The Italian approach to de-radicalization

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Abstract
Following the Western intervention in the Middle East, the Islamic State (IS) has been subjected to repeated military defeats. The Western victories on the field paradoxically but inevitably increase the risk of terrorism in Europe, which in the last year has been the preferred target of the Caliphate’s propaganda apparatus. IS invites its Western supporters to attack in the West rather than trying to join the jihadi forces in Syria and Iraq. Addressees of this message are all the supporters and sympathizers of the jihadist ideology residing in the Old Continent, which in the last years has been increasingly shaken by episodes related to transnational terrorism. In such a scenario, the ability of European states to fight radicalization becomes crucial, because it represents the only chance to win the war at home.

These days, among the European countries, Italy is considered exceptional for its low level of radicalization, and all the indicators estimating the phenomenon confirm it: the country has not yet suffered any attack, the number of foreign fighters is significantly lower than in other states, as well as the number of returnees. Yet, some key factors determining “the Italian advantage” in terms of radicalization are about to fade away, especially because the second generation of Muslims in the country is coming of age; among this new generation, the few who will turn radical represent a serious threat. This awareness is leading the Italian authorities to discuss and develop “an Italian approach to prevent radicalization”.

The purpose of this research is to analyze in detail the elements that up to now have determined the success of the Italian model in the prevention of radicalization, and provide food for thought in order to preserve, or at least prolong, the “Italian exceptionalism”. Furthermore, the analysis of these factors can provide useful indications to other countries, as well as to the European cooperation strategies aimed at curbing the problem.

This paper focuses on all the measures, even those not strictly connected to counterterrorism law, concerning radicalization in Italy. After a first chapter devoted to the evaluation of all the aspects

1 Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, Fear Thy Neighbor, Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West, ISPI, 2017.
3 Ibid.
4 Alessandro Boncio, Defeat of ISIS and Returning Foreign Fighters: the Italian Case (Disfatta ISIS e Foreign Fighters di Ritorno: il Caso Italiano), ISPI, 2017.
5 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
characterizing the radicalization phenomenon, the second will focus on the immigration management, concluding that tensions emerge between the measures aimed at repressing and those preventing radicalization; this conflict will inevitably lead the legislator to favor one of the two strategies. Subsequent chapters will deal respectively with the legal tools to repress jihadist extremism and those, elaborated and not yet adopted, to prevent it. This analysis will include the recently adopted counterterrorism laws, but also the constitutional laws concerning freedom of worship, the Immigration Law Code, the dialogue of Italian institutions with Islamic associations, the draft law for the fight against jihadist extremism and some de-radicalization projects implemented by civil society organizations.

The conclusions will reveal the imbalance of the Italian system in favor of repressive measures, but also the need to preserve the effectiveness of this system in the short term, in order to elaborate and test a strategy that guarantees to adequately contain extremism with a long-term social action. In particular, the analysis will focus on the "preventive expulsions" tool provisioned in the Consolidated Law on Immigration. This tool seems to have the potential to curb radicalization all over Europe if effectively implemented; yet, this potential effectiveness is currently undermined by an insufficient cooperation among the European member states. Finally, this paper will highlight that the Italian delay in defining a radicalization prevention approach represents an opportunity not to repeat those mistakes made by other European countries in the implementation of integration models and in the dialogue with the Islamic communities.
Introduction

In recent times, most European countries have experienced a significant increase in radicalization levels\(^7\). The Old continent has become the preferred target of IS propaganda, especially after the numerous defeats it has been subjected following the Western intervention in the Middle East. Consequently, most of the European countries are taking different approaches in attempting to ensure their national security. Among these, in the last decade, de-radicalization programs are on the rise almost everywhere as tools aimed at reducing the threat of domestic attacks, which are usually perpetrated by homegrown terrorists\(^8\). The focus of such programs is preventing individuals from adopting radical and pro-violent ideologies in the first place, as well as de-radicalizing and disengaging existing radicals\(^9\).

Among the European countries, Italy is one of the few in which a comprehensive de-radicalization strategy has neither yet been adopted nor experimented. It is true that, so far, the country’s radicalization level has been among the lowest in Europe. This has led several experts to speak about the Italian “advantage”\(^10\) or “exceptionalism”\(^11\), in terms of jihadi extremism. Yet, several indicators suggest that this advantage is deemed to fade away quickly\(^12\). Also the latest annual report to Parliament of the Italian intelligence community, published on February 20\(^{th}\) 2018, warned the authorities: “The terrorist threat remains current and concrete, not just as a result of the important role that our country has always occupied in the jihadi imaginary and narrative, but also for the presence on the national territory of individuals who are radicalized or otherwise exposed to radicalization processes”\(^13\). In the light of this risk, on January 26\(^{th}\) 2016, Stefano Dambruoso and Andrea Manciulli, two parliament representatives, presented a draft law focused on radicalization.

After almost two years, the bill has not yet been passed and jihadi extremism in the country is still considered a marginal problem with respect to the governmental priorities, despite the increasing number of warnings and alerts issued by the intelligence and experts’ communities.

The purpose of this paper is analyzing the issue of radicalization and de-radicalization in Italy from a very broad perspective, to assess if there is a real urgency for implementing measures aimed at

\(^7\) Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, *Fear Thy Neighbor*.


\(^9\) Ibid.

\(^10\) Lorenzo Vidino, Interview with the Author.

\(^11\) Michele Groppi, *The Terror Threat to Italy*.

\(^12\) Ibid.

countering extremism in the country, assessing challenges, opportunities and possible food for thought for the counter-radicalization programs already adopted in other countries.

The first part of this research analyses in detail the radicalization status in Italy, including a description of both violent and ideological radicalization, as well as of the main jihadi extremism’s hotbeds, in order to identify the factors that so far have determined the Italian “advantage” in terms of radicalization and to assess which are the better tools to keep this advantage in the future.

The second chapter will deal with the issue of Muslim immigration in Italy, including the legal tools provisioned by the country’s legislation, both directly and indirectly, affecting the status of radicalization. To do so, the author will go through a brief historical and sociological analysis of the Muslim immigration in Italy, as well as through the integration policies adopted so far and through the ongoing heated political debate about the criteria for granting citizenship to the immigrants.

The third chapter will provide a picture of the complex regulatory system in force into the country affecting the issue of radicalization. These tools include Constitutional laws determining the relationship between the Italian authorities and the different religious entities, counterterrorism laws, as well immigration laws. The author will try to identify both strengths and weaknesses of this system, as well as the threats that it is not able to tackle.

The forth and last section of this research will be more specifically dedicated to the actual issue of preventing radicalization in the country. An analysis of the draft law provisioning “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism” will be followed by a description of the dialogue that from the early 2000s is taking place between the Italian authorities and the Islam representatives. Then, after a brief analysis of the few governmental and civil society experiments aimed at preventing and countering radicalization, the author will try to define the peculiarity of the embryonic Italian approach to “countering violent extremism” and to evaluate the challenges and the opportunities of such approach.

The intent of the author is providing useful directions to the Italian authorities in the eventual implementation of a counter-radicalization strategy in the country, as well as identifying key elements which could provide food for thoughts for other countries and for implementing more effective cooperation measures among the European member states.
The status of radicalization in Italy

So far, the level of jihadi terrorist threat in Italy has been significantly lower than in other European countries. Despite the already historical 2014 statement in which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of IS, addressed directly Italy, menacing the conquest of Rome, and despite the more recent intimidations following the Barcelona’s attack, Italy has not yet experienced any major jihadi terrorist attack. Indeed, leading indicators of radicalization, like the number of foreign fighters and the number of conspiracies to attack the country, reveal that violent Islamist extremism in Italy is not yet severe such as in other European countries. However, there are evidences that this “Italian Exceptionalism”, or “Italian Advantage” in terms of radicalization, is rapidly diminishing, because a second generation of migrants is emerging. Indeed, the Italian authorities have already noticed a shift toward forms of homegrown radicalization, which have is roots in two main places, the web and the prison system. In light of this change of scene, it is important to assess the situation of radicalization in Italy and to single out the factors that have determined so far the lower level of radicalization compared to other European countries, as well as the elements on which working to avoid the rapid increase of extremism in the country.

Therefore, the first section of this chapter will deal with the situation of violent radicalization in Italy, the second one will analyze the level of ideological radicalization and the third will treat the main hubs of extremism in the country. Finally, the conclusions will synthetize the key factors behind the “Italian Advantage” in terms of extremism and the new tools aimed at preventing further radicalization in the future.

Violent radicalization

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14 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy; Lorenzo Vidino, The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy: Rise in Homegrown Radicals, CTC Sentinel, November the 26th 2013.
17 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
18 Lorenzo Vidino, Interview with the Author.
19 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
20 Lorenzo Vidino, The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy.
With regard to violent radicalization (where emphasis is put on the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goals\textsuperscript{21}), key indicators such as the number of perpetrated and thwarted plots, the number of foreign fighters and the number of returnees registered so far, suggest that the phenomenon is minor if compared to other European Countries. First, as stated above, since the emergence of the Islamic State, several jihadi leaders have repeatedly threatened Italy, but the country has never suffered any severe consequence from that so far. Indeed, in July 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audiotape inciting the followers “you will conquer Rome and own the world, if Allah wills”\textsuperscript{22}. Again, on September 21\textsuperscript{st} of the same year, the IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani promised: “With Allah’s permission, we will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women”\textsuperscript{23}. Then, in February 2015, the Islamic State released a video of the beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts on a Libyan beach, when one of the fighters warned on camera: “We are here, south of Rome. Soon we will conquer Rome with God’s will”\textsuperscript{24}. The same year, a videotape especially subtitled in Italian language was published. It threatened: “You have declared war on me with the misbelieving alliance ... the more you will fight, the more you will suffer”\textsuperscript{25}. The latter was a clear warning to Italian authorities, which were just offering logistical support to US airstrikes in Libya, not to deepen their involvement in the fight against IS. In addition, after the March 2016 Brussels’ bombing\textsuperscript{26} and the August 2017 Barcelona’s attack, Italy has been pointed as the possible next target. Yet, so far, Italy has not experienced any major terrorist attack. The only partially successful attack occurred in 2009 in Milan at the Santa Barbara Carabinieri’s Station when Mohammed Game attempted to detonate a rudimental device, but only he and a guard were ultimately injured\textsuperscript{27}. Since 9/11, 20 terrorist plots have been thwarted, very few of them were at an advanced stage, and none of the attacks caused fatalities\textsuperscript{28}. The most well-known among them included the 2001 Al-Qaeda-inspired failed chemical attack on the American embassy in Rome, which planned to release cyanide concealed in tomato cans into the building’s vent system; the 2005 Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat-inspired plot to crash a


\textsuperscript{22} Damien McElroy, “Rome will be conquered next, says leader of Islamic State”.

\textsuperscript{23} Robert Spencer, Islamic State: “We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah”, Jihad Watch, September the 21\textsuperscript{st} 2014. Available at: https://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/09/islamic-state-we-will-conquer-your-rome-break-your-crosses-and-enslave-your-women-by-the-permission-of-allah

\textsuperscript{24} Michele Groppi, \textit{The Terror Threat to Italy}.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Jack Moore, “ISIS identifies London, Berlin and Rome as next targets in a new video”, Newsweek, April the 5\textsuperscript{th} 2016. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/ISIS-identifies-london-berlin-and-rome-next-targets-new-video-444220

\textsuperscript{27} Michele Groppi, \textit{The Terror Threat to Italy}.

\textsuperscript{28} Michele Groppi, “Dossier on Italian Islamic Community: radicalization index” (“Dossier sulla comunità islamica italiana: indice di radicalizzazione.”), CEMISS, 2015.
ship filled with explosives in Naples’ port; the 2006 plot by a cell associated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to strike Bologna’s Dome and Milan’s subway; the 2012 Islamic State in Iraq-inspired plot by Mohammed Jarmoune to target Milan’s Jewish Synagogue; the 2016 Islamic State-inspired plan by Moutaharrik Abderrahim to carry out a suicide bombing operation at the Vatican; the 2016 plot by two Afghan citizens to attack the Colosseum and the Circus Maximus in Rome; and the 2017 Islamic State-inspired plan to attack Venice’s Rialto Bridge. The number of terrorist plots targeting Italy has been relatively low considering the large presence of jihadi activities in the country. Indeed, from the last two decades, there has been a large presence of jihadi activities on the Italian soil ranging from terrorism fundraising to counterfeiting documents, from intelligence gathering to recruitment. However, most of these activities were conducted to support terrorist operations perpetrated abroad. According to Lorenzo Vidino, one of the reasons why the conspiracies against Italy itself have been that scarce is that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates mainly used Italy as a logistical platform. However, this explanation was more solid fifteen years ago than today, because from the early 2000s, also Italy has experienced a significant rise in homegrown jihadi activities: thus, small clusters and lone actors with homegrown characteristics are increasingly active and the Internet is their main operational platform. The emergence of homegrown jihadi activities has neither caused a decrease in the traditional networks’ ones, nor an overlapping of the two. On the contrary, traditional and new networks coexist without cooperating, especially because Al-Qaeda’s affiliates and linked groups distrust the new militants. This shift in the nature of jihadi presence in Italy could be also one key reason for the raising amount of Italian foreign fighters leaving the country to fight abroad.

The number of foreign fighters is the second crucial indicator for the level of violent extremism affecting the country. Before the recent wave of departures to Syria and Iraq, a few dozen foreign fighters had left Italy for theaters of jihad in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Iraq following the breakout of the war in 2003. Instead, according to the Italian Interior Ministry, between 2011 and 2014, 87 foreign fighters fled the country to fight in Syria and Iraq. Since then, the increase in
departures accelerated and the number of foreign fighters has been estimated to be 122 in May 2017, 125 in the middle of the summer 2017 and 129 in June 2018. Despite the phenomenon’s rapid increase, the number of foreign fighters leaving Italy is very small when compared to the other Western European countries, like Germany (910), France (1910), United Kingdom (850) and Belgium (478). It has also been suggested that non-Italian recruitment networks operating within Italy predominantly characterize the foreign fighters’ phenomenon in the country. Indeed, the Italian Defense Minister noted that, out of the 87 people who left Italy to fight abroad between 2011 and 2014, only twelve had Italian passports and only six hold another (dual) nationality. Yet, as noticed by Alessandro Boncio, another fifteen of them fit the category of sociological citizens (legally permanent residents raised in a country, who absorbed the local culture, values and social perception of events) and, in addition, another 67 fighter are workers or students with a temporary residence certificate, whose radicalization process took place largely within the country. The important element, in substance, is socialization and not citizenship, because Italy current legislation does not automatically give citizenship to individuals born on Italian soil if at least one of their parents is not Italian (and it is difficult to obtain naturalization). Therefore, despite the fact that just a small number of the foreign fighters departed from Italy has Italian passport, those who have the right to come back and those who radicalized in Italy are a lot more.

38 Ibid.
40 Lorenzo Vidino, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon”, Press Conference in Palazzo Chigi, January the 5th 2017.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
It has to be noticed that according to the Italian Anti-Mafia and Counter-terrorism Directorate, the number of departures is deemed to decrease as a consequence of the Islamic State’s retreat in Iraq and Syria. Nonetheless, the Directorate still considers them as a severe threat. In fact, on one side, IS is less able to organize the departures from Western countries for new foreign fighters, but on the other side the terrorist organization is inciting its followers to perpetrate attacks in the West. Therefore, the counter-terrorism alert has to stay high, in particular with reference to those individuals who are coming back from the Islamic State territories. Indeed, according to Italian authorities, “foreign fighters and returnees represent a threat to national security due to their complete acceptance of extremist ideology and the experience they acquired in conflict zones,” which may lead them to continue the jihad “by either taking action, by radicalizing other militants, or by establishing recruitment networks for the Syria-Iraq battlefield.” So far, out of the 129 Italian foreign fighters, 22 have already come back to Europe and, out of them 13 have come back to Italy itself. Also, the number of Italian returnees is significantly lower than in other European countries like Germany (300), United Kingdom (425) and France (271). Yet many more Italian foreign fighters are expected to come back soon and, in addition, many returnees directed to other countries could come back to Europe through Italy, especially if they have been already identified in their own countries and therefore they travel under fake documents.

In conclusion, the main violent radicalization’s indicators suggest that so far Italy has been less affected by the threat of violent extremism than other European countries. Indeed, the numbers of terrorist conspiracies against the country, the number of foreign fighters who fled to join the Islamic State and the number of returnees are significantly lower than the ones registered in other European countries. Yet, the threat that jihadi extremism poses to the national security cannot be underestimated for four main reasons: First, the country registers a significant presence of jihadi activities; second, since the early 2000s a significant number of homegrown jihadi activities have emerged; third, the Islamic State is increasingly encouraging its followers to perpetrate attacks in

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51Ibid.
52Ibid.
54Ibid.
55Alessandro Boncio, Defeat of ISIS and Returning Foreign Fighters; Richard Barret, “Beyond the Caliphate.
56Richard Barret, “Beyond the Caliphate.
57Alessandro Boncio, Defeat of ISIS and Returning Foreign Fighters.
Western countries; finally, in the way back to Europe of the European foreign fighters, the passage through Italy is one of the most likely, especially for those coming back under fake identities\textsuperscript{58}.

**Ideological radicalization**

Ideological radicalization, in the context of this paper, must be intended as “a growing readiness to pursue and support far reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order\textsuperscript{59}”. It is important to underline that this definition refers to a “broader sense of radicalization, where emphasis is placed on the active pursuit or acceptance of far reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger for democracy [...] to attain the stated goals\textsuperscript{60}”. Moreover, despite the fact that several scholars have argued that the influence of ideological radicalization cannot be overrated because violent and non-violent radicals pursue the same antidemocratic objectives with different means\textsuperscript{61}, it is necessary to bear in mind that “being a terrorist is a crime, being a radical is not\textsuperscript{62}”. With this in mind, it is possible to deal with ideological radicalization in Italy.

Measuring the level of ideological radicalization is not an easy task. According to Italian counter-terrorism officials, radicalization is not as significant a problem in Italy as in some other European countries\textsuperscript{63}. Also, anecdotal evidence seems to confirm this assessment: Italian Muslims have been often unanimous in their condemnation of violence and terrorism in the name of Islam and the country has never experienced the unofficial establishment of sharia patrols by local Muslims, nor Islamist extremists burning of American and Israeli flags in front of their respective embassies\textsuperscript{64}. Indeed, 81% out of the almost two million of Italian Muslims claim to love Italy and its culture\textsuperscript{65}. Yet, a recent statistical survey conducted by Michele Groppi reveals that out of 440 subjects surveyed between November 2015 and August 2016, 24% stated violence in the defense of Islam is justifiable, 10% endorsed Al-Qaeda, 13% supported the Islamic State, and almost 30% agreed with the duty to

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\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{59} Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know*, Routledge, 2010.

\textsuperscript{60} Randy Borum, *Radicalization Into Violent Extremism*.


\textsuperscript{63} Michele Groppi, *The Terror Threat to Italy*.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
punish whomever insults Islam and its sacred tenets\textsuperscript{66}. In addition and more significantly, 50% of the Groppi’s sample agreed that theocratic rule is better than democracy\textsuperscript{67}. The author of this paper, analyzing the reasons behind this radicalization, has not found any significant statistical support for theories proposing discrimination, economic disparity, outrage at Western foreign policy, oppression of Muslims, traumatic experiences, or any standard sociological variable as indicators\textsuperscript{68}. On the contrary, the main reason for accepting violence centered on the notion of a religious duty to defend oppress fellow Muslims, in particular those of Syria in particular and the Middle East in general\textsuperscript{69}. However, it has to be stated that racism and perceived inequality are among the reasons leading individuals toward radicalization and they seem to play an increasing role, especially among the Muslim immigrants’ communities. Indeed, 51% of Groppi’s sample feel discriminated for being Muslims, 64% stated they have no voice, 82% believe there is a media war to discredit Islam\textsuperscript{70}. The just mentioned feelings, match perfectly Lorenzo Vidino’s notion of “integration”, more difficult to assess than socio-economic integration but arguably more important. Vidino defines “integration” as “the sense of a feeling of belonging to a certain society, irrespective of one’s socio-economic conditions\textsuperscript{71}”. According to him, this kind of integration appears to be a more determining factor for radicalization. Indeed, many European Muslims who become radicalized are individuals who are confused about their identity and find their sense of belonging in a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam rather than in their European citizenship\textsuperscript{72}.

