The Motivational Elements and Characteristics of ‘Home-Grown’ Islamic Terrorists

A Comparative Study

By: Ron Ben-Simhon
Abstract:

This paper intends to prove that with the combination of several character traits and/or behavioural patterns, as well as motivational elements, presented as independent variables, ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism is a potential outcome. This will be proven via a sample of analyzed case studies. By determining certain characteristics, perhaps the act of profiling suspected individuals will help in terrorism prevention.

The first section of the paper outlines the research problem, hypothesis, definitions, variables relevant theoretical approach and method in which the hypothesis will be proven.

Section two gives validity to the independent variables via a thorough literature review, citing academics and experts in the field who have studied the phenomenon of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism.

The third section analyzes six case studies in order to discern whether or not the hypothesized independent variables are present in each of them. With the combination of the literature review and analysis of the case studies, one can be certain that the findings present an accurate depiction of reality and indeed characterize or profile the characteristics and motivational elements of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorists.

The findings were hardly surprising. There is no doubt that religious extremism is a primary factor in the motivation of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, there is strong evidence showing that several other variables, presented in this paper, also contribute to the motivation of Islamic extremists. Finally this paper hopes to present a partial blueprint for a policy recommendation on how to combat radicalization, rather than terrorism.
# Table of Contents

## Section: Page #:

**Introduction** ............................................................................................................................... 4

## Section I - Research Method:

i.) Research Problem/Hypothesis ................................................................................................. 5

ii.) Relevant Definitions .................................................................................................................. 5-6

iii.) Main Concepts, Variables ...................................................................................................... 6-9

iv.) Relevant Theoretical Approach .............................................................................................. 9

v.) Research Design ....................................................................................................................... 9-10

vi.) Research Tool .......................................................................................................................... 10

## Section II – Literature Review:

i.) Religious Extremism .............................................................................................................. 11-13

ii.) Socio-Economic Strata (SES) ................................................................................................. 14-16

iii.) Feelings of Persecution & Harassment .................................................................................. 17-20

iv.) Immigration & Relative Deprivation ...................................................................................... 20-23

v.) Globalisation & Decline of Nationalism .................................................................................. 23-27

## Section III - Case Studies:

i.) John Walker-Lindh – The American Taliban ........................................................................... 28-32

ii.) Richard Reid – The Shoe Bomber ............................................................................................ 32-37

iii.) Mohammad Sidique Khan - The British 7/7 Terrorist Ring Leader ......................................... 38-42

iv.) Bilal Abdullah - Glasgow International Airport Attack .......................................................... 42-45

v.) Mohammed Bouyeri – The Murder of Danish Cartoonist, Theo Van Gogh ......................... 45-49
vi.) Major Nidal Malik Hasan - Fort Hood Massacre

Section IV – Conclusions and Policy Recommendation & Summary:

i.) Conclusions

ii.) Policy Recommendations

iii.) Summary

Bibliography
**Introduction:**

Political violence has been a tool for change long before the term ‘terrorism’ was coined. Throughout the ages, violence has been used to achieve different goals; today is no exception. During the 20th century, groups such as the IRA used violence against their fellow countrymen (albeit of different faith; Protestantism vs. Catholicism) with the intention to gain political freedom/independence.\(^1\) Today however, many groups and individuals using violence and ‘terrorism’ against their home societies have a different agenda; religious fanaticism. Today, many who commit acts of terror within their own societies do so out of religious extremism which is either a top-down or bottom-up process of radicalization. This research study will attempt to show how altruistic and/or fatalistic definitions of suicide are extended to the case of terrorism. How religious extremism breads terrorism and how a sense of being persecuted leads to persons lashing out against their society. Furthermore, this paper will attempt to prove that although feelings of relative deprivation, on account of a lower SES (Socio- Economic Status) which seems to be one of the major motivators for terrorism in Developing Nations, on the contrary, in the Developed world it is the middle-upper, relatively educated echelons of society that use terrorism as a way of striking at their societies. As well, this paper will attempt to prove that with the rise of globalization and the resulting weakening of nationalism which is replaced with religious solidarity/identification; this indeed leads to religious fanaticism/terrorism. This study will focus on two main spheres or realms of ‘Home-Grown’ Islamic Terrorist hubs; in North America and Western Europe. Finally, the paper will focus on six specific case studies that will hopefully prove said hypothesis.

---

\(^1\)Coogan (2000), p. 31.
Section I - Research Method:

i.) Research Problem/Hypothesis:
What causes certain Muslim citizens of any said western nation to use violence/terrorism against their home societies? For example, John Walker-Lindh was born into a secular Christian home in the United States but somehow converted to Islam and practiced the most radical form of it, involving himself in terrorist/insurgent activity; what were his motivations? In essence, what motivates people of the Muslim faith to lash out against their societies (whether they are native to the land or newly naturalized) through acts of terrorism?

This paper hypothesizes that several variables, when combined, spawn a ripe environment for the radicalization of people belonging to the Muslim faith. That is not to say that all Muslim men or women are susceptible to these variables, but that when said variables are present, the radicalization process can occur. These variables include immigration and consequential feelings of relative deprivation, religious belief (Altruism), SES – Socio-Economic Status (Fatalism) and Globalization (including all its implications). In essence, terrorist activity occurs as an extremist reaction to a perceived injustice propagated against their imagined community in an attempt to restore honour to that community.

ii.) Relevant Definitions:
Two key definitions will be presented in order to provide context to what the hypothesis is trying to prove:

1.) Terrorism: the actual act of, conspiracy to commit, and failed attempts. Terrorism/Political Violence can be defined as… ‘The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence
or the threat of violence, against civilian targets, in pursuit of political change…’² (Bruce Hoffman’s definition with minor, personal adjustments)

2.) **Islamism**: A radically anti-Western political current of contemporary Islamic thought with both revolutionary and restorationist characteristics.³

![Diagram of Islam, Political Islam, Muslim Fundamentalism, and Jihadism]

*Illustration provided by Dr. Peter Neumann, 7SSWM022 TERRORISM AND COUNTER TERRORISM, Lesson 6.

3.) ‘Home-Grown’ *Islamic Terrorists*: in our context of ‘Home-Grown’ Islamic terrorists, the ‘terrorist’ act is perpetrated by native citizens of said country, naturalized immigrants, and permanent residents from an Islamic background.

### iii.) Main Concepts and Variables:

**Independent Variables:**

1.) Religious belief (Altruism): Religious fanaticism, fundamentalism and extremism. Religious belief is defined by people’s personal belief, upholding religious laws and traditions, prayer, attendance in religious institutions. [Radical] Islam has inherent qualities that can justify certain

acts which can be deemed as terrorism. For example, the historical origins of which can be seen in the Shiite movement ‘Assassins’ and instances of suicide bombings are seen as Martyrdom.\textsuperscript{4} David and Cragin write, ‘the most prominently identified reward for participation in suicide terrorism is’ martyrdom.\textsuperscript{5} This ties in with religious belief and adds a motivational aspect to this variable; suicide terrorism brings divine rewards.

2.) SES (Socio-Economic Strata) (Fatalism): In developing nations, relatively poorer, uneducated persons turn to terror. However, in developed nations, middle-upper class, relatively educated persons are those who turn to terrorism. Karen Von Hippel writes: ‘People usually become politicised through education, so the educated middle or upper class carry out terrorist attacks more than the poor illiterates who spend most of their time trying to subsist and don’t have time to fight for a political cause.’\textsuperscript{6}

3.) Feelings of Persecution/Harassment: A feeling of being targeted or persecuted against (either physically, intellectually and/or culturally and collectively; ‘War on Islam’.) For example, Theo Van Gogh was murdered by an Islamic extremist for creating the movie ‘Fitna’, which portrayed Islam in a negative light. Todd C Helmus states that, ‘perceived injustices by governing authorities may promote a sense that these regimes should be removed’.\textsuperscript{7}

As well, ‘Muslims across Europe perceive widespread negative attitudes to their religion and at times are subject to verbal and physical attacks.’\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{4} Hudson (2006), p. 33.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid. p. 86.
4.) Immigration and consequential feelings of relative deprivation and/or being discriminated against as well as ‘alienation’, (which connects to the feelings of persecution/harassment). Marc Sageman argues that the Middle East Muslims who live in Europe ‘felt homesick, lonely and marginalized’. Second generation Muslims felt discriminated and excluded from society. Similar feelings were documented by members of 2006 London attacks (Kirby, 2007).

In the case of Islamic extremism, radicals and terrorists appear to be increasingly identifying with their Muslim heritage. And the discrimination they see of the wider Muslim community appears to have been a motivational force behind terrorist attacks in Europe.

5.) Globalization: in turn the ideas of cultural imperialism, ‘western invasions’ into Muslim lands, for example, Ben Barber’s concept of McWorld. People across the world are feeling the pressure of western culture and politics and hence are retreating to religious fanaticism, nationalistic groups, etc. (globalization). This applies to Dr. Peter Neumann’s ‘late modernity’; one can express globalization in: stretching of activities beyond national borders, intensification of such activity, speeding up of global interaction, etc. Globalization is about increasing interdependence between places. This act in turn creates issues with cultural imperialism as western advances into Muslim lands (albeit benign advances, from [our] point of view) are perceived as malignant invasions by the locals.

**Dependent Variable:**

1.) Terrorism/Political Violence: perpetrated by native citizens of said country, naturalized immigrants, and permanent residents from an Islamic background.

