UNDERSTANDING RADICALISATION & DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST NETWORKS THROUGH POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGY

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March 2, 2014

**ABSTRACT**

In a field dominated by political science, the study of radicalisation and terrorism is often weakened due to the absence of areas such as political-psychology. Despite the field beginning to embrace a wider multi-disciplinary approach there are only a few scholars who commit themselves to the study of radicalisation and terrorism through the lens of political-psychology. This paper will demonstrate the invaluable benefit political-psychology provides in understanding radicalisation and terrorism networks when used in conjunction with other disciplines. As such, political-psychology allows one to determine the normality of accused terrorists and understand how they manage to overcome mechanisms of self-censure to commit acts of indiscriminate violence. In addition, political-psychology allows the outsider to understand the internal dynamics of terrorist networks like: dependency, collective identity, leadership, competition and both internal and external rivalry. When utilised in conjunction with other disciplines, political-psychology allows law enforcement agencies and scholars to understand the radicalisation process and both the internal and external dynamics of terrorist networks to a greater extent, thus highlighting its necessity in an area that is only increasing in prominence.

* The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).
# Table of Contents

Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 3
Literature Review .......................................................................................................................................... 3
Normal or Abnormal? ................................................................................................................................... 8
The Dominance of Collective Identity ......................................................................................................... 12
‘Brotherhood’ & Dependency ....................................................................................................................... 15
Competition & Rivalry .................................................................................................................................... 18
Leadership ..................................................................................................................................................... 20
‘The Act of Killing’ ....................................................................................................................................... 22
Conclusion & Further Research .................................................................................................................... 25
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................. 27
UNDERSTANDING RADICALISATION & DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST NETWORKS THROUGH POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGY

The role of political psychology is often neglected in attempts to understand terrorist networks and radicalisation. This essay will demonstrate how, when utilised correctly, political psychology can shed light on the inner workings and development of terrorist networks.¹ Existing literature on the political psychology of terrorist networks is relatively limited and underrepresented compared to vast amounts of work regarding political science. This paper seeks to fill this knowledge gap by providing an analysis of how political psychology can contribute to the understanding of the inner workings and development of a terrorist network. This essay will highlight the role of political psychology in the provision of insight into: the thought processes and rationale of individuals and terrorists networks; the shift from individual to a group identity via complex and gradual radicalisation; how networks solidify their memberships’ dependency; the role of competition in hardening group solidarity and radicalisation, and finally how political psychology can reveal the mechanisms that terrorist networks utilise in order to overcome ‘mainstream-morals’ and disengage from self-censure (i.e. ‘the act of killing’). This research paper will contend that in conjunction with other fields (e.g. political science, sociology), psychology is a necessary and critical tool in understanding the intricacies surrounding the development and activity of terrorist networks.

Literature Review

Research within the field of terrorism and radicalisation will never be a “true science” due to the inherent complications surrounding the implementation of stringent research methodologies in the investigation of clandestine activity (i.e. terrorism).² With this in mind, it becomes difficult for researchers to produce entirely new thoughts and knowledge. Terrorism researchers are inclined to be too dependent upon easily attained data (i.e. secondary sources), hence subsequent terrorism articles establishing only 20 per cent of new data in the field.³ Fortunately this situation has improved since Silke’s publication. Recent

¹ Note: For the purpose of this research paper ‘Political Psychology’ will be defined as: “Political psychology involves explaining what people do, by adapting psychological concepts, so that they are useful and relevant to politics, then applying them to the analysis of a political problem or issue.” Martha Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology(New York: Psychology Press, 2010), 4.


research conducted by the *International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence* suggests radicalisation and terrorism researchers still rely upon secondary resources (54 per cent compared to 45 per cent), though they are no longer as reliant on these secondary sources to demonstrate their argument.\(^4\) Contributing to this problem is the role of the Government. State Governments who fund research often expect results and research to be delivered quickly, thus not allowing scholars to address the issue entirely, not in the required detail, nor apply the vital scholarly rigor that the field requires.\(^5\) This is exemplified with the boom in Government funding for radicalisation research following 2001 when ‘bad’ and incomplete research was funded and supported across the globe.\(^6\)

Due to this research project relying heavily upon theoretical concepts, psychological frameworks, and empirical data (i.e. case studies), leading contributors are difficult to identify as some in this project delve solely into theory, while others concentrate on facts inside various conflict and terrorism prevalent environments (e.g. Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq etc.). The field is extensive and diverse yet currently lacks the synthesis of theory with relevant case studies. Furthermore, radicalisation research, like terrorism, draws ‘transients’ whom delve into radicalisation research yet have not committed themselves to investigating the specific topic for a continuous period.\(^7\) However, after considerable research six leading contributors have been identified: Clark McCauley, Fathali Moghaddam, Martha Crenshaw, Marc Sageman, John Horgan and the late Ehud Sprinzak. Despite these scholars being primarily psychologists and psychiatrists, their knowledge combined with that of scholars from a range of disciplines and empirical research will provide a multidisciplinary approach for the paper. This is critical as a considerable amount of research within terrorism and particularly radicalisation is event-driven and reactionary thus requiring substantial collaboration between psychology and other disciplines.\(^8\) In fact, the multifaceted nature and the lack of coherent identity in the field of radicalization and terrorism should be considered a strength.\(^9\) Each argument’s weaknesses, strengths, methodologies and commonalities will be discussed in the forthcoming paragraphs.