A more recent statistical investigation conducted by the IPR Marketing, an institute specialized in market researches and public opinion surveys, has revealed that there is not a standard profile for the Italian Muslim migrants with regard to integration\textsuperscript{73}. Indeed, the perceived integration varies significantly according to the age: the most among the youngest feel or at least would like to be part of the Italian society, while the oldest are neither interested in integration\textsuperscript{74}. Thus, among the elder people (over 54 years old), only 3% affirms to feel integrated and 70% do not only perceive

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Lorenzo Vidino, \textit{Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy}.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Muslims in Italy: the exclusive survey of Ipr Marketing (Musulmani in Italia, il sondaggio esclusivo di Ipr Marketing, Quotidiano Nazionale)}, 19th of September 2017. Available at: \url{http://www.quotidiano.net/cronaca/foto/musulmani-italia-1_3407045; http://www.analisidifesa.it/2017/09/musulmani-in-italia-il-sondaggio-di-ipr-marketing/}.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
themselves as not integrated into the Italian society, but also have no intention or desire to work for it. The results are very different for the young migrants: 45% of them feels to be part of the Italian society, and the rest is equally divided between those who want to integrate and those who do not\textsuperscript{75}. The same is true for the migrants declaring to have Italian friends; they are 61% among the youngest, and only the 19% among the over 54 years old\textsuperscript{76}. Yet the most worrying results are those emerging from the questions dealing with terrorism and Jihadism. The 28% understands the reasons of the terrorists (58% among people over 54 years old), only 1% of them agree on the use of weapons (but the 8% chose not to answer the question) and 64% condemns terrorism\textsuperscript{77}. 33% of the interviewed thinks that Islam should conquer the West (47% of the over 54 years old and 31% of the youngest), and 38% would like religiously ruled politics (the percentage rises to 53% among the over 54 years old, and 19% of the interviewed decided not to answer the question)\textsuperscript{78}. Overall, 6 Muslim migrants out of 10 have declared not to perceive themselves as integrated, and the most concerning result is that one third out of them does not want to integrate, while 28% would like to do so but is not able\textsuperscript{79}.

In conclusion, both surveys demonstrate that so far, ideological radicalization in Italy in the form of support for violence seems to affect only a statistically marginal segment of the local Muslim population. Most of the Italian Muslims seems to appreciate the country and its culture. Yet, half of them express a preference for theocratic rule over democracy. In addition, a growing number of them feel to be excluded not because of their socio-economic condition, but because of the religion they practice. This lacking feeling of belonging to the Italian society has to be seriously taken in consideration as a driving factor for further radicalization in the near future.

The Italian radicalization hubs

As in many other European countries, in Italy the main places in which radicalization begins are the mosques, the Internet and the prisons; yet, the mosques seems to play a little role compared to others European countries, while the web and the prisons are the places in which the most of Italian radicals begun and still begins the path toward extremism.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
First, it seems apparent that Italian jihadist scene has few connections to mosques, even if sometimes and somewhere jihadi-inspired activities have been tolerated. The main controversial mosque is with no doubt the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan that the United States Treasury Department shortly after 9/11 labeled as “the main Al-Qaeda station house in Europe used to facilitate the movement of weapons, men and money across the world.” Indeed, this institute from 1995 has been subjected to several investigations and raids by the Italian authorities. In addition, some international radical Imams like the Bosnian Bilal Bosnic and the Italo-Australian Musa di Cerantonio preached in Italy between 2011 and 2012, before being arrested on charges of terrorism. The phenomenon of radical preaching occasionally continues to take place in Italy. Indeed, between 2001 and 2015, 9 radical Imams have been expelled from the country and, from January 2015 to September 2016, 12 more have been forced to leave Italy. Despite these events and the fact that according to the Italian counterterrorism intelligence there are 108 mosques that can be categorized as radical, most of the Italian Muslim worship places have, in the words of Claudio Galzerano, a dean of the Italian counterterrorism community, the “right antibodies” screening out bad apples from the start. Indeed, the less permissive environment and the closer surveillance of the last decade have put an end to the era of openly jihadist mosques in Italy, forcing their jihadist networks to operate more discretely. More interestingly, there are few or no contacts between radical Italian mosques and the nascent homegrown scene. The main reason for this lack of cooperation seems to be the fact that the traditional jihadist groups have a risk adverse attitude. On the contrary, the homegrown activists are more incline to express openly their opinions online attracting the attention of the authorities; moreover, the traditional networks are un receptive of the newcomers, especially Italian converts, because they suspect that among them there are

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80 Ibid.
81 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
83 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
85 “Country Security: the Imam of Treviso has been expelled” (“Sicurezza dello Stato: espulso imam di Treviso”), Ministero dell’Interno (Ministry of Interior), 2016. Available at: http://www.interno.gov.it/it/attualita/sicurezza-anno-espulso-imam-treviso
87 Lorenzo Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
infiltrators and spies\textsuperscript{90}. Therefore, there seems to be no overlapping between the traditional and the homegrown jihadist networks, while in other European countries they use to cooperate or even merge\textsuperscript{91}. In conclusion, the path toward radicalization in Italy is, in the words of Lorenzo Vidino, “little mosques and a lot of Internet”\textsuperscript{92}.

The second, not in order of importance, Italian radicalization hub is the web. Indeed, Internet is the main tool to get in touch with the jihadist ideology, to know more details about it, to interact with individuals who are either on the same process of radicalization or are already radicalized\textsuperscript{93}. Moreover, once the individual has decided to act, either to travel to a conflict area or to plan an attack, Internet is the best tool to look for operational support\textsuperscript{94}. A clear evidence of this is that Internet played the main role in the radicalization processes of two of the most known Italian foreign fighters, Giuliano del Nevo and Annas el-Abboubi\textsuperscript{95}. In addition, the Internet somewhat compensates for the lack of a developed homegrown jihadist scene on Italian territory\textsuperscript{96}. Lorenzo Vidino describes the Jihadist Italian online community as “small but active”\textsuperscript{97}. He and his team monitored the public Facebook profiles of 200 individuals identified as relevant, from August 2013 to January 2014\textsuperscript{98}. All of them are connected to each other on Facebook and are interested in some of the most conservative fringes of Salafism and jihadism. Not all of them have to be considered as dangerous, because many just invoke extreme violence online but are unlikely to engage in any kind of similar activity in real life. Yet, some of them occasionally make the leap into physical action, even without real-life interactions with other militants\textsuperscript{99}, as the above-mentioned foreign fighters. Therefore, despite the fact that the Italian Jihadist online community is significantly smaller than the corresponding scene in countries like Great Britain, the Netherlands or Germany\textsuperscript{100}, the Italian counterterrorism authorities are increasingly concerned with the jihadist online propaganda. Indeed, the most critical terrorist threat to Italy is precisely the one resulting from online self-

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} “Toward an Italian approach for preventing radicalization.”
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Giulia Conci, The role of the Internet in European Foreign Fighters’ radicalization processes (Il ruolo di Internet nei processi di radicalizzazione dei foreign fighters Europei), CeSI, 2016. Available at: https://www.cesi-italia.org/index.php?page=articoli&id=554&ln=en
\textsuperscript{96} Lorenzo Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
indoctrination and training of homegrown individuals. In particular, due to the increasing difficulties in reaching the Syrian-Iraqi territories, there is the concrete risk that some of these Italian online jihadists decide not to leave the country, but to perpetrate terrorist attacks on the Italian soil. In this regard, what emerged from the police operation 2016 “Terre Vaste” is illustrative: among the six individuals arrested on charge of terrorist association, there was a foreigner who, on behalf of IS, contacted many jihadist sympathizers on the Italian soil inciting them to act in Italy instead of joining the IS forces in Syria and Iraq. To sum up, the fact that the Italian Jihadist online community is quite new and small does not mean that the level of the threat has to be underestimated.

The last, but not least, Italian radicalization hub is the prison system. The prison institutions are the main physical places of radicalization in Italy. According to the DAP (the Italian Prison Service), a total of 375 prisoners are at risk of radicalization: 170 out of them are subjected to special monitoring, 80 are receiving a special attention and 125 have been reported as radicals. Despite the fact that the criteria of the just mentioned categorization are not clear, it is evident that the number of detainees at risk of radicalization is high, especially when compared to the number of people detained because of terrorism related activities. In addition, after the 2016 Brussels and Nice attacks, several prisoners in different prisons broke out into manifested exultation. The latter event has raised particular concerns about the potential threat emerging from these resentments after the detainees’ release. These concerns have then been confirmed by the fact that Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the December 2016 Berlin truck-attack who killed 12 people and injured 48 more, started is radicalization process in an Italian prison in Agrigento where he reportedly attacked another prisoner telling him “I will behead you because you are Christian”.

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
In conclusion, in Italy the most crucial radicalization hubs are two: one is virtual, the web, and one is a physical space, the prison. Despite the fact that Italy seems to have an advantage in terms of radicalization in comparison to other European countries, it is evident that in the last ten years this gap has been reducing. Indeed, the embryonic jihadist Italian community has been growing on the web, especially on some social networks, and in the prison system because some of the latest antiterrorism operations in Italy have been conducted against individuals who radicalized entirely, or at least largely, in prison. It is difficult to predict how the autochthonous jihadist scene will develop and if it will fill the gap with the other European countries, for example growing in size and sophistication. There are too many endogenous and exogenous elements that can affect these dynamics. Yet it is clear that the efforts aimed at preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism must focus on the Internet and on the Prison System.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Italy seems to have an “advantage” compared to other central and northern European countries in terms of radicalization. This is true not only with regard to violent radicalization, but also for ideological radicalization. Furthermore, all the traditional places in which the radicalization processes begin, namely the mosques, the Internet and the Prison System, are crucial also on the Italian scene, but still they are not that active as in other European countries. Nevertheless, on the Italian territory there are some small-scale dynamics replicating those of other northern European countries and that suggests that this “advantage” is rapidly diminishing even if it is difficult to predict if, when and how the Italian jihadist scene will align itself to the rest of Europe.

There are several reasons determining the “Italian Advantage” in terms of radicalization. Many of them are difficult to measure; as stated by Mister Daniele Moro, the Executive Director of the US-Italy Global Affairs Forum, southern Italy is geographically and culturally close to the MENA region, and consequently the Muslims living there have less issues of integration than those living in other countries.

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109 Lorenzo Vidino, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon”, Press Conference in Palazzo Chigi, January the 5th 2017.
108 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Paolo Gentiloni, Italian Prime Minister, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon”, Press Conference in Palazzo Chigi, January the 5th 2017.
112 Lorenzo Vidino, Interview with the Author.
113 “Toward an Italian approach for preventing radicalization.”
114 Ibid.
European countries. Moreover, during the ICT’s World Summit on Counterterrorism in Israel, Moro suggested that both the Catholic Church and the Italian Carabinieri have a widespread presence on the Italian soil and work everyday with the local communities, so that they collect detailed intelligence enabling the Italian authorities to have a good grip of the situation at local level. Finally, according to Moro, the fact that southern Italy is under the control of the mafia makes difficult the access to weapons to eventual terrorists.

Yet, there are also more measurable factors that have determined so far the Italian advantage in terms of radicalization, and it is possible to enumerate them as well those elements on which it is important to work to avoid a too rapid diminishing of the Italian “Exceptionalism”. Three seems to be the main reasons guaranteeing Italy a lower level of radicalization: first of all, the Italian Counterterrorism system that is with no doubt the most decisive factor. Indeed, Italian repressive tools against terrorism are considerably effective: the Italian juridical system was already prepared to terrorism both because of the previous experience with the 70s Red Brigades’ terrorism and because of the fact that in the immigration laws there is an expulsion system that is useful to eliminate those individuals who could infect the community. Secondly, there is an element linked to demography and sociology: in Italy, because of the migratory flows’ timing, there are not yet a lot of second generation individuals, who are those most subjected to radicalization’s appeal. The last element is the capability of the local Islamic Communities that, with some exceptions, seem to have good antibodies to fight against radicalization. In addition, the Italian parliament has recently approved a law aimed at preventing and countering radicalization to fill the legal vacuum affecting Italy that, till some months ago, was one of the few European countries in which measures aimed at preventing extremism had not yet been established and experimented.

To sum up, the explanation for the “Italian Advantage” in terms of radicalization can be so far traced back both to the more recent migration flows toward Italy (compared to Northern European countries) and to the effective repressive legal tools in the hand of the Italian counterterrorism authorities. Whereas, the ability to keep this “Radicalization Exceptionalism” in the future seems

115 Daniele Moro, Speech on Global Migration, ICT’s Annual Conference, World Summit on Counterterrorism, 2017.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
119 Lorenzo Vidino, Interview with the Author.
120 Ibid.
121 Lorenzo Vidino, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon.
122 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
to lie in the success of the recently established legal tools aimed at preventing radicalization. Therefore, in the next chapters each of these elements will be deeply analyzed to give a comprehensive picture of the Italian approach to de-radicalization.

The delayed Muslims’ immigration: tensions between prevention and repression of radicalization

As already stated in the previous chapter, one of the main factors contributing to the “Italian Advantage” in terms of radicalization is an element linked to demography and sociology, that is a more recent Muslim immigration to Italy compared to other northern and western European countries. Indeed, a significant influx of Muslim immigrants into Italy started only in the 1980s and peaked in the 1990s, while in other European countries such as Great Britain and Germany it begun between the 1950s and 1960s. As a consequence, in Italy there are not yet significant numbers of second-generation individuals who are those most subjected to radicalization’s appeal. This advantage is rapidly diminishing both because a second generation of Muslim immigrants is maturing precisely in the last years and because the influx of Muslim immigrants into Italy is increasing considerably. Yet, according to the Italian Interior Minister, Marco Minniti, there is still time to take advantage from the current situation with regard to preventing radicalization: indeed, Italy is lucky to be able to deal contemporary with integration and de-radicalization, so that the work on these issues will not be only for the security forces but also for the civil society itself.

Today, out of 2 million and 520 thousands Muslims residing in Italy, the 57% does not have Italian citizenship, while Italian citizens constitute the remaining 43%; in addition, there are 170 thousands irregular Muslim immigrants (the 40% of the total irregular immigrants). The higher number of non-citizens and irregular immigrants is typical of the Italian experience of Muslim immigration in comparison with that of other European countries. Italian citizenship laws are very strict and, while obtaining work and residency permits is not very difficult, in many cases even

123 Lorenzo Vidino, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon.
125 Lorenzo Vidino, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon.
126 Marco Minniti, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon”, Press Conference in Palazzo Chigi, January the 5th 2017.
127 Fabrizio Ciocca, “How many are the Muslims in Italy? Statistics analysis and prospects” (“Quanti sono i Musulmani in Italia? Statistiche, analisi e proiezioni”), LeNius, 22nd of August 2017. Available at: https://www.lenius.it/musulmani/
immigrants who have lived in the country for decades cannot obtain Italian citizenship\textsuperscript{129}. Indeed, Italy’s current legislation does not automatically give citizenship to individuals born on Italian soil if at least one of their parents is not Italian\textsuperscript{130}. With regard to radicalization, this situation creates a conflict between integration, as a preventive tool for jihadi extremism, and the availability of the preventive expulsion, as a repressive tool against radicalized individuals. Indeed, on one side, among second-generation immigrants, the most does not have Italian citizenship and is, therefore, liable to be expelled in case of terrorism involvement\textsuperscript{131}. On the other side, the fact that they are not citizens impedes them from enjoying a full-fledged integration, consequently increasing the risk of radicalization.

The just mentioned tension is the basis of a heated and intense debate in Italy concerning both the model of integration that has to be adopted and the criteria for the attribution of citizenship. Thus, this chapter will deal, first of all, with the history and the figures of Muslim immigration into Italy and the consequences on the jihadist scene of the country; secondly, it will explore the challenge to choose a model for the integration of the Muslim population; thirdly, it will illustrate the ongoing political debate on the \textit{ius soli} (citizenship birthright) in the light of the terrorist threat. Finally, conclusions will highly the reasons behind the necessity to implement an effective strategy to prevent radicalization in order to avoid the spread of jihadi extremism, already experienced by other European countries such as France and United Kingdom.

**Absence of a significant second generation of Muslims in Italy**

The first phase of Islamic history in Italy took place in 827 when the Arab forces led by Asan ibn al-Furat landed on the Sicilian coast and then conquered large part of today’s southern Italy. This chapter finished between the end of 12\textsuperscript{th} and the beginning of 13\textsuperscript{th} century, “as popular insurrections, Norman troops, and Fredrick II forced the Arabs out of the region\textsuperscript{132}”. In the 1950s and 1960s, when countries like France, United Kingdom and Germany were experiencing the first wave of Muslim immigration, Italy was still a country of emigrants looking for their fortune abroad and the Muslim presence in the country was limited to a few individuals, some of them were diplomatic personnel from Muslim countries, other businessmen and also some students\textsuperscript{133}. The

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} Lorenzo Vidino, \textit{Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy}.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} Lorenzo Vidino, \textit{Islam, Islamism and Jihadism in Italy}.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
number of Muslims increased significantly only in the 80s when many immigrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa started to choose Italy as initial or final destination in their migration to Europe. In the year 2000, the number of Muslim immigrants was 600,000. In the following 7 years the number almost doubled and then continued to increase steadily: so they were 1,149,938 in 2007, 1,292,000 in 2008, and 1,354,901 in 2009. Today the number of Muslim immigrants residing in Italy is 2,520,000, accounting for the 4% of the Italian population. This means that in the last 7 years the number almost doubled. This dramatic increase of Muslim presence is largely the result of the recent immigration influx that has affected Italy more than every other European country. The most numerous communities are the Moroccans (28%), the Albanians (15%), the Bengalese (7%), the Pakistanis (7%) and the Egyptians (7%).

Despite its extraordinarily rapid increase, the Muslim presence in Italy is still very young and, therefore, it has not yet produced a large number of second-generation Muslim immigrants. According to the Council of Europe, the definition of second-generation migrants makes reference to the children of migrants, therefore, those who were born in the country to where their parents moved, as well as those underage children who migrated with their families, and also those who reached their parents following a family reunification procedure. In accordance with this definition, it has been estimated that Italy hosts only the 5.1% of all the second-generation immigrants (not only Muslims) residing in Europe; this rate is significantly lower compared to the 30.7% of France, the 20.5% of the United Kingdom and the 15.3% of Germany. And the Italian rate is even lower considering that the second-generation immigrants constitute the 2.4% of the Italian population. These data are significant with regard to the radicalization problem. Indeed, despite the fact that there is no standard profile for the European terrorists, belonging to the second generation of Muslim immigrants is one of the most recurrent characteristics of those linked to radical networks. According to Olivier Roy, the typical European radical is a young, second-

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134 Ibid.
135 Flavio Bini, “In Italy 1,300,000 Muslims deemed to double in 2030” (“In Italia 1,300.000 musulmani destinati a raddoppiare nel 2030”), La Repubblica, 2011. Available at: http://inchieste.repubblica.it/it/repubblica/rep-it/2011/08/29/news/scheda_islam_italia
136 Ibid.
137 Fabrizio Ciocca, “How many are the Muslims in Italy?”
138 Ibid.
137 Fabrizio Ciocca, “How many are the Muslims in Italy?”
138 Ibid.
139 Abis Analysis and Strategy (Abis Analisi e Strategia), “G2: a proud generation”.
140 The countries with more migrants with respect to the natives (“I paesi con più migranti rispetto ai nativi”), Truenumbers, 2017. Available at: http://www.truenumbers.it/quantisono-immigrati-seconda-generazione/
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
generation immigrant or convert, very often involved in episodes of petty crime, with practically no religious education, but having a rapid and recent trajectory of conversion/reconversion, more often in the framework of a group of friends or over the internet than in the context of a mosque. Indeed, 60% of the European jihadists belong to the second-generation immigrants. Therefore, the absence of a significant number of them in Italy seems to be a crucial factor determining the lower level of radicalization compared to other European countries.

Yet, this advantage is rapidly diminishing: the available data demonstrate that the number of the second generation is swiftly increasing. Indeed, the Italian Education Ministry has estimated that the primary and secondary school’s students with a nationality different from the Italian one are the 9,2% of the total students’ population. Among them the 60% was born in Italy: therefore, the second generations account for, at least, the 5,4% of the Italian students’ population. From 2011/2012 to 2015/2016 they increased by 43,2%; and just in the last year, their number raised by 6,2% (+28,093). These figures represent a double challenge for the Italian authorities: one is the challenge of radicalization; the second is the one of integration.