---

9 Ibid. pg. 81.
The concept of ‘Home-Grown’ Islamic Terrorism is defined as the extent which citizens of a nation exhibit the characteristics of political violence against their society.

iv.) Relevant Theoretical Approach:

The most appropriate theoretical approach for this paper is the ‘Behaviourist Approach’. The first step includes development of a theory, then the formation of a hypothesis and finally, the collection of data from specific case studies. These case studies include:

1.) John Walker-Lindh – The American Taliban
2.) Richard Reid – The Shoe Bomber
3.) Mohammad Sidique Khan - The British 7/7 Terrorist Ring Leader
4.) Bilal Abdullah - Glasgow International Airport Attack
5.) Mohammed Bouyeri – The Murder of Danish Cartoonist, Theo Van Gogh
6.) Major Nidal Malik Hasan - Fort Hood Massacre

This paper will attempt to illustrate the presence of each of the hypothesized Independent variables in each of these cases.

v.) Research Design:

The Research Study will be conducted in a Nomothetic, Deductive, and Qualitative manner.

The most appropriate research design for this paper is the ‘Comparative Design’.

This design can be applied to terrorism by studying different cases in different countries and seeing if the same behaviour occurs in different places. Once the comparisons are conducted, and if commonalities exist, one can make generalizations regarding said research problem.
In essence, if the 6 cases that were chosen provide the same results, with regards to the different independent variables (e.g. SES, Religious vs. Secular feelings, etc), than the generalization, or hypothesis, can be proven correct.

Aswell Przeworski and Teune’s ‘Most Different Systems Method’ (similar to method of agreement), will be applied. They claimed that if the same phenomenon occurs in different contexts, one can come up with a significant finding.11

vi.) Research Tool:
This paper will utilize and apply several relevant research tools:

Main Tools:
1.) Available Sources: using articles, publications, websites, policy papers, research studies, etc.
2.) Interviews: interviewing experts on the subject of terrorism and possibly ex-Islamic extremists; taking the point of view from within the mind of a terrorist. *(Interviews excluded from gathered data due to technical issues concerning ethical approval).*

Possible Secondary Tools:
1.) Archival and Historical Sources: Trying to find acts of political violence/terrorism, identifying their motivations and seeing if they apply to the context presented here.

Section II: Reviewing Pre-Existing Literature:
This section of the paper will present pre-existing literature, outlining the key motivations and characteristics of terrorists and terrorist acts with hopes in finding similarities to the variables

---

that have been hypothesized. The *Axioms & Assumptions (A&A)*, that will be presented, are sourced from scholars and academics with extensive research in the field. Furthermore, their work will be added to the research conducted in Section III, which will add to proving the original hypothesis. The structure will go through the different independent variables; Religious Extremism, mid-upper Socio-Economic Strata, feelings of Persecution/Harassment, Immigration and consequential feelings of Relative Deprivation and Globalization.

**i.) Religious Extremism A&A:**

‘A characteristic of terrorism in the modern age, and particularly in the last few years, is that the perpetrators of terrorism often cite religious motivations for their actions’. With these words, Rebecca Glazier discusses the motivations behind religious terrorism. She goes on to say, that Islamic and Arabic culture is a ‘culture of martyrdom’ as allowing and even encouraging the use of suicide terrorism. This glorification of martyrdom facilitates the extremist with legitimization to commit acts of terror.

The concept that religious extremism is a leading factor in modern day terrorist motivations is further reiterated by David Rappaport. He discusses the different ‘waves’ of terrorism and how since the 1990’s, religious extremism (notably Islamic extremism) has been leading the way in modern terrorism. ‘Islam is at the heart of this wave and Islamic groups have carried out the most significant, attacks’. Rappaport’s writings refer mostly to global Islamic Jihad and the general trend of religious based terrorism, not necessarily the notion of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism. However, one may apply his concepts as they are relevant in illustrating how religion

---

12 Glazier (2008), p. 5.
13 Ibid. p.6.
15 Ibid. p. 17.
does indeed contribute to the motivations of modern day terrorism and hence, ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorists.

Stewart Bell, in his book, ‘The Martyr's Oath: the Apprenticeship of a Home-Grown Terrorist’, follows the radicalization process of a young Canadian-Kuwaiti Muslim who at the age of 19, was recruited by Al-Quada.16 ‘They [terror recruiters] friends and clerics approach potential recruits, and they couch their recruiting in the unquestionable authority of religion’.17 In essence, ones seeking impressionable, young, Muslim men use the faith and beliefs of the recruits in the brainwashing process. In the case that Bell was investigating, all it took to recruit young Mansour Jabarah was a trip to Kuwait, his native home, and a video of Jihad being waged in Bosnia where young Muslims around the world were recruited to ‘defend, fight and die for Islam’.18 The recruiters played on his strong belief and love for Islam, glorified the worthy cause and turned the teenager into a homicidal, suicidal jihadist.

In their book, ‘Terrorism in Perspective’, Sue Mahan and Pamela L. Griset discuss in detail the different motivational elements for terrorism.19 They determined that four common traits may be prevalent in a terrorist, including, ‘extreme opinions and emotions regarding a belief system’.20 Not surprising, this trait ranked number one regarding contemporary terrorism and it is a safe assumption that the research Mahan and Griset conducted, included fundamental, Islamic terrorism.

---

16 Bell (October 2005), p. 7.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. p. 37.
19 Mahan and Griset (2008), p. 11.
20 Ibid.
Religious rewards have also played as a motivational element: ‘...the most prominently identified reward for participation in suicide terrorism is martyrdom’.\(^{21}\) For ones wishing to engage in terrorist activity, the reward of ascending to heaven, as a glorified martyr, only sweetens the deal and could further invigorate one to radicalize. The ‘divine mandate’ strengthens the resolve and justifies the actions of said terrorists.\(^{22}\) Rex Hudson also touches on the subject of martyrdom writing, ‘scholars of Muslim culture say that instances of suicide bombings are seen as Martyrdom. Arabic has two terms for suicide, one which means, ‘to give one’s life in the name of Allah’\(^{23}\). Magnus Ranstorp further reinforces this when he writes that, ‘[all] are united in the belief on the part of the perpetrators that their actions were divinely sanctioned, even mandated, by God’\(^{24}\).

Finally, a 2009, Kruglanski study showed how, suicide terrorists’ farewell videos and interviews with mothers of successful suicide bombers found that stated reasons for suicide terrorism were almost universally ideological---that is, religious and/or nationalist.\(^{25}\) Indeed, religious extremism and fanaticism has the potential to create a hotbed of radicalization and terrorism.

The religious extremism assumptions and axioms researched, intended to show that this element has been a main cause for terrorism in the past and present. This sets the stage for the case studies that will be analyzed later in the paper.

\(^{22}\)Ibid.
\(^{25}\)Neumann and Rogers (2009-10), Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Lesson 6
ii.) Socio-Economic Strata (SES) A&A:

As explained earlier, this paper will argue that in contrast to the developing world, in which the assumption is that a low Socio-Economic Status (SES) is widespread among terrorist recruits, in the developed world, it is the middle to upper class of society that is susceptible to extremist recruitment.

‘There is no evidence of a general tendency for impoverished or uneducated people to be more likely to support terrorism or join terrorist organizations than their higher-income, better-educated countrymen’. Andrew Whitehead’s analysis seems to reinforce that it is not necessarily the poor, uneducated person that is susceptible to radicalization and terrorism. Whitehead goes on to say how in the developed world, statistics show how individuals who turn to terrorism are in fact the middle-upper echelons of society.

In the fall of 2003, Alan Krueger and Jitka Malec’kova sought out to prove how violent crimes and/or terrorism are connected to poverty. Quite the contrary, their research pointed in the other direction. They discovered that violent crime and murders typically are unconnected to economic status. They continued with, ‘if violent crime is unrelated to economic opportunity, terrorism may be unrelated as well’. In order to prove this theory, Krueger and Malec’kova tested the interactions between GDP per capita and measures of political freedom and civil liberties. They were unable to find any clear interaction. ‘The data seemed to suggest that a lack of civil liberties is associated with higher participation in terrorism and that low income has no direct

28Ibid.
30Ibid.
connection’.\textsuperscript{31} Their research also discovered how relatively educated persons are not only more likely to join a terrorist organization, but tend to be more appealing applicants for said terror groups.\textsuperscript{32} This further supports the hypothesis as it is rational to place more educated persons in a higher socio-economic stratum. This idea is further reinforced by Karen von Hippel, as discussed earlier in the paper.

Claude Berrebi attempted to determine the relationship between terrorism and poverty, by looking at the relationship through the lenses of the rational choice model. He questioned whether or not it was useful to discuss the cause-effect relationship via rational choice.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, Berrebi found that, ‘terrorists are not particularly poor, ignorant or mentally ill… Their most notable characteristic is normalcy.’\textsuperscript{34}

To give more credibility to the theory that middle-upper class citizens of any said developed country are more likely to turn to terrorism and use violence, this paper will turn to a scientific argument presented by Eric Hoffer. The study he conducted put ‘conflict/violence’ (and in our context, terrorism) on the Y axis and ‘satisfaction’ on the X axis in which both start at 0% and end with 100%. The outcome of his study would create a traditional Bell curve. A person who experiences 0% satisfaction (or completely impoverished) has a 0% chance of turning to violence, being part of an uprising and indeed, conducting an act of terror.\textsuperscript{35} This is explained by the perception that any said person who is completely impoverished must focus all of his/her energy in order to simply survive and does not have the time nor will to lash out against his/her

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid. pp. 140-141.
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid. p. 122.
\textsuperscript{33}David and Cragin (2009) – Chapter by Claude Berrebi, p.151
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid. p. 152.
\textsuperscript{35}Hoffer (1951), p. 51.
perceived oppressors. Similarly, Hoffer’s work showed how someone who is 100% satisfied will not turn to violence as he/she will have too much to lose. In fact, the people sitting on the 50% satisfaction mark are most susceptible to political violence and indeed terrorism. One may argue that Hoffer’s work is not completely accurate (as case studies such as Osama Bin Laden break his mould) however in every rule, exceptions exist and they do not necessarily deny all validity of said theory.

