

A Model of the Islamic State: The Case of Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen

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Introduction

As is known, the paramount aspiration of Global Jihad is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate [Khilafa] in the lands once under the dominion of Islam and its rule of (religious) law [Shari'a] (that is, the Middle East and territories once included in the Ottoman Empire). Once this aspiration has been fulfilled, it will be possible to focus on a second-most important goal: the expansion of the caliphate to additional territories, which are under the control of non-Muslim "infidels". This goal is not unique to the Global Jihad movement; it is shared by additional Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Global Jihad has a different plan of action than do these other movements, a violent, bellicose one exemplified by an aggressive, offensive (as opposed to defensive) Jihad.

"Islamic Emirates" – functioning nation-states under the rule of Islamic law – which have sprung up during the past decade throughout the Middle East (see below), in effect represent an interim stage in the process of realizing this overarching vision of establishing an Islamic caliphate. Abu Saed Al-Amili,¹ a Salafi Jihadist Sheikh who has a notable presence on Jihadist Web forums, sees these Emirates as successful to a certain extent, for having progressed from being part of an ideological movement to actual statehood. In other words, they have made the transition from being part of a narrow organizational framework to becoming ruling powers that control actual territory or territories, which have been forcibly freed from the rule of secular infidels. Al-Amili notes that the viability of such Emirates is dependent on two conditions: (1) ensuring the safety

¹ His precise identity remains a mystery, as he conceals it to ensure his personal safety. Nevertheless, he is quite active in promulgating Jihad on various dedicated Web sites and forums. See "The Jihadi Forums: An Open Forum with Sheikh Abu Saed Al-Amili", *JWVG Insights*, February 6, 2011, http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWVG_Open_Forum_Sheikh_Al-Amili.pdf.

and security of the territory(ies) in question; and (2) enforcing Shari'a [Islamic religious law].² Sheikh Abu Bakr Al-Ghazi Al-Ansari, a Palestinian Salafi Jihadist, concurs that securing the territory is essential to establishing an Islamic Emirate.³

As of this writing, it is possible to identify a number of notable Islamic Emirates or "states". They are listed here, in order of their chronological establishment:

1. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (first established in 1996 by the Taliban. In 2001, the Emirate collapsed following the incursion of Coalition Forces. Nevertheless, the Taliban continue to operate in Afghanistan and to call themselves "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan").
2. The Islamic State of Iraq (established in October 2006).
3. The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan (established in 2006).
4. The Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (established in 2007).
5. The Islamic Emirate of Somalia (established in September 2008; it is described in detail below).
6. According to Rashad Al-Amili, Yemen's Deputy Prime Minister for Security, Al-Qaeda has the express intention of establishing an "Islamic Emirate" in several areas of Yemen.⁴ As of this writing, this intention has been realized in the Abyan region, in southern Yemen, where an Islamic Emirate was established in May, 2011.
7. The Islamic Emirate of the Sahara (established in 2010).

² Al-Amili also cites the conditions that must be met by the emir: "Islam, manliness, maturity, wisdom, justice, talent, wholeness, health [precluding any physical disability that would prevent him from bearing responsibility for the Emirate], and abstinence [from women]". See Abu Saed Al-Amili, "Educational Observations and Guidance: On Questions Relating to the Movements and to Jihad", *Shumukh Al-Islam Network*, February 2010, pp. 30-31 (Arabic).

³ "Answers from an Open Session with Abu Bakr Al-Ghazi Al-Ansari", *Atahadi Forum*, August 2010, p. 23 (Arabic).

⁴ "Senior Yemeni Official: Al-Qaeda Aims to Establish an 'Islamic Emirate'", Sheema Press, December 24, 2009 (Arabic).

8. According to reports in the Saudi Arabian daily *Al-Hayat*, in April 2011 an Islamic Emirate was established in the eastern part of Libya; however, this has not been confirmed by any additional source.