It is evident within radicalisation literature that there are a vast number of debates occurring amongst a handful of respected scholars. One of the key discussions relates to the

\(^5\) Ibid., 378.
\(^6\) Ibid., 379.
\(^7\) Ariel Merari, *On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism* (Maryland: University Publications of America, 1985), 12.
\(^8\) Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al., "Countering Violent Extremism (Cve) Literature Review," ed. Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre(Edinburgh, South Australia DSTO, 2011), 73.
research methodologies utilised in the study of radicalisation and terrorism. Each methodology has individual advantages and disadvantages. Sprinzak’s methodology was highly analytical and his radicalisation theory was devised from numerous comparative case studies of right-wing terrorist groups. His research and subsequent conclusions were not analysed from afar, but through primary sources in the form of first-hand interviews and encounters with numerous right-wing groups and individuals throughout the US and Israel (e.g. the Kach Movement). Nonetheless, one downfall of Sprinzak’s research is his reactive analysis. Despite claiming his model to be the first of its kind, it can be said that Sprinzak’s research and subsequent methodology was event-driven. Many of his publications emerged when right wing terrorism became the paramount concern for governments post Timothy McVeigh and the rise of the extreme Israeli right wing. Having said that, terrorism research has often historically shown itself to be reactionary. In a similar methodological fashion, the work of Sageman also relies heavily upon primary resources and first-hand data collection. His research in “Understanding Terror Networks” and “Leaderless Jihad” provides a solid example of primary research analysis. Sageman established a database of 500 terrorists that enabled him to derive credible conclusions and dismiss unfounded beliefs (e.g. poverty, education) due the large sample size. However he never fully discloses the exact size of his sample, nor does he give sources precise analysis, possibly because his books are written for a general audience. Furthermore, Sageman fails to elaborate upon data, pair names and attacks in “Understanding Terrorist Networks” and “Leaderless Jihad.” In spite of this, his research is invaluable, primarily due to the vast number of sources he utilised e.g. judicial records, media articles, seized documents, open-sources and most importantly direct interviews. In contrast to both Sageman and Sprinzak, Moghaddam’s research methodology primarily relies upon secondary sources (generally psychological research) along with his own past research. Despite his radicalisation model being commonly used, the empirical

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testing of it would be near impossible to undertake due to the practical and ethical complications it would involve. Thus Moghaddam’s research methodology forces his staircase model to be used as an ‘organisational metaphor’ and not as a precise model due to its lack of empirical evidence. Like Moghaddam, the research methodology used by McCauley also depends on secondary literature. This literature is multi-disciplinary and ranges from psychological research to political theories. This multidisciplinary methodology, usage of renowned scholars, primary research via Gallup polling and clear structure provides a coherent and solid background to his work. Finally, Crenshaw’s research methodology like Moghaddam and McCauley relies heavily on secondary sources from across the academic field that allows her to provide a sound theoretical analysis of radicalisation.

Another debate evident within radicalisation related literature is the question of an appropriate definition of radicalisation. With ill-defined and vague definitions of radicalisation the task of producing accurate information, and then collating and contributing to the entire field is made more difficult. Crenshaw is a renowned scholar of terrorism whom regularly delves into radicalisation. Although she examines and discusses radicalisation, she fails to provide a precise definition of what radicalisation constitutes. One of her texts (The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism) alludes to her definition by stating that the radicalisation process involves ‘an attraction to a specific group or community, as opposed to a conceptual ideology or violence.’ This provides the audience with the impression that her definition of radicalisation revolves primarily around psychology and group interaction rather than political theory. Similar to Crenshaw, McCauley also focuses his definition on the group dynamics rather than the individuals. However, unlike Crenshaw, McCauley provides a clear definition of radicalisation that refers to “a change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group.” The definition is focused on inter-group dynamics and away from individual agents. This position is prominent with newly emerging literature on radicalisation. To McCauley’s detriment the definition ultimately concludes that radicalisation equals violence

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18 Ibid., 614.
(i.e. behaviours) and does not highlight that radicalisation can also include the hardening of thoughts rather than an ‘automatically’ violent outcome. Sprinzak on the other hand recognises that radicalisation does not simply result in terrorism. 22 His nuanced understanding allows the audience to recognise that radicalisation does not always result in violence. Moghaddam’s work also suggests a similar definition, yet like Crenshaw and many others in the field he does not provide a clear or easily identifiable definition. In Moghaddam’s ‘The Staircase to Terrorism’ a clear idea of what radicalisation involves is demonstrated, despite failing to postulate a definition. The study of radicalisation is plagued with limited and varying definitions that are often vague, ambiguous and unsuitable for this particular paper.23 Contrary to the above scholars, the definition of radicalisation provided by John Horgan is indisputably the most effective and concise working definition of radicalisation. Referred to as a “social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to an extremist political or religious ideology,” his definition contains the required elements of radicalisation (i.e. process, incremental and commitment) yet remains succinct in so far as it is a single sentence that any level of readership can understand.24 Whether ideology is required in radicalisation remains debatable, but Horgan does not pigeonhole one specific ideology. It is imperative that any definition of radicalisation is not confined to one particular ideology and appreciates radicalisation as a process that involves individuals wishing to modify the prevailing social setting, commonly but not inevitably via violent means.25 This is where Horgan’s definition of radicalisation, in all its simplicity is far superior to those discussed above.

The diversity of contributors and the subsequent body of knowledge in the field of radicalisation will be instrumental to this upcoming research paper. The methodology will be primarily based upon secondary sources (theories), as primary sources within the field are quite difficult to access due to its clandestine nature. When empirical primary resources are required they will be gathered via reliable sources (i.e. scholars, BBC, The New York Times, The Guardian etc.). This multifaceted approach will allow the research paper to fill the current knowledge gap and critically analyse the current literature. Current research and opinions, no matter how unconventional can provide a good foundation for further research.

