



WikiLeaks Project* – 2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks – An Analysis

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On 26th November, 2008 there were eleven coordinated shooting and bombing attacks in prominent places and landmarks of Mumbai, the financial capital of India. 164 people including 26 foreigners were killed and at least 308 were injured. While giving a judgment which confirmed the death sentence of the sole surviving terrorist this episode was described by the Chief Justice of India as having unprecedented enormity on all scales. The planning of this operation was intricate and comprehensive. The simultaneity and the multiplicity of the attacks were confounding for the police in the initial stages and the intensive and prudent use of technology by the terrorists disadvantaged the other security forces at the later stages of the attacks. These attacks were a synthesis of methodology and technique which had not been played out in the Indian context earlier. This paper looks into the minutiae of these attacks including the planning and the preparation which went in to it as well as the response to the attacks. The impact on relations with Pakistan in the aftermath is discussed within the broader light of the international response and intelligence sharing. After discussing the impact of the attacks, this paper closes with raising the most pertinent questions these attacks have left us with.

* **Disclaimer:** Although we do not condone the actions of WikiLeaks, its staff and its sources, the information is now in the public domain and therefore it is important for a research institute to analyze the contents of the materials. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).

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This analysis looks at the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, India's densely populated financial capital, multi-cultural metropolis and a hub of media and entertainment industries. A total of 164 people were killed¹, including 26 foreigners; and at least 308 were wounded² in the eleven coordinated shooting and bombing attacks in prominent places and landmarks of Mumbai including the Oberoi Trident Hotel, the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotels, and Chhatrapati Shivaji Railway Terminus. Of the ten terrorists (all Pakistani Muslims³) participating directly in the attack, only one, Ajmal Amir Kasab, was captured alive. He was later sentenced to death and executed in November, 2012.⁴ Following the attacks the Union Home Minister of India among others was driven to resign.⁵

As written by the Chief Justice of India while upholding the death sentence, the attack on the financial capital of the country had *"a magnitude of unprecedented enormity on all scales. The conspiracy... was as deep and large as it was vicious. The preparation and training for the execution was as thorough as the execution was ruthless. In terms of loss of life and property, and more importantly in its traumatizing effect, this case stands alone, or it is at least the very rarest of rare to come before this court since the birth of the Republic."*⁶ An occurrence which had significant impact on India, the spate of attacks drew international focus to the intelligence failure which occurred and the impact on India's ties with Pakistan which had until then finally started progressing on the right note. Wikileaks' releases focused on this relationship, as well as on the diplomatic relations with other countries in the aftermath of the attack. Furthermore the wikileaks addressed the possible retaliation measures which India examined. This paper will examine the wikileak material and highlight the details of the attacks *suo moto*.

The Mumbai attacks are noteworthy for multiple reasons. Distinctive features are discernible not from the weapons or the casualties per se but the synthesis of methodology and technique which had not been earlier played out in the Indian context. The following sections etch out the methodology, the techniques and the response to the attacks.

¹ "HM announces measures to enhance security" (Press release). Press Information Bureau (Government of India). 11 December 2008

² Black, Ian (28 November 2008). "Attacks draw worldwide condemnation". The Guardian (UK).

³ Friedman, Thomas (17 February 2009). "No Way, No How, Not Here". The New York Times.

⁴ "Ajmal Kasab hanged at Yerwada Jail in Pune at 7:30am". The Times of India. 21 November 2012

⁵ "Officials quit over India attacks". BBC. 30 November 2008

⁶ *Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab V. State of Maharashtra, Supreme Court of India*, Criminal Appeal No 1899-1900 OF 2011, available at <http://supremecourtindia.nic.in/outtoday/39511.pdf> at p. 353

1. Preparation

1.1 Ground Work

The success of the Mumbai attacks was a culmination of individual training as well as prolific ground work and planning. One of the deceased terrorists, Abu Ismail, was found in possession of a map of the important locations in Mumbai and investigations revealed⁷ that the map was prepared by Fahim Arshad Mohammad Yusuf Ansari (also known as Abu Jarar, Sakib, Sahil Pawaskar, Sameer Shaikh, Ahmed Hasan). Originally a resident of West Mumbai⁸, he assumed the alias of Sahil Pawaskar (a Hindu name) and tried renting an apartment at Badhwar Park; the importance of the location being in context of the proximity of the location to the targeted locations in South Mumbai. Further, the terrorists had also chosen Machhimar Colony, Badhwar Park to disembark on Indian soil and subsequently disperse. Together, these two factors made the location of Badhwar Park strategically important. However Fahim Ansari a.k.a. Sahil Pawaskar was unable to rent an apartment in Badhwar Park. He did manage to enroll at the Soft Pro Computer Educational Council⁹, located very close to Badhwar Park. He rented an apartment in another location of Mumbai¹⁰ and from there he conducted elaborate reconnaissance of the locations of importance in Mumbai, the details of which were given to him by Sabauddin Ahmed (also known as Sabba, Farhan, Mubashir, Abu Qasim, Sajju, Ashok, Shabbir Ahmed).

Under the same alias of Sahil Pawaskar, Ansari procured a mobile for the purpose of communicating with the other operatives. Ansari and Sabauddin also used email messenger to be in constant touch with each other.

On finalizing the detailed maps of the seven targeted locations Ansari handed them over to Sabauddin in Kathmandu, Nepal in January, 2008 and then Sabauddin in turn got in touch with his LeT bosses, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Abu Kaahfa. The big picture is indicative of how their ground work played a pivotal role in the precision with which the ten terrorists were finally able to attack since they placed complete reliance on these maps.

⁷ These details have been etched out in the report submitted by the Chief Investigating Officer of the attacks under Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on completion of investigation. Available at <http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbai-terror-attack-final-form.pdf>

⁸ Room No. 2409, Chawl No. 303, Motilal Nagar No.2, M.G. Road, Goregaon (West), Mumbai 400062

⁹ Opposite Bombay Stock Exchange, Mumbai Samachar Marg, Mumbai – 400001

¹⁰ 98-B Batatawala chawl, Room No. 14, Ground Floor, Patthe Bapurao Marg, Mumbai – 400008

1.2 Training

Investigation brought to light¹¹ the arduous and disciplined training routine which the ten terrorists had to undergo before departing for India. The schedule was split up into modules and a higher module could only be entered on successful completion of the previous phase. The training was carried on at multiple locations inside Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir including Muridke, Manshera, Muzaffarabad, Azizabad, Paanch Teni, etc. The trainers who imparted the training are alleged to be Abu Fahadullah, Abu Mufti Saeed, Abu Abdurrehman, Abu Maavia, Abu Anis, Abu Bashir, Abu Hanjla Pathan, Abu Saria, Abu Saif-ur-Rehman, Abu Imran, Zaki- ur- Rehman, Hakim Saheb, Hafiz Saeed, Kaahfa.

The ten terrorists sent to India were the most successful candidates of the training modules which entailed physical fitness, swimming, weapon handling, tradecraft, battle inoculation, guerilla warfare, firing sophisticated assault weapons, use of hand grenades and rocket launchers, handling of GPS and Satellite Phone, map reading etc. Teachings of the tenets of Jihad and the recitation of Quran and Hadis also formed a part of their preparation. During the last stage of the training the terrorists were handed over the maps of Mumbai which they were told had been prepared by Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin Sheikh. These ten terrorists had been trained to speak Hindi and were given fake identity cards with Hindu names.¹² (Refer to Annex 1)

1.3 Final Pre Attack Preparations

The ten terrorists were selected for the attack and then paired up in five groups. Each pair was given the following materials in the requisite quantities¹³

1 AK 47	1
2 Pistol	1
3 Hand grenades	8 to 10 each
4 AK 47 Magazine	8 (Each magazine hosting 30 rounds)

¹¹ These details have been etched out in the report submitted by the Chief Investigating Officer of the attacks under Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on completion of investigation. Available at <http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbai-terror-attack-final-form.pdf>

¹² See Tankel, S. (2011). Storming the world stage: The story of Lashkar-e-Taiba. New York: Columbia University Press., pages 207-221

¹³ Ibid.

5 Pistol Magazine	2 (Each magazine hosting 7 rounds)
6 Khanjir	1
7 Dry fruit (Badam, Manuka etc.)	2 kg
8 Cash (Indian rupees)	Ranging from Rs. 4000 to Rs. 6000/- each.
9 Nokia mobile handset	1 each
10 Headphone 1 each	1 each
11 Water bottle 1 each	1 each
12 G.P.S.	1 (Each Group)
13 RDX-laden IED (with timer)	1 (Approximately each 8 kgs.)
14 9 Volt battery	3
15 Haver Sack 1	1
16 Bag (for carrying RDX-laden IED) 1	1
17 Satellite Phone 1 (for all)	1
18 Rubberized dinghy with Outboard Engine	1

They set forth from Karachi and left Pakistani waters on 23 November in a Pakistani vessel¹⁴ and on the same afternoon on entering Indian waters hijacked the M.V. Kuber with a five crew members who the attackers ultimately killed. Using a rubber dinghy they reached the shoreline near the Machimar Nagar in Bombay from where they split up into pairs. This was reportedly around 20:00 hours on 26 November.¹⁵

2. The Attacks

2.1 Targets

The terrorists attacked a total of ten targets out of which attacks on five of the targets had been meticulously preplanned whereas the rest were targets of opportunity.¹⁶ The targets included two five star hotels, the Taj Hotel opposite the iconic Gateway of India in South Mumbai and the Oberoi Trident, another hotel in South Mumbai. Another target was the

¹⁴ Al Husseni, a boat allegedly belonging to one of the commanders of the operation: Rehman Lakhvi. As has been discussed in the course of the paper, this boat was allegedly purchased with money of the Inter Services Intelligence

¹⁵ See Moreau, Ron; Mazumdar, Sudip (27 November 2008). "The Pakistan Connection". *Newsweek*.