With regard to radicalization, the raising number of second-generation immigrants residing in Italy seems to go hand in hand with the emergence of homegrown terrorism. In 2012 the phenomenon of homegrown jihadism, long visible in other European countries, started emerging also in Italy, albeit on a significantly smaller scale, and the Italian intelligence community warned the Italian Parliament about the presence of individuals “belonging to the second generation of immigrants and Italian converts who are characterized by an uncompromising interpretation of Islam and attitudes of intolerance towards Western customs”. The problem is deemed to increase because today the first relatively large second generation of immigrants is coming of age, as the sons of the first immigrants are becoming adults. Despite only an insignificant percentage out of them is

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144 Olivier Roy, ISIS Generation. Who are the young people who choose the caliphate and the reasons why the fight against the West (Generazione ISIS. Chi sono i giovani che scelgono il califfato e perché combattono l’Occidente), Milano, Mondadori, 2017.
145 “Foreign students, 6 out of 10 were born in Italy. Fedeli: ‘Schools and universities are the motor of integration’” (“Alunni e alunni stranieri, 6 su 10 sono nati in Italia. Fedeli: ‘Scuola e università motore dell’integrazione’.”), Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, 2017. Available at: http://hubmiur.pubblica.istruzione.it/web/ministero/focus300317
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Lorenzo Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
embracing violence, those who do so “are relevant to policymakers”\textsuperscript{153} and it is extremely important that the Italian authorities are able to identify the threat. Yet, despite the above-mentioned increasing number of second-generation students in the country, so far the identification of eventual radicalization cases among them has been left to the spontaneous and intuitive initiatives of the teachers. Thus, the last ministerial policy aimed at dealing with immigration in school is the 2014 document “School guidelines for receiving and integrating immigrants”, in which the problem of radicalization is not mentioned at all\textsuperscript{154}. In the light of this vacuum, the Italian Chamber has recently approved a draft law on “Measures aimed at Preventing Radicalization and Jihadist Violent Extremism”. A large section of this draft is dedicated to “School Preventive Interventions”\textsuperscript{155}, but the law is still waiting for the approval from the Senate and is not yet into force.

The second challenge that Italy has to face dealing with the raising number of second-generation immigrants is the one of integration. Indeed, the lack of perceived integration is one of the key factors triggering the radicalization processes in many second-generation individuals. Today, Italy is still working on the adoption of a comprehensive integration model, because the policies adopted so far came as urgent measures to manage each of the several immigration’s influxes to which the country has been and is still subjected. For example, on September the 29\textsuperscript{th} 2017, the Ministry of Interior approved a “National plan for the integration of the beneficiaries of international protection”\textsuperscript{156}. Yet, this plan does not affect all the refugees residing in Italy, but only 74 thousands of them\textsuperscript{157}. Similar plans have been adopted also in the previous years and several other initiatives have been implemented by the local administrations and the civil society\textsuperscript{158}. Consequently, the Italian legislation on integration is highly fragmented and the country still lacks a coherent governance model. Yet, this delay could be turned into an opportunity. Indeed, according to several scholars, there is room to develop a completely new model of integration, learning from the

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} Guidelines for receiving and integrating foreign students (Linee guida per l’accoglienza e l’integrazione degli alunni stranieri), Ministero dell’istruzione dell’Università e della Ricerca (Ministry of Education university and Research, 2014. Available at: http://www.istruzione.it/allegati/2014/linee_guida_integrazione_alunni_stranieri.pdf

\textsuperscript{155} Chambers of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati), Law Draft n. 3558-A (Proposta di legge n. 3558-A). Available at: https://gallery.mailchimp.com/3cb1edae0527e03c3ed2db91e/files/9981f8dc-7334-478d-8a90-c301469b5a48/17PDLO0050830_TESTO_c_3558a.pdf

\textsuperscript{156} “Migrants, exclusive: the full text of the national integration plan” (“Migranti, esclusivo: il testo completo del piano nazionale per l'integrazione”), Quotidiano Nazionale, 26th of September 2017. Available at: http://www.quotidiano.net/cronaca/migranti-piano-na-l.3424963

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.

mistakes of other countries, such as France and United Kingdom, which have not been successful in preventing the spread of radicalization.

In conclusion, the delayed wave of Muslim migration to Italy and the consequent absence of significant numbers of second-generation immigrants has been so far a key factor determining a lower level of radicalization than in other European countries. Yet, the first relatively large second generation of immigrants is now coming of age and, as the data on school population demonstrate, in the next decade the numbers will increase exponentially. From the point of view of radicalization, these figures represent at the same time a threat, an opportunity and a challenge for the Italian system. The threat lies in the fact that despite second-generation immigrants number is raising dramatically, Italy has neither yet implemented a strategy for the prevention of radicalization nor has elaborated a coherent model of integration of the immigrant population and that consequently it is liable to be subjected to a wave of radicalization in the next years. The opportunity is the one of learning from the mistakes of other European countries to elaborate an integration model able to prevent the spread of extremism in the country. Finally, the challenge is the ability to act quickly, exploiting the time advantage that the delayed wave of Muslim immigration has guaranteed to Italy so far.

The integration challenge: a third way between multiculturalism and assimilationism?

As mentioned above, Italy still lacks a comprehensive model for the integration of the immigrant population. Indeed, so far the migration and integration policies can be summarized in a twin strategy: immigration and emergency. This means that during the years the policies adopted came as urgent and temporary measures to tackle the several immigration influxes, rather than as farsighted and programmatic laws aimed at framing the issue of integration once and for all. However, this gap opens opportunities to the Italian government, in particular the one of learning from other countries’ mistakes to design a new and more efficient integration model, which could be a valid alternative to those already adopted in Europe, namely the multicultural and the assimilationist ones.

As stated in the previous paragraph, immigration into Italy started later than in the other European countries: the first intense wave of migration was only in the 1980s and, as a consequence, the
integration issue entered the agenda of the Italian government only in the mid 80s and early 90s.\(^{159}\)

The initial laws dealing with this issue were emergency measures responding to the new situation: the first one was the December the 30\(^{th}\) 1986 law n.943, which aim was to guarantee equal treatment to the immigrant and the national workers. The second law was the February the 28\(^{th}\) 1990 n. 39, also called “Martelli’s law” from the name of the proponent; this law provided a distinction of competences between the central government, entitled to rule on the policies of the migratory flows, and the regional and local authorities, in charge of managing the social emergencies caused by the arrival of the immigrants into Italy.\(^{160}\) Thus, the Martelli’s law created a multi-level governance model, according to which the government manages the immigration policies, while regional and local authorities deal with the integration ones. This allocation of responsibilities has never been replaced by a more comprehensive governmental plan for integration. Indeed, also the following laws left to the regions and to the local authorities (municipalities in particular) the responsibility to find the best solution to deal with the integration of the immigrants residing in their territories.

In 1998, Italy approved the so-called “Turco-Napolitano’s Law” (March the 6\(^{th}\) 1998 n.40), which better clarified the role of the regions as the pivots of the Italian integration policies.\(^{161}\) In particular, the law encouraged the cooperation between the local entities and those organizations from the third sector operating in favor of the immigrants. The law explicitly mentioned “immigrants’ education”, “intercultural education”, “social integration”, “information on right, duties and opportunities”, “the use of cultural mediators”, and others, as regional competencies. Moreover, the law instituted a “National Fund for immigration policies”, to which the regions could get access after their annual and multiannual integration plans had been approved by the government.\(^{162}\)

Then, the 2001 Reform of the Italian Constitution’s Title V froze the competences of the regions in the field of integration, but also abolished the “National Fund for immigration policies”: the latter was merged into the “National Fund for Social Policies”, consequently giving complete autonomy to the regions in prioritizing the social policies’ activities and in deciding if and how to intervene on immigrants’ integration.\(^{163}\) The last law on immigration, called “Bossi-Fini” (1992 July the 30\(^{th}\)

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160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.
introduced restrictions on immigrants’ presence in Italy, but confirmed the multi-level governance model according to which the regions and the local entities have to deal with the integration issue. The only step toward a more centralized management of immigrants’ integration was taken by the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who introduced the so-called “Integration agreement” between the Italian government and the immigrants. This agreement committed the new immigrants to fulfill specific objectives regarding integration (knowledge of the Italian language, of the Italian Constitution and culture, obligation to put children through school, and others) in exchange for the residence permit. In 2010, Berlusconi also approved the “Identity and Encounter Plan” that prioritized Italian language, civic education, job, housing and children, as the main issues to achieve a successful integration. Nevertheless, these attempts to give to the regions and the local entities a clearer central guidance for integration policies has never been effective because of both the scarce resources provided and the lack of an adequate dialogue between center and periphery.

Also the very last governmental efforts to promote integration seem to be limited in their scope. For example, on September the 29th 2017, the Ministry of Interior approved a “National plan for the integration of the beneficiaries of international protection”\textsuperscript{166}, but it will affect only 74 thousands of the refugees residing in Italy\textsuperscript{167}, and therefore it has to be read as an emergency measure answering a contingent problem, rather than a model for the future.

To sum up, the issue of the immigrants’ integration in Italy so far has been characterized both by a multi-level model of governance, according to which the regional and local authorities are entitled to design and implement the integration policies, and by the absence of a comprehensive national plan to deal with the issue. This vacuum raises a question: is Italy delaying the solution of the problem because of its inexperience, or because of an intentional strategy\textsuperscript{168}? Giving an answer is reckless, especially because the immigration issue is highly politicized. Yet, what is certain is that an intense debate about the adoption of a more comprehensive integration model is ongoing in the country, especially in the context of the political dialogue with Islam’s representatives in Italy. Indeed, it seems that integration of the immigrants, and in particular of the Muslim immigrants, is a crucial issue to fight against the radicalization problem.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{166}“Migrants, exclusive: the full text of the national integration plan”
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} Giuseppe Sciortino, The immigration rebus (Rebus Immigrazione), Il Mulino, 2017.
As stated in the previous chapter, the notion of integration as “the sense of a feeling of belonging to a certain society, irrespective of one’s socio-economic condition,”\textsuperscript{169} appears to be a determining factor for the rise of jihadi extremism in Europe, especially among the second generation of Muslim immigrants. Indeed, it seems that a key cause for radicalization of the second generation Muslims is “a double sense of non-belonging”\textsuperscript{170}: they neither feel a sense of belonging to their parents’ home countries because they were born and raised in Europe, nor feel a sense of belonging to the Western European countries where they live in, because of their different origins. In the light of these considerations, the main integration models adopted in Europe seem to have failed\textsuperscript{171} in providing the immigrants and their children with a sense of belonging able to prevent radicalization. So far, in Europe two main integration patterns have been adopted: multiculturalism and assimilationism. The United Kingdom is the main European country in which the “multicultural integration” has been implemented: this model entails that cultural and religious differences are so preserved and recognized that in Great Britain sharia tribunals have been instituted since the 80s to solve legal issues that Muslims are not entitled to decide without the guidance of a religious scholar\textsuperscript{172}. Yet, this model has neither avoided nor mitigated the radicalization processes in the country, but actually according to many scholars it legitimized them\textsuperscript{173}. Indeed, the British waiver to any kind of cultural assimilation of the Muslim population is interpreted, from an Islamic point of view, as if the British government renounces to its legitimacy in ruling the public space\textsuperscript{174}. The French model has not been more successful in dealing with jihadi extremism. On the contrary, the assimilationist pattern for integration, which aims to neutralize the original identity of the immigrant (in terms of language, culture and religion) to assimilate it in a new neutral public space, has revealed to be even more detrimental\textsuperscript{175}. Indeed, the lack of spaces for dialogue and confrontation,

\textsuperscript{169} Lorenzo Vidino, \textit{Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy.}

\textsuperscript{170} Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, \textit{Violent Radicalization in Europe.}

\textsuperscript{171} Ciro Sbailò, “Islam in Italy: a political issue, no one of religious freedom. The way toward the interstate agreements” (“Islam in Italia: una questione politica, non di libertà religiosa. La via degli Accordi interstatuali”), Re-elaborated text from the speech given at the research meeting “Islam in Italy. Which Constitutional agreement?” (Testo rielaborato dall’intervento tenuto all’incontro di studio “L’Islam in Italia. Quale Patto Costituzionale?”), July the 9th 2017.

\textsuperscript{172} Homa Khaleeli, “Inside Britain’s sharia councils: hardline and anti-women – or a dignified way to divorce?”, The Guardian, 2017. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/mar/01/inside-britains-sharia-councils-hardline-and-anti-women-or-a-dignified-way-to-divorce

\textsuperscript{173} Ciro Sbailò, “Islam in Italy: a political issue, no one of religious freedom. The way toward the interstate agreements”.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{175} Ciro Sbailò, “Global turbolences and identity strategies: cultural and political dynamics of European Islam, with particular reference to the Italian case” (“Turbolenze globali e strategie identitarie: dinamiche culturali e politiche dell’Islam europeo, con particolare riferimento al caso italiano”), in The foreign immigrants condition in Italy (La condizione degli stranieri in Italia), Editrice APES, 2006.
as well as the pretense that the immigrants renounce to their original identity, has created a cultural discomfort facilitating ghettoization and radicalization\textsuperscript{176}. Both the models seem to ignore that the immigrants develop a more complex identity living in a new country; on the contrary, they try to simplify this identity\textsuperscript{177}. The multicultural pattern privileges the original identity of the immigrants, while the assimilationist one demands them to confine themselves in their new identity. Yet, both the models are missing something.

The just mentioned considerations have been confirmed by a research conducted among the second-generation immigrants in Italy. Indeed from the survey emerged that the majority of the interviewed feel to have a double identity, both the Italian and the original one\textsuperscript{178}. They do not feel that one is predominant on the other; rather the two have equal importance in their life, their system of values and their relationships\textsuperscript{179}. In particular they feel to be Italians with regard to open-mindedness and freedom, and they feel to be from the country of origin with regard to the values and ethical model that in Italy, according to many of them, are about to fade away\textsuperscript{180}. This double identity is perceived as a plus by the most of them: they know more than one language, understand different cultures, ethical systems and rules; therefore, they feel to have something more than the others and they think that they do not want to loose this plus\textsuperscript{181}. When it comes to integration, many of them are suspicious: answering the question if an immigrant has to maintain his own tradition or integrate into the new society, they answer that it is important to integrate, but maintaining the original traditions\textsuperscript{182}. Therefore, they intuitively identify a possible third way between the assimilationist and the multicultural model, an “intercultural approach”\textsuperscript{183} able to enhance the double identity that the immigrants and their children develop living in the new country. This third way toward an intercultural approach to integration of the immigrants is not easy to frame from a legal point of view because it requires flexibility and pragmatism\textsuperscript{184}. So far, the Italian legislator has privileged the administrative decision on the legislative one, leaving to the local entities the ability to rule integration via soft law\textsuperscript{185}. The advantage of the soft law is in combining minimalism and decision, which is very appreciated by the immigrants’ community, especially by

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} Ciro Sbailò, Global turbolences and identity strategies.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
Muslims. Moreover, administrative decisions are easy to be modified if necessary; therefore they are more flexible and adaptable to specific and local situations than a legislative rule. Yet, the disadvantage of the soft law is the lack of uniformity, namely the lack of a defined legislative framework according to which the regions and the local entities can operate to reach a precise objective in terms of integration.

In conclusion, so far Italy has not yet elaborated a comprehensive model to deal with the immigrants’ integration issue but delegated the main decisions to the local entities. This vacuum has been the result of the logic of emergency according to which Italian authorities have dealt with immigration so far. Nevertheless, this approach avoided that Italy occurred in the same mistakes of other European countries: indeed, France and United Kingdom adopted clearer integration models, respectively the assimilationist and the multicultural ones, which have been unable to understand and enhance the double identity the immigrants develop in their new countries, therefore not mitigating the radicalization issue that is highly connected to the integration one. The Italian decision to delegate to local entities the integration policies has the advantage of flexibility and adaptability, yet it lacks the comprehensiveness to give the same direction to the local legislations toward a uniform objective. The ongoing debate and the researches realized so far in Italy have opened the possibility of a third way toward integration. A way in between multiculturalism and assimilationism, namely interculturalism: an ideal model able to enhance both the original and the new identity of the Italian immigrants. Between saying and doing there is a long road, because concrete guidelines for a legal framework of this intercultural pattern have not yet been drafted. Yet, a similar model would be able to mitigate radicalization, in the light of the fact that integration is one of the crucial aspects in preventing extremism.

The “ius soli” debate

With regard to migration, integration and radicalization, the hottest and most contested topic in Italy is currently, with no doubt, the one of the criteria for granting citizenship to the immigrants. So far, Italy is one of the few European countries that do not grant birthright citizenship to the children of the immigrants born on its soil. From 2015, the Italian parliament is working on a law to approve the so-called ius soli, or citizenship birthright, but the issue is highly politicized and the process is facing several amendments and oppositions. Leaving on a side the possible effects the approval of the law could have on the immigration influxes into the country, a similar law would

186 Ibid.
impact also on the Italian counterterrorism measures. Indeed, turning a significant number of second-generation immigrants into Italian citizens would make them no longer liable to the instrument of “preventive expulsion for terrorism prevention”. On the other side, the advocates of the \textit{ius soli} underline that integration is impossible without citizenship birthright, and that its approval will provide the country with a precious tool to prevent radicalization. Both considerations are well founded and they synthesize a tension between tools aimed at repressing and at preventing terrorism. Should Italy privilege the repressive or the preventive measures? The following lines, rather than answering the question, will provide an overview of the issue, of the draft law and of its possible effects on the Italian counterterrorism measures.

As mentioned above, so far Italy is one of the few European countries (with Austria and Denmark) in which citizenship is not yet a birthright\textsuperscript{187}. Indeed, the law currently into force in the country (February the 5\textsuperscript{th} 1992 n. 91) provides for Italian citizenship only those children who have at least one already-citizen among their parents\textsuperscript{188}. Today a child born in Italy from immigrant parents acquires the right to apply for citizenship only when comes of age and only if he has been residing in Italy “legally and with no interruptions”\textsuperscript{189}. This kind of citizenship attribution is called \textit{ius sanguins} (blood citizenship), because the nationality of the child is determined by the nationality of his parents; consequently, the permanence of the immigrants’ children are strictly connected to the conditions of their parents: if the latters’ residence permit expires, also the children have to leave the country with them\textsuperscript{190}. As a consequence of this regulation, a lot of children living and going to school in Italy are Italians \textit{de facto} but not yet Italians \textit{de iure}, meaning that they do not enjoy the rights granted by citizenship even if they live the same life of the Italian children.

The draft law currently discussed in the Senate would change dramatically the criteria for granting citizenship to the children of the immigrants, introducing the so-called “tempered \textit{ius soli}” and the \textit{ius culturae}. The Italian Chamber approved the draft in 2015, which is still waiting for the approval of the Senate. Due to the fact that the time limit to amend it is already expired, it is possible to deal with the rules the law would introduce if approved, with no risk of further changes in the text\textsuperscript{191}. The draft provides two new criteria for the attribution of citizenship: the “tempered \textit{ius soli}” and

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\textsuperscript{187} Enrico Di Pasquale, Andrea Stuppini e Chiara Tronchin, \textit{“Ius soli, a way toward integration” (“Ius soli, una strada per l’integrazione”)}, lavoce.info, 2017. Available at: http://www.lavocen.info/archives/47477/ius-soli-strada-integrazione/

\textsuperscript{188} Law n.91 from February the 5\textsuperscript{th} 1992, \textit{New norms on citizenship (Legge 5 febbraio 1992, n. 91. Nuove norme sulla cittadinanza)}). Available at: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir-stato:legge:1992-02-05:91

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{190} Enrico Di Pasquale, Andrea Stuppini e Chiara Tronchin, \textit{Ius soli, a way toward integration}

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{“What is the ius soli, in easy words” (“C'è lo ius soli, spiegato semplice”)}, Il Post, 2017. Available at: http://www.ilpost.it/2017/06/16/ius-soli-italia/}
\end{flushleft}
the *ius culturae*. First of all, the “tempered *ius soli*” provides that a child born in Italy is automatically Italian if at least one of his parents is legally residing in Italy from at least 5 years. Furthermore, if the parent is not from the European Union, he/she has to demonstrate: to have a salary not lower than the social pension, to have a house and to handle Italian language by passing a test. The second way to grant children with citizenship is the *ius culturae*: the children who concluded successfully at least one education cycle in the country would become automatically Italian. According to a study conducted by Fondazione Leone Moressa, the impact of the new law would make immediately Italian 800 thousands out of the 1 million and 65 thousands immigrant children currently residing in Italy. In particular, 600 thousands of them would receive citizenship because born in Italy, and about 180 thousands born abroad would become Italian because they have already completed at least one school cycle in the country. Then, it has been estimated that around 50 thousands more children would receive citizenship every year thanks to the possible introduction of the new criteria.