*Here is a simple illustration of Hoffer’s theory.*

Setting the precedent, the examples and theories provided will hopefully be proven once analyzing the case studies. If each of the cases presented can illustrate how the ones committing terrorism did indeed have a middle-upper SES, this paper will be able to show validity in its original hypothesis.

---

36 Ibid.
iii.) Feelings of Persecution/Harassment A&A:

Generally speaking, visible minorities are more likely to be targeted and to suffer from persecution, harassment and prejudice. This could bring about feelings of resentment and injustice and a desire for revenge. However, it is important to note that everything is relative and hence when defining feelings of persecution and harassment we must note that perception is key. As well, we must distinguish between perceived grievances and concrete grievances. For example, a Muslim citizen experiencing genuine, or better, first hand persecution in the form of verbal and/or physical attacks, compared to Muslims perceiving a collective grievance with their Muslim brethren being ‘persecuted’ (as they see persecution) by Western entities (e.g. Western ‘invasions’ into Muslim lands; Iraq and Afghanistan).

‘Perceived social, economic, and political discrimination can play a critical role in the radicalization process’.37 Todd C. Helmus goes on to write how many European Muslims perceive widespread negative attitudes toward their religion. This at times could simply be oversensitivity (for example, the difference from criticism and overt prejudice) or at times real discriminatory acts (for example verbal and physical attacks).38 As discussed, the concrete and/or perceived grievance will create a desire to respond and strike back at one’s ‘oppressors’. Helmus goes on to describe three categories or levels of ‘responding to grievance’; (1) personal grievance/revenge, (2) personal attacks directed at self or loved ones and (3) collective grievance/ a duty or defend the collective (in our context, the greater Muslim community).39 Personal grievance and revenge seems to be one of the more common motivational elements.

38Ibid. p. 86.
Regarding most forms of terrorism and is an observed variable in many studies conducted.\textsuperscript{40} As well, many have observed how ones choosing to commit acts of terror did so after they personally had experienced some sort of traumatic violent event. Either they themselves were targeted or they witnessed a friend or loved one fall victim to persecutory acts.\textsuperscript{41} In our context of ‘home-grown’ Islamic extremism, one can hypothesize that said radical/s were perhaps not exposed to the type of violence that would radicalize a Chechen or Palestinian terrorist, nevertheless, with the onset of mass communication, the internet, etc, perceived grievance or witness to violent acts can provoke anger when it is inflicted onto a greater community, which touches on the subject of collective grievance.

\begin{quote}
In the case of Islamic extremism, radicals increasingly identify with their Muslim heritage and the broader Muslim community. They may see discriminatory practices unjustly affecting this group or become incensed at abusive acts perpetrated against faraway Muslim “kin.” The desire to address these collective grievances may prove a motivating force in the radicalization process.
\end{quote}

- David and Cragin (2009) – Chapter by Todd C. Helmus p.89
Retrieved: May 10, 2010

In a nutshell, perceived injustices across the Muslim world (notably: Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan) act as fuel for potential radicalization and extremist acts within Europe and the Western world.\textsuperscript{42} Professor Brooke Rogers explains how, ‘foreign policy is identified as the highest ranking issue or concern for Muslims overall. It is believed to be targeted at Muslim

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid. p. 87.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid. pp. 87-88.
\textsuperscript{42}Ibid. p. 89.
states and involve double standards’. As well, many studies conducted by academics such as Marc Sageman, Anthony Cordesman and Thomas Hegghammer found that exposure to propaganda videos of foreign Muslim conflicts, distributed to potential extremists, furthered the radicalization of European based militants. The combination of perceived collective injustices, persecutory policies and graphic imagery indeed creates a volatile mix for enraged extremists.

‘Helplessness which leads to hopelessness is the psychological state that enhances terrorism in the society. The societies in which the people are ignored and have to suffer from political injustice, prejudice and harassment provide a ripe environment to promote terrorism’. In essence, when individuals suffer from harassment and/or prejudice they are more likely to turn to terrorism as their form of vengeance and justice. This includes Muslims, who regularly suffer from social abuse and prejudice on account of their religion, customs and traditions.

In the book, ‘The Martyr's Oath: the Apprenticeship of a Home-grown Terrorist’, Stuart Bell describes the radicalization of Mansour Jabarah. As mentioned earlier, Jabarah’s radicalization began with religious extremism. However the radicalization process was perpetuated when Jabarah began to dress and groom himself in traditional religious Muslim attire. From this, Jabarah regularly suffered from religious intolerance and harassment.

43 Neumann and Rogers (2009-10), Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Lesson 12.
46 Ibid.
47 Bell (2005), p. 27.
Muslim perceptions of their non-Muslim countrymen and women also play a part in the radicalization of Muslims. Kimberley L. Thachuk, Marion E. “Spike” Bowman, and Courtney Richardson discuss this issue in their paper, ‘Home-Grown Terrorism: The Threat Within’.48

This poll clearly illustrates the resentment and even hatred that Muslims have for non-Muslims within any western nation.49 That is not to say that all will resort to terrorism and violence, however, this research sets the precedence for the hypothesized variable; feelings of harassment and prejudice.

iv.) Immigration &Relative Deprivation A&A:

W.G. Runciman defines relative deprivation as a phenomenon where a person feels deprived of X when: (1) he/she does not have X, (2) he/she sees some other person or persons, which may include him/herself at a previous time and place, having X, (3) he/she wants X, and (4) he/she deems it feasible that they should have X.50 This, like the previous variable is extremely subjective and can vary from person to person. As well, we must keep in mind that feelings of relative deprivation and feelings of harassment/persecution will be closely related as they share similar roots; the feeling or perception of injustice occurring against any said person. In order to

49Ibid.
show precedence for feelings of relative deprivation, this paper will attempt to further analyze and define the phenomenon and outline actual statistics, illustrating real variances between Muslims and non-Muslims within any said Western society. Once this is done, we will continue the trend of providing evidence via a third party; academics and scholars in the field.

There are different ways of measuring as well as different types of relative deprivation. First, we can measure relative deprivation either horizontally or vertically. Horizontally, is comparing what ‘we’ have with what ‘they’ have (‘they’ can be our neighbours, colleagues, countrymen, etc). Vertically, is comparing what ‘we’ used to have with what ‘we’ have now (either what ‘we’ have gained or lost). Basically one is comparing ‘what is’ with ‘what should be’ or ‘what could have been’. With this gap comes frustration and it creates pressure to act upon it.51

The different types of relative deprivation (RD) include: Aspirational (RD) in which you have achievement on the Y axis and time on the X axis. As time passes the achievement is a straight line but one’s aspirations grow creating a gap between achievement and aspirations. Decremental (RD) in which one’s expectations remain the same, but achievements lower, in turn a relative deprivation gap is created again. Progressive (RD) occurs when achievements rise however aspirations also rose, but at a greater rate. Finally, Persistent (RD) in which one’s capabilities stay the same (achievements) but so do the expectations hence a gap between the two (RD gap) is created.52 The expectations are the common denominator, meaning if one has no expectations, no hope, there will be no conflict and hence in our context, no terrorism. This also applies with Eric Hoffer’s work, as was illustrated in the SES independent variable.

52 Ibid.
Professor Brooke Rogers speaks about the Muslim population’s perceived discrimination and indeed perceived relative deprivation within the UK. Muslims, compared to other UK populations as a whole:

- suffer 3 times the unemployment rate,
- have a higher proportion that is unqualified (uneducated),
- have a higher concentration of people living in deprived areas,
- significantly under perform in secondary education,
- significantly under perform in higher education; university level,
- have a lack of political representation,
- and are grossly overrepresented in prison populations.53

This real disadvantage is being felt and in turn may produce feelings of injustice, resentment, hatred and eventually revenge. Such emotions do indeed lead to feelings of loneliness, marginalization and exclusion from society, as was noticed in some of the London 7/7 terrorists.54

In his book, ‘the Insurgent Archipelago’, John Mackinlay very accurately defines the growing internal threat to British (and to an extent, European) security. The claim state show the threat of a growing insurgency emanates from within Britain’s borders, from a migrant population that lives in large, isolated communities.55 These disenfranchised, radicalized, second or even third generation Muslim youth, are viewed as the true threat to British security. Prof. Mackinlay goes on to write how mass migrations were not a solely Muslim phenomenon; however the size of

53 Neumann and Rogers (2009-10), Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Lesson 12
said Muslim migrations has not been matched. This includes Turkish migrations to Germany, South East Asian (Indian and Pakistani) migrations to the UK and North African migrations to France and Spain. Many of these migrants, or rather their children, seem to suffer from a lack of opportunities, compared to their white, British, French, Spanish and German counter-parts. This illustrates the connection between immigration and relative deprivation.

Finally, a MI5 study showed how alongside relative deprivation, under-achievement also played a role in motivating terrorism. A sample of suspects, arrested on terrorism charges, expressed how they felt that society had cheated them. As well, their skill and talent was not utilized. They were educated, but didn’t reap the fruits of their education and hence, turned to terror.57

v.) Globalisation and Decline of Nationalism A&A:

Globalisation describes a process by which regional economies, societies, and cultures have become integrated through a global network of communication, transportation, and trade. This in turn creates interdependencies between states and peoples. In essence, one could view globalisation as an act of tearing down traditional borders, national and cultural identities, and as a whole, traditional independence. In the context of this paper, one could view globalisation as not only a facilitating element for global terrorism (for example, providing more affordable and accessible air travel, advances in communications, explosive technology, etc.), but also as a motivational element for potential extremists (touching on issues of perceived grievances; ‘western cultural imperialism’ and ‘western invasions into Muslim lands’, creation of social cleavages and as discussed, elements of relative deprivation that create perceived grievances).