¹⁶ Acharya, A, Mandal, S and A. Mehta (2009). Terrorist attacks in Mumbai: picking up the pieces. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Chattrapati Shivaji Terminus, an architectural splendor and Mumbai's major railway station for both local and long distance trains. Another primary target, Café Leopold, a popular café in South Mumbai, was frequented by both locals and foreigners. The fifth primary target was Nariman House, again in South Mumbai, houses a Jewish outreach center, and serves as the center of Jewish activity in Mumbai.

Secondary targets included the Cama Hospital, the area around Metro Cinema, a petrol station in Colaba, and two taxis that exploded in Ville Parle and Wadi Bunder.¹⁷

2.1.1 Leopold Cafe

Leopold was one of the first sites to be attacked.¹⁸ Abu Shoaib and Naser aka Abu Umer, one of the pairs of the terrorists, reached there by taxi. En route, they planted an approximately 8 kilograms of RDX laden I.E.D below the driver's seat.¹⁹ On reaching the Café they started firing indiscriminately using AK 47 assault rifles. Hand grenades were used by them to cause further mayhem. 11 people were killed and 28 injured, the latter including 9 foreigners. Subsequently the two terrorists walked to the Taj Hotel from there.²⁰ En route, one of them planted 8 to 10 kilograms RDX laden IED on the kerb near the Gokul Restaurant and Bar. This was diffused by the Mumbai Police Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (B.D.D.S.) in time to prevent further loss of life. However, the explosive planted in the taxi went off later killing two female passengers, the taxi driver and injuring innocent bystanders.

2.1.2 Chattrapati Shivaji Terminal (CST)

The arrested terrorist Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Aamir Kasab and the deceased terrorist Abu Ismail (Ismail Khan) hailed a cab to the Chattrapati Shivaji Terminal (CST) and en route planted RDX laden IED below the driver's seat. After alighting at the busy railway station, Abu Ismail planted his share of RDX laden IED in the station premises. The two then went on a spree of indiscriminate firing from the AK 47 rifles. The firing started around 21:30 and ended

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Blakely, Rhys; Page, Jeremy. 2008. "Defiant Leopold café shows that Mumbai is not afraid". *The Times* (UK), December 1.

¹⁹ The report submitted by the Chief Investigating Officer of the attacks under Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on completion of investigation. Available at <http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbai-terror-attack-final-form.pdf>

²⁰ Acharya, A, Mandal, S and A. Mehta (2009). Terrorist attacks in Mumbai: picking up the pieces. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

up killing 58 and injuring 104.²¹ The attack at the train station was aimed solely at causing mass casualties and accounted for more than a third of the total deaths.²² These two terrorists then hurled hand grenades at the Police officer and Home Guards who tried to intercept their reckless pursuit. The police officers led by Shashank Shinde managed to drive the two terrorists out of the station premises and onto the foot over bridge from where they continued to fire and hurl grenades. Ismail and Kasab entered the adjoining by-lane where the Times of India office is located. They tried to break open a private vehicle parked nearby, albeit without any success. They proceeded to Cama Hospital from there, unabashedly firing on the way and continuing the violence on entering the hospital premises. Police was trying to secure the safety of the patients and doctors inside the hospital and undeterred, the terrorists went on to fire at these police officers, killing two and injuring many more. From there the two terrorists walked down Mahapalika Marg, killing another police officer regulating traffic on the way. En route, they fired and killed a police officer who was regulating the movement of public. They fired at a Government vehicle on the Badruddin Tayabjee Lane, wanting to kill the driver and hijack the vehicle. They were rendered unsuccessful in this bid since a police vehicle approached and started firing at them. They retaliated and the firing killed three members of the Anti Terrorist Squad²³ who were in the vehicle, namely Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar. They then took control of the vehicle and drove it to Metro Cinema square, continuing to fire on the way. They had to desert the vehicle because of a puncture in one of the tires and went on to hijacked another vehicle by holding the occupants at gun point.

During this time, one of the police officers, Naik Arun Jadhav, who was seriously injured but still alive in the police vehicle they were using earlier called the control room and gave a complete briefing of the situation. The DB Marg Police acted promptly on this information and organized road blocks (*nakabandis*). When the terrorists approached the point where the road was blocked they were asked to turn off their headlights but instead they turned on the wiper spray on the windshield so the police would be unable to discern who they were. They tried to turn the vehicle around, crashing into the road dividers. This earned them significant attention and the police immediately surrounded them. There was cross firing and a police officer,

²¹ 2008. Police declare Mumbai siege over. *BBC*, November 29.

²² Rand Corporation (2009). Terrorists Can Think Strategically. Lessons Learned From the Mumbai Attacks. [report]. Page 3

²³ A force of 30 police officers in Mumbai, formed with an aim of taking control over modern-day terrorism. It also has branches in other states including Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh,

Tukaram Ombale (Assistant Police Sub Inspector), approached Ajmal Kasab and grabbed the AK 47 between his legs. Kasab immediately fired, killing Ombale but giving the rest of the police enough time to overpower the two terrorists. Both were taken to the hospital and while Ismail Khan was declared dead on arrival, Kasab was admitted for treatment, becoming the sole terrorist to be taken alive.²⁴

2.1.3 Hotel Oberoi and Hotel Trident

The fourth pair of terrorists, Abu Kaahfa (Fahadullah) and Abdul Rehman Chhota landed at the coast just opposite Hotel Oberoi and Hotel Trident after having dropped off the rest of the terrorists at Machimar Colony, Badhwar Park. One of them planted around 8 kilograms of RDX laden IED on a flowerbed near the main entrance of the Trident Hotel. The Mumbai Police Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (B.D.D.S.) later placed a bomb blanket on this bomb and subsequently minimized the damage. On entering the hotel the terrorists started firing indiscriminately in the lobby, restaurant, reception. They took hostages from the Kandahar restaurant and went upstairs and kept firing and hurling hand grenades from there. After a prolonged firing which lasted for 42 hours, the security forces succeeded in killing the terrorists but only after 35 persons were killed including 9 foreigners and 24 persons received injuries.

2.1.4 Taj Hotel

Another pair of terrorists comprising Hafiz Arshad alias Abdul Rehman Bada and Javed alias Abu Ali reached the landmark Taj Hotel by taking a taxi from Badhwar Park. They planted around 8 kilograms on the outside of the hotel and then proceeded to enter the hotel and managed to kill around 20 people by firing indiscriminately in the hotel lobby before being joined by two other attackers who came from the Leopold Café.²⁵ Together, the four terrorists went to the Heritage Wing of the hotel and took British and American citizens as hostages²⁶. The use of grenades and RDX laden IED which they planted on the fifth floor of the hotel led to the wing of the hotel catching fire and a major part of it being gutted.

²⁴ He was captured by the DB Marg Police of Mumbai and later handed over to the Crime Branch on November 27, 2008.

²⁵ Tankel, S. (2011). *Storming the world stage: The story of Lashkar-e-Taiba*. New York: Columbia University Press, pages 207-221

²⁶ On the basis of their passports.

2.2 Weapons and Modus Operandi

Carried out by ten militants, the attack entailed firing of guns, throwing of grenades, bombing, and the taking of hostages. The attackers were armed with AK 47s, low intensity bombs, RDX, and grenades²⁷. As mentioned earlier, each of the ten men was equipped with an assault rifle, eight magazines with thirty rounds each, a 9mm pistol with three clips of ammunition, eight hand grenades, materials to make an Improvised Explosive Device and a knife.²⁸ Some of the hand grenades recovered from the dead terrorists bore the name of a Pakistani weapon manufacturing company in Islamabad.²⁹ The distinctiveness of the attacks does not stem from the use of any nonconventional weapons but rather surprisingly from the point that this was the first mass casualty terrorism attack using hand-held weapons in the country.³⁰ In past major attacks, terrorists mostly used timed or remote controlled Improvised Explosive Devices.³¹ The more traditional firearm assault, which is an earlier operational form, was not as preferred as the mass casualty bombings and explosives. However, such an attack proved nevertheless effective in creating havoc and prolonged chaos.³²

The training of the attackers paid off and they displayed great tact and intensive stamina in an episode which stretched to more than sixty hours. According to New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, “*The attackers displayed a sophisticated level of training, coordination, and stamina. They fired in controlled, disciplined bursts*”.³³

Further, the terrorists used state-of-the-art digital technology through cyberspace. There were three main technology trails – cell phones, emails, and global positioning systems (GPS). The attackers remained in touch with each other through cell phones and voice over internet

27 Acharya, A, Mandal, S and A. Mehta (2009). Terrorist attacks in Mumbai: picking up the pieces. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

28 See, Tankel, S. (2011). Storming the world stage: The story of Lashkar-e-Taiba. New York: Columbia University Press.

29 Wah Nobel Company near Islamabad

30 Raman B (2009). “Mumbai 26/11 a day on infamy.” Lancer Publishers, New Delhi.

31 The 1993 serial bomb attacks are an exception where hidden timed explosive devices were used with arms, ammunitions and explosives brought through the sea route.

