‘trinity of evil’ and says its destruction was a punishment from Allah.

April - Home Secretary David Blunkett announces new laws allowing British citizenship to be removed from immigrants who ‘seriously prejudice’ the UK’s interests. Legal moves begin to get Hamza deported to Yemen. Two weeks later, his lawyers announce he will appeal against the move.

2004:

May - Hamza is arrested on a US extradition warrant. The US wants him on charges of conspiring to take Western hostages in Yemen, funding terrorism, and organising a terrorist training camp in Oregon between 1998 and 2000.

October - He is charged with 15 offences under the Terrorism Act, including incitement to murder and possession of a terrorism document, temporarily staying the US extradition process.

2006:

February 7 - Hamza is jailed for seven years after being found guilty on 11 of 15 charges.

July - He is given the go-ahead to challenge the convictions for incitement to murder and race hate offences.

November - The Court of Appeal dismisses his appeal against the conviction.

2007:

May - A preliminary extradition hearing takes place in London.

July - Hamza speaks by video-link in a hearing to fight the extradition.

November - A judge at City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court rules that Hamza has lost his legal
arguments against extradition. Senior District Judge Timothy Workman sends the matter to the Home Secretary to make a final decision.

2008:

**February 7** - Home Secretary Jacqui Smith signs an extradition order, meaning Hamza will be handed over to US authorities within 28 days if he does not appeal.

**June 20** - Two High Court judges rule that the extradition decision is 'unassailable'.

**July 23** - Hamza is refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords as senior judge Sir Igor Judge refuses to certify that his case raises a point of law of such public importance to go before the highest court in the land.

**August 4** - The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg rules that Hamza should not be extradited until judges can examine his case. The Home Office says it will abide by the court’s request.

2010:

**January 18** - Hamza launches another legal fight to hang on to his British passport.

**February 9** - Legal aid bosses seize Hamza’s house in Greenford, west London, to pay off his legal bills, despite the radical preacher claiming it does not belong to him. Officials hope to raise £280,000 from the sale.

**November 5** - Hamza wins his appeal against the Government’s attempts to strip him of his British passport. The move would have rendered him 'stateless' as he has already been stripped of his Egyptian citizenship, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission rules.

2012:

**April 10** - Europe’s human rights judges rule that Hamza, along with four other terror suspects, would not be subject to ‘ill-treatment’ in America and their extradition is lawful.

**July 9** - Hamza lodges an appeal with the ECHR over his extradition to the US - on the eve of the July 10 deadline.

**September 24** - Hamza’s request for an appeal is rejected as Europe’s human rights judges rule he can be extradited to America.

**September 25** - BBC journalist Frank Gardner apologizes for a 'breach of confidence' after telling the Radio 4 Today programme that the Queen had voiced concerns about the UK’s inability to arrest Hamza.

**September 26** - Hamza launches a last-minute High Court challenge in a move to avoid extradition.

September 27 - The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, says extensive delays in cases such as the extradition of radical cleric Abu Hamza are a 'source of real fury'.

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*IDC Herzliya*
October 3 - Hamza’s legal team claim his health is 'deteriorating' and he is suffering from long-term depression, inability to concentrate and short-term memory loss. But Sir John Thomas, president of the Queen’s Bench Division, suggests that if there is a risk of a degenerative condition, 'the sooner he is put on trial the better.'

October 5 - The High Court rules that Hamza can be extradited to the U.S. and the radical cleric is placed on a plane within hours.

October 6 - Hamza arrives in America was placed in front of a New York judge within 24 hours.