56 Ibid. p. 103.
57 Neumann and Rogers (2009-10), Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Lesson 3
59 Mackinlay (2009), p. 30.
Professor Peter Neumann further discusses these issues in his 2009 article, ‘Old and New Terrorism’. Professor Neumann describes how globalisation and ‘late modernity’ have brought about advances in technology and communications which have facilitated and made it possible for terror organizations to, ‘establish diffuse networks, spanning continents and allowing for an unparalleled degree of flexibility and operational reach’.\textsuperscript{60} Indeed, globalisation (and the advances in a globalised world) has removed the issue of time and space for ones seeking to conduct acts of terror; this includes movement of personnel, funds and equipment, communication of orders, coordinating attacks and more.\textsuperscript{61} As well, globalisation and said advances, have facilitated and allowed for acts of ‘Propaganda of the Deed’ to transcend national borders and expose a target audience within the western world, in turn radicalizing impressionable Muslim youth to commit acts of terror. Professor Neumann goes on to say:

\begin{quote}

‘While providing immense benefits for an increasingly cosmopolitan elite, they have produced political paradigms that revolve around particularist forms of ethnic and religious identity, which reject the universal, secular and liberal aspirations that late modernity and globalisation are meant to promote. Religiously motivated terrorism is one of the results’.

- Neumann, (2009), Old and New Terrorism (Social Europe Journal)
Retrieved: April 5, 2010
\end{quote}

Darcy M.E. Noricks describes globalisation as one of the ‘permissive factors’ to the root causes of terrorism. Global systemic factors, such as globalization, have far reaching effects on peoples; some positive some negative.\textsuperscript{62} Working off of Rappaport’s theories concerning the ‘waves of

\textsuperscript{60} Neumann, (2009), \textit{Old and New Terrorism} (Social Europe Journal)
\textsuperscript{61} Mackinlay (2009), p. 90.
terrorism’ (as previously discussed), we can hypothesize that contemporary issues do indeed have a role in the formation of ideologies and/or agendas for said terror organizations. For example, feelings of ‘oppression’ at the hands of ‘colonialist/imperialistic’ powers spawned a ripe environment for many of the ‘Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist’ organizations like the Irgun, PLO and IRA during much of the post-WWII era. Hence, it can be argued that globalisation and global systemic factors do incorporate as a motivational role in modern day religious extremism/terrorism as many view globalisation and its characteristics as an invasive, ‘raping’ phenomenon. As Magnus Ranstorp writes:

‘The threat of secularization from foreign sources is also the catalyst for springing religious terrorists into action. Intrusion of secular values into the extremists' own environment and the visible presence of secular foreign interference provoke self-defensive aggressiveness and hostility against the sources of these evils. This is especially true against perceived colonialism and neo-colonialism by western civilizations or against other militant religious faiths. These defensive sentiments are often combined with the visible emergence and presence of militant clerical leaders. It is often the case that these clerical ideologues and personalities act as a centrifugal force in attracting support, strengthening the organizational mechanisms and in redefining the methods and means through terrorism. At the same time, they provide theological justification, which enables their followers to pursue the sacred causes more effectively and rapidly’.


For extremists living in the west, their grievance is one of a collective, Muslim injustice and suffrage.

Finally, one may argue that globalisation has created a much more cosmopolitan world, in which people’s identification, or rather, nationalistic feelings, have declined. In turn, people around the
world seek out a new identification, whether it is based on racial, ethnic and/or religious grounds. As a result of this lack of identification, Muslims will identify with their ethnic-religious and/or history/backgrounds and in turn, will practice their religious laws and traditions that supersede national ones. Due to the lack of nationalistic sentiment, religious identification grows and in turn religious fundamentalism and extremism will penetrate more of the population.

To give some precedence, this paper will illustrate how nationalism is indeed in decline. In his paper ‘The Decline of Traditional Values in Western Europe’, Mattei Dogan discusses how nationalism has been on the decline for years now.63 ‘This paper analyzes the decline of nationalist tendencies and of confidence in institutions’.64 From his empirical study, Dogan found how many Europeans have lost their nationalistic feelings towards their nation-state. Although Dogan did not focus on Islam, one can assume that Muslims, in any said European state, would be a part of his sample and findings.

‘It is often said that Islam is in itself a sort of nationalism, in which umma Muhammadiyya (the Muslim community) occupies the place of the nation’.65 In essence, Nasim A. Jawed states that Islam and Muslims have a predisposition to banding with other Muslims, identifying and being loyal to Islam rather than the nation-state they inhabit.

In a Pew Research Center survey a group of researchers conducted a poll, attempting to ascertain how Muslims identify themselves.66 The ‘Muslims in Europe’ survey showed how in Britain, only 7% of Muslims felt more nationalistic [towards Britain] than Islam. As well, 81% of

63 Dogan (1998), pp. 77-83.
64 Ibid.
Muslims felt more Muslim than British. In contrast, the survey showed how 59% of British Christians identified with their national flag. These trends were further illustrated in Spain, where 69% of Muslims surveyed considered themselves Muslim first and only 3% considered themselves Spanish first. These numbers were also seen in countries like France and Germany. In Germany, 51% of Muslims surveyed felt that Europeans are hostile towards Muslims. This reinforces the perception of grievance held by many European Muslims.

Coupling these factors – globalisation/decline of nationalism and Islamic religious identification, we are one step closer to giving validity for the hypothesis.

This literature review attempted to set the stage and give validity to the independent variables presented. In the next section, this paper will identify and analyze specific case studies of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism and attempt to apply the template offered here, hoping to prove the legitimacy of the five different independent variables that were hypothesized.

---

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
Section III - Case Studies:

The Literature Review Section set the stage and gave academic validity to the hypothesized independent variables. This section will attempt to illustrate the presence of said variables in individual case studies. If achieved, coupling the existing data in the field with the data formulated here, this paper will gain credibility and bring us one step closer to determining the motivational elements and characteristics of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorists.

Each of the case studies will give a brief historical background, for contextual purposes, and then try to identify each of the independent variables that have been hypothesized; religious extremism, socio-economic status, feelings of persecution/harassment, immigration and/or relative deprivation and finally globalisation and the decline of nationalistic sentiments. The case studies section will make use of the different interviews, transcripts and archives produced by such media outlets as the BBC, New York Times and more. As well, official government reports and NGO analysis papers will be utilized.

i.) John Walker Lindh – The American Taliban:

John Phillip Walker Lindh, aka Sulayman al-Faris, aka Hamza Walker Lindh, was born on February 9, 1981 to an average American family. ‘John Walker Lindh was a middle child named
after John Lennon and Chief Justice John Marshall’. Lindh was an average American kid, raised in suburbia; ‘We were loud, normal kids’, explained Andrew Cleverdon, a boyhood friend of Walker’s. In a CNN interview, Frank Lindh, John’s father expressed, ‘he's not someone that would, that I would have ever imagined, could pick up a gun at all’. So what could compel this seemingly normal, Catholic young man to pick up arms, travel across the world and wage holy war against his fellow countrymen? What were his motivations? Unfortunately, Lindh was unavailable for interview as he is serving a 20 year sentence in the Federal Correctional Institution, Terre Haute, at Terre Haute, Indiana. However, an interview in December of 2001 held by CNN journalist Robert Young Pelton, gives some insight into the mind of Lindh. As well, in July of 2009, an exclusive ‘Democracy Now’ interview with Marilyn Walker and Frank Lindh (John Walker Lindh’s parents) illustrates the early life, Islamification, radicalization and eventual capture/incarceration of their son. To note, this paper will not acknowledge the personal political agenda of ‘Democracy Now’, but will focus on the testimony of John Walker Lindh’s parents.

Religious extremism is a relatively simply variable to prove and show validity in this case, as is expected in most. The FBI characterizes ‘home-grown’ Islamic extremists as [US] persons who may appear to be assimilated, but, to some degree, have become radicalized in their support for Islamic jihad. John Walker Lindh fit this description perfectly. ‘He was a soldier in the Taliban.

---

70 Tyrangiel (December 2001), The Taliban Next Door (Time Magazine). 

71 Ibid.


He did it for religious reasons. He did it as a Muslim, and history overcame him’,

his attorney, James Brosnahan, explained after Lindh’s trial. As discovered by FBI interrogators, Lindh became interested in Islam at age 12 after watching the movie ‘Malcolm X’, which discussed Mecca, Saudi Arabia and the religious pilgrimage Hajj. At the age of 16, Lindh converted to Islam. Upon completing high school, Lindh decided to move to Sa’na Yemen to study Arabic; ‘the language spoken in Yemen is closer to the holy language of the Koran and the sayings of the Prophet’. Lindh’s religious beliefs and adamant Muslim way of life is clear; Islam brought Lindh to Yemen and eventually to an Al-Quada training camp in Afghanistan.

As described earlier, Lindh was born to a middle class, Catholic family. His father was an attorney and his mother was a health care aide, who both earned a substantial living. Fitting perfect into the Hoffer theory that someone who sits in or around the 50% satisfaction mark (not too rich or not too poor) Lindh indeed enjoy a comfortable socio-economic status and indeed illustrates this hypothesized characteristic.

Lindh was not an immigrant, nor did he suffer from religious or ethnic persecution, as many visible minorities do. That would change after his conversion. According to Abdullah Nana, a friend of Lindh’s who attended religious services with him, for John moving to a Muslim country would make studying Islam much easier. That is to say that Lindh apparently found it relatively difficult to study and practice his newly found religion in a western country. In November of

---


75 Ibid.


2000, he took the next step and moved to Pakistan where he could ‘enrol into a Madrassa where they teach Quranic memorization, a skill all devout Muslims wish to achieve’. Evidence also showed by this time, Lindh swore allegiance to ‘Jihad’, or holy war against enemies of Islam. From this, one can assert that Lindh felt his religion was at risk and needed to be defended at all costs. In a correspondence with his father, Lindh was informed of the USS Cole bombing in a Yemen harbour. His response was since an American destroyer was docked in Yemen, that act alone was indeed an act of war against Islam and hence, attacking the USS Cole, using whatever means is a justifiable strike. This would most definitely fit into the variable of persecution/harassment in which Lindh felt that his religion was being attacked and in a state of siege.