32 Rand Corporation (2009). Terrorists Can Think Strategically. Lessons Learned From the Mumbai Attacks. [report]. Page 2

33 The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on “Mumbai Terrorist Attacks” on January 08, 2009.

protocols.³⁴ Every two-man team was given a GPS device. Ismail Khan, was chosen to lead the *fidayeen*³⁵ squad and he received a satellite phone as well.³⁶

Further, the 26 November episode comprised of not just one or two attacks but multiple and simultaneous attacks at various locations in the city of Mumbai. On the whole the protracted episode lasted for a lengthy 68 hours, the longest attack ever carried out by a terrorist group.³⁷ The multiplicity, simultaneity, and protracted nature together lend an unmatched character to the episode.

Apart from the complexity of the operation even the diversity of the targets (patients in hospitals, the Jewish community, rich guests of five star hotels, and everyday commuters at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus) made it an extremely ambitious pursuit. These attacks are held, it has been argued³⁸, to have a multifaceted agenda hinging on anti-India, anti-Israel, anti-Jewish, anti-US, and anti-NATO ideology.

2.3 Foreign handling and Situational Information

A perusal of the training preceding the attacks and the attacks itself demonstrates that most of the planning as well as handling of the attacks being done from a foreign land.³⁹

Each sub-group, with the exception of the duo which went to the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, continuously stayed in touch with a handler in Pakistan. One of the key handlers, Khalida (also known as Wassi), coordinated the attack at Hotel Oberoi and Hotel Trident through Abdul Rehman and Abu Kaahfa.⁴⁰ He also personally directed the attacks at Nariman House,

³⁴ Unknown. (2009). Global Lessons from the Mumbai Terror Attacks. Investigative Project on Terrorism News, November 25.

³⁵ Suicidal squad. The origin of the phrase is from 10th century Persia where after committing a murder, the *fidayees* (killers) would resignedly accept their punishment, which was extremely brutal.

³⁶ See, Tankel, S. (2011). *Storming the world stage: The story of Lashkar-e-Taiba*. New York: Columbia University Press.

³⁷ Acharya, A, Mandal, S and A. Mehta (2009). *Terrorist attacks in Mumbai: picking up the pieces*. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

³⁸ Raman B (2009). "Mumbai 26/11 a day on infamy." Lancer Publishers, New Delhi.

³⁹ New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said, "The ability of terrorist handlers to direct operations from outside the attack zone using cell phones" was a "formidable capacity to adjust tactics while attacks are underway". The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on "Mumbai Terrorist Attacks" on January 08, 2009.

⁴⁰ Azad, S. and Gupta, A. (2011). A Quantitative Assessment on 26/11 Mumbai Attack using Social Network Analysis. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 2 (2).

Café Leopold, and the Taj Mahal Hotel.⁴¹ There was, thus, a very strong involvement of and reliance on handlers who were sitting in Pakistan.

A total number of 41 calls (8834 seconds) were made from Taj Mahal Hotel, 62 calls (15,705 seconds) were made from Oberoi/Trident and 181 calls (35, 172 seconds) were made from Nariman House.^{42, 43}

Together with the foreign handling, what further advances uniqueness to this spate of attacks is the fact that this attack was one of the few times that the terrorists used minute by minute reporting by the media for perpetrating further attacks. These terrorists monitored and utilized situational information broadcast through live media and Twitter.⁴⁴ An interesting excerpt is a transcript where the handler said that *“See, the media is saying that you guys are now in room no. 360 or 361. How did they come to know the room you guys are in?...Is there a camera installed there? Switch off all the lights...If you spot a camera, fire on it...see, they should not know at any cost how many of you are in the hotel, what condition you are in, where you are, things like that...these will compromise your security and also our operation”*.⁴⁵ This transcript is just one example of how the attackers were using media to plan better and to secure information superiority.

The Mumbai attacks were scripted and staged in a conscious effort to obtain maximum media coverage, which also made the masterminds dependent on the media.⁴⁶ Another interesting mention is of how the handler noted that *“Israel has made a request through diplomatic channels to save the hostages. If the hostages are killed, it will spoil relations between India and Israel”* to which the reply received was *“So be it, God willing.”*⁴⁷ This

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² As recorded in the report submitted by the Chief Investigating Officer of the attacks under Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on completion of investigation. Available at <http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbai-terror-attack-final-form.pdf>

⁴³ The prosecution relied upon the said conversation between the terrorists in Mumbai and the co-conspirators in Pakistan which was lawfully intercepted as per the provisions of Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 by the Anti Terrorist Squad of the Mumbai Police.

⁴⁴ Thussu, D. (2009). Turning terrorism into a soap opera. *British Journalism Review*, 20 (1), pp.13-18.

⁴⁵ Khetan, A. 2009. "60 Dark Hours at Hotel Taj," in *26/11 Mumbai Attacked*, H. Baweja (ed.), New Delhi: Roli Books, pp. 46-83.

⁴⁶ Kolas, A. (2010). The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks: (re-)constructing Indian (counter-) terrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 3 (1), pp.83-98.

⁴⁷ *Mumbai Terrorist Attack: Dossier of Evidence* (2009)

synchronous monitoring lead to extremely opportunistic decision making to mount further attacks against civilians and increase the overall effectiveness of the attack.^{48, 49}

2.4 Reporting of the Incidents

The first call which was received dealt with Leopold Café at 21:48 hours IST. The details of the Taj firing came out at 21:54 hours, of the Oberoi shooting at 21:56, and of the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal attack at 21:59. There were two reports of taxis exploding at 21:56 and 22:53 hours.⁵⁰ The Control Room received 1,365 calls between 21:00 and 02:00 hours among which 267 were terrorism related calls. (4.5 calls per minute).⁵¹ The wireless communication system was overloaded and personal cellphones were used by officers.

2.5 Role of the Police

Initially, the firing incidents at various places were assumed to be a gang war. It was only after a few hours that a terrorist situation was confirmed.⁵² The simultaneity of the attacks was expectedly confounding for the police. The state police of Maharashtra had never experienced a direct commando attack⁵³ and had mostly only seen terrorist attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices.⁵⁴ A spate of almost simultaneous attacks using an array of varied weapons was, therefore, something which took the police by surprise.

Despite the lack of previous experience in countering such attacks and the unprecedented enormous and simultaneous nature of these attacks, as noted by the High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on the attacks after monitoring all the Control Room logs, the speed and efficiency of the police even in light simultaneity of the attacks cannot be ignored.⁵⁵

⁴⁸ Oh, O. et al. (2011). Information control and terrorism: Tracking the Mumbai terrorist attack through twitter. *Information Systems Frontiers*, 13 (1), pp.33-43.

⁴⁹ For a detailed record of the conversations of the terrorists see Khetan, A. 2009. "60 Dark Hours at Hotel Taj," in *26/11 Mumbai Attacked*, H. Baweja (ed.), New Delhi: Roli Books, pp. 46-83.

⁵⁰ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11* Section 2, paragraph 29- 30

⁵¹ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11* Section 2, paragraph 30

⁵² Presentation titled "*Urban Counter Terrorism Operations: OP Black Tornado-A Case Study*" by Maj Gen Abhaya Gupta, SM, VSM, IG (Ops), NSG (now retired) held at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, on 4 March, 2009, transcript of the same is available at <http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?169548-A-year-since-26-11-OP-Black-Tornado-A-Case-Study>

⁵³ Such as the 2001 Parliament attack or 2002 Akshardham temple attack

⁵⁴ The 1993 serial bomb attacks are an exception where hidden timed explosive devices were used with arms, ammunitions and explosives brought through the sea route.