The changes regarding the criteria to grant citizenship to the immigrants is a bone of contention from several points of view, not least the one of terrorism. In particular, the broadening of the criteria for the attribution of citizenship would narrow the scope of action of the “preventive expulsions”, one of the strongest Italian measures for the repression of terrorism. This measure, which will be discussed in details in the next chapter, allows the Italian authorities to expel from the country non-citizens on national-security grounds with an administrative decree. The one of “preventive expulsions” is considered a precious tool in the light of the fact that the major terrorist threat to Europe, as well as to Italy, is currently the one of the radicalization of second-generation individuals. Indeed, the head of Italian Intelligence Alessandro Pansa, in presenting the 2017 “Report on information and security policy”, has underlined that the most dangerous threat to security is represented by the self-radicalization of individuals residing on the Italian soil. Moreover, it is well known that 60% of the European jihadists belong to the second-generation immigrants and, even if only an insignificant percentage of the second-generation individuals residing in the country will...

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192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Reform of citizenship. 800 thousands new Italians (Riforma della cittadinanza. 800 mila nuovi italiani, Fondazione Leone Moressa, 2015. Available at: http://www.fondazioneleonemoressa.org/newsite/riforma-della-cittadinanza-800-mila-nuovi-italiani/)
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
198 Olivier Roy, *ISIS Generation*. 
take the path toward radicalization, those who do so are relevant for the authorities. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, so far in Italy the numbers of the second generation is still low, but rapidly increasing (100 thousands in 2013, 130 thousands in 2014, 178 thousands in 2015, 205 thousands in 2016\(^{199}\)); therefore, the potential threat represented by the possible radicalization of some of them has to be taken into serious consideration.

Yet, if granting citizenship to thousands of immigrants would raise or lower the level of the threat is contested. Indeed, on one hand, it would weaken the authorities’ ability to resort to repressive measures such the one of “preventive expulsions” but, on the other hand, it would empower the feeling of belonging of the new-generation immigrants, therefore preventing radicalization. The problem is that, due to a lack of evidence, it is impossible to evaluate if there are more advantages or disadvantages in enlarging the criteria for granting citizenship. This is the reason why the debate in this regard is more political than technical, and consequently very heated. On one side, there are advocates of the *ius soli*, who state that the threat of terrorism has no connection with citizenship\(^{200}\) and that on the contrary citizenship represent a step toward integration that is the most effective weapon against radicalization\(^{201}\). For instance, Filippo Miraglia, the president of the association Arci (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana) and spokesperson of the popular initiative “Italy is also me”, thinks that not granting citizenship to the second generation is not only unjust but also dangerous. Indeed, according to him, make the second-generation immigrants feeling at home in Italy is the best way to give them the right antibodies so that they feel less attracted by possible radicalizing factors\(^{202}\). Miraglia is also against the “preventive expulsions” because, according to him, the neutralization of a potential terrorist is not in expulsion but in detention\(^{203}\). On the other side, the opponents of the *ius soli* think that weakening the “preventive expulsions” tool would be detrimental for the Italian counterterrorism capability. For example, Gianandrea Gaiani, the director of Analisi Difesa an Italian magazine dealing with defense and security issues, thinks that Italy has a sole advantage in terms of radicalization and terrorism, that is the one of “preventive expulsions”, and that the approval of the *ius soli* would deprive the country of that advantage\(^{204}\). In addition, according to Gaiani, the more immigrants with Italian citizenship there are, the more are the


\(^{200}\) Enrico Di Pasquale, Andrea Stuppini and Chiara Tronchin, “*Ius soli, a way toward integration*”

\(^{201}\) Ibid.

\(^{202}\) Daniele Brunetti, *The ius soli dilemma*.

\(^{203}\) Ibid.

\(^{204}\) Gianandrea Gaiani, Interview with the author.
opportunities that a possible Islamic Party becomes relevant in a proportional system like the Italian one\(^{205}\). There are also representatives of the second-generation immigrants against the *ius soli*: Kawtar Barghout, Moroccan girl and president of the Association “Stop Radicalization”, is 24 years old and became an Italian citizen only two years ago. She thinks that Italian citizenship is not a gift and that without it a child is treated equal to an Italian citizen. “I went to school and to the University, I travelled and I have been treated in Italian hospitals”; moreover, according to her Italy has to be careful in granting citizenship due to its peculiar geographical position\(^{206}\).

In conclusion, the possible introduction of the *ius soli* and the consequent broadening of the criteria to grant citizenship to the immigrants residing in Italy (in particular to their children) creates tensions between the repressive and preventive countering radicalization strategies of the country. Stefano Dambruoso, commissioner of the Italian Parliamentary Chamber and main proponent of the draft law to prevent radicalization in Italy, well explains this tension: “It is difficult for the security forces to keep under control a high number of citizens suspected of terrorism related activities\(^{207}\)”. Indeed, in France there are almost 400 individuals suspected of terrorism who cannot be arrested because there are not enough evidences\(^{208}\); they should be monitored 24 hours, but it is impossible to do so because they are too many. In this sense, the system of preventive expulsion is very helpful not to overwhelm the Italian security forces\(^{209}\). On the other side, the *ius soli* could be the first step toward a better integration of the immigrants’ community, therefore preventing radicalization\(^{210}\).

Yet, “it is very important that the birthright citizenship is supported by an effective de-radicalization strategy, otherwise the risk that Italy will face the same situation of countries like France and United Kingdom in terms of extremism will turn into reality in the next 10/15 years\(^{211}\)”.

**Conclusions**

As analyzed into details in the previous paragraphs, Italy is not yet a country of second-generation immigrants because it has become a destination for migrants only in the late 80s and early 90s. Yet,

\(^{205}\) Ibid.

\(^{206}\) “As an Italian Muslim, I can tell you that the one of ius soli is a silly issue” (“Io islamica d’Italia vi dico: lo ius soli è una sciocchezza”), Il Giornale, 2017. Available at: [http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/io-islamica-ditalia-vi-dico-ius-soli-sciocezza-1434052.html](http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/io-islamica-ditalia-vi-dico-ius-soli-sciocezza-1434052.html)


\(^{208}\) Ibid.

\(^{209}\) Ibid.

\(^{210}\) Daniele Brunetti, “The *ius soli* dilemma”.

\(^{211}\) Federica Fantozzi Dambruoso: “*Migrants and terrorism, the real risk is to end up like France and UK*.”
in the last years the country is experiencing a dramatic change because the number of immigrants’ children born and raised in the Italian soil is increasing rapidly. This change represent an important challenge to the country in many respects, not last the ones of terrorism. Indeed, the absence of a second generation of Muslim immigrants has been so far one of the most crucial factors guaranteeing to Italy a lower level of radicalization compared to other European countries. This has been with no doubt an advantage, so far. Yet, to keep it in the future, it is necessary to act quickly with regards to prevention of radicalization, because otherwise the same wave of extremism that has invested other European countries will reach also Italy in the coming years.

With regard to the emergence of a numerous second generation of immigrants and to the threat represented by the possible radicalization of a small portion of them, two seem to be the main connected challenges: the one of integration and the one of citizenship. First of all, Italy has not yet projected a model for integration of the immigrants’ community, yet it has implemented only emergency measures that came as a direct and necessary consequence of the several immigration influxes into the country. It means that the management of the integration policies has been not only implemented but also projected by the regions, rather than by the central government, according to a unique multi-level model of governance. Consequently, there is not a uniform integration strategy in the country. This lack has its advantages, in particular the fact that Italy has still time to learn from the mistakes of other models, like the assimilationist one and the multicultural one, implemented respectively in France and United Kingdom, which seem not to take in account the complex identity the migrants develop living in a new country, therefore failing in providing them with a full feeling of belonging. Italy is aware of the challenge represented by integration, which is considered to be one of the best tools against radicalization. Indeed, some researches have been conducted for the development of a new model of integration. The intercultural model, able to enhance the double identity that the immigrants and their children develop living in the new country, seems to be a viable third way toward integration, but no concrete steps have been taken so far to develop and implement this potential model.

Instead, an intense and heated debate is taking place in the Italian political realm with regard to the second above-mentioned challenge: the criteria for granting citizenship to the immigrants, and in particular to their children. The debate concerns a draft law currently discussed by the Italian Parliament to introduce the so-called *ius soli*, or birthright citizenship, which approval would grant immediate citizenship to almost 800thousands immigrant children and to 50thousands more every year. With regard to radicalization, the approval of the draft would represent with no doubt a step
forward in the prevention of radicalization, increasing the feel of belonging of many second-generation immigrants and, consequently, acting as a tool to prevent extremism. Yet, granting citizenship to so many immigrants would, at the same time, weaken one of the most important measure the Italian authorities use to repress terrorism: the one of “preventive expulsions”, allowing the security forces to send non-citizens back to their country of origin on national security grounds. It is impossible to forecast if the introduction of the citizenship birthright would lower or raise the threat of radicalization to Italy. Nonetheless, it seems that the enlargement of the criteria to grant citizenship should be supported by an effective de-radicalization strategy, otherwise Italy could soon find itself in the same situation of countries like France and United Kingdom in terms of extremism. Despite the fact that the Italian Parliament is discussing a draft aimed at preventing and countering radicalization, Italy still lacks the implementation of a similar strategy. Moreover, even if the law is approved in the next months, its effectiveness will not be proved before several years from its implementation.

In conclusion, the case of Italy explains that there can be tensions between the policies aimed at preventing and repressing terrorism. At the moment, it seems to be too early to make a choice between the two. Indeed, before renouncing to an effective measure such the one of “preventive expulsions”, would be better to evaluate the effectiveness of the counter radicalization national strategy. Yet, a similar plan has neither yet been approved nor implemented; therefore the country is still relying more on the proved effectiveness of the repressive tools to fight against radicalization, which will be analyzed into details in the following chapter.

The repression of radicalization in Italy. A complex regulatory system: Constitution, counterterrorism laws and migration laws
The Italian counterterrorism measures are crucial in determining the “Italian Advantage” in terms of radicalization, alongside the absence of a significant number of second-generation Muslims and the strong antibodies of the Islamic communities. Actually, according to Lorenzo Vidino, the Italian counterterrorism system is with no doubt the most decisive factor contributing to the Italian advantage with regard to jihadi extremism.

Italy has a long history of struggling with terrorism, and its legal and judicial systems are better set than others to deal with this complex phenomenon, despite the fact that there is not yet a given

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212 Ibid.
213 Lorenzo Vidino, Interview with the Author.
214 Ibid.
definition of terrorism\textsuperscript{215}. Indeed, the Italian penal code made its first reference to terrorism in the late 70s and early 80s, with the introduction of the crimes of “attack for the purposes of terrorism” and “association for the purposes of terrorism” (Article 270-bis)\textsuperscript{216}. Subsequently, the Italian Penal Code has been amended and updated over the years, so that it has always kept up with the continuous evolution of the terrorist threat. Yet, the strength of the Italian measures specifically aimed at repressing terrorism is not the only factor determining the success of the country’s legal framework in countering the jihadist extremism. In fact, there are also measures designed for different purposes, which over the years revealed themselves to be precious instruments to fight against jihadist radicalization. The best example for that is with no doubt the already-mentioned law on “preventive expulsions”, which is provisioned by the “Consolidated Law on Immigration” and which allows the authorities to expel people on national security grounds by administrative decree. Yet, also the Italian Constitution provides the authorities with a special monitoring ability on the religious activities, which is a great deterrent for the spread of extremism in the country, despite the fact that Islamic religious entities have been able to avoid it by finding a loophole. Indeed, according to the article 8 of the Constitution, the relations between the religions and the State “are regulated by law on the basis of intese (accords) between the State and the respective representatives\textsuperscript{217}”. Islam still misses this agreement with the State and, consequently, should be subjected to the restrictions provisioned by the “law on the admitted cults”\textsuperscript{218}. Yet, the Islamic organizations haven’t asked for recognition as religious entities therefore avoiding some restrictions. Nonetheless, the Italian authorities keep pushing Islam’s representative to find an agreement, rather than changing the “law on the admitted cults” and, in the meanwhile, exercise their monitoring activities on the ground of general security and immigration powers.

To sum up, the repression of radicalization and terrorism in Italy cannot be relegated to the Penal Code, but has to be framed in a more complex regulatory system, in which also the Italian Constitution and the “Consolidated law on Immigration” play a great role. The next paragraphs will be an attempt to explain and disentangle the key factors determining the effectiveness of the Italian counterterrorism and counter radicalization system. The first paragraph will deal with the


\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{217} Art.8 of the Italian Constitution. Available at: http://www.educational.rai.it/materiali/pdf_articoli/22122.pdf

Constitutional framework on religious freedom and with the provisioned limitations, as well as with the “law on the admitted cults”; the second one will discuss the counterterrorism laws, in particular the article 270 bis of the Italian Penal Code and its evolutions, but also more recent legal improvements introduced to fight transnational and online radicalization. The third paragraph will analyze the contested law on “preventive expulsions” and other immigration issues connected to radicalization that are crucial for Italian national security. Finally, the conclusions will be an attempt to assess the Italian counterterrorism strategy and the evolutions it might be subjected in the next future.

Islam and the Italian Constitution: the law on the admitted cults and the necessity of an intesa (agreement) with Islam

To explain the relationship between Islam and the Italian State it is necessary to start from the Constitutional framework on freedom of religion. The constitutional articles dealing with religious freedom are the numbers 3, 8, 19 and 20. They respectively provide: non-discrimination on religious grounds (3), equality for all religions in front of the law (8), freedom to profess freely everyone’s religious faith in any form, individually or in association (19), prohibition of either any special limitations under the law, or for special taxation based on religious affiliation, with respect to the establishment of religious associations and institutions (20)\textsuperscript{219}. Among these articles, the most crucial is the number 8, which provisions the relationship between the Italian State and the religions other than the Catholic one (the relationship between the State and the Catholic Church is ruled by article 7 of the Constitution). The article 8 provides that:

“All religious confessions are equally free before the law.

Religious confessions other than the Catholic one have the right to organize themselves in accordance with their own statutes, provided that these statutes are not in conflict with Italian law. Their relations with the State are regulated by law on the basis of accords between the State and the respective representatives\textsuperscript{220}.”

Therefore, for the religions different from the Catholic one, the article 8 provides the “principle of regulation by intesa (agreement/accord/consensual solution)”, which should have been the main

\textsuperscript{219} Anna Nardini e Iole Teresa Mucciconi, “The exercise of religious freedom in Italy” (L’esercizio della libertà religiosa in Italia), Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri), 2013. Available at: http://presidenza.governo.it/USRI/confessioni/Esercizio_liberta_religiosa_italia.pdf

\textsuperscript{220} Art.8 of the Italian Constitution.
form for regulating the relationships between the State and these religions. Actually, the intese’s stipulations have started only from the 80s and there are still many religions missing such accord, among them Islam. For the religions missing the intesa, the article 8 refers to the law. The law in question is the “law on the admitted cults”. The “law on the admitted cults” is the number 1159 of 1929. It was approved under the Mussolini’s regime and it is still into force because it has never been repealed. The law is based on the “principle of admitting different worship”, as long as they “do not profess principles and rites that are in contrast with common decency” 222. Moreover, according to the law, the non-Catholic institutes have to ask for recognition as “moral entities” by the Italian State. This recognition provides them with several advantages, for example the permission to acquire and own goods and tax relieves. Yet, the State through the Interior Ministry can exercise control 223 toward the recognized entities applying measures such as:

- Governmental approval of preachers 224;
- Monitoring and surveillance to ensure that the entity is not conducting activities in contrast with the Italian legal system (surveillance includes inspections and also the ability to dissolve the entity, or to put it under temporary receivership, if dire irregularities take place) 225.

The implementing regulation of this law (R.D. 289/1930) includes not only the implementation norms but also new principles and more restrictive measures, such as 226:

- Necessity of authorization to open temples and speakers: the administrative authority has to ensure that the opening of such places is necessary to “satisfy existing needs of important and numerous religious communities” and that the entities willing to do so “have the necessary financial means to sustain the maintenance costs” 227. This comma has been repealed by the Constitutional Court’s ruling n. 59 in 1958.
- Limitation of public reunions: it is necessary a preventive authorization, when such reunions takes place out of worship places. For reunions inside worship places is anyway necessary the supervision of an authorized preacher 228.

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221 Religious freedom. The conclusion of consensual solutions (Libertà religiosa. La stipulazione delle intese). Research Department of the Chamber of Deputies (Servizio Studi Camera dei Deputati). Available at: http://www.camera.it/cartellecomuni/leg14/RapportoAttivitaCommissioni/testi/01/01_cap12_sch02.htm
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
Over the years, several Islamic communities (Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia-CICI; Associazione musulmani italiani- AMI; Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia- UCOI; Comunità religiosa Islamica Italiana- Coreis) have proposed themselves as representatives of the Italian Islam to reach the *intesa* with the State\(^{229}\), necessary to escape the framework of the “law on admitted cults”. These attempts, which will be analyzed into detail in the following chapter, have always failed mainly because of the impossibility of finding a unitary representative for the Italian Islamic community. Nonetheless, the Islamic associations have found a way to overcome the “law on the admitted cults” by non-asking for the recognition of their legal personalities as “moral entities”. Indeed, to be recognized as “moral” or “religious entities”, it is necessary that the organizations’ statutes are not contrary to the legal order of the State\(^{230}\). Yet, several Islamic organizations’ statutes make reference to the Sharia law, polygamy, hijab, repudiation and other principles, therefore conflicting with the Italian legal system\(^{231}\). So far, the only Islamic association recognized as a religious institution is the “Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia” (Islamic Cultural Center of Italy), to which the Great Mosque of Rome belongs. All the rest of Islamic organizations have asked for legal recognition as “associations for social improvements”\(^{232}\), to which the law on the admitted cults cannot be applied\(^{233}\). Consequently, these “associations” operate on the basis of the general law, enjoying the non-discrimination right provided by the article 20 of the Italian Constitution. Despite the fact that according to the general law they are not allowed to open places of worship, the Interior Ministry has estimated that on the Italian soil there are at least 1251 Muslim houses of worship\(^{234}\). Out of them, 4 are mosques (with a dome and a minaret), 906 are prayer rooms and 341 are cultural centers and associations\(^{235}\). Many of these places often change address because associations, differently from worship places, can be located everywhere and do not necessitate specific architectural standards\(^{236}\). The issue has been raised in front of the Italian authorities several

\(^{229}\) Laura De Gregorio, “*The juridical treatment of the Islamic minority in Europe.*

\(^{230}\) *Art. 8 of the Italian Constitution.*


\(^{235}\) Ibid.

\(^{236}\) Antonio Cavaciuti, *Italian Mosques.*
times, but no concrete action, except the initiatives for the dialogue with Islamic representatives toward an *intesa*, has been yet taken.

According to Izzedin Elzir, the president of the Unione delle Comunità Islamiche Italiane (UCOII-Union of Italian Islamic Communities), despite the fact that the freedom of religion is recognized by the Italian Constitution, there is not yet a law to implement it and, as a consequence, “Italian Muslims have been forced to find a way to answer their community’s needs”\(^{237}\). Yet, actually a law on religious freedom does exist, it is the “law on the admitted cults”, but this law would subject the Islamic associations to the several above-mentioned limitations, among which a statute that does not conflict with the Italian legal order and “governmental approval for preachers”. With regard to Islamic places of worship, Islam should not receive direct public funds because it lacks the *intesa*. Yet, this does not impede Islamic associations from receiving funds from regions and municipalities. Consequently, not only only many municipal and regional development plans point specific areas for building Muslim worship places, but they also partially finance the construction with public funds\(^{238}\). Despite this, there are many prayer rooms located in private apartments, warehouses and plants\(^{239}\).