‘[They] (referring to home-grown Islamic extremists), often see themselves as devout Muslims and reject the cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the United States’. In essence, many who choose to follow the path of radical Islam indeed lose nationalistic feelings towards their home nation; Islam, and the greater Muslim community, becomes the nation in which they become loyal to. For John Walker Lindh, this became true once the US began its campaign against the Taliban, by which that time, Lindh had already joined. One may argue that globalization, and the technological advances achieved in a globalised world, also facilitated Lindh’s actions. His travels to Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan were all possible, as it was for other Jihadist’s flocking from states within the Arab world and elsewhere (Chechnya), due to

---

31
advances in affordable/accessible air travel. Open borders and the freedom to travel also contributed to the ease of Lindh’s expeditions. ‘[We] assess that the overseas experiences of John Walker Lindh played a pivotal role in his involvement with the Taliban. Once overseas, he was directed by radicalized individuals to attend extremist universities and ultimately, training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan’. As well, the rejection of the newly democratic regime (late modernity) installed in Afghanistan certainly played a pivotal role in Lindh’s continued fight alongside the Taliban.

From this analysis, there is evidence that most of the independent variables are present in the Lindh case; religious extremism, middle-upper SES, feelings of persecution (a perceived collective grievance), a decline of nationalism and finally, an ever more globalised world. John Walker Lindh indeed shows elements of these variables, which arguably can be related to his transformation into an Islamic terrorist/combatant.

ii.) Richard Reid – The Shoe Bomber:

Richard Colvin Reid, aka Abdul Raheem, aka Tariq Raja, aka ‘Abdul Ra’uff’, was born in the London suburb of Bromley, in 1973. His grandfather was a Jamaican immigrant to Britain, and

---

83 Ibid. p. 4.
his father Colvin Robin Reid met and married Lesley Hughes, a white woman who was the
daughter of an accountant and magistrate.\textsuperscript{85} For much of his life, his father was imprisoned,
creating a void in Reid’s upbringing; ‘I was no great example to my son’, explained Robin
Reid.\textsuperscript{86} By the time he reached his teenage years, Richard Reid had dropped out of school (at 16)
and involved himself in criminal offenses (at 17, he assaulted and robbed a senior citizen).\textsuperscript{87} By
1994, after several incarcerations, Reid had converted to Islam. For the next six years, Reid had
transformed into the Islamic radical who in 2001 attempted to blow up American Airlines flight
67.\textsuperscript{88} What could have motivated Richard Reid to attempt such a heinous act?

When Richard Reid converted to Islam in 1994, he did so with hopes of finding some salvation
in a cruel and racist world. ‘Islam is a sort of natural religion for underdogs’, says Ziauddin
Sardar, a British scholar of Islam, ‘and that's one reason why Afro-Caribbean people have found
its message very attractive’.\textsuperscript{89} Initially, Reid was enthusiastic to learn and embrace his new found
faith. He did not wish to align himself with any extremist groups. Reid found the Brixton
Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre, in the heart of black London. At first he was described as
soft spoken and gentle, in contrast to other extremist alumni originating in Brixton, notably
convicted 9/11 co-conspirator, Zacarias Moussaoui.\textsuperscript{90} Eventually, Reid moved to the Finsbury
Park Mosque in north London, notorious for the radicalism of its message and the number of
suspected terrorists who have worshipped there. At the time, the freedom of extremist thought
ran rabid in the UK, in hopes to keep the movement above ground, where it can be monitored

\textsuperscript{85} Elliot (February, 2002), \textit{The Shoe Bomber's World} (Time Magazine: USA).
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} BBC News (December 28, 2001), \textit{Who is Richard Reid?} (BBC: UK).
\texttt{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1731568.stm} Retrieved: June 24, 2010
\textsuperscript{88} Elliot (February, 2002), \textit{The Shoe Bomber's World} (Time Magazine: USA).
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
with relative ease.\textsuperscript{91} This in turn allowed radical ideas to spread like wildfire among the impressionable young Muslim men searching for meaning in their life. Very quickly, Reid’s anger with society (which will be discussed in the ‘feelings of harassment/persecution segment of this case study) was channelled through radical Islamic thought. ‘Younger, more disaffected Muslims, mainly from working-class backgrounds, mostly unemployed, unmarried. These guys see themselves as totally under siege. For them, jihad is a salvation’,\textsuperscript{92} continues Ziauddin Sardar. This also touches on issues of relative deprivation and the resentment/hatred that accompanies it. By 1998, Richard Reid had committed himself to Jihad and began taking steps to become militant. He travelled to Pakistan in 1999 and 2000 in order to attend an Islamic ‘Madrassa’ and it is believed that he travelled to an al-Qaeda training camp in Khalden, Afghanistan, not too far from the capital Kabul.\textsuperscript{93} His radicalization and training grew exponentially there, until he was finally ready to become an active extremist. In the summer of 2001, Reid travelled back to London and eventually found himself in Israel, scouting potential targets for a future attack. During this time he also travelled to Egypt, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands and France.\textsuperscript{94} After a failed attempt to board a flight on December 21, Reid finally had his opportunity to become a martyr for his cause on December 22, 2001 when he boarded American Airlines flight 67 from Paris to Miami.\textsuperscript{95} Islamic extremism gave Richard Reid the justification to not only attempt mass murder, but suicide as well. Reid failed in his mission and was turned over to US authorities who officially indicted him for attempted murder, the

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, among other charges. Richard Reid was convicted and sentenced to 80 years imprisonment in a federal penitentiary. Upon receiving his punishment Richard Reid stated:

‘I start by praising Allah because life today is no good. I bear witness to this and he alone is right to be worshiped. And I bear witness that Muhammad Sa’laat Alayhi as-Salaam is his last prophet and messenger who is sent to all of mankind for guidance, with the sound guidance for everyone’.

-CNN Law Center (January 31, 2003), Reid: ‘I am at war with your country’, partial transcript of Richard Reid’s trial and sentencing (CNN: USA).

Richard Reid went on to say, ‘I further admit my allegiance to Osama bin Laden, to Islam, and to the religion of Allah’. Indeed, Richard Reid illustrates how religious extremism played a pivotal role in his indoctrination and attempted execution of a terrorist attack.

As was mentioned, Reid was born and raised in the modest London suburb of Bromley. Although he did not have much of a father figure growing up, his socio-economic status was not one of an impoverished refugee. ‘...the borough's schools are among the UK's best, and street crime is half that in smarter areas such as Kensington and Chelsea’. That is to say, that Reid’s neighbourhood was hardly a breeding ground for ‘dissidents’ or rather, disgruntled,

---

96 United States District Court of Massachusetts (January 16, 2002), *Official Indictment of Richard Colvin Reid*, (Massachusetts: USA).


97 CNN Law Center (January 31, 2003), Reid: ‘I am at war with your country’, partial transcript of Richard Reid’s trial and sentencing (CNN: USA).


98 Ibid.


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1731568.stm Retrieved: June 24, 2010
impoverished segments of the population. Like Lindh, Reid illustrates how a middle-class, socio-economic strata is one of the characteristics of a ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorist.

Perhaps one of the more important variables regarding Reid’s transformation and radicalisation is his feeling of harassment and persecution. Reid’s father recounts a conversation he had with his son Richard, prior to his Islamic conversion. He recalls: ‘[he] seemed depressed and downhearted. He was born here in Britain, like I was, explained Robin. It was distressing to be told things like ‘go home, nigger!’ Reid’s father advised him to convert to Islam, as Muslims would treat him as a ‘human being’ and will accept him regardless of the colour of his skin. As Ziauddin Sardar explained, Islam offers salvation to these disenfranchised young men. It is fairly simple to identify the reasons behind Richard Reid’s conversion to Islam. However, why did he eventually turn to radical, extremist Islam? Upon his arrival at the Finsbury Park Mosque, Reid was already determined he wanted to wage Jihad. Abdul Haqq Baker, the Chairman of the Brixton Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre attempted to warn Reid about the path of extremism, however to no avail. Reid felt that the actions taken by the more moderate Baker were ‘too slow and passive’. Indeed, Reid wanted revenge against his antagonists. This illustrates his personal desire to lash out against his fellow countrymen, demonstrating his feelings of persecution. However, Reid’s actions on December 22, 2001 were targeting foreigners; American and French citizens. What grievance did he hold against them?

100 Ibid.
102 Ibid
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
On the day of his sentencing, Richard Reid was given the opportunity to speak to not only the jury of his peers and the presiding judge, but to the entire world.

Reid here shows classic examples of how collective grievances, regarding feelings of perceived persecution, harassment and/or injustice, play a fundamental role in the radicalisation of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorists. As well, this illustrates his rejection of the perceived Western world’s invasion of Muslim lands and corruption of Arab regimes.

Richard Reid is a classic case of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism. He indeed shows elements of each of the hypothesized variables; his religious extremism, his feelings of persecution/harassment and relative deprivation vis-à-vis not only his immediate countrymen, but the western world as a whole. Finally, globalisation, late modernity and the advances of a globalised world were all elements in the motivation and facilitation of Reid’s actions.

‘Your government has killed 2 million children in Iraq.... Your government has sponsored the rape and torture of Muslims in the prisons of Egypt and Turkey and Syria and Jordan with their money and with their weapons. I don’t know, see what I done as being equal to rape and to torture, or to the deaths of the two million children in Iraq. So, for this reason, I think I ought not apologize for my actions. I am at war with your country. I’m at war with them not for personal reasons but because they have murdered more than, so many children and they have oppressed my religion and they have oppressed people for no reason except that they say we believe in Allah. This is the only reason that America sponsors Egypt. It’s the only reason they sponsor Turkey. It’s the only reason they back Israel’.