⁵⁵ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11* Section 1, Para 4.1

However, the police responded to the situation as they would have responded to a normal law and order situation. Clad in police uniforms, by the time they reached the spots the terrorists had already got hold of more advantageous positions. Also, some of the policemen were armed only with sticks (*lathis*).⁵⁶ The police had only sticks, gas guns, and .303 rifles; they were faced with terrorists who had AK 47 rifles, pistols, hand grenades, 8kgs of RDX. In some cases the policemen were armed only with sticks (*lathis*).⁵⁷ While the terrorists used “*area clearing*” by throwing grenades, the policemen lacked any protection against grenade attacks which entailed lacking good bullet proof vests.⁵⁸

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the United States of America while analyzing the attacks asserted that a civil police like Mumbai Police would not have been able to face a professional and well trained group of heavily armed commando terrorists unless they had an equally professional and well trained set of commandos who had superior weaponry.⁵⁹

The role of the DB Marg Police is especially noteworthy as has been discussed earlier, since they nabbed the only terrorist to be caught alive, Mohammad Ajmal Kasab on whose confession most information about the attacks rests.

2.6 National Security Guard (NSG): Operation Black Tornado

As mentioned earlier, local police arrived immediately but the National Security Guards arrived the next morning from New Delhi.⁶⁰ The National Security Guard (NSG) is a special force in India, created by the Cabinet Secretariat under the National Security Guard Act of the Indian Parliament in 1986 and has primarily been utilised for counter-terrorism activities. It works completely within the Central Armed Police Forces structure. This force which is a second line of defence, was inducted into Mumbai at 3 AM on November 27th, 2008 after travelling a distance of 1163 kilometers by air from Delhi.

⁵⁷ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*, paragraph 31

⁵⁸ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*, paragraph 32

⁵⁹ Allen, C., Testimony before the ‘Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’, “Lessons from the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks”, Dirksen, Senate Office Building, Washington DC, January 8, 2009.

⁶⁰ This was following a delay in procuring an aircraft for their transfer.

The operation⁶¹, also called Black Tornado, was a lengthy and strenuous one. The first two targets to be identified by the NSG were The Taj Palace hotel and the Hotel Oberoi and Hotel Trident in South Mumbai. A naval helicopter was used for aerial surveillance. Accordingly the force was split into two, one under the command of DIG (Operations) NSG and the other under the command of Deputy Force Commander, 51 SAG. Preliminary briefing was provided by Mumbai Police and the hotel staff. Additional deployments were subsequently flown in.

It was only later that a terrorist situation was confirmed in Nariman house and a further sub division of the task force was deployed there. Two sniper detachments from the Taj Hotel were sent to Nariman House. The second contingent arrived on November 27th and the third one on 28th. In toto, the task force comprised of 195 army personnel who were drawn from Special Action Groups (SAG).

2.6.1 Taj Hotel

The NSG took over from the MARCOS, the Marine Commandoes, which had been deployed at the Taj at 9:20 AM on November 27. The force obtained the hotel layout plan and first secured the Taj Chambers and the restaurants. With only one master key being available and occupants being scared of opening doors of rooms they had sought shelter in, the doors had to be broken down. With curtains drawn there was lack of ambient light inside and no knowledge of the small rooms along corridors which could be used as hiding places. It was a large area of operation and the necessity of ensuring the safety of the hostages made it even more challenging. The commandoes approached the terrace using the service stairs and launched top down operations from there.

Contact with the terrorists was established during clearance of the first floor. Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan went up the staircase firing at the terrorists and was fired at, and received injuries which he later succumbed to. The four terrorists were later accosted in the Wassabi restaurant on the first floor and the commandoes used IED to enter the same. One terrorist jumped out of the window and was shot and the others died inside the restaurant.

⁶¹ The details of the same are available in Major General Gupta, A. 2009. "Urban Counter Terrorism Operations: OP Black Tornado-A Case Study", paper presented at *Urban Counter Terrorism Operations*, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, March 4th. (Singh Rohan, Article No. 1438. Published by Centre for Land Warfare Studies, available at http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=439&u_id=36 [Accessed on 7th July, 2013])

2.6.2 Hotel Oberoi and Hotel Trident

The two terrorists in Hotel Oberoi⁶² were lying low and after the initial firing, opened fired only while changing their location and when they were fired at. They stayed fixated in one room, which was opened using a master key. One of the terrorists was killed while trying to escape using the elevator and the other terrorist moved into the bathtub and was killed there. The Oberoi Hotel was declared clear at 2:00 PM on November 28th and after the Rendering Safe Procedure was handed over to the police at 6:00 PM on the next day.

2.6.3 Nariman House

Nariman House, inhabited by Jews, had a peculiar problem, even the neighboring residents did not have any knowledge about the internal layout of the building. While entering the building the terrorists had broken the windows and the shards of glass lay around the building and the noise of footsteps on this glass made by approaching commandoes would attract fire from the terrorists. There were only starkly varied inputs available to the commandoes regarding the number of terrorists inside as well as the layout of the building. The curtains were drawn on all windows.

After clearing all neighboring buildings, operations were commenced on the intervening night of 27/28 November. The force split up into an assault group which slithered down the helicopter at 7:15AM the next morning, and the support group which fired at the building. After clearing the sixth and fifth floors, contact was made with the terrorists by 8:00 AM. One member of the force lost his life while trying to enter from the front door because of the terrorists firing at him. Another entry point was then created using IED. The commandoes then moved in and killed both the terrorists. Nariman House was declared clear by 6:25PM on November 28.

The strategy used by all the NSG deployments was to use varied ‘shock’ as well as top-down tactics to neutralize the terrorists. Overwhelming small arms fire was made use of during the whole operation. The render safe procedure (RSP) was used to sanitize and secure the buildings.

The actual final operation at the Taj Hotel was completed by the National Security Guards at 08:00 AM on November 29th after a grim battle for over two days, killing three

⁶² The Oberoi Hotel has 11 floors, with 33 rooms on each floor, and three interlinking corridor at three floors with the Trident Hotel.

terrorists and resulting in the end of the attacks.⁶³ In all, eight terrorists were killed during the operation by the NSG and a total of 610 hostages/guests rescued from all the three locations. Two NSG commandoes lost their lives and eighteen suffered injuries.

However, the Israeli Shin Bet believed⁶⁴ that the NSG commandoes reached the location and immediately started firing without gathering sufficient intelligence and taking control of the location and this cost them lives of more hostages.

2.7 Specialized Forces

Quick Response Teams (QRTs) had been trained by the State Reserve Police Force but given no actual training in simulated terrorist attack situations or hostage like situations.⁶⁵ No firing practice had been given to them since 2007.⁶⁶ The Control Room logs revealed that QRTs had been summoned at different situations. They are supposed to move as teams of twelve but were split up⁶⁷ and lacked effective leadership. There had also been Special Motor Cycle Born Commandos that had been trained to deal with violent under world crimes and for immediate response to terrorist attacks. However, this system fell into disuse and was subsequently not available during the 2008 attacks.⁶⁸

2.8 Casualties and Injuries

A total of 173 people were killed, including nine of the ten terrorists. Out of the 164 victims, 114 were male. Most of the deaths, 68, were due to bullet injuries sustained to vital organs. 30 people died from blast injuries, and 10 had both bullet and blast injuries.⁶⁹ Further,

⁶³ Unknown. 2008. Police declare Mumbai siege over. *BBC*. November 29.

⁶⁴ Unknown. 2008. 'Operation Black Tornado was ill conceived' : Israeli officials. *Mumbai Mirror*, [online] November 28. Available at: <http://m.mumbaimirror.com/index.aspx?Page=article&name=News%20-%20Cover%20Story&id=15&contentid=2008112820081128130958808352ab741> [Accessed: 7th July, 2013].

⁶⁵ These selected men are posted for a period of 3-4 years in QRT but none above 35 years of age are retained. They work in two shifts – 4 officers and 24 men – and ready to move as a team of 1 officer-12 men at any given time. They are required to be constantly on training and do firing every four days.

⁶⁶ Owing to the shortage of ammunition

⁶⁷ Deployment in smaller groups was confirmed by Shri Param Bir Singh, Additional Commissioner, ATS. This has been noted in the HLEC Report at paragraph 3.57

⁶⁸ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*, para 3.96

⁶⁹ Bhandarwar, A. (2012). Mortality pattern of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. *The Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery*, 72 (5), pp.1329-1334.

the hostage crisis resulted in varied and delayed evacuation times, which led to the death of nine victims with non-severe organ injuries.⁷⁰

2.9 Chargesheet, Investigation and Arrests

There were significant complexities in filing the charge sheet⁷¹ and it was finally filed only on February 25, 2009.⁷² The three months of investigation which proceeded to it lead to charges being filed against 44 Pakistanis in an 11,280 page report.⁷³ 2,202 witness statements were recorded.^{74, 75} Documentary and oral evidence, fingerprints, forensic evidence, transcripts of calls and GPS records were all part of the evidence.⁷⁶ Five⁷⁷ of the fifteen⁷⁸ nations which lost citizens in the attacks triggered their own mechanisms within their systems.

The confessions of those arrested have been imperative in revealing details about the attacks.