23 Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism.”
24 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (New York: Routledge, 2009), 152.
and assistance in demonstrating the importance of psychology in understanding terrorist networks and the radicalisation process.

**Normal or Abnormal?**

Political psychology provides an invaluable insight into the thought processes and rationale of individuals within a terrorist network by debunking notions of terrorists’ personality and irrationality. It has long been claimed that terrorists are psychologically different than those ‘normal’ people who do not commit mass violence. However, normal people can certainly act abnormally at times. Nevertheless, particular researchers and a variety of mainstream media organisations still claim that terrorists are psychologically abnormal. In 1971 American psychiatrist David Hubbard claimed aircraft hijackers were in fact physically and mentally ill, and often had a violent father, a deeply religious mother, were sexually inexperienced, overly protective of siblings and socially underachieved. According to Walter Laqueur ‘madness’ characterises contemporary terrorists. Twenty-first century psychologists are being forced into embracing terrorists’ normality in the face of evidence that disapproves the notion of a ‘terrorist personality’, disorders, madness and abnormality. No respected psychologist, psychiatrist or terrorist researcher has been able to conclusively identity abnormalities or predispositions within terrorists. Further, three decades of empirical research has been unable to detect the slightest pattern of psychological illness within terrorists. Studies have in fact indicated that terrorists are more psychologically stable and healthy than violent criminals. Individuals refuse to admit that they could be terrorists. Many cannot fathom that ‘normal people’ like themselves could partake in acts of terror. Therefore they wish to differentiate themselves from terrorists by claiming terrorists possess unproven abnormalities. This characterisation is comparable to what was witnessed post-WWII with the capture of 16 leadings Nazis, including Rudolf Hess and Hermann Göring when an allied forces psychologist concluded that they were hostile, violent and ‘lacked real human

26 Note: for the purpose of this assessment terrorism will be defined as: “the implementation fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 43.


30 Silke, “Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research,” 182.


34 “Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research,” 67.
feeling.35 Such a portrayal matched the public expectation and demand of what Nazi leaders should be (i.e. abnormal, irrational etc.).36 In a similar fashion to today with regards to terrorists, the public did not want to see any similarities between themselves and the Nazis. Decades later the original results were debunked and testified to the normality of Nazis.37 Like Nazis, it is impossible to distinguish a terrorist from the general population. Attribution Theory asserts that individuals see their own behaviour as something that originates from structural, environmental and situational forces, but wishes to distinguish this from the abnormal behaviour of others that arises from internalised forces such as personality traits or other mental conditions.38

In reality, modern political psychological research has demonstrated that terrorists are rational normal human beings who are typically from the middle or professional class.39 Through countless interviews of Aum Shinrikyo members, psychiatrist Robert Lifton was astonished by the “familiar ordinariness” of Aum members.40 This is a testament to the familiarities between terrorists and non-violent citizens. Today this familiarity and normality can be witnessed with the personnel inside listed terrorist groups: Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS that are fighting within the Syrian conflict (e.g. Australian kick-boxer Roger Abbas who was rumoured to be fighting with Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria when he died in 2012).41 The actions or mission of a terrorist network might appear to be irrational, erratic or abnormal to an outsider or victims, but are entirely rational and calculated in the mind of the network or involved individual.42 The act is not generated by abnormality or imbalance. The act is instead meaningful and rational to the person making the choice.43 Terrorism is not randomised violence driven by abnormal individuals. Instead terrorism is strategically calculated, ‘goal-directed behaviour’ that is undertaken with deliberate and rational (from the groups

36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Silke, “Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research,” 52.  
41 Note: to further understand the death of Roger Abbas and the circumstance leading up to it see: Sabour Bradley, “Lost in Syria,” in Head First, ed. Catherine Armstrong (Australia: ABC, 2013).  
perspective) choices. Terrorism is an end product of the ‘relative deprivation’ of a fraternal group, not a mental illness.

Relative Deprivation is the perceived feelings of inequality and injustices present in a fraternal group, in contrast to absolute deprivation that is relative to another group. Psychology has shown that terrorism involves the perception of unjust or harsh treatment via existing structures, individuals, groups or government against the fraternal group. There has been a lack of empirical research that can adequately link terrorism to absolute poverty or the absence of education. Instead, relative deprivation implies the perception of deprivation is what matters. To exemplify this, Moghaddam juxtaposes an individual living in squalor in Mumbai but despite the conditions he and others around him are living in, he does not feel unjustly treated, although an individual living in the most comfortable circumstances in Riyadh could feel unjustly treated. Psychology has demonstrated that poor living conditions are not a precursor to terrorism. Minorities and disaffected groups often perceive that the world and structural conditions treat them differently and more harshly compared to others. Instead societal structures may confine opportunity and generate the perception of hopelessness amongst individuals whose background and circumstances are not underprivileged. These perceived injustices could arise from humiliation and threats, to a collective or individuals’ identity, or the judgement of fairness. The perception of humiliation is demonstrated through secret recordings from Abdennabi Kounjaa (Madrid Training bombing suspect) who stated: “I can’t put up with this life living like a weak and humiliated person,” comparing his relatively comfortable circumstances to others. Evidence suggests relative deprivation may mobilise collective action. Terrorism is not the result of a single factor, but rather there are multiple. Furthermore, there is not one route to terrorism yet many individual routes with a variety of complex activities and choices that an individual makes. Terrorists are not purely created by their structural environment due to the

45 Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism," 163.
48 Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism," 163.
51 Moghaddam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism," 91.
52 Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, "Maghreb Immigrants Becoming Suicide Terrorists," ibid., 190.
54 Ibid., 615.
individual possessing a degree of agency through which they make personal decisions and actions that lead them to transforming themselves into terrorists. Terrorists seek to radically change the unjust status quo. Although as both Moghaddam’s (Staircase to Terrorism) and Sprinzak’s (The Process of Delegitimation) psychological research confirms: individuals slowly move towards terrorism via a process of radicalisation when other methods fail to improve their conditions. Fraternal groups continue radicalisation (move to the next floor) in the hope of ascertaining greater justice.