With regard to the obligation of governmental approval for preachers, no Islamic community in Italy has asked for the Interior Ministry’s approval, despite the fact that the Ministry has declared its availability to provide it also to those communities lacking the status of “religious entity”\(^{240}\).

In conclusion, the “law on the admitted cults” should rule Islam relationship with the Italian State because the Islamic religion still lacks an *intesa*, as provided by the Constitution. Yet, the Italian Islamic communities and organization (except the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia) have found a way not to be subjected to the “law on the admitted cults” by asking for legal recognition as “associations for social improvements”, rather than as “moral entities”. As a consequence, many of the restrictions provisioned by the just mentioned law, among which the special monitoring and the governmental approval of preachers, cannot be applied to them and plenty of illegal places of worship are disseminated all over the Italian soil. Nonetheless, all of this does not impede the Italian authorities from monitoring their activities. Indeed, according to several Italian security experts, the Italian security services keep many mosques under close surveillance, using also methods as wiretapping, infiltration and placement of cameras outside\(^{241}\); in addition, several raids have been

\(^{237}\) Ibid.

\(^{238}\) Laura De Gregorio, “The juridical treatment of the Islamic minority in Europe.

\(^{239}\) Ibid.

\(^{240}\) Carlo Cardia e Giuseppe dalla Torre, *Italian Islamic Communities*

conducted over the years in massive operations targeting mosques and informal Muslim prayer halls.\textsuperscript{242} The authorities do not rely explicitly on antiterrorism powers to do so, but instead they use general security or immigration powers as a framework for these actions, because the Islamic associations for legal improvements” are subjected to the general law.

However, it seems to be urgent to find a solution for the recognition of Islam in the Italian legal system. The opponents of the “law on the admitted cults” push for the approval of a new law on religious freedom; some attempts have been done over the years but no draft has been approved so far. It seems that the Italian authorities prefer the road toward the stipulation of an intesa with the Islam’s representatives, because such an accord would rule more specifically the relation between the Islam and the State than a general law on religious freedom. Indeed, even if the attempts of the last 15 years have always failed, Italy is still working in that direction. The efforts of Italian authorities to reach a constitutional agreement with Islam will be analyzed in the next chapter. While, the following paragraphs will deal with those counterterrorism, general security and immigration powers that provide Italy with the ability to repress terrorism and radicalization.

**Counterterrorism laws in force into Italy**

The Italian counterterrorism legal framework is considered by Lorenzo Vidino the most crucial factor determining the “Italian Advantage” in terms of radicalization compared to other European countries. This is partially due to the fact that the Italian fight against terrorism started in the late 60s and early 70s when an “armed fight” between leftist and rightwing movements affected the country. As a consequence, the Italian authorities approved both emergency measures and counterterrorism laws that still today provide excellent tools to fight against terrorism and radicalization. Yet, Italy has also been able to adapt its legislation to the evolving threat, in particular by modifying its legal framework to face international terrorism, foreign fighters, suspected radicalized individuals and facilitators of terrorism. The history of Italian counterterrorism can therefore be divided into two phases: the first one from the late 60s to the 80s, when the country dealt with separatist violent incidents and, above all, with a long and intense campaign of right-wing

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{244} Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970s to date: a review, Transcrime and The Kingdom of the Netherlands (Ministry of Justice), 2007. Available at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/14_Terrorism_and_Counterterrorism_in_Italy1.pdf
and left-wing terrorism, during the *Anni di piombo*\textsuperscript{245}; the second phase from the 90s to the present day, when Italy has had to face new challenges, included the one of jihadi extremism\textsuperscript{246}.

The first wave of terrorism that invested Italy took place between 1969 and 1979; that decade was characterized by the presence of several actors like red terrorists, black terrorists, anarchists, institutions, law enforcement and parallel organizations (which all seemed to be connected to the secret services)\textsuperscript{247}, by the striking of terror into the society and public opinion, and by the use of “statements” in order to claim responsibility for the attacks\textsuperscript{248}. The authorities addressed the issue by recurring to “emergency legislation”, meaning that the measures adopted were designed to strike terrorists by punishing them\textsuperscript{249}. Three are the main important measures adopted during this first wave of terrorism: the “Legge Reale”, the law n.191 of 1978 and the article 270 bis of the Italian Penal Code. The first one is the so-called “Legge Reale” (law n.152 of 1975) that is still into force\textsuperscript{250}. This law does not directly mention terrorism, yet it has introduced body searches (including without any authorization from a magistrate), prohibited the use of garments that made a person unidentifiable and extended the definition of “improper weapons”, allowing to a greater extent the arrest of people carrying instruments aimed at offending others\textsuperscript{251}. The second one, the law n.191 of 1978, has allowed the detention of those who refuse to give their personal details to public officials, as well as of those suspected of furnishing false details to public officials\textsuperscript{252}. It also has allowed suspected terrorists’ telephones to be tapped\textsuperscript{253}. Moreover, it has introduced new offences like attacks on public facilities, kidnapping of a person for terrorist or subversive purposes and money laundering \textsuperscript{254}. The third law approved in the first historical phase of the Italian counterterrorism is the article 270 bis of the Italian Penal Code that, as it will be later analyzed, has been modified throughout the years to better answer the new challenges that the contemporary terrorism poses. This law was the first one to introduce the term “terrorism” in the Italian legal system; indeed, it has provisioned the crimes of “attack for the purposes of terrorism” and

\textsuperscript{245} Francesco Marone, *The Italian Way of Counterterrorism*.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{247} *Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970s to date*.

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{251} *Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970s to date*.

\textsuperscript{252} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
“association for the purposes of terrorism”. In addition, it provisions an article to provide some benefits for those who help in the identification and arrest of terrorists.\textsuperscript{255}

The second phase of Italian fight against terrorism, the one from the 90s to the present day, is characterized by the abandonment of the “emergency measures” logic that has been replaced by a new approach, which aim is not only to repress, but also to prevent the phenomenon\textsuperscript{256} by national security means. In this new context the article 270 bis of the Penal code has been modified twice (one in 2001 and one in 2015), the penitentiary regime has been make severer, a Committee of Financial Security has been instituted, international cooperation has been strengthened and, finally, new laws have been introduced to fight the new threats coming from foreign fighters, radicalized individuals and the internet.\textsuperscript{257}

To begin with the changes introduced to the article 270 bis of the Penal Code, in 2001 the law number 438 equipped the Italian legal system with measures against the “association with international terrorism aims”\textsuperscript{258}. Therefore the new article covers cases of international terrorism, thus honoring the international commitments made by Italy.\textsuperscript{259} Subsequently, in 2015 the article 270 bis has been modified again by law 153 of 2016, which introduced the “crime of supporting international terrorism” (art.4)\textsuperscript{260}. This new case is a very useful tool to punish also the “lone wolves”, those that today represent the greatest threat to European security.\textsuperscript{261} Moreover, the new article covers “financing of conducts with terrorism’s purposes” (art. 270-bis 1 c.p.), “misappropriation of confiscated goods or money” (art. 270-bis 2 c.p.), “nuclear terrorist acts” (art. 280-ter c.p), and “mandatory, direct and equivalent confiscation for all the crimes committed for terrorist purposes” (art. 270-septies c.p.)\textsuperscript{262}. In addition this law authorize the ratification and the execution of several international terrorism agreement like: the Council of Europe Convention on the Repression of Terrorism (2015), International Convention for the Repression of Nuclear Acts of Terrorism (2005), Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (2003), Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{259} Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970s to date.
\textsuperscript{260} Riccardo Bertolesi, Again, new norms in the field of terrorism. Law number 153 of July the 28\textsuperscript{th}, 2016, an earliest reading (Ancora nuove norme in materia di terrorismo. Legge 28 luglio 2016 numero 153: una primissima lettura), Diritto Penale Contemporaneo,2016. Available at: https://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/d/5013-ancora-nuove-norme-in-materia-di-terrorismo
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.

Secondly, in 2002 by law number 279, Italy has made the penitentiary regime severer. Indeed the new law applies to all criminal associations, including terrorist ones, and excludes those convicted for such crimes from external contacts connected to the organization 264. Moreover, their correspondence is subjected to strict controls, and the objects they can receive in prison are limited265.

Thirdly, the Committee of Financial Security has been established by law number 431 of December 2001. The Committee has several tasks like the protection of the Italian financing system from terrorists, the collection of information useful to freezing their assets, the introduction of the regulation necessary to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism266, and others. This measure has been important to ensure the necessary international cooperation and has consequently strengthened the Italian support to fight terrorism at international level.

The last legal effort to counter terrorism has been decree law number 7 of 2015, converted into law number 43 in 2015267, which envisages several measures to counter the new threats coming from international terrorism. First of all, it provisions pre-trial detention and arrest from 5 to 8 years for foreign fighters and their funders and facilitators268. Secondly, it is a strong tool against lone wolves because it provisions a jail sentence from 5 to 10 years for those engaged in self-recruiting and/or training aimed at committing terrorist attacks269. Moreover, it envisages detention for those participating in terrorist organizations and networks and for those who give them any kind of assistance270. Thirdly, the new law contains even norms regarding the Internet surveillance. Indeed, it provisions the creation of a websites’ Black List, in which web proselytisms takes place, and the removal of those judged illicit. Moreover, using the web to conduct terrorist activities (recruitment, apology, training) is considerate an aggravating factor to other crimes271. Fourthly, the law allows the use of preventive wiretappings for countering terrorism and more stringent monitoring on

263 Ibid.
264 Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Italy from the 1970s to date.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
268 Measures contrasting terrorism, also the international one (Misure per il contrasto del terrorismo anche di matrice internazionale), Ministry of Interior (Ministero dell ‘Interno), 2015. Available at: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/10_febbraio_slides_antiterrorismo_mininterno.pdf
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
explosive precursors, including an administrative sanction for those who do not report to the authorities suspect transactions of materials that could be used to build explosives.  

In conclusion, the Italian counterterrorism legal framework has been able to adapt, over the years, to the changing nature of the terrorist threat. Indeed, despite the fact that the laws approved during the 70s and the 80s already provisioned terrorism, from the early 2000s the Italian authorities have continuously introduced new laws adapting the legal system to the new challenges posed by contemporary terrorism. Particularly successful has been the adoption of measures aimed not only at repressing, but also at preventing terrorism, like the Internet surveillance, the preventive wiretappings, the more stringent monitoring of explosive precursors and all those norms punishing also terrorist facilitators and financers. Therefore, repressive measures can be designed not only to punish but also to prevent terrorism. Another good example of this logic is the instrument of “preventive expulsions”, a legal tool that has been created to prevent national security issues caused by significant immigration influxes, which revealed to be a precious tool to prevent radicalization in the country. This tool will be the topic of the following paragraph.

The Immigration Law and the system of preventive expulsions

Among the tools available to the Italian authorities to prevent radicalization and terrorism, in the last years the one of “preventive expulsions” has become one of the most frequently used. This norm allows expelling from the country non-citizens suspected of radicalism or involvement in terrorist activities by administrative decree. From January to October 2018, 109 foreigners have already been expelled on national security grounds. This instrument is considered precious to avoid the infection of the Italian society by radicalization and is an integral part of the Italian strategy to fight against terrorism. Indeed, according to Marco Minniti, the Minister of Interior, “preventive expulsions” are necessary to eradicate the radicalized individuals from the society before they can turn their ideas into concrete plans to perpetrate attacks on the Italian soil and before they can infect others. Yet, the efficiency of this tool is strictly connected to the ability of an

272 Ibid.
274 Fiorenza Sarzanini, Interview to Marco Minniti: “That’s the way to protect our cities: expulsions for whosethose who take the path toward radicalization” (Intervista a Marco Minniti: «Così proteggeremo le città. Espulsioni per chi si radicalizza»), Ministry of Interior (Ministero dell’Interno), 2017. Available at: http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/cosi-proteggeremo-citta-espulsioni-chi-radicalizza
275 Ibid.
effective execution of the expulsion’s order: there are notorious cases of terrorists who had been expelled from Italy before perpetrating attacks somewhere else in Europe. Therefore, in the last months, new measures have been introduced to make the system more effective and bilateral relations with the countries that have to receive the expelled people have been strengthened. However, due to the freedom of mobility guaranteed by the Schengen agreement on European soil, it seems that the efficiency of the expulsions is not only important for Italy, but it represents also a vital interest for other European countries. This paragraph will, first of all, analyze the law instituting preventive expulsions; secondly, the new measures recently introduced to strengthen the efficiency of expulsions will be explained; thirdly, numbers and trends will be illustrated and, finally, some reflections on the European interest in the effectiveness of the Italian expulsions will be provided.

The system of “administrative expulsions” is provisioned by the article 13 of the “Consolidated Law on Immigration” (legislative decree number 286/1998)\(^{276}\) and it has been introduced in the Italian legal framework to fight against illegal immigration. There are two different kinds of “administrative expulsion”: one can be activated by the Italian Interior Minister for national security reasons, while the second one can be declared by the District Magistrate for different reasons, such as “clandestine immigration”, “irregular immigration”, “delinquency or affiliation to criminal association”, and “prevention of terrorism”. The preventive expulsion aimed at preventing terrorism has been introduced in the “Consolidated Law on Immigration” after the 7/7 London terrorist bombings by the so-called “Pisanu’s decree” (legislative decree number 144/2005)\(^{277}\). This typology of expulsion is slightly different from the other ones, because it is immediately executed with no need of clean bill nor confirm by the jurisdictional authority and with no suspension in case of appeal\(^{278}\). The expulsion aimed at preventing terrorism can be decided either by the Minister of Interior or by the District Magistrate and interests those immigrants who, alone or in group, are conducting activities relevant to perpetrate an attack, as well as those whose permanency on the Italian soil favors terrorist organizations, and, finally, those who finance or instigate the just mentioned individuals\(^{279}\).

\(^{276}\) art.13 d.l.286/1998. Available at: http://www.normattiva.it/atto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=1998-08-18&atto.codiceRedazionale=098G0348&queryString=%3FmeseProvvedimento%3D%26formType%3Dricerca_sempl%ce%26numeroArticolo%3D%26numeroProvvedimento%3D286%26testo%3D%26annoProvvedimento%3D1998%26giornoProvvedimento%3D&currentPage=1

\(^{277}\) Immigration: contrasting illegal immigration (Immigrazione: contrasto dell’immigrazione clandestine). Research Department of the Chamber of Deputies (Servizio Studi Camera dei Deputati). Available at: http://www.camera.it/cartellecomuni/leg14/RapportoAttivitaCommissioni/testi/01/01_cap09_sch03.htm

\(^{278}\) Counterterrorism: the 2005 decree law n.144 (Antiterrorismo: il decreto legge n.144 del2005). Research Department of the Chamber of Deputies (Servizio Studi Camera dei Deputati). Available at: http://www.camera.it/cartellecomuni/leg14/RapportoAttivitaCommissioni/testi/01/01_cap22_sch01.htm

\(^{279}\) Ibid.
According to the Italian Interior Minister Marco Minniti, preventive expulsions of those who do not match the requirements for asylum is a precious instrument in the hands of the Italian government to guarantee security inside the country\textsuperscript{280}. This does not mean that the Italian authorities believe in the equation that immigration equals terrorism. Yet, at the same time, it is impossible to exclude that among the migrants there could be potentially dangerous individuals\textsuperscript{281}. Therefore, it is crucial for the Italian national security that the effectiveness of this measure is ensured. This is the reason why from the early months of 2017, the Minister has been travelling through several Northern and Western African countries to make agreements with the governments that have to take back the expelled people\textsuperscript{282}. In addition, the Italian Ministry of Interior has drafted a law to strengthen and make more effective the instrument of “preventive expulsions”. The draft has been approved first by decree law number 13 of 2017, and then converted into law (n.46 of the 13\textsuperscript{th} of April 2017). It provisions the establishment of the Permanent centers for repatriation (CPR) aimed at making more effective the execution of the expulsions in general, and faster the forced repatriation of those foreigners who are potentially dangerous for national security\textsuperscript{283}. Also the procedures for granting international protection have been accelerated, so that will be easier to distinguish between those who have the right to asylum and those who do not\textsuperscript{284}. Moreover, the asylum seekers will be registered as residents and, waiting for the approval of their request, will be able to work in social activities to help the community that is hosting them\textsuperscript{285}. With particular regard to expulsions, the article 19 of the decree law provides “Urgent provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the expulsions and the strengthening of the permanent centers for repatriation”. It provisions, first of all, a change in terminology: those that were before called “centers for identification and expulsion” (CIE) are turned into “permanent centers for repatriation” (CPR)\textsuperscript{286}. The terminological change could seem insignificant, yet it is crucial due to the heated political debate on migrants’ human rights inside the country. The name has been changed to mark a new and more human approach, because

\textsuperscript{280} Marco Minniti, Presentation of the “Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{282} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{283} “Minniti’s decree law to contrast illegal immigration becomes law” (“È legge il decreto Minniti sul contrasto all’immigrazione illegale”), Ministry of Interior (Ministero dell’Interno), 2017. Available at: http://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/e-legge-decreto-minniti-sul-contrastro-allimmigrazione-illegale

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{286} Decree Law n.13/2017 (d.l.13/2017). Available at: http://www.normative.it/atto/caricaDetttaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2017-02-17&atto.codiceRedazionale=17G00026&queryString=%3FmeseProvvedimento%3D%26formType%3Dricerca_semplificata%26numeroArticolo%3D%26numeroProvvedimento%3D13%26testo%3D%26annoProvvedimento%3D2017%26giornoProvvedimento%3D&currentPage=1
the old CIE have been too often places of long detentions where the migrants lived in not dignified conditions. Secondly, the legislative decree provisions that, when it is impossible to execute the repatriation of the immigrant because of reasons of force majeure, the judicial authority orders the reactivation of the state of detention of the individual for the time necessary to execute the expulsion. This measure should ensure an effective repatriation of the people expelled from the country, avoiding the illegal permanence of the individual on the Italian or the European soil. Thirdly, to ensure a more effective execution of the expulsions’ orders, the Ministry of Interior, in conjunction with the Minister of the Economy and Finances, takes the initiatives to guarantee the enlargement of the network of the centers for repatriation so that they can be equally distributed on the entire national soil. “The dislocation of the new centers takes place, audited the president of the interested region/or of the interested autonomous province, preferring the locations that are near to the urban centers, that are easy to be reached, and where there are public properties.” The locations can be make adequate to host the people also by renovation, “taking into consideration the necessity of creating small capacity facilities, adequate to guarantee conditions of staying that are respectful of the human dignity of the people received.” The just mentioned measure should ensure that the new centers will be more adequate to host the immigrants waiting for the expulsion, especially because they will be smaller and more equally distributed on the Italian soil. Overall, the legislative decree number 13 of 2017 represents both continuity and a turning point. Indeed, on one hand the Italian government reaffirms that it has no intention to renounce to the instrument of “preventive expulsions” and, on the other hand, it wants to give more dignity to this tool by solving the problems that have affected some of the centers for repatriation so far.