2.9.1 Kasab

Ajmal Kasab was arrested by the DB Marg Police of Mumbai on the night of November 26th, 2008 by the Mumbai Police and handed over to the crime branch on 27 November.⁷⁹ He was produced before the Magistrate on 28 November and remanded to police custody till December 11th, 2008.⁸⁰ He was brought before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, on February 17th, 2009, to make his confessional statement which was ultimately taken by Mrs. Sawant-Wagule, Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. He refused an advocate.⁸¹ His confession formed the basis of his conviction as well as the main source of information about the training and execution of the attacks as have been discussed in this paper.

70 Ibid

71 Under different sections of the Indian Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), the Explosives Substances Act, the Arms Act, the Customs Act and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and before different authorities.

72 Rath, S. (2009). 26/11 Attacks: Looking into the Legal Questions. Social Research Reports, 9 pp.3-36.

73 Ibid

74 Ibid

75 Including those of US FBI officials

76 Rath, S. (2009). 26/11 Attacks: Looking into the Legal Questions. Social Research Reports, 9 pp.3-36.

77 US, Singapore, Italy, France and Japan

78U. S. A., England, Germany, Israel, Canada,

Australia, Mauritius, Belgium, Malaysia, Japan, France, Thailand, Italy and Singapore,

79 Rath, S. (2009). 26/11 Attacks: Looking into the Legal Questions. Social Research Reports, 9 pp.3-36.

80 Ibid

81 *Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab V. State of Maharashtra, Supreme Court of India*, Criminal Appeal No. 1899-1900 of 2011, available at <http://supremecourtindia.nic.in/outtoday/39511.pdf>

On May 3rd, 2010, the Sessions Court held Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab guilty of 80 offences, including murder, waging war against India, possessing explosives.⁸² On May 6th, he was convicted and sentenced to death on four charges and to a life sentence of five charges.⁸³ Kasab's death sentence was upheld by the Bombay High Court on February 21st. 2011.

On August 9th, 2012, Kasab and Abu Jundal were brought in front of each other. Kasab identified Jundal as the handler of the attacks as well as his teacher of Hindi.

The verdict was upheld by the Supreme Court of India on August 29th, 2012⁸⁴ and subsequently Kasab was hanged on November 21st, 2012 at 7:30 AM and buried at Yerwada Jail in Pune.⁸⁵

2.9.2 Fahim Ansari

Fahim Ansari had been arrested earlier on February 10th, 2008 for his involvement in another separate attack on a Central Reserve Police Force camp in Rampur on December 31st, 2007, in which 7 paramilitary personnel and 1 civilian were killed.⁸⁶ On December 12th, 2008 Additional Sessions Judge of Rampur Mr Jai Sheel Pathak allowed the police to take Fahim Ansari, lodged in the Bareilly Central Jail, to Mumbai for interrogation. The interrogation revealed Fahim Ansari's role in reconnaissance and mapping over a period of two months.⁸⁷ On December 31st, 2008, Ansari, along with Sabauddin Shaikh was charged in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attacks.⁸⁸ A total of 21 such sketches were seized by the Uttar Pradesh Anti Terrorism Squad from Fahim Ansari. However, on May 3rd, 2010, Ansari and the co-accused Sabauddin Shaikh were acquitted of any complicity in the attacks. The judge described both of them as "blemish-free"^{89,90} The same acquittal was upheld by the Bombay High Court as well as the Supreme Court of India owing to the lack of evidence.⁹¹

⁸² *The State of Maharashtra vs. Muhammad Ajmal Muhammad Amir Kasab & Ors.*, S.C. No. 175/09 of 2010.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab V. State of Maharashtra, Supreme Court of India*, Criminal Appeal No. 1899-1900 of 2011, available at <http://supremecourtfindia.nic.in/outtoday/39511.pdf>

⁸⁵ 2012, Ajmal Kasab hanged at Yerwada Jail in Pune at 7:30am. *The Times of India*. 21 November

⁸⁶ Faheem Ansari, Sabauddin shifted to UP. *Indian Express*. 2 June 2010.

⁸⁷ Hafeez, Mateen (17 February 2008). LeT man did recce of 12 places in Mumbai. *Times of India*.

⁸⁸ Yet another terror plot to target Mumbai foiled. *Indo Asian News Service*. 10 February 2008

⁸⁹ NDTV correspondent (3 May 2010). Co-accused Fahim Ansari, Sabahuddin, acquitted. *NDTV*.

⁹⁰ Judgment. 2010. 'The State of Maharashtra vs. Muhammad Ajmal Muhammad Amir Kasab & Ors.', S.C. No. 175/09, p. 1572.

⁹¹ *Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab V. State of Maharashtra, Supreme Court of India*, Criminal Appeal No. 1899-1900 of 2011, available at <http://supremecourtfindia.nic.in/outtoday/39511.pdf>

The judgment enunciates that Ansari and Sabauddin were not present in the city on the day of the attacks and if they had in fact supplied the maps to the attackers the condition of the map should not have been as unwrinkled and unstained as it was found. Also, since the terrorists were using high class technology it would have made more sense for them to use digital maps than amateur sketched ones. The trial court gave them the benefit of the doubt as regards the charges of conspiracy and abetment of other offences by conspiracy, and further held that the prosecution completely failed to establish those other charges that were made directly against them.

2.9.3 Headley

Headley was arrested in Chicago in October in 2009 for his alleged involvement in conspiracies to provide material support and/or to commit terrorist acts against overseas targets. While Headley was in custody of the FBI in Chicago in November, 2009 the new National Investigation Agency (NIA) registered a case against Headley and Rana for allegedly plotting the 2008 Mumbai attacks in India.⁹² After having interrogated Headley in Chicago for a week, the NIA requested a Delhi court to issue non-bailable warrants to arrest Headley.

Headley's confession⁹³ corroborated Kasab's confession and also threw light on Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligences (ISI)'s involvement in the attack.⁹⁴ However, he later went back on this stance and said that ISI had not had any role in the plotting, planning or the execution of the attacks.⁹⁵

While pleading guilty and testifying against Tahawwur Hussain Rana (co accused with him for the Denmark terror plot), he admitted to having admitted LeT training camps on five separate occasions between 2002 and 2005.⁹⁶ He also admitted to conducting reconnaissance in Mumbai on the behest of LeT.⁹⁷ There were reports that Headley received a message from his

⁹² Kumar, V. 2009. NIA registers case against Headley, Rana. *The Hindu*, [online] November 9. Available at: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nia-registers-case-against-headley-rana/article47249.ece> [Accessed: 5th July].

⁹³ Defence Pakistan. 2010. *The David Headley Confessions: Part-II How I waged war on India*. [online] Available at: <http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/82495-david-headley-confessions-part-ii-how-i-waged-war-india.html#ixzz2YBPzdIvX> [Accessed: July 7th, 2013].

⁹⁴ Thompson, Ginger. 2009. A Terror Suspect With Feet in East and West. *The New York Times*. November 22.

⁹⁵ "Mumbai Attacks: ISI leaders had no involvement, says Headley", *Tribune*, Pakistan

⁹⁶ Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, United States of America 2013. *David Coleman Headley Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison for Role in India and Denmark Terror Plots*. [press release] January 24.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

wife, Shazia Gilani, hours after the attacks, encrypted as "*I am watching cartoons*". "*Congratulations on your graduation.*"⁹⁸

He arrived in India in 2006 for the first time and started taking a large number of photographs of Brihan Mumbai Corporation building, Haji Ali, Gateway of India, Hotel Taj, state police headquarters, Azad Maidan, Marine Drive, VT Railway Station, Mumbai Central Railway Station, Leopold Cafe etc. which, he claimed, were highly appreciated by the ISI as well as the LeT. He claimed that the Mumbai attacks were financed by the ISI, much like any other plan of the LeT. The first boat used by the ten terrorists before they hijacked MV Kuber was purchased with ISI money. Headley in his confession stated that the ISI was fully aware of the entire plan and he was the one who intimidated ISI officials, Major Iqbal and his boss Lt Col Hamza of the entire design of the attacks.

Headley testified against LeT handler Sajid Mahid (a middle level handler) who asked him to conduct extensive reconnaissance at the Taj hotel in particular and Headley had worked on doing the same. Headley also testified against Zaki-Ur-Rehman Lakhvi who told him to explore the options for landing on Indian shores from the side of the Taj Hotel. A another individual whose identity remains unknown asked Headley to check on whether Indian vessels would be present around there so that possible gunfights could be avoided. Headley also testified that Hafiz Saeed had complete information on the 26/11 attacks and a green signal was required from him before execution of the attacks.

According to Headley the initial plan was to have two or three gunmen enter India from Nepal or Bangladesh and then attack the Taj Hotel. No other targets were part of the plan earlier and till his sixth trip to India Headley was asked to concentrate on the Taj hotel. His final trip to India was to videograph various Chhabad Houses in India and also the Israeli embassy.

On January 24, 2013, a U.S. Federal Court sentenced Headley to 35 years in prison for his role in the Mumbai attacks.⁹⁹ He was given a relatively lighter sentence of 35 years in lieu of his cooperation with the authorities.