Modern psychological research has found little evidence suggesting that terrorists embody distinctive and abnormal individual qualities that predispose them to political violence. Unfortunately the notion of predisposition and abnormality has resurfaced within aspects of

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56 Moghaddam and Marsella, Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences & Interventions, 65.
58 Note: Radicalization is defined as the: “social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to an extremist political or religious ideology.” Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements. 152.
59 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 162.
60 Benjamin MacQueen, “Week Two - Becoming a Terrorist: The Ira & Journey into Terrorism,” in ATS2701 - Terrorism and Violence in Global Politics(Monash University Caulfield2011).
the media (e.g. Fox News), governments (Bush Administration) and academia (e.g. Laqueur) post the events of September 11. Political psychology highlights why individuals and terrorist networks may engage in terrorism, whilst debunking notions of abnormality, irrationality and the terrorist personality by presenting the process of radicalisation and the fundamental importance of relative deprivation.

**The Dominance of Collective Identity**

Along with providing insight into the thought processes of terrorists and subsequent terrorist networks that psychology offers, it also provides information about the dynamics of a network by explaining the sense of shared identity that is formed amongst its members. In search for solutions to their perceived mistreatment, individuals’ seek out a group with similar position as them. Psychological research suggests Sageman’s assertion that terrorism is a “group phenomenon” has a credible degree of validity. Understanding the group radicalisation process and the various stages the individual and the network progress through is equally important as attempting to understand the individual person’s psychology. These networks form a cohesive community as each individual is interacting with the group in the interest of achieving a shared goal (i.e. alleviating their share deprivation). Though the individual voluntarily joins a network, peer influence, societal standing and identity are major contributors to the decision making process. Individuals begin to identify with the fraternally disaffected group and share their senses of injustice and ill treatment (e.g. with the Syrian civilian population). Although each member joins a network with the intention of achieving their personal goals, the members within the terrorist network are now interdependent of each other in the pursuit of achieving their desired outcomes and goals. It therefore becomes increasingly difficult to delineate the individual’s goal and the networks. The new group infringes on the individual’s behaviour, and it becomes necessary to understanding the individual within the broader context of the network and their new social

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67 Silke, "Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology,” 182.

environment. This is exemplified in the case of the Italian Red Brigades: although joining the group was a personal choice all subsequent actions and the radicalisation process is undertaken from within the group environment. The network essentially becomes the sum of the individuals. The network is thus much more than a collection of people, but more so a network of individuals who begin to share common characteristics and who mutually interact with one another, agree to collective expectations and obligations while sharing a common identity.

In spite of the apparent rise of ‘Lone-Wolf Terrorism,’ (i.e. Kaczynski, the ‘Unabomber’) network terrorism is still far more prevalent. It is not inherently necessary for an individual to seek, start, join or remain in a terrorist network in order to commit political violence; nonetheless the radicalisation process and the ultimate act are aided greatly by being a member. Other than hoping to achieve their original aim, individuals gain much more via network membership than they initially bargain for. Similar to one’s sporting or social club membership, individuals receive many more emotional gains. These include a sense of cohesiveness, belonging, comradeship, worldview and identity. The group essentially determines the individual’s ‘life experiences.’ It becomes impossible to analyse individuals in isolation: away from their group, society and structural context. The network begins to isolate itself from the outside world. Membership now presupposes isolation from the individuals’ original community, culture and political norms.

However, terrorist networks are far from stagnant organisms. While they might reject the prevailing political and cultural norms they evolve and adapt in reaction to internal, external and structural pressures. Networks are dynamic and in a constant state of flux in an attempt to adjust to their surrounding environment. Consequently, the group begins to draw closer together and become more exclusive. Group rules, culture, practices, decision-making and philosophy are all formed and enforced upon the members due to the intense

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71 Taylor, “Is Terrorism a Group Phenomenon?,” 123.
73 McCauley and Segal, “Terrorist Individuals and Terrorist Groups: The Normal Psychology of Extreme Behavior,” 42.
76 Sprinzak, “Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization,” 38.
socialisation of the group. As time progresses, individuals are further isolated and disconnected from the outside world. This is particularly evident in millenarian cults where communication with family and friends outside the group is heavily restricted. The network now influences and possibly determines an individual’s behaviour, satisfies their urge regarding fraternal action and belonging, validates collective grievances, propels the group to shared identity, whilst pledging individuals’ dedication to the cause and the group. The collective group identity now supersedes individual identity. The individual actively takes on a new collective identity. Countless examples attest to Bjørgo’s claim that the more the individual socialises and succumbs to the network, there begins to be less opportunity for individual identity and decision-making (agency). Sageman’s outstanding primary research analysis on Al-Qaeda operatives illustrates this process clearly. As the individual’s friendship intensified they transformed into a “bunch of guys” that resented prevailing structural and societal norms while developing a clear collective and common identity. However, such a collective identity is not formed in isolation. The new collective ‘in-group’ identity is built around and in opposition to the ‘out-group’ identity. In the face of the new powerful collective identity and organisational psychology of the network, individual differences and identity disappear in exchange of uniformity of behaviours and cohesiveness of the terrorist network. The radicalisation process depends upon and deepens as the collective group identity consumes the individual identity. This identity process reaches its peak upon the violent act. After losing their original identity, an individual’s behaviour and action is now explained by the psychology of the network. The individual now strongly identifies with the group, and the collective identity is now the individual identity. The newly formed collective identity provides a public description of the network and articulates their distinctive attributes against their standard societal norms. This collective psycho-political identity can undoubtedly change as the radicalisation process continues, external norms shift and the
networks interacts with the external structures.\textsuperscript{88} As the individual and collective identity continues to fuse, the struggle for success is no longer about the personal but rather for the collective.\textsuperscript{89} Each individual believes the network is striving to fulfil the needs that they themselves wish to fulfil.\textsuperscript{90} At this stage the network is central to the individual’s identity and ‘reason for living.’\textsuperscript{91} Political psychology reveals how individuals’ identity can radically shift in the process of radicalisation to a collective group identity when the individual becomes deeply entwined with likeminded people in an isolated and cohesive network.