Hizb Al-Tahrir and the Vision of a New Caliphate

Although Global Jihad is endeavoring to establish the infrastructure necessary to the existence of Islamic Emirates, it has been criticized for lacking an orderly outline of the structures and system of government that will be in place, once these Emirates have been established. In other words, to date, Global Jihad has been more concerned with the religious-legal nature of the (hypothetical) Islamic Emirate, than with its actual structure or institutions. In this context, it is worth citing an Islamic movement called Hizb Al-Tahrir ("The Party of Liberation"), which was established in 1953 in East Jerusalem (then under Jordanian rule) by a Palestinian religious leader named Taqi Al-Din Al-Nabhani. This movement set its sights on re-establishing the Islamic caliphate through Da'awa [proselytizing] and political action. It should be stressed that, unlike Al-Qaeda, this movement opposed the use of offensive Jihad or violent acts for political aims, and has denounced their use more than once. Also unlike Al-Qaeda, Hizb Al-Tahrir has devised a detailed, organized model of the institutions of the Islamic state, which can be used as a blueprint once the caliphate has been established.⁵

Hizb Al-Tahrir is composed of a number of hierarchical committees, which are subordinate to a central leadership committee headed by an emir (at present, Ata

⁵ For more on this political party see, *Hizb Al-Tahrir, Second Edition* (Beirut: Dar ul-Ummah, February 2010), <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/files/pdf/TAA%27REEF.pdf> (Arabic); see also Zeyno Baran, *Hizb Ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2004), http://reviewhudson.org/files/publications/Eurasian_TahrirIslamsPoliticalInsurgency.pdf. For specific details on the state institutions of the caliphate, see *The Institutions of State in the Khilafah (In Ruling and Administration)* (Beirut: Dar ul-Ummah, 2005), <http://hizb-america.org/images/documents/pdf/Ajhizah.pdf>.

Ibn Khalil Abu Rashta). A committee of five-ten members headed by a Mu'tamad [regional leader] is established in each state or "province", as the Party calls them.⁶ Hizb Al-Tahrir posits three general stages in the process of working to establish the Islamic caliphate:

1. The acculturation or "culturing" phase, which involves inculcating the Party's beliefs, agenda, and world view among its members.
2. The "interaction" phase, which involves proselytizing and explaining, to society at large, the necessity of establishing the caliphate; it also involves recruiting new members to the Party.
3. The "search for power", which involves using existing power brokers, such as military or security officials, in establishing the caliphate.

Officially (as noted), the Party objects to violence, and proposes achieving its aims peacefully. However, members of the Party's inner sanctum have been known to propose a fourth stage, which may be called the "push" stage to reflect their feeling that a sort of upheaval or uprising may be necessary to effect real change in the locus of power.⁷

The structure of the future caliphate, its institutions and their spheres of responsibility as envisioned by Hizb Al-Tahrir can be divined from the comprehensive description provided in a book issued by the Party: *The Institutions of State in the Khilafah (In Ruling and Administration)*.⁸ Following is a brief explication of the institutions meant to comprise the caliphate, with diagrams excerpted from the book.

⁶ This is because the Party does not acknowledge the legitimacy of existing nation-states.

⁷ See Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (New York: Routledge), pp.268-269.

⁸ *The Institutions of State in the Khilafah (In Ruling and Administration)* (Beirut: Dar ul-Ummah, 2005), <http://hizb-america.org/images/documents/pdf/Ajhizah.pdf>.




Diagram 1: The structure of the caliphate proposed by Hizb Al-Tahrir

Source: http://www.caliphate.co.uk/images/orgchart_caliphate.gif

The Structure of the Caliphate [Khilafah] Envisioned by Hizb Al-Tahrir

The Caliph [Khalifah]

The caliph is the person chosen to head the Umma [Muslim Nation] and rule the caliphate, managing its affairs and enforcing Shari'a [religious law]. In order to compete for this position, the candidate must meet the following seven preconditions:

- a. He must be a Muslim
- b. He must be a man (a woman may not serve as caliph)
- c. He must be an adult (no child may be appointed caliph)
- d. He must be mentally sound
- e. He must have integrity

f. He must be a free man

g. He must be able to carry out the task(s) of the caliph [Khalifah]⁹

However, the Party stresses that the appointment of the caliph is legitimate and sustainable only if the Umma – or, more precisely, the Muslim residents of the caliphate – swear fealty [Bay'a] to the intended caliph.