⁹⁸ Unnithan, S. 2013. Sex, Drugs & Jihad Inside the secret world of David Headley, the man who plotted the 26/11 terror attack. *India Today*, [online] February 7th. Available at: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/david-coleman-headley-and-his-network-26-11-mumbai-attack/1/248508.htm> [Accessed: 28th June, 2013].

⁹⁹ Michael, T. and Sophia, T. 2013. David Coleman Headley Sentencing: American Mumbai Attack Plotter Sentenced To 35 Years. *Huffington Post*, [online] January 24. Available at: On January 24, 2013, a U.S. federal court sentenced Headley to 35 years in prison for his role in the Mumbai attacks. [Accessed: 27th June, 2013].

2.9.4 Abu Jundal

Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal¹⁰⁰, a suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative and key 26/11 Mumbai terror attack handler, and also a Mumbai resident, while testifying to the Maharashtra Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) made imperative disclosures about the planning and execution of the attack. He claimed that Hafiz Saeed (the LeT Chief) had had a pivotal role in the Mumbai attacks. He further testified that Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi (LeT cofounder) was involved in engineering the carnage. Abu Jundal had met Saeed when the plot was in its nascent stage.¹⁰¹

2.10 Planners and Trainers behind the Attack

During the investigation the names of thirty five terrorists were found to be relevant to these attacks because of the important roles they played in the preparation preceding these attacks. These include

- | | | |
|--|---|-----------------------------|
| 1) Hafeez Muhammad Saeed @ Hafiz Saab, | 13) Abu Mufti Saeed, | 25) Col. R. Saadat Ullah, |
| 2) Zaki-Ur-Rehman Lakhvi, | 14) Hakim Saab, | 26) Khurram Shahdad, |
| 3) Abu Hamza, | 15) Yusuf, | 27) Abu Abdurrehman, |
| 4) Abu Al Kama @ Amjid, | 16) Mursheed, | 28) Abu Mavia, |
| 5) Abu Kaahfa, | 17) Aakib, | 29) Abu Anis, |
| 6) Mujjamil alias Yusuf, | 18) Abu Umar Saeed, | 30) Abu Bashir, |
| 7) Zarar Shah, ⁴ | 19) Usman, | 31) Abu Hanjla Pathan, |
| 8) Abu Fahad Ullah, | 20) Major General Sahab – Name not known, | 32) Abu Saria, ⁵ |
| 9) Abu Abdul Rehman, | 21) Kharak Singh, | 33) Abu Saif –ur- Rehman, |
| 10) Abu Anas, | 22) Mohammed Ishfak, | 34) Abu Imran and |
| 11) Abu Bashir, | 23) Javid Iqbal, | 35) Hakim Saheb. |
| 12) Abu Imran, | 24) Sajid Iftikhar, | |

¹⁰⁰ Jundal had also been allegedly involved in the conspiracy to attack Nashik-based Maharashtra Police Academy

¹⁰¹ Unknown. 2013. LeT co-founder Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi was worried the 26/11 attack was too big an operation: Abu Jundal spills the beans. India Today, [online] February 11th. Available at: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/abu-jundal-gives-details-on-26-11-zaki-ur-rehman-lakhvi/1/249767.html> [Accessed: 27th June, 2013].

2.11 Judgment

The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of Ajmal Kasab on all grounds as has been specified in section 2.9.1. Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin Shaikh;s acquittal was confirmed on grounds stated in 2.9.2. Of the 35 charged by the prosecution, 20 were found guilty. Justice Chandramauli Prasad wrote that this was one of the few rare instances where there was no element of uncertainty and with complete surety it could be said that *“the planning and conspiracy to commit the crime were hatched in Pakistan, the perpetrators of crime were Pakistani trained at different centres in that country, and the devastation which took place at various places in the city of Mumbai, were executed by the appellant in furtherance thereof.”*

The Judges also saluted Tukaram Ombale, Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte, Vijay Salaskar, Sandeep Unnikrishnan and all other policemen who laid down their lives in the fight. They recorded their appreciation for the sense of duty of all the policeman.

3. Aftermath

3.1 Indian Dossier submitted to Pakistan

According to the Indian Dossier which was submitted to Pakistan on January 5th, 2009, providing information based on Indian intelligence investigations, the attacks were conducted by ten terrorists who were Pakistani nationals. The dossier included details about the training, the travel to India, the killing of the fisherman, the attacks themselves as they have been discussed in this paper. The Indian Government requested Pakistan to arrest those involved and conduct fair trials.

3.2 International Response

As has been recorded in a Wikileaks cable¹⁰² immediately after November 2009 attacks, diplomatic missions concentrated on sending out sympathetic messages to India and its people rather than rebuking it for the *“massive intelligence failure”*. The same cable records how Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions had jointly concluded that any offer of assistance needed to be made with tepidity since their intentions could be interpreted

¹⁰² In “MUMBAI ATTACKS UPDATE: DIPLOMATS IN DELHI DELIVER UNITED MESSAGES” published by The Guardian and available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/180978>

by India as being politically motivated. There were substantial offers of help made from various sources. The European Union planned on sending a counter-terrorism expert to India. Australia offered any help which might have been required but the offer was never made use of.

3.3 India and Pakistan Ties

In the light of the political situation, diplomatic missions also jointly decided that they had to steer clear of the blame game which naturally ensued between India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan's reaction to the incident had been extremely appropriate. Another cable¹⁰³ by Gerald Feierstein, Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States recorded Pakistan's reactions. Pakistan sent out the right public statements in the aftermath of the attack. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan called Indian Congress leader Sonia Gandhi conveying his grief to the people of India and families of the other victims who lost their lives in the "*detestable act*".¹⁰⁴ Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani, called the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to empathize.¹⁰⁵ The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi immediately offered to set up hotlines for intelligence sharing and strengthening of the anti-terror mechanism between the two countries. Pakistan also agreed to India's request of sending Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the ISI Chief for the investigation.¹⁰⁶

Immediately after the attack, the Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayan, conveyed the message to Pakistan that India was not blaming the Pakistani Government, understanding that it has no control over either the ISI or the army but would however, need Pakistan's close assistance.¹⁰⁷ Noteworthy is the fact that the cable highlights the suspicion of ISI involvement in the attack.

Both the above mentioned cables give an insight into the international reaction, which showed the responses of the international community were defined by the strained India-Pakistan relations. This can be seen in the caution exercised by international actors to not take sides or aggravating the conflict. Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath was exercised by both India

¹⁰³ In "PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO TERROR IN MUMBAI" published by The Guardian and available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/180496>>

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ In "MUMBAI ATTACKS UPDATE: DIPLOMATS IN DELHI DELIVER UNITED MESSAGES" published by The Guardian and available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/180978>.

and Pakistan to not point fingers, realizing that cooperation in these circumstances was imperative.

3.3.1 Retaliation in the Aftermath

In the immediate aftermath of the terror attack, as recorded in the cable by Gerald Feierstein which was sent immediately after the attack on November 28th, the UK High Commission had feared retaliatory measures by India and advised London to advise the Pakistani Government to take quick and credible action, possibly in the form of arresting senior LeT leaders and "*permanently closing down the infrastructure of the militancy.*"¹⁰⁸ Feierstein records the belief of the UK that India would be politically pressed to react with force rather than diplomatic means with a minimum of increased proxy action in Balochistan, and at a maximum with attacks on LeT training camps in Kashmir.¹⁰⁹ Feierstein believed that the UK Embassy was over-reacting. However, in the same cable, he also agreed that a coordinated message urging Government of Pakistan to act against LeT would be welcome.¹¹⁰

India did not respond militarily to the attack either in the immediate time frame or in the long run. The lack of retaliation acquired accolades as well as further recommendations urging restraint from India's side by the UK through UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband to External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee on 1 December.¹¹¹

By December 1st, 2008, the Pakistan High Commissioner Shahid Malik was handed over India's first formal complaint against Pakistan in the form of a demarche expressly claiming that Pakistani elements had carried out the attacks. The Indian Government explicitly elucidated their expectations of "*strong action*" being taken against those elements.¹¹² These attacks had, not surprisingly, vitiated the peace process between the countries, and the same was articulated by the Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee on December 2nd in an interview to NDTV^{113, 114}. He asserted the need not for merely a reply to the demarche but for effective action

¹⁰⁸ In "PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO TERROR IN MUMBAI" published by The Guardian and available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/180496>>

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ In "MUMBAI ATTACKS UPDATE: DIPLOMATS IN DELHI DELIVER UNITED MESSAGES" published by The Guardian and available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/180978>

¹¹² Unknown. 2008. Mumbai gunmen trained in Pakistan – Investigators. *Reuters*, December 1.

¹¹³ New Delhi Television Limited (NDTV) is an Indian commercial broadcasting television network founded in 1988

against the perpetrators.¹¹⁵ What added more turbulence to the state of affairs then was his refusal to rule out the option for a military retaliation.¹¹⁶

On the same day the Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari denied his nation's involvement in the attacks and vociferously emphasized that the perpetrators were stateless actors.¹¹⁷ Almost simultaneously, the Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi snubbed India's accusations when he said that it wasn't a time to point fingers. Instead, he suggested a joint investigation.¹¹⁸ India however, kept to its stance that the perpetrators were Pakistani and not stateless and reiterated the same during the joint press conference with the visiting US Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice on December 3rd.¹¹⁹ India never availed the offer of conducting a joint investigation.