\textit{‘Brotherhood’ & Dependency}

In conjunction with the newly formed collective identity, members form a relationship with the network. Psychology sheds light on how this ‘brotherhood’ is formed and to what extent individuals are willing to go to ensure its survival. Radicalisation and terrorism result in bringing the network into a closer and smaller group.\textsuperscript{92} The commitment and camaraderie within a group will undoubtedly increase as cohesion intensifies and the network faces external and existential threats.\textsuperscript{93} The network takes various conscious and unconscious steps that subsequently intensify the relationships amongst its members (i.e. forming a ‘brotherhood’), radicalisation process and the embracement of political violence. The group responsible for the 2004 Madrid train bombings demonstrates this. Serhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, known as ‘\textit{The Tunisian}’ arrived in Spain in 1994 to complete his PhD, however he soon left university and became a real estate agent. Fakhet was not a very religious man upon arrival in Spain although upon meeting Amer Azizi and Mustapha Maymouni via his wife: the radicalisation process began.\textsuperscript{94} He and other members of the network began meeting more regularly in several locations across Madrid where they were exposed to indoctrination via inflammatory speeches, texts and videos.\textsuperscript{95} These meetings had an astounding effect on both the individuals and the group. So much so that the members eventually no longer attended their local mosque as the Pakistani who ran the mosque possessed a different interpretation of the texts and Islam to theirs.\textsuperscript{96} As social ties within the network began to solidify, the group

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Sprinzak, “Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization,” 19.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Jerrold Post and Ehud Sprinzak, “The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists,” ibid.5(2003): 176.
\item \textsuperscript{90} V Volkan, \textit{Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism}(New York: Basic Books, 1998), 27.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Post and Sprinzak, “The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists,” 175.
\item \textsuperscript{93} McCauley and Segal, “Terrorist Individuals and Terrorist Groups: The Normal Psychology of Extreme Behavior,” 421.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Alonso and Reinares, “Maghreb immigrants becoming suicide terrorists,” 188.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 189.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 192.
\end{itemize}
slowly withdrew from the original mainstream society. Members began to coalesce around a run-down house outside Madrid and another member’s shop where they socialised, prayed and exchanged ideas that in turn reinforced their collective and ideological commitments. 97 These meetings in Madrid and their frequent country getaways where members played football, swam, cooked and prayed together continued for a couple of years. 98 This protracted process undoubtedly solidified the relationships between the members. These regular meetings engaged the participants in a gradual radicalisation process that deepened their involvement in training for the attack, but more importantly strengthened the solidarity and commitment to one another among those within the radicalising group. 99

The case of the Madrid bombers is typical of many terrorist networks with solidarity to the network and its members being of the utmost importance. After interviewing thirty long-term IRA members, Robert White concluded that group solidarity and devotion to fellow comrades is the most forceful element that holds militants and their mission together in tough times. 100 “I just can’t turn my back on it . . . there’s too many of my friends in jail, there’s too many of my mates given their lives.” 101 Non-active members repeatedly mention the ‘closeness’ they used to feel with their respective group members when a common purpose was shared and more so when risk was heightened. 102 Furthermore, when these above ground networks move underground into isolation, solidarity is greatly increased. When isolated from society the network forms not only a distinct identity as discussed earlier, but also clear values, norms and standards of behaviour. 103 Conversely, transitioning to isolation and underground can also heighten the group’s anxiety level and fatigue that can potentially lessen the network’s ability to recognise alternative action and adjust to the changing structural environment. 104 Psychology has shown terrorist networks operate in a similar fashion to military units. Both terrorists and soldiers rely on one another for their survival that in turn fosters extreme group solidarity. 105 Terrorist network members are psychologically rewarded not only for bringing the group closer to their goals, but also by

97 Ibid., 193.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 195.
enhancing group cohesion and thinking.\textsuperscript{106} The consequences of betrayal are encapsulated within the Madrid network. It is very clear one of the group’s members did not approve of the group’s decision of self-immolation as his body (either Rifaat or Mohammed Oulad) was separated and hidden underneath a bed at the bombsite (Leganés).\textsuperscript{107} In spite of being written 40 plus years ago, Janis is still correct in proclaiming “blood price” is instrumentally powerful in coercing group conformity and solidarity.\textsuperscript{108} However, although the threat of blood for disloyalty is always present and there is a degree of individual agency, disloyalty is rarely actualised due to the individual becoming increasingly intertwined and dependent on the network. In fact some networks (e.g. the Uruguayan Tupamaros, Jabhat al-Nusra) consciously create this feeling of dependency in order to make the individual feel they were no longer self-sufficient in any other manner.\textsuperscript{109}

Although moving underground into isolation may be required to continue the network’s inherent illegal activities, there are also other reasons for doing so. Such social isolation fosters further dependency on the network and thus an incredibly strong motivation to stay within the group, in order to achieve the reassurance, approval and interactions the individual now craves in the face of external danger.\textsuperscript{110} The effect of this psychological dependence on a network is highlighted by the imprisonment of network’s member. Historically when a group’s member is imprisoned, other group members outside have desperately attempted to free the individual as there is a strong mutual interdependence between the group outside prison.\textsuperscript{111} Moreover, the network might be unable to accept new members as sufficient emotional replacements for the former (arrested) member.\textsuperscript{112} Members become mutually reliant on one another. Members become more dedicated to the network and its’ goals as the individual’s self-worth is deeply rooted in their worth and importance within the network.\textsuperscript{113} Success of the network becomes a vested and personal interest because if the network is successful so is the individual.\textsuperscript{114} Political psychology has shed substantial light on the inner workings of a terrorist network by revealing how members form dependency networks and a relationship that resembles a brotherhood.