The delegated assistants/assistant caliphs [Mu'awin Al-Tafwid]

The assistants are Wazirs, who with the caliph bear the burden of administering the caliphate; they are meant to lighten the caliph's load. The assistant caliphs are appointed personally by the caliph himself. In order to be appointed to this position, the assistant caliphs must meet the same seven criteria required of the caliph, listed above.

The executive assistants/cabinet secretaries [Mu'awin Al-Tanfeedh]

These are also Wazirs appointed by the caliph to help him implement his rules and regulations. Their authority is limited to management of the administrative affairs of the caliphate, as ordered by the caliph; they have no authority to make policy decisions, appoint government officials, and the like. In fact, the executive assistants mediate between the caliph and the various departments of the caliphate, and between the caliph and the military and the citizenry. Following is a diagram showing how the executive assistants link the caliph to the caliphate's offices and citizens.

⁹ Cf. the list of attributes necessary for the emir cited by Al-Amili, footnote 2 above.




Diagram 2: The division of power in the caliphate

Governors [Wulah]

A governor [Wali, plural Wulah] is appointed by the caliph to govern and control each of the provinces [Wilaya] within the territory of the caliphate. The provinces themselves are subdivided into regions [‘Imala], which are further subdivided into administrative divisions, each of which is known as a metropolis [Qasbah]. These in turn are subdivided into smaller administrative units known as quarters [Hayy]. Like the caliph and his assistants, the governors must meet the seven criteria listed above. Following is a diagram of how the governors interact with other functionaries in the caliphate.




Diagram 3: The functioning of the governor within the caliphate

The Emir of Jihad: The war department

The war department is one of the caliphate's ministries, and is headed by an emir of Jihad. However, it should be stressed that the caliph himself is considered to be the commander in chief of the army. The war department is meant to be responsible for matters concerning the armed forces, equipment, armaments, military tasks and so forth. The army of the caliphate is charged with preparations for war, military training, development of weapons and the like. The army itself is divided into two sections: reserves and regulars, who will receive a salary from the state. The following diagram shows a breakdown of the military in the caliphate.




Diagram 4: The structure of the caliphate's military

The department of internal security

This department is responsible for internal security in the caliphate, and is headed by a director of internal security. The department is to be represented by an "internal security section" in each and every province, headed by a "police commissioner" [Sahib Al-Shurtah], who will be under the command of the governor (see Diagram 3 above). The police force will serve as the primary tool for maintaining internal security; for example, it will be responsible for quelling rebellion against the state, and for redressing damage to state or personal property. Following is a diagram of the police force within the caliphate, its hierarchy and responsibilities.




Diagram 5: The structure and functioning of the police force in the caliphate

The department of foreign affairs

This department is responsible for managing the caliphate's foreign relations, including concluding and signing treaties and agreements, overseeing cease-fires, appointing ambassadors, establishing embassies and consuls, and the like.

Following is a diagram of this ministry's structure.




Diagram 6: The department of foreign affairs

The department of industry

This department is responsible for all of the issues related to industry and commerce, including heavy industry such as building cars, engines, electrical equipment and so forth, as described in the diagram below.




Diagram 7: The department of industry

The judiciary

The justice system in the caliphate is responsible for resolving all disputes among citizens, as well as for maintaining law and order. In order to be appointed a judge, an individual must fulfill the same seven conditions required of a caliph (see above). The judiciary will be organized as is detailed in the following diagram.




Diagram 8: The judiciary

Departments of public affairs

Within the caliphate, these various departments will constitute the administrative system, whose purpose will be to ease daily life for citizens – in education, health, employment, transportation, agriculture and other institutions with which an individual is likely to come into contact during the course of his life. The heads of each of the various departments report back to the caliph, as the following diagram shows.