- CNN Law Center (January 31, 2003), Reid: 'I am at war with your country', partial transcript of Richard Reid’s trial and sentencing (CNN: USA).
iii.) Mohammad Sidique Khan - The British 7/7 Terrorist Ring Leader:

‘On 7 July 2006 fifty-two people were killed in the terrorist attacks in London’.  

Involved in the attack were four suicide bombers; Mohammad Sidique Khan (30) – Shehzad Tanweer (22) Germaine Lindsay (19) Hasib Hussain (18). Apart from Jermaine Lindsay, all were British nationals of Pakistani origin, born and brought up in the UK, and at the time of the bombings based in West Yorkshire. Lindsay was a British national of West Indian origin, born in Jamaica and based in Aylesbury prior to the attacks. He was a convert to Islam. Evidence shows that Lindsay suffered from similar verbal and racial abuse as Richard Reid did. The four terrorists presented here all fit the profile of a ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorist.

*The bombers caught on CCTV at Luton railway station at 07:21 a.m. on 7 July. From left to right, Hasib Hussain, Germaine Lindsay, Mohammad Sidique Khan, and Shehzad Tanweer*

This case study will focus on Mohammad Sidique Khan and hope to prove that the hypothesized variables fit in his profile.


106 Ibid. p. 11.

107 Ibid.

Mohammad Sidique Khan was born on the 20th of October, 1974 in Leeds, to Tika Khan, a foundry worker and Mamida Begum, both from Pakistan. He was the youngest of six children and grew up in Beeston, attending Matthew Murray High School, now known as South Leeds High School. Friends from his teenage years recall a highly Westernised young man who insisted on being called ‘Sid’. What were the possible motivations and characteristics of a born and bred British citizen, son of assimilated Pakistani immigrants, to strap on a suicide belt and kill dozens of innocent people?

According to Rebecca Glazier, ‘some scholars who have looked at the issue of religion have concluded that suicide terrorists are religious fanatics who have been manipulated by outside forces into committing acts of suicide terrorism’. Indeed Mohammad Sidique Khan was coerced by religion and religious fanaticism to commit the heinous act that he did.

In 2001, West Yorkshire Police observed a group of forty men attending a training camp believed to be organized by two known extremists. At the time, photographs identified nine of the men. Only after 7/7 was it confirmed that Siddique Khan was indeed one of the recruits at the camp. Throughout the next few years, evidence has shown that Siddique Khan had surrounded

---

110 Ibid.
111 Glazier (March, 2008), p. 5.
112 Howells (May 2009), Intelligence and Security Committee, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? (Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister: UK), p. 17.  
him self with known extremists and was active within their community.\textsuperscript{113} According to a British Intelligence assessment of the 7/7 attacks, Khan travelled to Pakistan in 2004-05 with his co-conspirator Shazad Tanweer where it is assessed that they met with al-Quada operatives.\textsuperscript{114} On 1 September 2005 a video message from Siddique Khan was aired on Al-Jazeera. Here his true motives are illustrated:

\begin{quote}
\textit{I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad... Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{115} For full video, refer to: \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oc8IZvJWKwg} Retrieved: August 3, 2010

This video confession,\textsuperscript{115} clearly illustrates several of the independent variables presented in this paper as the necessary motivations of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorists. ‘Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam...’ Religious extremism, and his unquestionable belief in Islam, is clearly shown here.

‘...Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world’. Here we see that Khan felt that he and his fellow Muslims across the

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} For full video, refer to: \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oc8IZvJWKwg} Retrieved: August 3, 2010
world were in a state of siege which fits nicely with the variable of that discusses feelings of harassment/persecution, as well, the collective grievance held by many Islamic militants. This also shows Siddique Khan’s resentment towards the liberal democracy he had called home, illustrating how extremism is affected by late modernity and the ‘corrupt’ western democratic values that come alongside it. A close analysis of Khan’s words illustrates how he also collectively blamed all of western society for the actions taken by its government. ‘And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters’.116

As shown, Khan was born into a middle class family with two working parents. He lived a relatively comfortable middle class life. Upon graduating, Khan worked in a low-level clerical job for the government. He eventually went on to business school at Leeds Metropolitan University.117 Khan went on to work as a primary school teacher and as a ‘learning mentor’ for children of immigrant families who had just arrived in Britain.118 ‘Staff described him as gently spoken, endlessly patient, and immensely popular with children who called him their buddy’.119

It would seem that Siddique Khan was adamant about helping disadvantaged immigrant youth and was angered by the perceived lack of opportunities in the British society. These factors clearly show that Khan came from a middle class family, worked a middle class job and didn’t suffer from any sort of poverty. This once again fits into the SES variable and Hoffer’s theory.

As well, elements of perceived relative deprivation (a collective, Muslim immigrant deprivation)

116 BBC News (September 1, 2005), London bomber: Text in full (BBC: UK).
117 BBC News (April 30, 2007), Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan (BBC: UK).
118 McGrory, Evans and Kennedy (July, 2005), Killer in the Classroom, (The Times: UK).
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article543801.ece Retrieved: June 29, 2010
119 Ibid.
also became a grievance of Khan’s. This self and collective victimization would be one more motivational element for Khan’s terrorist activities.

Mohammed Sidique Khan indeed illustrates the presence of the hypothesized independent variables presented in this paper. This brings us even closer to showing correlation between the independent variables and ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism.

**iv.) Bilal Abdullah - Glasgow International Airport Attack:**

On Saturday, June 30, 2007, Bilal Talal Samad Abdullah (pictured left) and Kafeel Ahmed, aka Khalid Ahmed (pictured centre and right) drove a green Jeep Cherokee, loaded with propane tanks, into the glass doors of the Glasgow International Airport.¹²⁰

*Left: Bilal Abdullah, Center: young Kafeel Ahmed, Right: Kafeel Ahmed.*

The plot and execution of the attack included many more people than the two perpetrators. However, this paper will focus on Bilal Abdullah and attempt to illustrate the different independent variables in this classic case of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism.

Bilal Abdullah was born on September 17, 1980 in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire. He was raised in Baghdad, Iraq to a ‘well-known and respected doctor’. Bilal Abdullah went on to study medicine, like his father, at the College of Medicine of Baghdad University. Eventually, Dr. Abdullah worked at the Royal Alexandra Hospital in Paisley as a diabetes specialist. Like his partner in this attack, Kafeel Ahmed, Bilal came from an affluent background, was well-educated and successful, so what would motivate him to attempt a suicide terrorist attack?

‘We knew that Bilal was a religious person. He had a beard, and we used to say that he looked like a Wahhabi’, a colleague of Bilal’s brother was quoted saying. Abdullah also attended Mosque services regularly and was described as a strong believer of Islam. A witness to the attack said on BBC television that one of the car’s occupants had been ablaze from head to foot, and as he struggled with the police, ‘was throwing punches and shouting ‘Allah, Allah’. Shiraz Maher, a former member of the radical group Hizbut-Tahrir who knew Abdulla in Cambridge, stated in a BBC interview that Abdullah regularly praised the acts of Sunni terrorism in Iraq. In one instance, Bilal Abdullah went on to play DVD’s of the execution of infidels in Iraq, quoting

121 Burnett and Rubin (July 2005), Doctor accused in Glasgow attack described as loner angry about Iraq war (The New York Times: USA).
122 BBC News (October 5, 2007), Bomb plot: Arrests and releases (BBC: UK).
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6264230.stm
123 Burnett and Rubin (July 2005), Doctor accused in Glasgow attack described as loner angry about Iraq war (The New York Times: USA).
124 Ibid.
125 Cowell and Bonner (July 2007), 4 Held in Scottish Attack as British See Broader Plot (The New York Times: USA).
126 Burnett and Rubin (July 2005), Doctor accused in Glasgow attack described as loner angry about Iraq war (The New York Times: USA).
sermons by the late insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. With these testimonies, one can infer that religious belief and fanaticism played a role in Bilal Abdullah’s terrorist attack. The attack itself was meant to be a mission of martyrdom and sacrifice, but only Kafeel Ahmed later died of his injuries. Currently, Bilal Abdullah is serving two life sentences for his involvement in the attack, which adds up to at least 32 years in prison.

As we have seen, Bilal Abdullah was the son of a successful doctor and he went on to study medicine himself. Hicham Kwieder, secretary of the Cambridge Muslim Welfare Society and friend of Abdullah’s is quoted of saying, ‘...that a person who is educated would turn to violence — he must have been guided by the wrong person’. Indeed, Abdullah’s SES is one of an upper echelon of society and fits perfectly into the profile presented in this paper. Furthermore, Hoffer’s theory also reinforces this case.

According to Hicham Kwieder, Bilal Abdullah became increasingly angry about the situation in Iraq. The U.S. led invasion of Iraq, including the U.K., started amassing large amounts of civilian deaths and Bilal ‘worried about his parents, friends and family, who he believed should flee the country’. This anger and resentment could be attributed to Abdullah’s feeling of being under attack and yes, persecuted. Shiraz Maher is quoted of saying, ‘...he actively cheered the death of British and American troops. One of his best friends had been killed by Shias’. His fear for his family, fellow Sunni Iraqis and nation as a whole fits into the variable that describes

127 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
‘feelings of persecution/harassment’. Britain’s involvement in Iraq was one facet of Abdullah’s resentment. As well, the element of having a collective grievance against his perceived enemy surely was a strong motivational element for Bilal Abdullah to lash out in the way that he did.