From an analysis of the number of repatriations, it emerges the clear intention of the government to strengthen this tool, rather than just giving to it a new dignity. Indeed, Italy is the first country for number of preventive expulsions in Europe, with a total of 346 expulsions from January 2015 to October 2018. From January to October 2018, 109 persons have been expelled from the country because of involvement in religious extremism, in contrast to a total of 66 in 2016 and of 105 in

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287 “What the CIE are” (“Che cosa sono i CIE”), Il Post, 2017. Available at: http://www.ilpost.it/2017/01/03/cosa-sono-cie-centri-identificazione-espulsione/
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
292 “Italy is the country which resort the most to security expulsions” (“L’Italia è il paese che ricorre di più all’espulsione per ragioni di sicurezza”), Libero, September the 7th 2018. Available at: https://www.confessioni-elytiche.ch/2018/09/07/italia-e-il-paese-che-ricorre-di-piu-alleespulsione-per-motivi-di-sicurezza-libero-07-09-2018/
293 Islamic Extremism: a Tunisian and an Algerian citizen expelled
294 Ibid.
2018. The numbers keep rising every week, and the data demonstrate that repatriations for involvement in extremism have increased by 81% in the 2017\textsuperscript{295}. This numbers seem to be the result of a strengthened targeted surveillance: in fact, from January to July 2017 the Italian authorities checked 190.909 people (during the same time in 2016 the people checked were 77.691) and 65.878 vehicles (19.693 in 2016)\textsuperscript{296}. The majority of those expelled from the country are Tunisian citizens, followed by the Moroccans; also Egyptians, Pakistanis, and Kosovars are overrepresented. Three were the imams repatriated in the first seven months of 2017, and 125 the number of monitored foreign fighters\textsuperscript{297}. The choice of the Italian government to use more frequently the “preventive expulsions” seems to be dictated by the difficulties to condemn those suspected of radicalization; indeed, despite the new crimes introduced for those who train themselves to terrorist activities and for targeting the so-called “lone wolves”, it is still difficult to provide evidences to get the suspect condemned\textsuperscript{298}. Therefore, when the intelligence agencies and the authorities have no more than reports and indications, they proceed by administrative decree with the expulsion, rather than by trial, because this guarantee the removal from the society of the radicalized individuals. In addition, the expulsions are preferred for the citizens of highly cooperative countries, like Morocco and Tunisia, which not only ensure to take back their suspects but also keep investigating on them, sometimes with success\textsuperscript{299}. The same cannot be done with Iraqi and Syrian citizens\textsuperscript{300}, whose countries are at the moment unable to cooperate.

With regard to the expulsions carried out by the Italian government, there are also some controversies emerging especially from the fact that sometimes persons who have been expelled from Italy are able to reach again the European soil and, in some rare cases, also to attempt or perpetrate attacks. This has been the case of Anis Amri, the Berlin Christmas market killer who hijacked a truck and carried out the carnage of 12 people on December the 19\textsuperscript{th} 2016\textsuperscript{301}. Amri, after

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\textsuperscript{295} Francesco Grignetti, “Territory control and expulsions. This is the way Italy fights against radicalism” (“Controllo del territorio ed espulsioni. Così l’Italia lotta contro il radicalismo”), La Stampa. 2017. Available at: http://www.lastampa.it/2017/08/19/italia/cronache/fattore-umano-ed-espulsioni-preventive-cos-litalia-lotta-contro-il-radicalismo-KplsCY8RGB3noJ3VWF5kXP/pagina.html


\textsuperscript{297} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{298} Giovanni Bianconi, “The surge of expulsions after the terror attacks that have hiten Europe” (“L’impennata delle espulsioni dopo gli attentati che hanno colpito l’Europa”), Il Corriere della Sera, 2017. Available at: http://www.corriere.it/politica/17_maggio_27/impennata-espulsioni-gli-attentati-che-hanno-colpito-l-europa-aeab1fd4-424a-11e7-b153-c2fd0d43182d.shtml

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{301} Barbie Latza Nadeau, Italy’s Trouble With Terrorists, The daily best, 2017. Available at: https://www.thedailybeast.com/italys-trouble-with-terrorists
\end{flushright}
having spent 4 years in Sicilian prisons where he took the path toward radicalization, was expelled by Italian authorities\textsuperscript{302}. Yet, at the time the Tunisian government was not as cooperative as today, and the “expulsion order was not completed”, because no one was waiting for Amri in his own country\textsuperscript{303}. Consequently he was able to reach again the European soil. Another case of return to the European soil after the expulsion is the one of Anis Hannachi. Anis is the brother of Amhed Hannachi, who stabbed two young women in Marseilles on October 1\textsuperscript{st} 2017 before a French soldier on patrol shot him dead. Anis had come to Italy originally in 2014 on a migrant boat from Tunisia and was promptly expelled from the country\textsuperscript{304}. Italian authorities knew he then went straight to Syria and later Iraq to support the fight of the Islamic State. Despite this, after two years Anis moved to France illegally and, then, he was arrested in Ferrara in October 2017 by the Italian authorities that were watching him closely since he crossed the Ventimiglia’s border\textsuperscript{305}. A third similar case is the one of Mohamed Lahlaoui, a 28 years-old Moroccan who was arrested in Germany. He was the last person Khalid el Bakraoui, one of the suicide bombing brothers in Brussels in March 2016, messaged before blowing himself up\textsuperscript{306}. Also Lahlaoui had been expelled from Brescia in 2014 for planning an attack against a shopping mall, but he never actually left the country\textsuperscript{307}. These and other similar cases are the reason why the Italian authorities are working to strengthen the effectiveness of the expulsions’ system. Yet, the cooperation with the governments meant to receive the expelled people seem to be insufficient, because it is crucial that dangerous individuals are made unable to reach again the European soil. A European cooperation on this information does exist. Indeed, the Schengen Information System (SIS) is the register where, among other dangerous individuals, the ones expelled are enlisted to alert the authorities of all the other European member states. Yet, this system did not worked for the just mentioned cases. A possible reason for this inefficiency could be found in the European Court of Justice’s judgment of January the 31\textsuperscript{st} 2006 in the case C-503/03, which declares illicit the denial of entry on national security grounds for those enlisted in the SIS, if their danger level is not verified and updated\textsuperscript{308}. Therefore, the enlistment in the SIS does not


\textsuperscript{303} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{304} Barbie Latza Nadeau, Italy’s Trouble With Terrorists.

\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{307} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{308} Mario Pavone, “SIS’ reporting does not legitimate the rejected entrance to the extracomunitary migrant” (“Segnalazione nel SIS non legittima il rifiuto all’ingresso dell’extracomunitario”), Altalex, 2006. Available at: http://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2006/02/24/segnalazione-nel-sis-non-legittima-il-rifiuto-all-ingresso-dell-extracomunitario
represent an effective ban to reach again the European soil for those expelled from Italy for reason of terrorism’s prevention. Yet, it seems urgent that the European authorities take some action to solve this issue because the effectiveness of the Italian “preventive expulsions” is important not only for Italy itself, but also for the security of other European countries, as demonstrated by the cases mentioned above.

In conclusion, it seems that the “preventive expulsions” system is quite efficient in preventing the spread of jihadi extremism into Italian society, taking into consideration that nowadays the major threat to Italy, as well as to Europe, is represented by the self-indoctrination of individuals who are not necessarily connected to terrorist organizations, and by the fact that many returnees directed to other countries could come back to Europe through Italy, especially if they have been already identified in their own countries and therefore they travel under fake documents. Deportation of foreign suspects has been the cornerstone of Italy’s counterterrorism strategy. Administrative deportations are often ordered when evidence against an individual is deemed insufficient for prosecution, but sufficient enough to determine that he/she may pose a threat to national security. According to many experts, the wide use of this tool represents an important factor in maintaining low levels of radicalization in the country, as the use of fast-track deportations can help prevent the formation of extremist networks on national territory. Moreover, the expulsion’s order is quick because it is declared by administrative decree and is immediately effective. These seem to be the reasons why the Italian authorities have recently decided to strengthen it by decree law number 13 of 2017 and are currently increasing the number of expulsions. Yet, this instrument has also limitations. First of all, it has been demonstrated by several cases that it does not ensure that the expelled person will not reach again the European soil to continue his radical activities. The solution for this could be more coordination with the other European member states, which have an interest in not making radical individuals entering their countries. Secondly, and more significantly, only non-Italian citizens are liable to be subjected to an expulsion’s order: therefore, the threat of citizens’ self-indoctrination cannot be tackled by it. Considering that the number of second-generation immigrants who are acquiring citizenship in the country is rapidly increasing (100thousands in 2013, 130thousands in 2014, 178tousands in 2015, 205thousands in 2016) and that a law on citizenship birthright is currently discussed in the Parliament, the effectiveness of this instrument will fade away in the short term. Probably, if the draft law on citizenship birthright is not approved, the expulsions’

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310 Lorenzo Vidino e Francesco Marone, The Jihadist threat in Italy
311 “More and more numerous the adult and minor foreign citizens who acquire Italian citizenship”
effectiveness will have longer life, and partial benefits will be preserved also in the future, ensuring the country from the newcomers’ potential radicalization. Yet, the expulsions’ tool has to be considered a short-term policy to contrast radicalization because its usefulness is anyway deemed to decline in the medium-long term.

Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed into details the Italian legal framework aimed at repressing terrorism and radicalization, which is composed by a complex regulatory system in which not only the counterterrorism laws, but also the Constitution and the Immigration laws play a great role. First of all the Constitution, provisioning the necessity of an agreement between the State and the religions different from the Catholic one should ensure different rules for different religions, leaving room to the authorities to agree with the religions’ representatives specific norms to solve the specific issues related to each case. Yet, Islam because of its plural nature has not yet found a sole representative to reach the agreement with the State. Consequently, it should be subjected to the “law on the admitted cults”, which provides the Italian authorities with stronger surveillance’s measures. Nonetheless, Italian Islamic organizations (except for the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia) have never asked for legal recognition as “religious or moral entities” and have so far operated as “associations for social improvements”, therefore avoiding to be subjected to the just mentioned law. This situation, which is the main reason why most of the Islamic places of worship in Italy are illegal (or at least irregular), does not impede the Italian authorities from monitoring the Islamic associations by general security or immigration powers as a framework for their actions. In addition, the fact that the Italian authorities have shown no intention to change the law on religious freedom and the consequent necessity for Islam to reach soon an agreement with the State are great deterrents for Islamic associations to conduct radical activities.

Secondly, the Italian counterterrorism legal framework is very effective and updated. When in the late 90s and early 2000s the jihadi terrorism started threatening Europe, the article 270 bis of the Italian Penal Code already provisioned the crimes of “attack for the purposes of terrorism” and “association for the purposes of terrorism”, because the country had already faced internal terrorism problems in the 70s and the 80s. Then, these legal instruments have been updated and adapted to the evolution of the threat from the early 2000s with the introduction of measures aimed at repressing foreign fighters, radicalized individuals, financers, facilitators and also by specific norms to fight against online radicalization. It is noteworthy that Italian legislators have been able
to design repressive counterterrorism laws with a prevention logic, allowing for preventive Internet surveillance, wiretappings and a careful monitoring activity on explosives’ precursors.

Thirdly, article 13 of the “Consolidated Law on Immigration” provides the Italian authorities with the ability to expel immigrant-radicalized individuals by administrative decree. This instrument is particularly useful in a context like the Italian one where thousands of new immigrants reach the country every year, and also helpful to remove from the society those radicalized individuals who have not yet committed a crime and who, consequently, cannot be arrested.

Despite the extreme effectiveness of the Italian system aimed at repressing terrorism and radicalization, there are still threats that it is not able to tackle. In particular, there are not designed procedures for the citizens’ pre-criminal phase. Therefore, considering that the self-indoctrination of isolated individuals currently represents the greatest threat to Europe and that the number of immigrants acquiring citizenship is considerably increasing, it is necessary to design new measures to tackle this issue. There is growing concern, among the police forces and the other people working in the antiterrorism, that the contrast action based solely on repression is not enough\(^\text{312}\). The traditional measures of anti-terrorism, such as arrests and expulsions, must be completed by policies aimed at preventing radicalization itself through non-repressive actions. This approach is very common in many European countries; moreover, the United Nations and the European Union have repeatedly urged member states to create programs for the prevention of violent extremism. In Italy this approach is almost unexplored, yet in the last year a lot of efforts have been made to take a way toward an Italian system to prevent radicalization, including a draft law currently discussed in the Parliament. These efforts will be the topic of the next chapter.

**Toward an Italian approach to prevent radicalization: next legal tools, future agreements and experimented best practices**

Italy is one of the few European countries in which measures aimed at preventing radicalization have not yet been established and experimented. Yet, this approach is very common in several European countries; moreover, both the United Nations and the European Union have repeatedly urged Member States to create programs for the prevention of violent extremism\(^\text{313}\) (internationally known as CVE, Countering Violent Extremism). The term CVE includes initiatives aimed at contrasting radicalization in different ways and at different stages. It is appropriate to talk about

\(^{312}\) Ibid.

\(^{313}\) Ibid.
“prevention of radicalization” for those measures that take place before the beginning of the radicalization process, and to talk about de-radicalization measures (that is, the abandonment of violent ideologies) or disengagement measures (that is, the abandonment of active militancy) when the radicalization process has already begun. In Italy, some spontaneous initiatives have been taken by local administrations and civil society, yet none of these aspects of the CVE have so far been implemented in the framework of a national strategy.

This Italian delay in terms of preventing radicalization can be attributed to several factors; among them, the limited resources, the extreme effectiveness of the Italian counterterrorism system and the Italian advantage in terms of radicalization compared to other European countries. Nonetheless, the evolving nature of the jihadist threat to the West, consisting mainly in the self-indoctrination of individuals residing on the European territory, as well as the growing presence of second-generation individuals and the emergence of an Italian homegrown terrorism are raising the awareness of the necessity to elaborate a strategy aimed at preventing radicalization. Indeed, the absence of designed procedure for the terrorism pre-criminal phase and the awareness of the incompleteness of the repressive tools have led the Italian intelligence and the security forces community to ask the authorities for provisioning also radicalization’s prevention tools. This request did not fall on deaf ears, and in the last years some steps have been taken to move the country legal framework toward a specific approach to prevent violent extremism. On September the 9th 2014, during a parliamentary discussion on the jihadist terrorism threat, the former Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano talked about the opportunity to introduce “a strategy aimed at de-radicalizing jihadism, with the help of teachers, social workers and moderate imams’ experience”. Following that appeal, on January the 26th 2016, Stefano Dambruoso and Andrea Manciulli, two parliament representatives, presented a draft law provisioning “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism”. The draft has been already approved by the Italian Chamber and is now waiting for the Senate’s approval. From its first text, the draft has been dramatically amended, because the Italian government considered necessary a Commission of experts to analyze the situation. Therefore, on 2016 September the 1st, an Antiterrorism Research Committee has been installed to examine the radicalization’s problem in Italy, as well as tailored solutions to that. The work of the Committee is clearly reflected in the new text of the draft law, which approval from

314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
316 Lorenzo Vidino, “Italy and terrorism at home: what to do?” (“L’Italia e il Terrorismo in Casa: Che Fare?”), ISPI, 2015. Available at: http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/L%27italia%20e%20il%20Terrorismo%20in%20Casa.040315.pdf
317 Lorenzo Vidino, Interview with the author, 2017.
the Senate is currently uncertain because of both political and budget reasons. Yet, it seems that Italy is almost ready to implement its own approach to prevent radicalization, even because the European Union is pushing its member states to do so.

The following paragraphs will deal with the steps Italy has already taken toward an approach to prevent radicalization. The first paragraph will analyze the draft law provisioning “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism” and the process it has been subjected so far. The second paragraph will explain the efforts and the institutional steps that the Italian authorities have taken in dialoguing with the country’s Islamic organizations to build an interlocutor able to help them in dealing with radicalization. The third paragraph will discuss the spontaneous civil society’s initiatives and best practices already implemented in the country, which could be useful tools to prevent radicalization; in particular, the last paragraph will focus on the interreligious dialogue activity of the Catholic church. Finally, some conclusions will try to assess the direction Italy is taking to prevent the spread of jihadi extremism.

Italian “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism”: still a draft law

In Italy jihadist extremism is still considered a marginal problem, because the country has not yet suffered from any major jihadist terrorist attack and the level of radicalization is still law compared to other European countries. Consequently dealing with prevention of radicalization has not been among the governmental priorities so far. Yet, as stated above, the Italian scenario is changing: the number of foreign fighters is rising, the second generation of immigrants is coming of age and a homegrown jihadist community is emerging. Thus, the “Italian Exceptionalism” in terms of radicalization is rapidly diminishing and the Italian intelligence and security forces consider that the most critical terrorist threat to the country is the same that the other European countries are facing, precisely the one resulting from online self-indoctrination and training of homegrown

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318 Andrea Manciulli, Conference “Measures to prevent radicalization and violent Islamic jihadi extremism” (“Convegno “Misure per la prevenzione della radicalizzazione e dell’estremismo violento di matrice jihadista”), October the 17th 2016, Palazzo Montecitorio.
319 Luigi Soreca, Conference “Measures to prevent radicalization and violent Islamic jihadi extremism” (“Convegno “Misure per la prevenzione della radicalizzazione e dell’estremismo violento di matrice jihadista”), October the 17th 2016, Palazzo Montecitorio.
320 Lorenzo Vidino, The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy.
321 Michele Groppi, The Terror Threat to Italy.
individuals because IS is inciting its followers to perpetrate attacks in the West. In brief, the intelligence community is concerned about the potential radicalization of individuals residing on the Italian soil, as well as of citizens, and about the fact that there is no opportunity to intervene on that. Indeed, there is a legal vacuum on the so-called gray area of radicalization, the one in which the individuals start to show signs of radicalism, in which they do not yet commit any crime (neither the one of self-recruiting and/or training aimed at committing terrorist attacks), that is precisely one in which they should be connected to someone who could prevent them from embracing violence.

Italy does not only lack a comprehensive strategy to fight against radicalization, but similar programs are also barely experimented in institutions such as prisons and schools. The fact that the Italian criminal and repressive tools are not balanced by preventive measures is in disagreement with the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, approved by the General Assembly of UN December 2015 the 24th, and with the resolution n. 2178 (2014 September the 24th) approved by the Security Council. Furthermore, this lack could make the country loosing its advantage in terms of radicalization, which could become soon a thing of the past. In the light of this risk, on 2016 January the 26th, Stefano Dambruoso and Andrea Manciulli, two parliament representatives, presented a draft law focused on radicalization’s prevention rather than on punishment, called “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism”, aimed at finishing the job started by the approval of the above mentioned repressive measures criminalizing lone wolves, foreign fighters and online radicalization. This draft attracted the attention of the media, which focused on the topic especially in the aftermaths of the terrorist attacks that took place in Europe. The main focus of the draft’s original text was on social recovering and reintegration of people already affected by radicalization, in the logic of the Italian penal system that is aimed at social reintegration of prisoners after they have served their sentence. Therefore, the main action provided was the introduction of extensive education programs for schools’ administrators and students, and for prison guard officers.

323 Annual report on the activities carried out by the National Prosecutor and the National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Directorate, as well as on the dynamics and strategies of mafia-type organized crime in the period July the 1st 2015 – June the 30th 2016.
325 1.43/2015.
326 Stefano Dambruoso in: Elena Zacchetti, “How to find a terrorist before he becomes such.
327 Federico Solfrini, The Italian counter-terrorism formula.
Before the draft had started its process in the Parliament, the Italian government decided that it was the case to consult experts; therefore, on 2016 September the 1st, an “Antiterrorism Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadi Extremism” has been installed to examine the country’s situation and to give indications with regard to the issue. The Committee, coordinated by Lorenzo Vidino and composed by several experts from the academic and information fields, was supposed to last only 120 days, at the end of which it would have presented a final report to the Parliament and the government. Thus, as planned, after four months the Committee’s report was ready and was presented to the Italian authorities. Yet, the meeting was held privately and the report has been classified. After that, the Italian Interior Minister, Marco Minniti, and the Coordinator of the Research Committee, Professor Lorenzo Vidino, held a press conference, during which has been announced that the Committee will keep on working for the government because the phenomenon of radicalization is evolving in nature and needs to be followed in its evolution. Moreover, a summarizing document of the report, which is the only paper that has been made public, has been presented to the press. According to Vidino, the report does not include any sensitive information and has been classified only because of peculiar Italian political dynamics. Indeed, the first part of the document provides a picture of the jihadist mobilization in Italy and the second one, that is the one of recommendations, provides nothing more than a summary of the counter radicalization programs already implemented in other European countries, adapted to the specificities of the Italian situation. The summarizing document presented during the press conference reports that the Committee recommends that Italy aligns itself with most of the European countries adopting a strategy to contrast violent extremism at three levels (macro, medium and micro) to shape a comprehensive and inclusive approach to radicalization’s prevention. In particular, at the macro level, the document suggests the adoption of a counter-narrative (or an alternative narrative) able to compete with the appeal of the jihadist message, underlining that the content of the message is a crucial issue, as well as the legitimacy of the channels chosen to reach the desired recipients. Moreover, at the medium level, the committee suggests the implementation of “positive engagement” measures aimed at involving actively the communities, and specifically those

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329Ibid.
330Lorenzo Vidino, Interview with the author, 2017.
331Ibid.
332“Toward an Italian approach for preventing radicalization”.
333Ibid.
segments considered potentially more subjected to the radicalization’s risk\textsuperscript{334}. Such measures go from interreligious dialogue to programs designed to develop critical thinking and resilience against extremism in young people, from meetings between communities and law enforcement to other types of cultural initiatives\textsuperscript{335}. At the micro level, there are measures aimed at de-radicalizing or disengaging those specific subjects identified as extremists. Moreover, the document suggests that, as in several European countries, it is desirable to create a system through which civil society’s representatives can report about the presence of potentially radicalized individuals to the authorities in charge\textsuperscript{336}. Finally, the Committee recommends respecting some guiding principles in implementing the Italian counter extremism strategy, such as: the involvement of a large number of public and private actors; the safeguard of the society but also of the individual subjected to the program (safeguarding principle); transparency of means and aims (despite the necessary confidentiality of certain delicate dynamics); and, last but not least, territoriality (because radicalization dynamics change significantly, and must be faced differently, according to the territory)\textsuperscript{337}.