Diagram 9: Departments of public affairs

The state treasury [Bayt Al-Mal]

The state treasury is responsible for collecting and managing the income and revenue of the caliphate, and reports directly to the caliph himself. The state treasury [Bayt Al-Mal] is divided into two parts, one of which handles revenue, and the other of which handles expenditure. These are further subdivided into bureaus [Diwan], as follows:

Revenue

- Diwan [bureau] of spoils and Kharaj (land and property taxes): spoils and booty acquired by the caliphate through war and appropriation; land and property taxes; Jizyah [a tax levied on non-Muslim citizens of the caliphate],¹⁰ other personal taxes.
- Diwan of public property: taxes and income from oil, gas, electricity, minerals, seas, rivers, lakes, springs, forests, pastures and protected lands.
- Diwan of Sadaqah: Zakah [charitable tithe mandated by Islam] in money and in kind (e.g., merchandise, harvest and fruits, camels, cows and sheep).

¹⁰ Non-Muslim citizens of the caliphate, particularly "People of the Book" as defined in the Qur'an [Jews and Christians], may be considered under the protection of Islam and the caliph if they fulfill several conditions, one of which is paying a per capita tax [Jizyah] to the Islamic state. These are the so-called "protected peoples", or Ahl Al-Dhimma. – trans.

Expenditure

The section of the state treasury responsible for expenditures is further subdivided into eight bureaus [Diwan], each of which is responsible for a different type of expenditure, as follows: the "Khilafah House" (the seat of government); state services; grants; war [Jihad]; charity [Sadaqah.]; the maintenance of public property; emergencies; and the general budget, including general accounting and scrutiny. The structure of the state treasury is shown in the diagram below.




Diagram 10: The state treasury

The department of information [I'lam]

This department is the most important in the caliphate, as it is central to Da'awa [propagation of Islam]. It is subdivided into two main divisions: a government information office responsible for information related to the military and security, including peace agreements, military victories and all other information pertaining to the caliphate; and a government media department, responsible for all other types of news and information (see Diagram 11).




Diagram 11: The department of information

Council of the Muslim nation [Majlis Al-Umma]

The Council of the Umma [Muslim Nation] is composed of officials elected by the citizens of the caliphate, who are meant to represent the Muslim citizens. In addition, the caliph will consult with the Council on various matters. Non-Muslim citizens will also be eligible to be elected to the Council. The Council is invested with a great deal of authority, including for acting as state comptroller in reviewing the caliph's functioning in economic and foreign matters, for example.

The Council may also decide to limit the number of candidates for caliph. The following diagram displays the interaction of the Council of the Muslim Nation with the caliph and other state officials.




Diagram 12: The organization and functioning of the Council of the Muslim Nation

Subsequent to this brief overview of the structure of the future caliphate as conceived by Hizb Al-Tahrir, the following section will examine the Islamic Emirate of Somalia, an actual Islamic state established by the Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen Movement – one of the most visible Salafi-Jihadist groups active in Somalia. According to Al-Qaeda, with which Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen is associated, the Islamic Emirate of Somalia should serve as an ideal model for the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. To assess the underpinnings of the Islamic Emirate of Somalia, in light of the Hizb Al-Tahrir model presented above, this

article will review the booklet, "A Real, Living Model of the State Envisioned by Al-Qaeda", in which Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen presents its world view, and what it regards as the correct way to implement an Islamic state – as is exemplified, in theory and in practice, in the Islamic Emirate of Somalia under its control.

Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen: Background


In effect, the roots of the Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen Movement were planted in the late 1990s, when this group split off from a Somali Salafi group known as "The Islamic Union". With the end of the bloody civil war in Somalia (1991-1998), the various rival factions, including the "Islamic Union", agreed to lay down their arms. However, the young guard of the "Islamic Union" – especially those Mujahideen who were returning to Somalia from Afghanistan – took issue with this decision, and firmly refused to disarm. Ultimately, the young leadership broke away from the "Islamic Union" and established a new organization, which they named "Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen". During the first years of its existence, the new movement concentrated on recruitment and training, and avoided entering into conflict with other players in the Somali arena. At that time, Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen (hereafter, Al-Shabab) also joined the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an umbrella organization of Shari'a [religious law] courts in Somalia, and became entrenched among its institutions. Al-Shabab came to prominence in 2005, when the ICU took over southern Somalia. However, in 2007, with the encouragement of the UN, the ICU's leader, Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, who is currently serving as Somalia's president, initiated negotiations with the Somali government. Disagreeing with this move, Al-Shabab split off from the ICU. On September 12, 2008, the leaders of Al-Shabab declared the establishment of the "Islamic Emirate of Somalia" in the south of the country.

The Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen Movement is identified with the ideology of Al-Qaeda, and maintains relations of one kind or another with that organization. In an audio tape that Al-Shabab made public on September 22, 2009, its members swore loyalty to Osama Bin Laden. On January 1, 2010, Al-Shabab expressed its support for "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" [the arm of Al-Qaeda operating in Yemen]. **Mukhtar Rubo** – one of Al-Shabab's senior leaders – declared publicly that his Movement's fighters were "...willing to cross the Red Sea to help our brothers in Yemen in their war against the enemies of Allah...". These examples are a good indication of the relationship between Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda and its offshoots.

Since its unification with additional Islamist factions in Somalia, such as Ras Kamboni, and the arrival in Somalia of some 1,200-1,500 foreign troops as reinforcements, Al-Shabab has been getting stronger. Moreover – or perhaps consequently – Al-Shabab has captured large swaths of southern Somalia, reaching even to the outskirts of Mogadishu, the capital. It has succeeded in establishing judicial institutions in the areas under its control and using them to enforce Shari'a and maintain order and peace. Its success in eliminating the tribal militias that were wont to pillage the local population, has also boosted its popularity.¹¹

¹¹ Ali Khalani, "Al-Qaeda's Arm in the Horn of Africa", *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, August 13, 2010, <http://www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=582171&issueno=11581> (Arabic).

“A Real, Living Model of the State Envisioned by Al-Qaeda”



The cover of the booklet “A Real, Living Model of the State Envisioned by Al-Qaeda”

Background: Appropriate or deviant? Al-Qaeda in the sources

In April 2010, the Jihadist propaganda center “Da’awat Al-Haqq Lil-Dirasat Wal-Buhuth”, which is under the auspices of Al-Shabab, published a booklet titled “A Real, Living Model of the State Envisioned by Al-Qaeda” on various Web forums.¹² As indicated by its title and stressed in its content, this booklet presents the state established by Al-Shabab as an ideal model of the future Islamic caliphate.

In the introduction to the booklet, Al-Shabab heaps praise on Al-Qaeda for having succeeded, more than any other Islamic movement, in overcoming an extensive campaign of persecution, led by the “Jewish-Crusader front” and marked by

¹² April 11, 2010, <http://www.atahadi.com/vb/showthread.php?t=17219> (Arabic).

murder, incarceration, and a propaganda war aimed at the organization's delegitimization. Moreover, Al-Qaeda has had to cope with "collaborators" – that is, Arab rulers and the biased Ulamaa [Supreme Islamic Council for Sunni Islam, engaged in adjudication, interpretation, and promulgation] – which, according to Al-Shabab, **are not loath to use any means to oppose Al-Qaeda**, including holding seminars, conferences, lectures, and radio and television programs.¹³

It is worth noting that Al-Shabab justifies Al-Qaeda's activities, which it feels are supported by Islamic sources, and rejects the claims of detractors that Al-Qaeda's path is strewn with murder and hasty denunciation of other Muslims as Takfiris [infidels]. According to Al-Shabab, serious study of the history of Islam and the life of the Prophet Muhammad reveals that Al-Qaeda actually closely follows the path of the Prophet – the path that Allah has outlined for His followers. From Al-Shabab's perspective, there is a clear equivalence between the activities of Al-Qaeda and those of the disciples of the Prophet [Al-Sahaba], who with their tribes and families fought the enemies of Islam under the leadership of the Caliph Abu-Bakr the Righteous. Thus, for example, the first followers of Islam waged a simultaneous, dual campaign against the two enemies of Islam: "the near enemy" – that is, Muslims who had left the faith [Muratadun], and "the distant enemy", that is, the (infidel) Persians and Byzantines. Although these wars cost many lives – "...more than 85% of them died outside of Mecca and Al-Madina, that is, in Jihad, conquests, killings and war..." – in the end the Muslims were able to establish an Islamic state, just as is happening today. According to Al-Shabab, study of the Qur'an reveals a large number of verses stating the principle of the oneness and uniqueness of God [Tawhid], followed by the

¹³ In particular, the booklet cites the documentary program, "The Industry of Death", which is aired on *Al-Arabiya* satellite television. Each episode of this program is devoted to a different aspect of Global Jihad.

commandment [to wage] Jihad. In the eyes of Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda succeeds in upholding and exemplifying these two principles.