3.3.2 Retaliation: The Cold Start Doctrine

However, whether India did have in a place a possible military retaliation strategy was questioned. The possible retaliation in the immediate aftermath of the attack could have been in alignment with the Cold Start Doctrine, according to the views of the US Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer expressed in another Wikileaks cable.¹²⁰ The cable was sent immediately after another terror attack in India the 13 February bomb attack on Pune's German Bakery that killed 17 persons with Roemer expressing his views on how India could have used the strategy post November 2008.

The Cold Start Doctrine owes its origins to an earlier military failure. Following the attack on the Parliament in 2001, the Indian army was mobilized in Operation Parakaram in the largest mobilization since 1971. After ten months both sides disengaged without India getting any strategic gains. In the three weeks which India had taken to mobilize its troops warranted enough time for international pressure and combined with the lack of strategic surprise, the

¹¹⁴ Mukherjee, P. 2008. *External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee on NDTV Tonight Programme*. Interviewed by Nidhi Razdan [TV]

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Unknown. 2008. Zardari: 'Pakistan in no way responsible' for Mumbai attacks. *CNN Asia*, [blog] December 2, Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/02/pakistan.zardari.lkl/> [Accessed: 27th June, 2013].

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2008. *Joint Press Conference by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of External Affairs of India and Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State of the United States of America*. [press release] December 3.

¹²⁰ In "COLD START - A MIXTURE OF MYTH AND REALITY" published by The Guardian, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248971>

operation amounted to a faulty military strategy. This is what gave birth to the Cold Start Doctrine, an operational attack plan which can be enforced within 72 hours of commands being given purposing a rapid invasion as well as occupation of Pakistan. Resting on the tenets of swift mobilization to undertake punitive strikes it envisages making territorial gains of roughly 30-50 miles which can be used to negotiate and get concessions post the conflict.^{121, 122}

The Cold Start Doctrine is aimed at punishing Pakistan and at the same time not invoking the wrath of a nuclear attack, a significant threat with Pakistan being a self-declared nuclear state which like India, has not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty.¹²³

The Cold Start Doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government. As noted in the cable, the question of whether the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government which succeeded the BJP led Government even embraced the doctrine . Several senior government officials have not “*supported, endorsed or advocated*” the Cold Start Doctrine,¹²⁴ and till today it has never been put into use.¹²⁵ In the leaked cable Timothy Roemer describes this policy which the Indian Government has never openly accepted as “*a mixture of myth and reality.*”¹²⁶

However, post the November 2008 attacks, the one incident which could have been a plausible trigger, the Government did not make any use of this Doctrine. As Roemer opines, “*depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options,*”¹²⁷ the Cold Start option is neither the only nor the most preferred option and may never be exercised.

¹²¹ “Pakistan’s Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities,” *Intelligence Quarterly* , 6 July 2010, www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/05 .

¹²² Thus, as in the Israeli model against the Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and against the Hamas in Gaza early this year, India could withdraw to positions status quo ante. It may not choose to do so with respect to gains made on the Line of Control.

¹²³ A landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>

¹²⁴ In “COLD START - A MIXTURE OF MYTH AND REALITY” published by The Guardian, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248971>

¹²⁵ However, operations like Divya Astra (Divine Weapon) 2004, Vajra Shakti (Thunder Power) 2005, Sang-i-Shakti (Joint Power) 2006, and Ashwamedh (Valor and Intellectual Illumination) 2007 were all believed to be operations practiced to firm up on the Doctrine.

¹²⁶ In “COLD START - A MIXTURE OF MYTH AND REALITY” published by The Guardian, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248971>

¹²⁷ Ibid

Further this also questions the fear which Pakistan has over Cold Start Doctrine "*as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to US government officials*" since Pakistan has known about the doctrine since 2004 and the terror strikes emanating from there continue.¹²⁸

Thus, it is clear that India not retaliate post November 2008, and the question of whether it will possibly use the Cold Start Doctrine in future cases remains unanswered because of both political as well as practical restraints.

3.4 Intelligence in the Domestic Realm

There was intelligence beginning from August 2006 portraying LeT's plan of sending in terrorists into India through the sea route.¹²⁹ Separately there was intelligence pointing to the possibility of attacks at the Taj Hotel, the Oberoi Hotel, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, and Leopold Café¹³⁰ inter alia¹³¹. There had also been intelligence showing the possibility of the perpetration of simultaneous attacks.¹³² An overall analysis would have clearly shown the impending threat, but as the High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC)¹³³ notes, such an analysis was lacking and is attributable to the inadequacy of the existing mechanism. The HLEC noted that it would be wrong to allege that there was enough intelligence pointing to the attacks but was not taken seriously by the Maharashtra Police. The Committee substantiates by stressing on how action was taken as exemplified by the alert dated 9 August 2008 on the possible bomb attack at various targets in South Mumbai like Taj Mahal Hotel, World Trade Center, Oberoi Hotel etc. was issued by the Jt. Commissioner (Law and Order).¹³⁴ The Committee noted that the recommendations made by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) following the alert were not heeded to by the Taj and Oberoi, because of their hospitality policy.

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*, Section 1 paragraph 8-10

¹³⁰ Intelligence Alert to the DCP Zone 1 on 26/6/2008

¹³¹ High Court, DGPs Office, Naval Installations, Department of Atomic Energy etc.

¹³² *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*, Section 1 paragraph 8-10

¹³³ Also known as Pradhan Committee

¹³⁴ The committee substantiates by giving an example of an alert dated 09/8/2008 on the possible bomb attack at various targets in South Mumbai like Taj Mahal Hotel, World Trade Center, Oberoi Hotel etc. was issued by the Jt. Commissioner (L&O). This alert had been taken very seriously by DCP Zone-1 and his staff. He personally visited the target areas on 11/8/2008 and issued written instructions on security measures on 12/8/2008. In fact Sr. P.I. Marine Drive Police Station informed in writing to the Security Manager, Oberoi regarding the measures for security and also conducted a security briefing of representatives of various hotels, malls, multiplexes etc in his jurisdiction on 12/8/2008.

Also, the attack on Nariman House had greater element of surprise with there being no former intelligence about it. However, there was indication of attacks on Jewish targets and Nariman Point happened to house Chabad, a Jewish outreach center.

What becomes discernible is the confusion in processing of intelligence alerts, with them being mechanically forwarded to the operational units by the Anti-Terrorism Squad of Maharashtra, the Home Department or the DGPs office. There was a significant amount of confusion regarding the transfer of certain alerts.¹³⁵ Sensitive communication was found to be handled by the desk officers¹³⁶ who had in all probability been unable to comprehend the intricacy of the matter.¹³⁷ Also, the handling of intelligence pertaining to terrorism by multiple officials within the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) undermined the possibility of a cohesive response.¹³⁸

3.5 Intelligence Sharing and Investigative Cooperation in the International Domain

There are a significant number of cables which deal with the intelligence sharing and investigation cooperation between India and the other countries, especially Pakistan, post the attack. One argument is that another element which makes these attacks discernible from others is the post attack cooperation. What followed has been considered extraordinary to the extent that that some argue that it is a highly illustrative case for examining international cooperation in counter-terrorism.

Pakistan agreed to India's demand of sending its ISI Chief to assist in the investigation because, as they had written to the US, Pakistan wanted to avoid dragging the India- Pakistan factor into the militant's agenda.¹³⁹ However, in light of the spate of attacks by the Indian media, an official in the Pakistani High Commission blamed the Indian media for aggravating the

¹³⁵ This was encountered by the HLEC when the Addl.CS (Home) and Principal Secretary (Home) initially gave in writing to the Committee that they had not received any intelligence alerts from the Ministry of Home Affairs. However the DGP had furnished copies of several important intelligence alerts issued by the MHA addressed to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary etc.

¹³⁶ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*, Section 1, paragraph 18

¹³⁷ In consonance with this finding the committee recommended that the Principle Secretary (law and Order) should be the nodal officer dealing with such intelligence reports and a special group should be formed to deal with giving instructions pursuant to the examination of such intelligence and decide when an alert should be given and when it should be removed.

¹³⁸ *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*, paragraph 3.98

¹³⁹ In "PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO TERROR IN MUMBAI" published by The Guardian and available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/180496>>

situation by misrepresenting the promised visit of the ISI Chief.¹⁴⁰ As recorded in the cable by Feirstein, Pakistani media was denying any Pakistani involvement in the attack.¹⁴¹ Finally, Pakistan opted out of the offer, complicating the possible cooperation which could have ensued. This was a dampener on the cooperation and the ties between the two countries.