Bilal Abdullah indeed illustrates several of the independent variables presented in this paper. He was a strong believer of Sunni Islam, he belonged to the middle-upper echelons of society and he genuinely felt that his people and religion was targeted by western entities.

v.) Mohammed Bouyeri–The Murder of Danish Cartoonist, Theo Van Gogh:

On November 2, 2004, Theo Van Gogh, modern filmmaker and great-grand nephew of the artist Vincent Van Gogh, was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri in broad daylight.132 ‘I heard Theo van Gogh beg for mercy, ‘...don’t do it, don’t do it,’ he cried. I saw him fall onto the bicycle path. His killer was so calm. That really shocked me. How you can murder a person in such cold blood, right there in the street’? (Eye-witness remarks)133 This was no act of senseless violence or a crime motivated by monetary gain, this was an ideological murder committed by an angry, extreme individual. What were the motivations and characteristics behind Mohammed Bouyeri’s act of terror?

133Ibid.
Mohammed Bouyeri was a second generation Dutch citizen, born to Moroccan immigrants. This seemingly assimilated individual committed the most heinous crime when he shot Theo Van Gogh several times, impaled him with a machete and knife and attempted to decapitate him; this was indeed murder in the first degree and a brutal act of terrorism.

Bouyeri’s radicalization began after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. He began to practice extreme Islam, regularly downloading violent acts of terrorism from the internet, including the killing and beheading of American reporter Daniel Pearl. Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence illustrating Bouyeri’s Islamic extremism was the five page letter he left on the bloody corpse of Van Gogh. In the letter, Bouyeri addresses several key points, which subsequently fall into several of the independent variables presented in this paper.

A key topic in the letter, addressed Van Gogh’s short movie called ‘Fitna’, or ‘Submission’. The movie stars a young Muslim woman, depicting Islam as a violent and persecuting religion. Hirsi Ali, an ex-Muslim, Somali immigrant, Dutch politician, made the film popular by endorsing it and supporting its theme. In his letter, Bouyeri targets Hirsi Ali and describes her as a ‘heretic’ who ‘turned her back on Islam’ and should ‘smash herself into pieces on Islam’. This clearly illustrates Bouyeri’s Islamic extremism and fanatic belief system. As well, this illustrates the variable that defines persecution and feeling of harassment.

---

134 Ibid. p. 2.
135 Ibid. p. 3.
136 Ibid. p. 4.
137 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
138 Ibid. p. 5.
After killing Van Gogh, Bouyeri ensued to engage Dutch police forces with the same gun he used to murder Van Gogh. He was eventually shot and arrested.\footnote{139}

Upon apprehension, a poem Bouyeri had written was found on him after the murder; it was titled ‘Drenched in Blood’.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Drenched in Blood (English translation)}
\begin{quote}
So this is my final word...
Riddled with bullets...
Baptized in blood...
As I had hoped.
I am leaving a message...
For you...the fighter...
The tree of Tawheed is waiting...
Yearning for your blood...
Enter the bargain...
And Allah opens the way...
He gives you the Garden...
Instead of the earthly rubble.
To the enemy I have something to say...
You will surely die...
Wherever in the world you go...
Death is waiting for you...
Chased by the knights of DEATH...
Who paint the streets with Red.
For the hypocrites I have one final word...
Wish DEATH or hold your tongue and ...sit.
Dear brothers and sisters, my end is nigh...
But this certainly does not end the story.
\end{quote}
\end{center}

During his trial, Bouyeri is quoted stating, ‘I take complete responsibility for my actions. I acted purely in the name of my religion’.\footnote{140} The evidence is overwhelming; Mohammed Bouyeri was indeed motivated by radical Islam.

\footnote{139} Browne (July, 2005), Muslim radical confesses to Van Gogh killing in court tirade (The Times: UK). \url{http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece} Retrieved: July 12, 2010
\footnote{140} BBC News (July 12, 2005), Van Gogh suspect confesses guilt (BBC: UK). \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4675421.stm} Retrieved: June 2, 2010
‘Mr. Bouyeri, 27, was a well-educated moderate Muslim who was considered reasonably well integrated’, before he turned to extreme Islam. Bouyeri did not come from poverty; on the contrary, he came from an affluent family and was able to go to university in Diemen. Bouyeri indeed belong in the middle-upper class of society, fulfilling the criteria of the SES variable.

As illustrated earlier, Bouyeri’s actions were motivated by extreme Islam, however, his target was chosen due to the variable which argues that persecution and feelings of harassment/injustice motivate ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorists. Two key elements to the actions perpetrated by Bouyeri were indeed 9/11 and the ensuing invasion of Afghanistan/Iraq and, the Theo van Gogh Movie, ‘Fitna’ (‘Submission’). ‘Seven months before his ritualistic slaughter, van Gogh had produced a film about domestic violence in Islam, which offended many Muslims. Mr. Bouyeri insisted: ‘If I ever get free, I would do it again’. The film fed Bouyeri’s anger and feeling of personal persecution as well as his hunger for personal revenge. Furthermore, the film created a feeling that Islam as a whole was being attacked and furthered Bouyeri’s desire to defend and strike back against [his] ‘persecutors’. Coupling this with the invasion of Muslim lands (Afghanistan and Iraq), by western nations, Mohammad Bouyeri indeed had enough self-justification to commit this murder and act of terror.

Mohammed Bouyeri clearly illustrates several of the variables described in this paper; religious extremism, middle-upper SES and feelings of harassment/persecution.

141 Browne (July, 2005), Muslim radical confesses to Van Gogh killing in court tirade (The Times: UK). [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece) Retrieved: July 12, 2010


143 Ibid. p. 4.

144 Browne (July, 2005), Muslim radical confesses to Van Gogh killing in court tirade (The Times: UK). [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece) Retrieved: July 12, 2010
In his trial, Bouyeri turned to police in the court and said: ‘I shot to kill and be killed. You cannot understand’. With these chilling remarks, there is evidence that Mohammed Bouyeri also intended it to be a suicide mission; that of a martyr for Islam.

vi.) Major Nidal Malik Hasan - Fort Hood Massacre:

Nidal Malik Hasan was born and raised in Arlington County, Virginia to Palestinian immigrants from a town near Jerusalem.\(^{145}\) Hasan grew up as a normal American youth, attending regular public schools. Upon graduating high school, Hasan joined the US Army and for the next eight years he received a bachelor’s degree in biochemistry from Virginia Tech (1995) and went on to study medicine at the Bethesda campus of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in 1997. Hasan graduated in 2003 as a medical doctor.\(^{146}\) From 2003 through the summer of 2008, Hasan was an intern, a resident and then a fellow at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, specializing in psychiatry. He finally transferred to Ft. Hood in the summer of 2009.\(^{147}\) Hasan was an educated, cultured, successful American. His family owned a thriving restaurant and had not suffered from any form of poverty. What could have compelled this

---


\(^{147}\) Ibid.
seemingly born and bred American patriot, who joined the armed forces and swore allegiance to his country, to commit such an act?

Hasan was described by many of his colleagues, and in particular one Imam named Faizul Khan, as a ‘devout and discreet’ Muslim. He attended daily prayer services at the Muslim Community Center in Silver Spring, often coming in his army fatigues. In one conversation, Hasan expressed his frustration to Khan with regards to finding an equally devout Muslim woman to marry. Hasan’s loyalty to Islam was unshakeable. However why did it become extreme, resulting in his attack in Ft. Hood? In June of 2007, Hasan prepared and presented a lecture on ‘The Koranic World View as it Related to Muslims in the US Military’. The presentation was intended to focus on medical issues, but Hasan stunned his colleagues by delivering a lecture on Islam. Hasan described Islam itself, the amount of Muslim soldiers in the US military, but then when onto describing the hardships Muslim face, especially at a time when the US is waging war in two different predominantly Muslim nations. ‘It’s getting harder and harder for Muslims in the service to morally justify being in the military that seems constantly engaged against fellow Muslims’, stated Hasan. He went onto to say that a Fatwa has ‘no conflicting authority’; hence not even the oath taken to protect and serve the United States can supersede a Fatwa. Hasan gave examples of prior Muslim deserters who could not

152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. p. 12.
find balance between their service as an American soldier and their religion, describing their treasonous acts as ‘adverse events’ to the US engagements. He also quoted Koranic versus and how they forbid Muslims from fighting other Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan.

From his power point presentation, we can clearly see his qualms with the US expeditions’ into Muslim lands, fighting and killing his Muslim brethren.

His presentation became more and more radical, citing examples of justified jihad and culminating with recommendations for the Department of Defense, ‘[the] Department of Defense should allow Muslim soldiers the option of being released as “conscientious objectors” to

---

increase troop morale and decrease adverse events". The ‘adverse events’ Hasan was referring to would eventually translate into the Ft. Hood massacre.

This clearly illustrates Hasan’s belief and extreme interpretation of the Koranic texts. It also touches on Hasan’s personal grievance and collective grievance as he viewed US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan as actions against himself and ‘his people’. To give this hypothesized variable even more credence, this paper will examine some of Hasan’s personal experiences with prejudice and racism.

Several reports show that Hasan had suffered from harassment and racism while in the military. A cousin of his was quoted of saying, ‘...he had faced harassment over his “Middle Eastern ethnicity” and had been trying to leave the army’. ‘He had listened to all of that, and he wanted out of the military, and they would not let him leave, even after he offered to repay’, his aunt Noel Hasan said regarding his medical training and time owed to the US military. Hasan’s personal grievances are fairly clear. As this paper has already shown, Hasan opposed US military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it would seem the straw that would break the camel’s back would be his inevitable deployment to the Iraq theatre. ‘We've known over the last five years that was probably his worst nightmare’, his cousin, Nader Hasan was quoted saying. For Hasan, the active employment in a theatre of conflict against other Muslims was not an option.