Al-Shabab also justifies Al-Qaeda's activity in the lands of the "distant enemy" – that is, the "Crusader enemy" (e.g., the United States, Great Britain) and the Jewish enemy. It claims that the Prophet Muhammad himself used catapults to hurl ballistics at the distant settlement of Al-Taif – without considering whether its inhabitants were adults or children, armed or unarmed – and, similarly, led the slaughter of the 700 members of the Jewish tribe Quraytha. In other words, the leadership of Al-Shabab justifies the use of terrorism even against civilians, all of whom it perceives as being enemies of the Muslim Nation [Umma]. Al-Shabab also justifies warfare against the "near enemy", citing the opposition, during the early centuries of Islam, of the first Muslims to the tyranny of Muslim rulers and, in the 7th century CE, the Ulamaa's [supreme Islamic council] objections to the rule of Ali Al-Hajjaj [a Muslim leader infamous for his cruelty to his subjects]. By citing these examples, the leadership of Al-Shabab is in effect telling the contemporary Ulamaa to imitate its predecessor.

According to the booklet, a caliphate cannot be established peacefully or by signing agreements with other nations, but rather will only arise through bloody conflict; here, too, Al-Shabab cites historic examples such as the Seljuk Empire, the Mamluke dominion, the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, all of which were born in violence. Furthermore, the only way the Muslim Nation will enjoy a cultural flowering, according to Al-Shabab, is if the Islamic caliphate is established through Jihad and murder – precisely as happened in Andalusia, or in the Abbasid Empire under Caliph Harun Al-Rashid. Al-Shabab also cites the bloodstained genesis of Western states such as the Roman Empire, France and the United Kingdom. It then asks why men of

education, culture and philosophy, why nationalists and others decry Al-Qaeda's path – as it is, after all, no different from that of any other nation.

The Islamic state envisioned by Al-Qaeda: The case of Somalia

It is in this context that the leadership of Al-Shabab expresses sincere satisfaction at having established a living, realistic model of an Islamic state like the one envisioned by Al-Qaeda, despite all obstacles. A section of the booklet titled, "And on that Day the Believers Will Rejoice", is devoted to describing the characteristics of the Islamic state in Somalia, which in essence embodies Al-Qaeda's aspirations.

According to the leadership of Al-Shabab, American President George Bush Jr.'s campaign to punish Islamic lands for the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was a failure, in part thanks to the staunch resistance encountered in Somalia, which led the Muslim Nation in its opposition to this onslaught – for example in The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative¹⁴ undertaken by the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).¹⁵ As American bombs rained down on the nascent Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Somali people felt great pain and suffering, because they, like the Afghans, are an organic, inseparable part of the Muslim Nation. Moreover, the tough stand taken by the Taliban in Tora Bora inspired "the young men of Islam [with] a spirit of dedication and sacrifice". According to Al-Shabab, the US was so afraid that another Taliban Emirate might be established, that it had no choice but to seek the assistance of Christian

¹⁴ For further information about this Initiative see: <http://www.linkagesproject.org/media/publications/world%20linkages/worldghai.pdf>

¹⁵The United States Africa Command, also known as AFRICOM, is the US military headquarters devoted solely to Africa. It is one of the Defense Department's six regional headquarters. Africa Command was created following an internal reorganization of the US military command structure, which led to the establishment of one administrative headquarters responsible to the US Secretary of Defense for military relations with 53 African countries. For more on AFRICOM, see <http://www.africom.mil/AfricomFAQs.asp>.

Ethiopia – assistance that proved futile, as the Mujahideen gained the upper hand in the war against Ethiopia and its allies.

The leadership of Al-Shabab further stresses that its success is measured by, and dependent on, the extent of adherence to its principles. Despite real difficulties, Al-Shabab claims to have succeeded in never wavering from the principles underlying the hoped-for Islamic state. These principles will be explicated in the following section.