The work of the “Antiterrorism Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadi Extremism” has had a significant impact on the text of the draft law on “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadi extremism”. Indeed, the text approved by the Chamber on June 2017 has been dramatically amended to incorporate the recommendations of the Committee. The new text, which is still waiting for the Senate’s approval, provisions first of all the institution of a National Center on De-radicalization (CRAD) entitled to elaborate a yearly National Strategic Plan to prevent the processes of radicalization and to rehabilitate the people involved in radicalization phenomena\textsuperscript{338}. Secondly, the draft provides the institution of Regional Coordination Centers on Radicalization (CCR) entitled to implement the National Strategic Plan\textsuperscript{339} respecting the above-mentioned principle of territoriality. Thirdly, it is envisioned also the institution of a Parliamentary Committee to monitor radicalization and violent jihadi extremism’s phenomena. Fourthly, the article 7 plans a special training for Police Forces, Armed Forces, Prison Service, national and local defenders of prisoners’ rights, teachers and schools directors, universities employees, socio-sanitary and social services workers and police employees at local level. Then, the article 8 and 9 respectively provision the

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{336} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{338} Chamber of Deputies, Law Drafn.3558-A.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid.
creation of school preventive interventions and graduation and post-Graduation projects to train specialized professionals. Moreover, the draft includes “communication and information activities” and projects “to develop informative campaigns, via multimedia platforms in different languages” \[340\], the realization of such campaigns has to involve actors from both the public and the private sector, and a special role is provisioned for the national channels (RAI, Radiotelevisione Italiana Spa) entitled to “realize a specific multimedia platform to broadcast information and education programs both in Italian and in Arabic” \[341\]. Finally, the text provides the Ministry of Justice with the task of drafting a “National Plan for the rehabilitation and the de-radicalization of the prisoners and the sectioned” to guarantee them “with a penitentiary treatment aimed at their reeducation and reintegration in the society” \[342\]. To do this the jail system administrators are entitled to hire terrorism and radicalization experts \[343\].

This draft law and its contents, according to Lorenzo Vidino, result innovative only in Italy where programs on radicalization’s prevention have not yet been experimented \[344\]. The same view is the one taken by Luigi Soreca, the Director for the Internal Security at the European Commission, who thinks that the debate emerged in the country as a consequence of the draft has finally brought Italy to participate in a discussion that in the rooms of the European Institutions is ongoing from 2011 \[345\]. Yet, the approval of the draft from the Senate cannot be taken for granted because the majority in this chamber is precarious. Indeed, on one side, the topic has broken the political arena because of the view that “repressive measures are rightwing, while the preventive ones are leftwing” \[346\]; on the other side, and more significantly, the resources to be allocated to this project are struggling to be considered a priority for the country’s expenditure. However, there is the opportunity to accede the funds provided by the European Union to finance de-radicalization programs: recently Europe has earmarked 6 million euros for this purpose, and 2018 will be “the year of radicalization’s prevention” in terms of resources’ allocation \[347\]. Therefore, it is crucial that Italy becomes able to present projects good enough to get the funds, because the money goes to the best projects and so far other European countries have done dramatically better \[348\].

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340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid.
345 Luigi Soreca, *Conference “Measures to prevent radicalization and violent Islamic jihadi extremism”*. 
346 Andrea Manciulli, *Conference “Measures to prevent radicalization and violent Islamic jihadi extremism”*. 
347 Luigi Soreca, *Conference “Measures to prevent radicalization and violent Islamic jihadi extremism”*. 
348 Ibid.
In conclusion, Italy is taking its first uncertain steps toward a national strategy to prevent radicalization and the Senate’s approval of the draft on “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism” is necessary to make these efforts real. Yet, it is important to underline that another important element to prevent the spread of jihadist extremism is the dialogue with the Muslims’ representatives in the country, because the Islamic organizations can play a key role in avoiding the radicalization’s escalation and diffusion. We will see in the following paragraph that the Italian dialogue with Islam has started from several years and that, in more recent times, has also made significant progresses.

The dialogue with Islam: toward a Constitutional agreement

The involvement of Islamic organizations in preventing radicalization is crucial for the policies aimed at countering the jihadist extremism. Indeed, the dialogue with the Muslim associations, which have a greater credibility with the key Muslim constituencies, is useful to promote a version of Islam compatible with the legal order of western countries, to develop imams familiar with the western culture and traditions, and to ensure an effective monitoring grasp at the local level. Thus, several European countries have encouraged a greater dialogue with Muslim associations, often struggling with the question of what types of organization to engage in order to achieve better results. From the early 2000s, also Italy has taken this path in the light of the fact that the Constitution provides that all religions other than the Catholic one have to sign an intesa (accord/agreement) with the State in order to be recognized and to receive legal and financial benefits. As stated in the previous chapter, the fact that Islam still lacks this agreement is to be found in the lack of a unified leadership in the Italian Muslim community, and has led to the paradoxical situation that the country’s second religion has not yet been recognized as such by the State. After almost 17 years of dialogue with the Italian Islam, the Italian authorities have not yet signed the necessary intesa; however, they seem to have reached a good point in the negotiation with the ratification of the “National Pact for an Italian Islam”, which is the first document submitting both the State and a large number of associations to several commitments, some of them crucial to prevent radicalization.

The history of the dialogue between the Italian authorities and the Islamic organizations can be traced back to the early 90s, when various groups submitted the first proposals for reaching an agreement with the State. The Centro Culturale Islamico d’Italia (Rome’s Islamic Cultural Center) did so in 1993, The Associazione Musulmani Italiani (AMI- Italian Muslim Association) in 1994, and the

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349 Lorenzo Vidino Islam, Islamism and Jihadism in Italy.
Comunità Religiosa Islamica (Coreis- Islamic Religious Community) in 1996\textsuperscript{350}. All these proposals have been rejected by different Italian governments because the proponents were not considered able to legitimately claim to represent the majority of Italian Muslims\textsuperscript{351}. The Italian authorities faced the opposite problem in rejecting the several proposals of the Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d’Italia (UCOII- Union of the Islamic Communities of Italy), which is considered the Italian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the largest Islamic association in Italy, therefore the most representative. However, the UCOII asked to be the sole representative of the Italian Muslims and signing an \textit{intesa} with them would have meant giving them a virtual monopoly that would never be accepted by the other organizations\textsuperscript{352}. Moreover, the Italian authorities considered some of the requests advanced by UCOII to be excessive, and others unacceptable because incompatible with the country’s legal framework\textsuperscript{353}. In 2000, the UCOII tried another way in: it constituted an Islamic Council of Italy, in which 50% out of the 10 members were UCOII exponents and the rest came from other organizations; yet, political rivalries with the organizations excluded from the council (Coreis, in particular) created the chaos, and also this experience did not lead anywhere\textsuperscript{354}. After these failed attempts, the Italian institutions took another more proactive approach to Islam, trying to directly channel the negotiations for the agreement via the “institutionalization of the dialogue with Islam”.

In 2005, the then Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu, after months of consultations and research, created the \textit{Consulta per l’Islam Italiano} (Council for Italian Islam), an advising body composed by 16 members from the main Islamic organizations chosen by the Ministry itself\textsuperscript{355}. The \textit{Consulta} was supposed to deliver opinions and proposals on the issues pointed by the Ministry of Interior, with the purpose to favor the integration of Islamic communities\textsuperscript{356}. Moreover, the \textit{Consulta} had to work with the prospect of forming an Italian Islam, compatible with the principles of the Italian Constitution and legal order\textsuperscript{357}. The creation of this organ represented a watershed in the relation between the Islamic communities and the State, which both could finally contribute constructively.

\textsuperscript{350} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{354} Silvio Calzolari, “\textit{Reflecting on the Pact for an Italian Islam}” (“\textit{Riflessioni sul Patto per un Islam Italiano}”), Freedom Of Belief, 2017. Available at: https://freedomofbelief.net/it/articoli/riflessioni-sul-patto-per-un-islam-italiano
\textsuperscript{355} Lorenzo Vidino Islam, Islamism and Jihadism in Italy.
\textsuperscript{356} “\textit{The composition of the Consulta}” (“\textit{La Composizione della Consulta}”), Historical Archive of the Ministry of Interior (Archivio storico del Ministero dell’Interno). Available at: http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/app_notizia_220_30.html
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid.
to the legal recognition of Islam\textsuperscript{358}. In 2006, the then Interior Minister Giuliano Amato readjusted the Consulta’s tasks, posing peculiar attention to integration in order to avoid any ghettoization and radicalization’s risk\textsuperscript{359}. Then, on 2008 April the 23\textsuperscript{rd}, seven Consulta’s members took an initiative full of political significance\textsuperscript{360}: after the emergence of radical positions inside the organ itself, they presented to the Interior Ministry the 	extit{Federazione dell’Islam Italiano} (Federation of the Italian Islam) based on the principles of moderation and pluralism and recognizing the secular nature of the state, the gender equality and rejecting any form of violence and terrorism\textsuperscript{361}. The initiators of this initiative were Yahya Pallavicini (Coreis), Mario Scialoja (Muslim World League) Soaud Sbai, Gilshan Antivalle, Mohamed Saady, Ejaz Ahmad, Younis Tawfik and, later, Abdallah Redouane (the general secretary of Rome’s Mosque). They opposed the radical views of some UCOII’s members, which led to the Consulta’s inactivity from 2006 onwards.

The controversies among the Islamic organizations that led to the experience of the Federazione had been already identified as an obstacle by the Ministry of the Interior Giuliano Amato, who decided to form a Comitato Scientifico (Scientific Committee) entitled to write a 	extit{Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’immigrazione} (Charter of citizenship and immigration’s values) for all the Islamic organizations operating on the Italian soil\textsuperscript{362}. The Charter was adopted by administrative decree of the Interior Ministry in 2007, yet the Scientific Committee’s work went on elaborating a “Report on Islamic Presence in Italy”, which was published in 2008\textsuperscript{363}.

On 2010 February the 10\textsuperscript{th}, the former Interior Minister Roberto Maroni established a new organ, the Comitato per l’Islam Italiano (Committee for Italian Islam). The new committee was again a consultative organ, yet it was constituted by both Islamic associations’ members and experts such as academics, jurists, sociologists and journalists. In addition, radical Islamic associations such as UCOII were excluded from this new experience\textsuperscript{364}. The committee worked mainly on topics of integration and security, dealing with several issues, among which the most important were the one of imams’ training, mosques’ surveillance and full Islamic veil\textsuperscript{365}.

In 2012, the then Ministry of International Cooperation and Integration, Andrea Riccardi, instituted the Conferenza permanente su Religioni, Cultura e integrazione (Permanent Conference on Religions

\textsuperscript{358} Yahya Pallavicini, \textit{The role of the Islamic Communities, Il Ruolo delle comunità Islamiche}. In: Lorenzo Vidino, Lorenzo Vidino, “Italy and terrorism at home: what to do? ”.

\textsuperscript{359} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{361} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{362} Silvio Calzolari, “Reflecting on the Pact for an Italian Islam”.

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{365} Ibid.
Culture and integration), to which members from all the religions present in Italy took part. The Muslim exponents joined this new organ forming the Conferenza per l’Islam Italiano (Conference for Italian Islam) composed by members of 250 different moderate organizations recognizing the secular nature of the state and other values, very similar to the ones written in the above-mentioned Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’immigrazione.

The following significant step in the dialogue with Italian Islam was taken by the former Minister of the Interior Angelino Alfano, who in 2016 established a Consiglio per le relazioni con l’Islam (Council for the relations with Islam), which is a board of experts with consultative functions dealing with issues that have to do with the presence of the Islamic communities on the Italian territory\textsuperscript{366}. The works of this council have led to the ratification of the Patto Nazionale per un’Islam Italiano (National pact for an Italian Islam) that took place on 2017 February the 1st\textsuperscript{367}. The Pact consists of 10 points and commits both the Islamic Organizations and the Interior Ministry to respect them\textsuperscript{368}. The representatives of the Islamic Organizations involved commit themselves to:

1) facilitate the development and the strengthening of the dialogue and confrontation with the Italian Interior Ministry, with the contribution of the Council for the relationship with Italian Islam\textsuperscript{369};

2) continue the actions aimed at contrasting religious radicalization, also providing the authorities and the institutions tools to interpreter the radicalization phenomenon\textsuperscript{370};

3) promote a process of juridical organization of the Islamic associations respectful of the existing legislation on religious freedom and of the principles of the Italian legal system\textsuperscript{371};

4) promote the education of imams and religious leaders who can be employed by Italian institutions as mediators to ensure the full implementation of the principles of pacific coexistence, secular nature of the State, legality, gender equality, in a context characterized by confessional and cultural pluralism\textsuperscript{372};


\textsuperscript{367} “Signed at Viminale the ‘National Pact for an Italian Islam’. ”("Al Viminale firmato il ’Patto Nazionale per un Islam Italiano’."). Adnkronos, 2017. Available at: http://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/cronaca/2017/02/01/viminale-firmato-patto-nazionale-per-islam-italiano_v2Ne0e8kphNDSi4UL0rkK.html

\textsuperscript{368} National Pact for an Italian Islam, expression of an open and integrated community, adhering to the values and the principles of the rule of law” (“Patto nazionale per un Islam Italiano, espressione di una comunità aperta integrata e aderente ai valori e principi dell’ordinamento statale”), Ministry of Interior (Ministero dell’Interno), 2017. Available at: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/patto_nazionale_per_un_islam_italiano_1.2.2017.pdf

\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{371} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{372} Ibid.
5) Continue the organization of public events aimed at implementing the efficacy of intercultural dialogue. These events must both enhance the contribution of Islamic tradition to Italian society and promote the integration of Muslim immigrants contrasting the phenomenon of religious radicalization. In this context, the cooperation with Italian institutions and the contribution of young Muslim generations are crucial.373

6) Facilitate the implementation of the necessary prerequisites to reach a constitutional agreement (in particular, working to make the organizations’ statutes in compliance with the Italian Constitution)374;

7) Continue the commitment to guarantee that the worship places’ standards are respectful of the Italian laws and can be visited by non-Muslim visitors to promote the dialogue with the local civil society375;

8) Facilitate the relationship of Italian institutions and civil society with the Islamic associations, publishing the names and addresses of imams, religious leaders and people who can mediate between their own communities and the surrounding civil society376;

9) Take the concrete necessary steps to hold the Friday’s sermon in Italian, or at least to translate it, without prejudice to the original rite. The same must be done for the ordinary communications about the communities or associations377;

10) Ensure the highest level of transparency about the documentation dealing with financing coming from Italy and from abroad to manage the worship places, or to build new ones378.

On the other side, the Interior Ministry commits itself to take all the steps necessary to create the “prodromal conditions” to start the negotiations of the intesa necessary for the legal recognition of Islam, as provided by the article 8 of the Italian Constitution379.

In conclusion, after almost 20 years of dialogue with Islam, the Italian authorities have not yet signed the constitutional intesa necessary for making Islam a full-fledged Italian religion. Yet, the signature of the “National Pact for an Italian Islam” represents a first concrete step in that direction, and a great achievement in terms of fight against extremism. Indeed, the pact has been signed by 11 associations (including the UCOII), which represent the 70% (1.5 million) of the Muslims living in Italy380. It is very relevant and new that so many associations, some of them in conflict between

373 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
each other in the past, have subscribed this agreement, which commit them to take concrete actions to counter the spread of radicalization. However, 30% of the Italian Muslims remain outside the agreement and there are arguments from some that their perceived exclusion could lead them toward radical positions. Moreover, with regard to the negotiations to sign a constitutional agreement with the State, there are still many controversies among the several organizations that could represent a serious impeding factor to the stipulation of the intesa. Indeed, the option of “more than one agreement” between the State and different Islamic organizations is one of the most recurrent in the meetings dealing with this issue. All of these considerations reflect the difficulties that also other European countries are facing in trying to build a sole interlocutor for a national Muslim community, because Islam is a religion pluralistic in its nature. There is no doubt that a lot of work is still to be done; yet, Italy seems to have reached a good point so far, because 70% of the Islamic organizations are now committed to take proactive actions in countering radicalization.

Experiments of radicalization’s prevention in Italy

As explained into details above, Italy has not yet implemented a strategy to prevent radicalization, yet the authorities are taking the first steps toward a comprehensive approach to fight against extremism in recent times. Nonetheless, a few civil society and religious associations’ initiatives have been experimented in the last years especially as a response to the European Union’s encouragement to take actions aimed at preventing radicalization. Indeed, Italy participates in the European Commission’s project called “Radicalization Awareness Network” (RAN) aimed at creating a network of experts and operators involved in activities to counter radicalization. A few projects have been funded and experimented so far, especially in the detention and education fields. Moreover, there are activities that do not openly mention the fight against radicalization in their objectives, which however deserve to be pointed as Italian best practices against radicalization.

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381 Silvio Calzolari, “Reflecting on the Pact for an Italian Islam”.
Among these, the interreligious dialogue’s initiatives of the Catholic Church seem to be the most consolidated because they are in place since a long time. This paragraph will provide some examples of the activities implemented in Italy so far to prevent radicalization. First of all, two experimental projects recently implemented in the prison system will be presented; secondly, two education projects realized by the civil society and financed by the European Union will be explained; and finally, the interreligious dialogue’s activity of the Catholic Church will be analyzed and special attention will be focused on an educational project for students, which seems to be the most comprehensive because it is conceived to be implemented at national level.

To begin with the prison system, despite the fact that the phenomenon of radicalization in prison is well known, Italy has not yet implemented anything else than two pilot programs, which are also very recent and therefore difficult to be assessed. In Italy out of almost 11thousands Muslim prisoners, 375 are at risk of radicalization: 170 out of them have been arrested on radical proselytism related charges, 80 are receiving a special attention because they have shown behavioral radicalization’s signs, and 125 have been reported as having close relationships with radical detainees. To avoid a further spread of radicalization providing spiritual advice by selected imams seems to be crucial. Therefore the DAP (the Italian Prison Service) has launched a pilot project in collaboration with UCOII aimed at gradually introducing selected spiritual leaders in the prison system. This activity started at the beginning of the year 2017 and is an experiment involving almost 1000 convicted from 8 different prisons in northern Italy (Torino, Cremona, Modena, Sollicciano a Firenze, San Vittore a Milano, Bollate, Canton Mombello e Verona). UCOII has selected 12 imams who have received authorization from the Ministry of Justice; out of them four are women and each one deals with almost 100 prisoners. According to the UCOII itself the feedbacks collected so far are positive: in the beginning there were suspicions especially toward the women, yet then the detainees have accepted them. Ensuring the exercise of the prisoners’ civil rights is a strong tool to fight against radicalization and doing so through the UCOII, which is the most important Islamic organization in Italy, decrease the suspicions that some prisoners have

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388 Ibid.
389 Goffredo Buccini, “The female imam of the prisons”.
390 “Preventing radicalization in prison”.
toward the spiritual leaders sent by the authorities. Yet, there have been also several criticism raised by the project. First of all, many people think that UCOII’s imams are not reliable because several members from this organization, which is tightly connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, have expressed and keep on expressing radical views. In addition, other organizations that have not been involved in the project feel to be excluded and are worried about a future monopoly of prisons’ spiritual leaders who, being connected to the UCOII, could diffuse a Salafi version of the Quran. The second project, taking place in the Italian prison system, is an educational program aimed at teaching religious pluralism to the detainees. The course has been already experimented for one year on prison officers and is promoted by Coreis (Islamic Religious Community), several Catholic organizations and the Milan’s Jewish Community. The project, which is financed by Fondazione Cariplo (an Italian bank foundation) has been enlarged to the convicted since March 2017 and is being experimented in 9 Lombardy’s prisons. It consists of three days lectures on different religious habits and rites aimed at promoting the peaceful coexistence and the respect for diversity. It is important to underline that the effectiveness of both these programs cannot yet be assessed because they have been in place for a few months. In addition they are experimental and have nothing to do with a national strategy aimed at countering radicalization in the prison system, which is instead included in the draft law on “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadi extremism” analyzed in the previous paragraph.