155 Ibid. p. 51.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
As the investigation continues, more and more evidence is being revealed regarding Major Hasan’s religious extremism, feelings of persecution and resentment/negative feelings towards the US. FBI investigators have also revealed how Hasan praised acts of violence against the US. Furthermore, the relationship between Hasan and his former Imam Anwar al-Awlaki (currently being targeted by US forces) was also exposed. Al-Awlaki was heavily criticized for being the spiritual advisor of at least two of the 9/11 terrorists as well as promoting Jihadist activity on the internet.

A series of e-mails between the two illustrate a frustrated, passionate Muslim in Hasan and a mentor/guide in al-Awlaki. Considering the message that al-Awlaki was promoting and the volume of correspondences between the two men, it is logical to assume that there was more than a mere exchange of information or passing on of spiritual advice. In a February of 2009 online sermon titled “44 Ways to Support Jihad”, al-Awlaki encouraged others to “fight jihad”,

---


161 Ibid.
as well as actively support the Jihadi movement. It is fairly clear that any advice or guidance handed down by al-Awlaki was hardly benign and nonviolent. From this we can extract one element of the globalisation variable; the facilitating powers the internet provided al-Awlaki to help further radicalize Hasan and possibly persuade him to commit such a devastating attack.

Major Nidal Malik Hasan provides us with the quintessential example of a ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorist. Moreover, he also provides us with the serious warning that even seemingly patriotic Americans, who served in their armed forces and swore an oath to defend their way of life, are susceptible to the clutches of religious extremism.

Section IV – Conclusions, Policy Recommendation & Summary:

i.) Conclusions:

This paper began with an assertion claiming that independent variables such as, religious extremism, middle-upper SES, feelings of persecution/harassment, immigration & relative deprivation and the decline of nationalism/globalization are all motivational elements/characteristics of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism. The literature review, expressing the findings and analysis of learned academics, illustrates validity in all of the variables. The case studies section had several mixed results; however most of the independent variables were present in each (Refer to chart below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Religious Extremism</th>
<th>Middle-Upper SES</th>
<th>Feelings of Persecution &amp; Harassment</th>
<th>Immigration &amp; Relative Deprivation</th>
<th>Globalization &amp; Decline of Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case Studies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Wallace-Lawson</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Reid</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Zulique Khan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilal Abdulhassan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Rahmani</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nidal Mohammed</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the case studies several variables stood out. All six of the case studies illustrated how a strong belief in Islam and religious extremism was present in motivating the individuals to commit their acts of terror. As well, all of the case studies showed how the persons analyzed
belonged to a middle-upper socio-economic stratum. Amalgamating the third and fourth variables, feelings of persecution/harassment and immigration & relative deprivation, this paper found that all the cases once again illustrated signs of these variables. Whether it was John Walker Lindh feeling that he must defend Islam by waging holy war in Afghanistan or Mohammed Bouyeri murdering an opinionated filmmaker in the streets of Holland, indeed the individuals presented in this paper illustrated how feelings of persecution/harassment play an integral part in the motivation of ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism. Although immigration had less of a role in characterising ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism, it seemed prudent to amalgamate immigration and feelings of relative deprivation with feelings of harassment/persecution and discovered that together they form a more powerful variable. Finally, globalisation (including the decline of nationalism) as a variable was not present in all of the case studies analyzed, however from the existing data, one can assert that this hypothesized variable can be proven with future research.

In his article, ‘Terrorism in the Name of Religion’, Magnus Ranstorp provides powerful reinforcing words...

‘The accelerated dissolution of traditional links of social and cultural cohesion within and between societies with the current globalization process, combined with the historical legacy and current conditions of political repression, economic inequality and social upheaval common among disparate religious extremist movements, have all led to an increased sense of fragility, instability and unpredictability for the present and the future. Not only do the terrorists feel the need to preserve their religious identity, they also see this time as an opportunity to fundamentally shape their future’.

**ii.) Policy Recommendations:**

Much of the western world has adopted counter-terrorist measures (and at times, counter-insurgency – COIN - tactics/strategies) to combat the problem that ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism poses. However, treating just one nuance of the problem, one ‘symptom’ of the ‘disease’ called radical Islam, will not solve the issue. A reactive policy is inadequate, for obvious reasons as it does little to prevent an attack from occurring. A pre-emptive policy, that targets the capture and incarceration of known terrorists is also inadequate as it is simply continuing the cat and mouse game between extremists/terrorists and security forces. Therefore, a combined policy, amalgamating the current strategy with a counter-radicalisation program is the key. The focus needs to be on subverting the potentially radicalising Muslim population who perceive their neighbours as being ‘menacing hosts’.  

So what can be done? Just as one facet of the problem is correctly identified; ‘the radicalization begins at home and ends at home’, so should the solution. For the UK, initiatives such as CONTEST were a first step to tackling the problem, however inept and inadequate in many ways. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency programs are limited to the doctrines which define them. In order to ‘cure’ this ‘disease’ one needs to create a ‘counter-radicalization’ program. This should include:

- Outreach programs to local communities, set with the task of acknowledging societal issues as well as promoting British solidarity.
- Outreach programs targeting Muslim youth, who at times become radicalized simply to be a part of ‘something special’; a group. Supportive peer groups have been an element

---

163 Mackinlay (2009), p. 201.
164 Ibid.
165 Neumann and Rogers (2009-10), *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, Lesson 12.
in radicalising individuals; hence isolation from peer groups, providing good role models, self-esteem programs, etc, can perhaps counter that.¹⁶⁶

- Engagement of community leaders (political and spiritual) and recruiting [them] to the cause.
- Ideology and religion plays a part in radicalization, hence maybe ideological re-education can help in de-radicalization. As well, de-legitimize the use of violence.¹⁶⁷
- Most importantly, social cohesion initiatives aimed at indoctrinating migrant youth under a British banner.

In essence, many scholars and researchers have found that ‘pull’ factors (as listed above) tend to be much more attractive and effective than ‘push’ factors (e.g. strong counter-terrorist measures including sweeping arrests, prolonged detainment, harsh interrogations, etc). These ideas will demand heavy investment not only by municipal and regional bodies, but by the national government; investing time, energy, resources, manpower and money.

This modest ‘policy recommendation’ section of the paper is but a simple template and broad concept. However, the main idea behind countering what has become a plague in western society, ‘home-grown’ Islamic terrorism, is the idea of counter-radicalisation.

¹⁶⁶ David and Cragin (2009) – Chapter by Darcy M.E. Noricks, p. 299
¹⁶⁸ Ibid.
iii.) Summary:

What are the motivational elements and characteristics of ‘Home-Grown’ Islamic terrorism? That is a question which has no simple answer. Do several of the variables presented in this paper indeed illustrate motivational components or factors of ‘Home-Grown’ Islamic terrorists? Most certainly. However that does not mean that in each specific case one may find variables not encountered in others. In this lays the problem of properly identifying and profiling suspected terrorists, or potential terrorists, in western countries. Part of the inspiration behind this research paper was to perhaps provide a schematic, or outline, in which investigators and intelligence officers may use to profile and identify possible terrorist threats within the western world. As well, by identifying such variables perhaps we can find a way to not only stop terrorist acts from happening by capturing the perpetrators before they reach their target, but to prevent the radicalization of individuals as whole. To possibly identify and eradicate the elements that motivate people to turn to terrorism is better than any tactic which requires combating the already radicalized terrorists. One can only hope that this is the beginning of a state of mind that pursues curing the ‘disease’ called ‘terrorism’ as opposed to fighting the ‘symptoms’ created by terrorism.
Bibliography:


13.) Browne, Anthony (July, 2005), Muslim radical confesses to Van Gogh killing in court tirade (The Times: UK). http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article543212.ece Retrieved: July 12, 2010


16.) CNN Law Center (January 31, 2003), *Reid: 'I am at war with your country', partial transcript of Richard Reid’s trial and sentencing* (CNN: USA).


20.) David, Paul K. and Cragin, Kim (2009), (eds.), *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together* (Rand: Santa Monica, CA, USA).

21.) Democracy Now (July 31, 2009), *Exclusive video interview with Marilyn Walker and Frank Lindh* (USA).

22.) Dogan, Mattei (1998), *The Decline of Traditional Values in Western Europe* (Centre National de la Recherché Scientifique: France).


26.) Hasan, Major Nidal M. (June 2007), *PowerPoint Presentation to Senior Army Doctors in June 2007: The Koranic World View as it Related to Muslims in the US Military* (Distributed by the NEFA Foundation: USA).


35.) Mahan, Sue and Grist, Pamela L (2008), *Terrorism in Perspective* (Sage Publication).
McGrory, Daniel, Evans, Michael and Kennedy, Dominic (July, 2005), *Killer in the Classroom*, (The Times: UK).
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article543801.ece Retrieved: June 29, 2010

37.) Neumann, Dr. Peter R. (2009), Old and New Terrorism (Social Europe Journal)

38.) Neumann, Dr. Peter and Rogers, Dr. Brooke (2009-10), Class Lecture Notes, 7SSWM022 TERRORISM AND COUNTER TERRORISM, Department of War Studies, King’s College London. (London, England: UK).

39.) Pelton, Robert Young (December 2, 2001), Transcript of John Walker interview in Afghanistan (CNN: USA).

40.) Pew Research Center (July, 2006), Muslims in Europe (I.H.T.)


43.) Sabir, Michael (2007), Terrorism a Socio-Economic and Political Phenomenon, (Journal of Management and Social Science, Biztek.)


46.) The Associated Press (December 2008), Doctor gets two life sentences in U.K. bomb plot (AP).


48.) Tyrangiel, Josh (December, 2001), The Taliban Next Door (Time Magazine: USA).
49.) United States District Court of Massachusetts (January 16, 2002), official Indictment of Richard Colvin Reid. (Massachusetts: USA).

50.) Vidino, Lorenzo (December 18, 2009), The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (ARI) (Area: International Terrorism).


52.) Wright, Lawrence (June 2, 2008), the Rebellion Within, the New Yorker. Available at www.newyorker.com or