“A real, living model of the state envisioned by Al-Qaeda”: Excerpts and explications

The following section presents excerpts from the booklet compiled by Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen about the Islamic Emirate of Somalia and its ideological and procedural likeness to the Islamic caliphate envisioned by Al-Qaeda.

The path and the promise

1. “Our aspiration remains to please God by fulfilling the promise of unification [Tawhid] emblazoned on our banner, by proclaiming God’s oneness and uniqueness in our worship, and by inspiring [others] to follow Allah’s messenger.”
2. “We still aim to smash the edifice of Ridda [renunciation of the Muslim religion], overthrowing those secular regimes where people work for people [rather than for Allah’s sake] and fashioning an Islamic regime from their ruins. Then we will cause people to worship their Lord by enforcing Islamic Shari’a [religious law] and making it mandatory.”
3. “We yet strive with all our being to unite the Muslim Nation [Umma], despite differences of [skin] color and language, under the banner: ‘There is no God

but God and Muhammad is his messenger'. [We] understand [the injunction on] this banner to give rise to both enmity and friendship, and to an obligation to assist the weak throughout the land and strive for good to eliminate suffering and help the oppressed."

4. "We still believe that we are part of worldwide Jihad, which demands solidarity, assistance and counsel. Moreover, the unity of our ranks is most crucial, for the promise of oneness and uniqueness [Tawhid]..."
5. "We yet endeavor to regain the oppressed Islamic lands, the Holy Lands chief among them. We hereby promise Allah that we will regain them, whether as a Movement, as a State, or as soldiers of the caliphate."

Obedience, not innovation

According to the leaders of Al-Shabab, the Mujahideen cleave to the truth, propagating Islam and proselytizing in a way that is faithful to the sources:

1. **Da'awa original to Allah:** that is, Da'awa [proselytizing] that is immune to external influences and is not self-righteous.
2. **A broad interpretation of Al-Hisbah [a practical realization of the Qur'anic injunctions to do good and avoid what is prohibited by Islamic law]:** That is, "...promotion of virtue [if the people abandon it] and prevention of vice when it is committed. Allah has opened a wide door through which we must meet this responsibility to protect society from immorality and guide it towards inspiration. For the first time in contemporary Islamic history, a specific army has been formed to watch over [the] cities and towns, while the Hisbah Army protects the Islamic lands from aggressors on the battlefields". Thus, "the hope of our Muslim Nation, to live under the rule of Islam, has been fulfilled".

3. **Jihad for Allah:** According to the leadership of Al-Shabab, martyrdom has taken root in society, and is bearing sweet fruit.

Victory and sovereignty

Sovereignty is a gift from heaven, made possible thanks to the will of Allah. Since Shari'a [religious law] subsumes the interests of both this world and the next, Allah has enabled us to discern things, found only in the source texts. For example:

Eliminating polytheism: The Mujahideen must continue the work inherited from Ibrahim [Abraham]: that is, to smash all idols and uproot all idolatry, such as veneration of the dead.

Delineating borders: This will bring security to Somalia in a way not seen in the past. Today, the eight Islamic regions of Somalia enjoy safety and stability.

Revitalizing the commandment of charity [Sadaqa], which has been languishing for decades: This involves taking charity from the rich and distributing it to the poor. This restores social balance and eliminates class distinctions. By insisting on the commandment to tithe [Zakat], [Somalia] has been able to leave the World Food Organization, which claimed, after it was banished, that it had reduced the number of poor in the country. Social solidarity makes it possible to maintain the practice of charity.

Exiling infidel organizations: These organizations, active in [Somalia] since colonialism, had actually been running the country from behind the scenes. They "...led [the country] to poverty in the name of wealth, to licentiousness in the name of progress, to sickness in the name of health, to ignorance in the name of education and to oppression in the name of peace and security. In this they made bright their goals until the longed-for day came, when the truth was revealed and

people were given back their rights. These organizations have been banished without a tear...".