\textsuperscript{107} Alonso and Reinares, "Maghreb Immigrants Becoming Suicide Terrorists," 194.
\textsuperscript{109} M Gillo, \textit{The Tupamaros}(London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), 137.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 397.
\textsuperscript{112} Janis, "Group Identification under Conditions of External Danger," 85.
\textsuperscript{113} Post and Sprinzak, "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," 176.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
Competition & Rivalry

As a result of this dependency, the threat of competition can emerge from rival terrorist networks and other political organisations. Political psychology allows external observers to analyse and explain how the network and its members will perceive and act in the face of competition. Psychological research testifies that in the same way as an external threat accelerates the radicalisation process and enhances group cohesion, so can competition (internal and external), despite it not always representing a physical threat. In their well-researched and case-study rich paper, psychologists McCauley and Moskalenko argue that radicalisation emerges and intensifies against the backdrop of intragroup competition. Essentially every member strives to be more radical than the other. Crenshaw agrees with this position and sees competition as critical for group solidarity, identity formation and continued radicalisation vis-à-vis the external society. Notwithstanding the importance of internal competition for terrorist networks, external competition is additionally critical for its continuation. Having said that, external competition is not necessarily beneficial for the terrorist network. Regardless of some contentions bordering on the ‘terrorist personality’ argument, Post raises a strong argument regarding external competition. External competition and potential retaliation against the network significantly strengthens the group and proliferates terrorist acts since external competition and retaliation confirms the thought process regarding threats and ostracisation inherent within the network. As previously mentioned, the competition does not necessarily signify a physical threat (e.g. a peer group). Psychology illustrates how networks respond to non-threatening competition. With external competition, the network becomes radicalised while further solidifying. In fact historical examples indicate that some terrorist networks thrive and rely upon external competition. Some networks have clearly endeavoured to provoke attacks from their competitors as a means of rallying a larger support base and solidifying support amongst existing sympathisers. If the two competing networks are fighting for the same support and sympathisers, research by McCauley and Moskalenko has suggested heightened ‘radical action’ (which does not mean the demise of the other network) can stimulate more external

116 Ibid.
117 Crenshaw, M 2000, 414
119 "Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics," 23.
support, prestige and status for the competing networks. The competition for support between Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon and Hamas and Fatah in Israel-Palestine demonstrate this process clearly. That being said, competition can lead to severe outbidding between the networks and a subsequent deadly cycle of violence. Competing networks try to violently outdo one another in order to retain the existing members and supporters, or in some cases attract new recruits. Mia Bloom explains that in order to maintain their ‘market share’ and internal esteem via outbidding the groups begin to adopt tactics (e.g. suicide attacks) that they have never previously used. This process of outbidding is exemplified in Sri Lanka between competing Tamil groups. Hoffman who has published widely in the field of terrorism, asserts that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) commenced suicide attacks in order to distinguish itself from other competing Tamil groups that opposed the LTTE desires to lead the resistance against the central Sri Lankan Government and on behalf of all Tamil’s. Hoffman’s assertion may be an over a simplification of other geo-political conditions leading to the adoption of suicide attacks, yet competition is undoubtedly a contributing factor. Without doubt, competition led Shiite groups: Hezbollah and Amal (Lebanon) to outbid each other in suicide attacks. Domestic constituents and popularity effectively demanded the competing organisations to continue conducting suicide attacks in order to keep and enlarge their respective market share amongst the domestic Shiite community. Nevertheless, this competition can lead to a cycle of violence that damages both the network internally and its support base. As Sprinzak argues, it could enrage and further radicalise previously ‘moderate’ members within the network to execute extreme form of protest. On the other hand, this outbidding and cycle of violence can cause fracturing within the group, as they are no longer acting in line with network’s established ideological and moral prescriptions. Members with sufficient radicalisation will likely peel off from the original network and join or establish a small faction that will eventually condense into an extremely radicalised network and continue competing. This situation is represented across the globe and spectrum of terrorist networks. For example, the

121 Ibid., 424.
126 Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism,” 94.
127 Ibid.
129 Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism,” 89.
Italian Red Brigades and German Red Army Faction (RAF) were condensed from left-wing student movements.\(^{131}\) Further, another example is the competition between rival Irish Republican groups that led to the splintering of members resulting in the formation of more rival groups (e.g. Official IRA, Real IRA, Provisional IRA and Continuation IRA).\(^{132}\) Political psychology has provided outsiders and governments with an insight into how terrorist networks and their members will regard and behave in the face of competition. Psychological research proposes that groups will typically solidify and radicalise to a greater extent when competition is present. Yet if a cycle of violence ensues, psychology stipulates that under-radicalised individuals will likely split from the network, leaving the remaining network members to accelerate their radicalisation process.