On the whole, the way in which India sought assistance from Pakistan was never criticized. However, the one criticism which did come up from the UK was that India, while sending the list of the wanted criminals included names of Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed who had already been on earlier lists and this was believed to be digressing focus from the specific attacks.¹⁴²

Another cable¹⁴³ reveals that the US was skeptical of the fact that India was planning to release information early regarding its investigation into the Mumbai attacks to all countries that lost citizens in January, 2009. The US Embassy believed that this premature revelation would “*undermine essential law enforcement efforts and forestall further Indo-Pak cooperation.*”¹⁴⁴ It was at that time that the FBI had given India a list of matters on which it sought information from India for its own investigations. The cable elucidates that the US goal was beyond meting out justice to the perpetrators, it also entailed reducing tensions between the two countries.¹⁴⁵

This cable came just after ISI Director General Pasha had approved the sharing of information on Pakistan's investigation with Indian intelligence, in what was considered a “*significant*” step by the US but had the possibility of humiliating Pakistan, especially General Pasha if information was not returned. The cable urged that Government of India should be encouraged not to go ahead with the information disclosure until “*intelligence and law enforcement sharing with the GOP*” and the US “*has been able to move forward*”.¹⁴⁶ This was the point of difference between India and the US naturally creating a rift because of the two different approaches the countries considered apt.

However, with Pakistan things during the same period were proceeding moderately well. The initial official assessment of the Pakistani response to India's dossier was offered by Indian

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

¹⁴¹ Ibid

¹⁴² Ibid

¹⁴³ In “PRESERVING INFORMATION SHARING”, published by The Guardian, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/pakistan-usforeignpolicy2>>

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon during a meeting with Richard Holbrooke, US special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. This has been recorded in a cable¹⁴⁷ from February, 2009. Menon said that it "*remarkable that we got this far,*" and was grateful for the US pressure on Pakistan to act. However, at the same time he was cautious and iterated that future clarity on Pakistan's cooperation was still lacking. Pakistan's cooperation could not be assumed for the future especially once public pressure would wane.¹⁴⁸ Menon highlighted the role domestic pressure played on India with there being an addition to the earlier questions sent to Pakistan by Government of India on this account.¹⁴⁹

By 2010 the spirit to engage in talks continued. In a meeting with Under Secretary Burns in June 2010, the details of which were released in another cable¹⁵⁰, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh "*asserted that India was willing to engage with Pakistan, but the Pakistan government had an obligation to stop the planning and launching of terror attacks from its territory.*"¹⁵¹ The Prime Minister was approving of the way in which counter-terrorism cooperation had been enhanced. Further, he believed that that intelligence sharing had not benefitted India too much but was, however, depictive of how the threat still loomed large. He further said that "*that he did not sleep well at night*" knowing about these threats.¹⁵²

During this time Pakistan released LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, this was naturally seen as a confusing signal by India since Pakistan had been cooperating with India at other levels. In this particular cable the Indian Prime Minister's assertion of continuing to engage in talks with Pakistan was recorded with a caveat that Pakistan had an obligation to ensure that simultaneously no terror attacks are being plotted from the same territory since it would make him "*look ridiculous*"¹⁵³ in front of the Indian people.

¹⁴⁷ In "INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY: "HUGE STAKE" IN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE'S SUCCES" published by The Guardian available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/192309>

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ In "UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETS INDIAN PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN SINGH" published by The Hindu, available at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/the-cables/article2035552.ece>

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

3.6 Wikileaks Cables – an Insight into the Impact of the Attacks

The Wikileaks releases also make mention of the impact of the attack, both in terms of India's reaction as well as on the ties with Pakistan. As a cable¹⁵⁴ by Feierstein noted, *“if the militant's plan was to force the Pakistani Army to re-focus on its eastern border and eliminate any chance (however slight) of moving forces from the Indian border to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), then their plan may have succeeded. The Mumbai attacks likely torpedoed any prospect of Indian CBMs on Kashmir in the immediate future.”*

At the domestic level, as believed by the Indian Foreign Secretary, the Mumbai attacks were not on their own expected to play a major role in India's upcoming elections, because efforts to capitalize politically on such a heinous event would likely backfire on any political party. And rightly, the United Progressive Alliance was voted back to power.¹⁵⁵

3.7 Economic Impact

The attack also had an immense economic impact, both in terms of the monetary loss and credibility in the foreign investors' community. Losses of an estimated \$80.8 million were suffered by the Indian economy loss in the immediate aftermath of November 2008 attacks with tremors travelling across the world.¹⁵⁶

3.8 Broader Questions

As well articulated by the Union Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, the attacks raised a plethora of questions. While summarizing the attacks he highlighted how the attacks had left a billion plus people humiliated and brought the country to its knees. He mentioned the most obvious questions which had arisen in the aftermath of the attack – had the intelligence failed? Had the first responders, the Mumbai police, been totally inadequate? Was the National Security Guard too slow? The security forces and the Central and the State Government were all being questioned.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴In “PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO TERROR IN MUMBAI” published by The Guardian and available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/180496>>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

¹⁵⁶ Mukherjee, N., ‘From Bad to Battered’, India Today, December 15, 2008.

¹⁵⁷ Home minister proposes radical restructuring of security architecture Press Information Bureau, Government of India (2009) [press release] December 23.

According to the High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC)¹⁵⁸ appointed by the Maharashtra Government, after a detailed analysis they concluded that there was “*a lack of: intelligent appreciation of threats, handling of intelligence, maintaining high degree of efficiency in instruments specifically set up to deal with terrorist attacks and certainly lack of overt and visible leadership in carrying out operations to face multi-targeted attacks.*”¹⁵⁹

3.9 Broader Implications

Some broader implications have been highlighted through the attack. The attack on Chattrapti Shivaji Terminus were illustrative of how terrorists view public transportation as a killing field, offering easily accessible, dense populations in confined environments.¹⁶⁰ Also, a trend which is reinforced is that terror attacks on flagship hotels have been found to be increasing in number, in total casualties and in number of casualties per incident.¹⁶¹

The attacks were successful in the way they were able to garner worldwide attention for more than 60 hours apart from causing the casualties and injuries. It is argued that such threats predict the repetition of such attacks.¹⁶² The attacks through the diversity of targets and tactics elucidate the sophisticated strategic thinking of the attackers. It would be rational to imply that such strategically culture makes this terrorist enemy particularly dangerous.¹⁶³ The way in which they approached from sea unlike earlier attacks where weapons were brought in on trucks and trains is illustrative of the ability to tactically adapt in the future¹⁶⁴.

¹⁵⁸ Also known as Pradhan Committee

¹⁵⁹ Ram Pradhan Committee (2009). *Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee on 26/11*. [report], Section 1, para 4.

¹⁶⁰ Rand Corporation (2009). *Terrorists Can Think Strategically. Lessons Learned From the Mumbai Attacks*. [report]. Page 2

¹⁶¹ Ibid

¹⁶² Rand Corporation (2009). *Terrorists Can Think Strategically. Lessons Learned From the Mumbai Attacks*. [report].

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Ibid

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Annex 1 – Fake Identities Used

Name of the Terrorist	Name on Bogus Identity Card	Information on the Bogus Identity Card
Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab alias Abu Mujahid (arrested)	Samir Dinesh Chaudhari,	254 Teachers Colony, Nagarabhavi, Bangalore Arunodaya Degree And P.G. College
Ismail Khan alias Abu Ismail	Naresh Vilas Varma	House No.28/B, Mamata Nagar, Nigol, Hyderabad Arunodaya Degree and PG College, Vedre Complex, Dilsukh Nagar, Hyderabad, PIN CODE: 500 060.
Babar Imran alias Abu Akasha	Arjunkumar Virakumar	13/2, S.K. Apartment, Indira Nagar, Hyderabad Arunodaya Degree and PG College, Vedre Complex, Dilsukh Nagar, Hyderabad, PIN CODE: 500 060.
Nasir alias Abu Umar	Dinesh Kumar Ravikumar	781, Huda Colony, Sarur Nagar, Hyderabad-35. Arunodaya Degree and PG College, Vedre Complex, Dilsukh Nagar, Hyderabad,

<p>Hafiz Arshad @ Abdul Rehman Bada Alias Hayaji</p>	<p>Raghubir Singh Ranajit Singh</p>	<p>PIN CODE: 500 060. Plot No.673-4V, Elisbridge, Ahmedabad Arunodaya Degree and PG College, Vedre Complex, Dilsukh Nagar, Hyderabad, PIN CODE: 500 060.</p>
<p>Abdul Rehman Chhota alias Sakib</p>	<p>Arun Vikram Sharma</p>	<p>Plot No.36-A, Ganga Colony, Navi Delhi Arunodaya Degree and PG College, Vedre Complex, Dilsukh Nagar, Hyderabad, PIN CODE: 500 060.</p>
<p>Fahad Ullah Rohit</p>	<p>Dipak Patil</p>	<p>313 SK Apartments, Indira Nagar, Vijay Nagar Colony, Hyderabad Arunodaya Degree and PG College, Vedre Complex, Dilsukh Nagar, Hyderabad, PIN CODE: 500 060.</p>