Islamic jurisprudence and the office of the ombudsman: For decades Muslims were disadvantaged because of the laws of men, invalid tribal laws, bribery and corruption. But with the ascendance of Shari'a [religious law], the situation has changed and oppression has been eliminated. The people wish to be judged according to Shari'a; they even come from areas ruled by the government – which has gone astray – to be tried in Mogadishu under Shari'a.

Islamic identity: The collapse of regimes of Rida [apostates, Muslims no longer considered Muslims because of their actions], the failure of Crusader programs, and the coming of those who acknowledge the oneness of God, have all helped put society back on the straight path. The Arabic language [the language of the Qur'an] has risen to a higher status, "...it has become the official language in the public schools, in the institutions, and in the military camps of the Mujahideen...".

The banner and the goal: One negative manifestation of colonialism, one of its deleterious influences on the people of this country, has been the tying of their loyalty to the despot's flag as determined in the Sykes-Picot agreement. Ever since then, countless wars have erupted because of this flag. But the Mujahideen have come and made the people aware, they have convinced the residents of Somalia that their loyalty should be to the banner of monotheism that unites the Muslims of the world. The banner of monotheism is the goal toward which we must strive.

The oath of the tribes: For a long time, the tribes were accustomed to forming alliances among themselves. With the coming of the Mujahideen, the tribes have all united around the Qur'an that the Mujahideen have brought [back] to them, and their relations with the Mujahideen and with each other have, as a result,

grown stronger. The Mujahideen and the tribes have even cooperated [in the fight] against highway robbers. Because of their [new] unity, most of the tribes are loyal to the Mujahideen, as proven by their willingness to fight those who oppose Shari'a [religious law]. "In accordance with [this] oath of loyalty, these tribes have given the bulk of their heavy arms to the Mujahideen..."

They would extinguish the light of Allah with their words: According to the leaders of Al-Shabab, all of these achievements may be lost to the people, because of the enemy's propaganda, which obscures and distorts [such achievements] in its effort to "fight the Mujahideen from the [television] screens and microphones". But the Jihadi propaganda has no difficulty combating this mendacity.

Allah refuses to let them extinguish His light: According to the leaders of Al-Shabab, one can already see signs of the collapse of the Crusader campaign – for example, the hollow threats of the infidel government of Somalia, located four kilometers away from the Islamic Emirate of Somalia. In Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Arabian Peninsula, in Nigeria and in other arenas of Jihad, among the ranks of the enemy the signs of defeat are visible, as are the signs that power will be removed from their hands and returned to the people.

In summary, the leadership of Al-Shabab reiterates the obligation to follow the path of Allah and raise the banner of monotheism over all the Islamic lands.¹⁶

¹⁶ Da'awat Al-Haqq Lil-Dirasat Wal-Buhuth, "A Real, Living Model of the State Envisioned by Al-Qaeda", April 2010 (Arabic).

Summary

This examination of the components of the model state envisioned by Al-Qaeda, as that is perceived by the leaders of Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen, reveals that, in the main, attention is focused on aspects of statehood such as the definition of Islamic identity and the assurance of safety for the residents of the Islamic Emirate. Yet this alone is insufficient. Other, no less important aspects of statehood – chiefly the delineation of the sovereign state's territorial borders – are glossed over or ignored. Perhaps this oversight may be explained by the Al-Shabab Movement's ambition of expanding to additional territory. Nevertheless, Al-Shabab's concentration on religious doctrine and security needs indicates a failure of thought, and hints at difficulty proposing a real, organized and logical plan for all components of the Islamic state.

Consequently, it seems that this is a preliminary attempt to describe the model of the Islamic state, based on the existing Islamic Emirate of Somalia. Thus, this booklet does not represent the development of a clear, coherent structural model of an Islamic caliphate, as it claims to, but rather an attempt to extrapolate from the reality in Somalia the principles underpinning the idea of the caliphate. Moreover, it is important to note that the dialog surrounding this model has not gained in intensity, and also has yet to be authorized by – or even to have gained serious attention from – senior Al-Qaeda officials. This suggests that Al-Qaeda has an under- developed philosophical and ideological framework for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, its institutions, and its functioning. In light of the detailed, coherent model of the caliphate proposed and propagated by Hizb Al-Tahrir, this would seem to point to a true weakness in Al-Qaeda.