**Leadership**

Equally important is the role of leadership in uniting the network and furthering the radicalisation process of its members. Some networks claim they are leaderless (online networks are a case in point) yet, in the physical reality leaders are essential. Leaders often set the tone of the network, that being their beliefs and aims. Leader’s authority can rest on charisma (personal authority), ideology (intellectual authority) or in some cases operational prowess (military authority)\(^ {133}\). However, the primary role of the leader is to preserve and in some cases develop the collective beliefs of the network in order to connect their aims to outside environments.\(^ {134}\) However, it should be noted that one cannot make sweeping generalisations on the role leadership plays in all terrorist networks. Leadership can be vastly different across terrorist networks. Nonetheless, in many cases there is an authoritarian aspect to leadership exemplified by the mantra “what the leader says is wrong is wrong and so their right is right”.\(^ {135}\) Moghaddam is in part correct in saying the individual is influenced, enabled and disabled by their surrounding social environment.\(^ {136}\) Leaders establish their authority on the capacity to manipulate their members via psychological (threatening expulsion or isolation) and political incentives (goal accomplishment).\(^ {137}\) Therefore members are psychologically tied to the leader. Within these types of networks leader’s demand their

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 426.

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 425.

\(^{133}\) Crenshaw, “Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning,” 4.

\(^{134}\) Ibid., 7.


\(^{136}\) Moghaddam and Marsella, *Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences & Interventions*, 65.

\(^{137}\) Crenshaw, “Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning,” 4.
member’s complete submission to them and whatever limitations they impose. In essence members in these authoritarian networks are told what to believe and when, and they have very little influence.

With access to restricted police intercepts, Harris-Hogan elucidates the role of a leader in a Melbournian jihadist terrorist network arrested in 2005. In spite of receiving no formal religious instruction network leader ‘MJM532’ was leader of the entire cell. Harris-Hogan claims that without his leadership the network could have separated and essentially failed. MJM532 held considerable control over the member’s behaviours and thoughts: “We don’t teach brothers to think for themselves.” When sentenced the judge noted the “enormous influence” MJM532 held over the individuals who followed him. The process of indoctrination is a gradual process whereby the leader affirms, strengthens and nourishes the individual’s involvement in the network and loyalty to the leadership by closing or narrowing other “escape” routes that effectively leads to a “point of no return.” Horgan and other psychologists compare this psychological and incremental process undertaken by the network leader to a paedophile grooming a child. According to Horgan, both acts draw on similar processes and are protracted in nature.

In addition to consolidating power via indoctrination, leaders can deflect internal aggression and conflict onto the enemy that would have otherwise been placed upon them. Leaders shape and influence the networks perception of events by scapegoating the opposition and consequently deflecting hostility towards them [the opposition] that could otherwise shift to internal hostility. Leaders take this conscious step as internal conflict can threaten group cohesion and identity. This step can be illustrated by Yasser Arafat’s [then leader of Fatah] apparent sanctioning of violence outside Israel-Palestine and the Middle East in order to curb dissent towards his leadership and Fatah. Even with the displacement, aggression and blame, leaders can face significant challenges to their authority. Whether it is an authoritarian or democratic based leadership, fractionalisation and splintering can occur.

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140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Moghaddam and Marsella, *Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences & Interventions*, 164.
147 Ibid.
Challenges to authority may arise for a variety of reasons and emerge from a variety of sources. In some cases it might result from personality differences between the leader and his network, ideological disagreements or in some cases personal rivalry.\textsuperscript{149} The ramifications of these leadership and fractional disputes have been seen in many groups. For instance, leadership disputes and the resulting fractionalisation regarding the nonviolent methods of the ‘Students for a Democratic Society’ (SDS) prompted a small section of the SDS leadership and members to split from the mainstream SDS and form the Weather Underground terrorist group.\textsuperscript{150} Therefore leadership must not be taken for granted or abused. Due to the leaders’ limited external power, their authority rests upon accurately interpreting the network’s objectives and efficiently directing related operations.\textsuperscript{151} Whilst undertaking these roles, the leader is under enormous physical and psychological stress to conform to the group’s norms, thus making compromise and innovation troublesome.\textsuperscript{152} One could juxtapose a terrorist network leader and his member’s to multinational companies CEO’s and their shareholders. Both are under substantial pressure from their constituents to perform and uphold organisational benchmarks. Political psychology provides intimate details on the relevance a leader has to a terrorist network. Descriptive approaches allows one to see the superficial role of the terrorist leadership, although it is psychology that allows one to see how this leadership gains and maintains their authority whilst heavily influencing the network both individually and holistically.

‘The Act of Killing’

In addition to explaining the importance of a leader in a network, psychology further enables ‘outsiders’ to understand how terrorists overcome the self-regulatory and self-sanction inhibitions that typically prevent humans from killing other humans. Overcoming these inhibitions is the fifth and final floor of Moghaddam’s \textit{linear} ‘Staircase to Terrorism’ and is also present in Sprinzak’s last behavioural stage: ‘Crisis of Legitimacy.’ Instrumental to this paper is the contribution of psychologist Albert Bandura, whose work in the 1980’s demonstrated how terrorist networks overcome these common inhibitions. Bandura’s psychological research plausibly claims networks vanquish self-sanction by ‘moral-disengagement.’ However, he fails to mention that although terrorists may not fit with

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{151} Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Political Terrorism” 399.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
societal morals, they do not internally view themselves as amoral. From their perspective, terrorist networks see themselves as ‘moral agents.’

In order to undertake mass-casualty violence, terrorist networks disengage their internal self-regulatory processes and reframe typically reprehensible conduct. The capacity to kill is developed via a gradual process that some members may not even recognise. Individuals do not generally partake in reprehensible activities until they can personally justify them. Leadership encourages this process further by not allowing emotions to induce members. Leadership and peers create a moral divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘the other’ that over time encourages the evasion of inhibitory mechanisms. Furthermore, violent conduct is effectively constructed as benign and personal agency of those engaged in it removed. There is an array of mechanisms used by terrorists to overcome natural inhibitions in order to kill other humans. By far the most commonly used and psychologically researched mechanism is dehumanisation. To recognise another as human triggers empathetic and vicarious emotional responses: an identifiable similarity. Members of the terrorist network seem as psychologically different as the out-group. In order to conduct mass atrocities terrorist networks strip individuals of their human characteristics. A new lexicon is created and the out-group is now described as ‘animals’, ‘monsters’, ‘subhuman’, ‘aliens’ or objects with the relevant psychological makeup. Once dehumanised, people are not regarded as humans with feelings and aspirations. Ulrike Meinhof (RAF) underwent this process: “the person in uniform [West-German Government official] is a pig, that he is not a human being.” Psychology has shown that dehumanisation of the out-group is absolutely critical for terrorist networks in order for them to carry out mass-casualty violence.

In addition to dehumanisation, Bandura identifies ‘advantageous comparison’ as the most effective psychological mechanism for disengaging self-sanction through which the
group positively contrasts their activities against the target [i.e. regime]. In turn, they are effectively self-approving their action. In conjunction with these people, Bandura suggests people can behave more aggressively when an action is provided with a sanitised label (e.g. purifying over killing). As the Nazi’s and various other groups (e.g. Jabhat al-Nusra) have demonstrated, euphemistic language is a powerful mechanism in overcoming self-censure.

There are many mechanisms that remove self-censure yet still contain the element of personal agency. ‘Attribution of blame’ strips the individual and thus the network of any personal agency. Instead the terrorist network blames the out-group for their own suffering that they ultimately bought upon themselves. In turn, the group sees their violent action as being compelled and justifiable, not as a personal decision. This was a common tactic of the IRA in Northern Ireland. The ‘Provisionals’ often attributed blame for various explosions onto the “security forces” which also attracted community support. Further, the ‘displacement of responsibility’ is another tool to overcome self-censure. Those individuals undertaking the violent action actively obscure and distort their relationship between the action and the outcome. Agency is removed and agents see their actions deriving from social and leadership pressures, thus removing any perceived personal responsibility. Individualised reprehensible behaviours have shown it can be overcome when one diffuses responsibility onto a group. Bandura’s research has proven people behave more cruelly when responsibility is shifted to a group. Everyone becomes responsible yet no individual feels responsible. The final tool Bandura identifies as essential in moral-disengagement is the ‘disregarding or distorting of consequence.’ This process entails the selective distortion and misrepresentation of one’s conduct. When one’s actions are ignored there is little sense for self-censure to be triggered. Besides the moral-disengagement mechanism identified by Bandura, various other scholars have recognised alternative methods. One method involves individuals perceiving themselves as soldiers. Despite their victims seeing them as terrorists, individuals and their relevant networks see themselves as soldiers or in some cases

167 Ibid.
168 Ibid., 366.
169 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., 366.
176 Ibid.
warriors. Crenshaw argues that by distinguishing themselves as soldiers or the avant-garde acting for the people, (i.e. altruism) allows the terrorists to disengage as they are not fighting for personal self-gain but in lieu of ‘the people’. This form of self-identification and perception is a survival method in the face of physical danger as well as with the emotional repercussions associated with killing humans. Yet again the IRA mobilised this disengagement mechanism: “I tried to look at Brady's death in a detached way. He was a soldier and I was a soldier, and in war soldiers die…. I tried to look at it as a job that had to be done.” These methods of disengagement were not created in isolation within the individuals’ mind, but through internal group dynamics, notably ‘groupthink’. Due to high-level of dependency upon the network and psychological pressure towards conformity, debate within groups is often stifled. Groupthink fosters conformity, ‘de-individualisation’ and group polarisation. Original thought and individual decision-making is suppressed. Experimental social psychology suggests that by doing so conformity ensues that can result in a ‘risky-shift’: whereby a polarised group embraces the more extreme positions that would have otherwise been discounted by an individual. Psychology has been critical to our understanding of how terrorist networks and their members disengage from self-censure and thus commit mass-scale violence that is considered reprehensible to the out-group.

Conclusion & Further Research

Political psychology can shed substantial light on the inner workings of terrorist networks and the subsequent radicalisation process. Although the psychology of terrorism is still under researched and underutilised, existing literature shows the clear benefits of viewing terrorism through a psychological lens in conjunction with other research methodologies (e.g. political science). As such, political psychology can provide considerable insight into the rationale and thought dynamics of individuals and terrorist networks whilst explaining how an individual’s identity is reformed and shifted to group identity via a complex and gradual process of radicalisation. Additionally, it is evident that the well-defined psychological changes a terrorist network and individuals move through is often associated with the network’s membership solidifying and the intensification of dependency. Finally, it is only through a

179 "The Psychology of Political Terrorism " 399.
180 M Stone, None Shall Divide Us(London: John Blake, 2003), 71.
psychological analysis of terrorist networks that the various mechanisms that engender terrorists to evade self-censure and mainstream-moral hurdles, which cannot not be understood via conventional political science. When utilised in conjunction with other fields (e.g. political science, sociology etc.), political psychology is in invaluable tool for comprehending the inner workings of terrorist networks and radicalisation. The post September 11 world has seen a return to classic event-driven research and more frightening: the ‘terrorist personality’ argument. In order to accurately understand and make sense of terrorist networks, governments and academics must further embrace and encourage the use of political psychology, or otherwise risk disastrous and irreversible results.
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