Also at European level, Italy has not yet almost taken steps to get the funds available to fight against radicalization. Indeed, excluding a project promoted by the DAP (Italian Prison Service) in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice to teach the basics of radicalization’s phenomenon to the

391 Ibid.
393 Maryan Ismail in: Alberto Giannoni, “More controls are needed, with bad teachers the fanatism is spreading” (“Servono più controlli con i cattivi maestri si diffonde il fanatismo”), II Giornale, 2017. Available at: http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/servono-pi-controlli-i-cattivi-maestri-si-diffonde-fanatismo-1351813.html
395 “Thanks to CEM, the Curia and Coreis the project to prevent terrorism in prison has started. Davide Romano ‘We made it’.” (“Grazie a CEM, Curia e Coreis parte il progetto di prevenzione del terrorismo nelle carceri. Davide Romano: ‘Ce l’abbiamo fatta.’”), Mosaico, 2017. Available at: http://www.mosaico-cem.it/articoli/primopiano/grazie-cem-curia-coreis-parte-progetto-prevenzione-del-terrorismo-nelle-carceri-davide-romano-ce-labbiamo-fatta
396 Zita Dazzi, “Religious pluralism behind bars.”
397 Ibid.
prison officers\textsuperscript{398}, only a couple of projects have deserved to be funded by the European Commission so far. The first one is the three years “Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project” (YEIP) and has been presented in March 2017: it involves 20 organizations from 8 different member states; the association “Anziani e non solo” and the Liguria region, in collaboration with the Interdepartmental Research Centre on Discrimination and Vulnerabilities (CRID), represent Italy\textsuperscript{399}. YEIP is aimed at designing a positive policy prevention framework for tackling and preventing marginalization and violent radicalization among young people in different European states. A key factor is the direct participation of young people in the construction and testing of innovative policy intervention models, which should favor the development of positive identities through the promotions of the talents and strengths of vulnerable young people\textsuperscript{400}. The second project, “Global Education and Active Response for the Protection of Human Rights, Inclusion and Democratic Values in Intercultural Societies”, has started also in 2017 and is deemed to last two years\textsuperscript{401}. It is promoted by the association Gruppo di Solidarietà Internazionale (GSI- International Solidarity Group): its general objective is to prevent violent radicalization and to promote democratic values, fundamental rights, intercultural understanding and active citizenship through the co-operation of civil society organizations with formal education systems, teachers and students\textsuperscript{402}. So far, with the available resources, it has been possible to provide national training for 20 teachers and educators, and 3 days transnational exchange and education training\textsuperscript{403}. Yet GSI is still collecting money through crowd funding to train young promoters of tolerance and interculturalism, and to realize exchange experiences among the schools involved in the program\textsuperscript{404}. Besides these two projects, there have been in Italy other few cases of educational and research programs co-financed by the European Union or financed entirely by actors from the private sector. However, overall it seems that Italy has still to improve its ability to present projects deserving to be financed by the European Institutions, especially in the light of the fact that more and more funds are being provided to develop similar programs.

\textsuperscript{398} Damiano Aliprandi, “At the start a European project against radicalization” (“Al via un progetto europeo contro la radicalizzazione”), Il Dubbio, 2017. Available at: http://www.ristretti.org/Le-Notizie-di-Ristretti/al-via-un-progetto-europeo-contro-la-radicalizzazione


\textsuperscript{400} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{401} GEAR, Global Education and Active Response for the Protection of Human Rights, Inclusion and Democratic Values in Intercultural Societies, GSI Italia, 2017. Available at: https://www.gsitalia.org/en/attivita/gear/

\textsuperscript{402} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{403} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{404} Ibid.
Besides projects specifically focused on fighting against radicalization, in Italy there are a lot of initiatives aimed at social inclusion and integration, reciprocal knowledge of different cultures and so on. Many of these activities came up as a consequence of the several immigration influxes to which the country has been subjected in the last years and they are run at local level by different social organization of minor or major importance. Among these, the interreligious dialogue activities run by the Catholic Church seem to be the most experimented and the most comprehensive in promoting reciprocal knowledge among the different cultures and religions meant to fight against potential incomprehension and misunderstandings. It was in 1964 that Pope Paul VI instituted a special department of the Roman Curia for relations with the people of other religions. Known at first as the Secretariat for Non Christians, in 1988 it was renamed the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue (PCID)\textsuperscript{405}. From 1974, the PCID has also a special commission for relations with Muslims\textsuperscript{406}. Although the PCID is the central office for dialogue in the Catholic Church, dialogue is mainly carried out in and through the local churches\textsuperscript{407}. Many local churches have dialogue commissions, at the national or regional level. The PCID works in close collaboration with these, and encourages their formation where they do not yet exist\textsuperscript{408}. Leaving on a side all the activities carried out to promote the theological debate with the Muslims, there are also many initiatives involving directly citizens and non-citizens. Indeed, according to the Church guidelines, the interreligious dialogue has to include also “the dialogue of life” and “the dialogue of actions”, which are aimed at involving both believers and non-believers to create a positive relationship among the different cultures and religions to better understand each other, leave peacefully together and implement shared activities and projects\textsuperscript{409}. Therefore the Catholic organizational network promotes and carries out several local and national initiatives aimed at improving the religious reciprocal understanding. The most systematic among these seems to be the one of the “Centro Astalli”, the Italian branch of the “Servizio Gesuiti per I Rifugiati”, an international non-governmental organization (INGO) with a mission to accompany, serve, and advocate for the rights of refugees and forcibly displaced people. The project “Incontri” (encounters) is an initiative proposing to schools director to implement periodical meetings aimed at acknowledging the students about

\textsuperscript{405} The Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, La Santa Sede. Available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/interelg/documents/rc_pc_interelg_pro_20051996_en.html

\textsuperscript{406} Pietro Paolo Parolin, “Interreligious dialogue as the basis for an outlook of peace” (“Il dialogo interreligioso come base di una prospettiva di pace”), L’Osservatore Romano, 2016. Available at: http://www.osservatoreromano.it/news/il-dialogo-interreligioso-come-base-di-una-prospett

\textsuperscript{407} The Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue.

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid.

religious differences, therefore promoting reciprocal understanding among the youngest generations. Among the activities included in the program, there are teachers education sessions, visits to different places of worship, lectures by representatives of different religions, and musical, food, art and cinema itineraries. From the author point of view, the strength of the project is in its format, designed to be implemented at national level. The program seems also to be very successful; indeed, the requests to adhere to “Incontri” have been many for the year 2017-2018 and came from all over the country.

In conclusion, it seems that Italian delay in preventing radicalization is not limited to the lack of a national strategy to fight against extremism. Indeed, also the experimental projects implemented so far are all very recent, difficult to be assessed in their effectiveness and very limited in scope. Moreover, they are focused on the educational and prison systems and they do not yet cover the most dangerous radicalization hub, which is the Internet. In addition, most of them involves only local communities and are not designed to be implemented at national level. Indeed, among the project analyzed, only the one from Centro Astalli, as well as those experimented in the prison system, are easily implementable on the entire national soil. Of course, the Centro Astalli’s resources cannot cover the needs of all the Italian schools, yet is the format of the project that has to be considered as a best practice, despite the fact that it is not specifically focused on radicalization. Indeed, it is easy for the schools directors interested in the program to contact the organization and to ask for their school participating. Also the UCOII imams’ selection for the prison system is easily enlargeable to other prisons; yet, a wider project should include also the other Islamic organizations not to raise criticisms and rivalries. Overall, it seems urgent that Italy makes an effort to develop the skills necessary to get the European funds for radicalization prevention. Indeed, so far the number of projects financed by the European Commission in the country is very low, despite the fact that the Union is increasing the resources allocated to counter radicalization. Moreover, because of the fact that the prevention of extremism is not among the governmental expenditure’s priority, it is even more necessary that the institutions, the civil society and the religious associations make an effort to get these funds. Even after the possible approval of the draft law on “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadi extremism”, the limited resources allocated could foreseeably impede the effective implementation of this national strategy. Indeed, budget concerns are currently the main obstacle to the approval of the law. The European Union funds make possible to overcome this obstacle, it is just necessary to improve the skills to get them developing a “prevention culture”.

Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed into details the embryonic status of radicalization’s prevention in Italy. From the analysis, it emerges clearly that the country is moving its first steps toward the implementation of terrorism preventive measures only in recent times and that the process is still slow and full of obstacles. Indeed, so far the authorities have not considered radicalization’s prevention a priority of the governmental agenda mainly because the level of radicalization in Italy is still very low compared to the other European countries. Moreover, even now that the necessity of preventive measures not to loose the country’s radicalization advantage has been clearly assessed by several analysis and intelligence’s reports, the authorities find difficult to accelerate the approval and the implementation of programs aimed at preventing extremism, mainly because of budget constraints. Indeed, expenditure’s concerns are obstacles to be surmounted in order to get approved the draft law on “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadi extremism” that has been already passed by the Chamber, but is still waiting for the Senate’s green light. Nevertheless, the fact that the government has established a Research Committee on Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism Phenomenon, which worked to help the politicians in amending the draft law and which will keep on working to advise the government, is a clear sign that the authorities have understood the necessity of a national strategy to prevent radicalization. Yet, Italy seems to lack also the culture of preventing radicalization: indeed, so far the number of programs experimented is very limited and a very few projects to counter radicalization have been financed by the European Commission in the country, despite the fact that over the years the Union is allocating more and more resources to this objective. It seems urgent that the authorities improve both the promotion of similar projects and the skills to design projects that deserve to be founded, because the European funds are among the easiest accessible means to accelerate the implementation of the radicalization preventive measures and to spread a culture of terrorism prevention around the country. It seems also important that the projects are designed in a format able to be implemented at national level, so that the gap with other European countries that are running preventive programs since decades can be quickly filled. Despite all of these problem and despite the enormous delay in designing and executing a strategy to counter the spread of jihadi extremism, the country seems to have performed well so far in the dialogue with the Islamic

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410 Andrea Manciulli, Conference “Measures to prevent radicalization and violent Islamic jihadi extremism”.
associations and in pushing them to take commitments in the fight against radicalization. Indeed, the “National Pact for an Italian Islam” has been signed by the Interior Ministry and by 11 Islamic organizations, representing the 70% of the Muslims residing in the country. Moreover, the pact commits the Islamic associations to take several concrete actions to tackle the spread of jihadi extremism in cooperation with the Italian authorities. This is particularly significant in the light of the fact that the religious organizations themselves are the most reliable interlocutor in the eyes of the Muslim communities and, therefore, probably also the most effective actors in the fight against radicalization.

Overall, there are no doubts that the Italian counterterrorism system is still unbalanced because it consists of a lot of repressive measures and of almost no preventive ones. Yet, the authorities seem to have understood the necessity to fix this unbalance and are moving the first slow steps to do so. The path toward an Italian approach to counter jihadi extremism seems to have privileged the dialogue with Islam and the involvement of Muslim organizations so far: if the Islamic organizations keep their promises, this approach could lead toward unexpected positive results. Thus, the Italian delay could be turned into an opportunity. Yet, it is necessary to act quickly to overcome the budget constraints impeding the implementation of a national strategy to counter extremism, otherwise Italy could rapidly become the next France or United Kingdom in terms of radicalization, loosing the advantage that, so far, has kept its citizens safe.
Summary

This paper has analyzed the status of radicalization and de-radicalization in Italy from a broad perspective, including the level of jihadi extremism in the country, the issue of Muslim immigration, the complex -mainly repressive- regulatory system aimed at countering the spread of the jihadist ideology and the still embryonic de-radicalization approach which is currently being discussed by the Italian authorities.

The first part of the paper has listed the factors determining the Italian “advantage” in terms of radicalization, namely those elements making Italy one of the less radicalized countries among the European member states. From the analysis conducted two, among several, emerge as the main factors determining this “advantage”: namely, the absence of a large population of second-generation Muslim immigrants, who are those more exposed to the risk of radicalization, and the effective repressive legal tools in the hand of the Italian counterterrorism authorities. These two factors have been the central focus of the following two chapters of the research.

The second section is, indeed, dedicated to a historical and sociological analysis of the Muslim immigration toward the country, from which it emerges that Italy is not yet a country of second-generation immigrants because it become a destination for migrants only in the late 80s and early 90s. Yet, the situation is changing because the second-generation individuals are coming of age and, despite among them only a minor percentage could in the future represent a threat for the country, those who will do so are relevant to the authorities, which should get ready to tackle the problem.

In this respect, the Italian politics is currently dominated by a heated debate between those who want to grant the birthright citizenship to the children of the immigrants born on the Italian soil, favoring their integration and consequently eliminating grievances that could increase the radicalization level, and those who instead believe that a similar decision would weaken the ability of the authorities to expel radicals from the country, which is especially guaranteed by the “preventive expulsions system” allowing the Italian authorities to expel from the country non-citizens on national-security grounds by administrative decree. Thus, there is a clear tension between legal tools aimed at integrating the immigrants and those meant to repress illegal immigration, which shows that there can be conflicts between policies aimed at preventing and at repressing terrorism. Considering the current situation, it seems to be too early for the Italian authorities to make a choice between the two. Indeed, before renouncing to an effective measure such the one of “preventive administrative expulsions”, would be better to implement and test a just as effective counter radicalization national strategy.
The third chapter has dealt with the Italian complex regulatory system regulating the repression of radicalization and of terrorism, which is composed not only by actual counterterrorism laws, but also by Constitutional laws regulating the relationship between the State and the religions confessions different from the Catholic one, as well as by immigration laws providing tools allowing the authorities to expel the radical immigrants with no need of clean bill nor confirm by the jurisdictional authority and with no suspension in case of appeal \(^{411}\) (above mentioned as “preventive administrative expulsions”). From the analysis of these measures it emerges that, despite the Italian system aimed at repressing terrorism and radicalization is extremely effective, there are still threats that it is not able to tackle. In particular, there are not designed procedures for the citizens’ pre-criminal phase, which are crucial in fighting radicalization. Therefore, the traditional measures of anti-terrorism, such as arrests and expulsions, must be completed by policies aimed at preventing radicalization itself through non-repressive actions.

The conclusive section of the paper has, indeed, investigated the most recent steps the Italian authorities are taking to elaborate an approach to de-radicalization to be implemented in the country. These efforts include both a draft law provisioning “Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism” and a decades long work of institutional dialogue with the Islamic associations aimed at involving them in the fight against radicalization. Few are, instead, the civil society and religious associations’ initiatives that have been experimented in the last years especially as a response to the European Union’s encouragement to take actions aimed at preventing radicalization.

Overall, it seems that that the country is moving its first steps toward the implementation of terrorism preventive measures only in recent times and that the process is still slow and full of obstacles especially because of budget constraints impeding the Italian authorities from inserting the de-radicalization measures among the governmental priorities. This delay, from one side, constitute an opportunity because the Italian authorities have been engaged in a positive dialogue with the representatives of the Muslim communities in the country, obtaining from them legally binding their commitments in the fight against extremism. Yet, this continuous postponement in provisioning, approving and implementing a comprehensive strategy aimed at tackling with radicalization seems to be a short sighted choice, because the key factors determining the Italian advantage in terms of jihadi extremism are about to fade away. If no de-radicalization strategy is

\(^{411}\) Counterterrorism: the 2005 decree law n.144
implemented, Italy could rapidly become the next France or United Kingdom in terms of radicalization, loosing the advantage that, so far, has kept its citizens safe.
Appendix

Appendix 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence in defence of Islam can be justified</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A recent statistical survey conducted by Michele Groppi reveals that out of 440 Muslim subjects residing in Italy, surveyed between November 2015 and August 2016, the 50% agreed that theocratic rule is better than democracy.\(^{412}\)

In addition, 24% of the Groppis sample stated violence in the defense of Islam is justifiable.\(^{413}\)

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\(^{413}\) Ibid.
A more recent statistical investigation conducted by the IPR Marketing, an institute specialized in market researches and public opinion surveys, has revealed that there is not a standard profile for the Italian Muslim migrants with regard to integration. Indeed, the perceived integration varies significantly according to the age: the most among the youngest feel or at least would like to be part of the Italian society, while the oldest are neither interested in integration.

Thus, among the elder people (over 54), only 3% affirms to feel integrated and 70% do not only perceive themselves as not integrated into the Italian society, but also have no intention or desire to work for it. The results are very different for the young migrants: 45 % of them feels to be part of the Italian society, and the rest is equally divided between those who want to integrate and those who do not.

Overall, 6 Muslim migrants out of 10 have declared not to perceive themselves as integrated, and the most concerning result is that one third out of them does not want to integrate, while 28% would like to do so but is not able.

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414 Muslims in Italy: the exclusive survey of Ipr Marketing.  
415 Ibid.  
416 Ibid.  
417 Ibid.
The same is true for the migrants declaring to have Italian friends; they are 61% among the youngest, and only the 19% among the over54\textsuperscript{418}.

From the questions dealing with terrorism and Jihadism it emerges that The 28% understands the

\textsuperscript{418} Ibid.
reasons of the terrorists (58% among the over54), only 1% of them agree on the use of weapons (but the 8% chose not to answer the question) and 64% condemns terrorism\(^\text{419}\).

The 33% of the interviewed thinks that Islam should conquer the West (47% of the over 54 and 31% of the youngest).

\(^{419}\) Ibid.
The 38% of the interviewed would like that politics is ruled by religion (the percentage rises to 53% among the over54, and 19% of the interviewed decided not to answer the question)\textsuperscript{420}. 

\textsuperscript{420} Ibid.
According to the Italian Interior Ministry, between 2011 and 2014, 87 foreign fighters fled the country to fight in Syria and Iraq. Since then, the increase in departures accelerated and the number of foreign fighters has been estimated to be 122 in May 2017, 125 in the middle of the summer 2017 and 129 in June 2018. Despite the phenomenon’s rapid increase, the number of foreign fighters leaving Italy is very small when compared to the other Western European countries, like Germany (910), France (1910), United Kingdom (850) and Belgium (478).

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421 Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, *Fear Thy Neighbor*.
422 “August 2017 Ministry of the Interior Dossier”
423 Ibid.
424 Francesco Marone, Lorenzo Vidino, “Destination Jihad: Foreign Fighters of Italy”.
425 Daniel H. Heinke, “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: The Updated Data and its Implications”.
426 Richard Barret, “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees.”
427 Ibid.
428 Ibid.
The expansion of IS into South East Asia is also likely to lead to regional recruits joining it there. Fighters from elsewhere appeared in the IS-led battle for Marawi in Southern Philippines, and given the numbers of radicalized men, women and children in South East Asia, active recruiting efforts by IS in the area will present the authorities there with a serious challenge.

Table: Foreign Fighters who have gone to Syria or Iraq (II) have stepped up, departed from, drifted away or, in some cases, been returned by Turkey (II) or remains fighting. As of: 5 May 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NW</th>
<th>ETA</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>08/2016</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>16/2016</td>
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<td>02/2017</td>
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<td>03/2017</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1,421</td>
<td>135</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
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<td>05/2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>630</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>895</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/2016</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2,44</td>
<td>766</td>
<td></td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Asia</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>03/2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>07/2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>06/2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td>08/2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>02/2017</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>02/2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>530</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>08/2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>630</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>03/2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>629</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>03/2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>630</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>05/2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the end of July 2017, the Italian Ministry of Interior estimated that the number of foreign fighters who fled from Italy was 125 and that out of them 37 died and 22 have already came back to Europe.\textsuperscript{430}

\textsuperscript{430} "August 2017 Ministry of the Interior Dossier"
Despite the fact that the number of Italian returnees reported in the graph is 13 and not the actual current one (22), the chart is helpful to understand the disproportion between the number of returnees in Italy and in the other European Western countries.431

431 Maria Torres, “1,700 ISIS members have returned to their home in Europe after migrating to the ‘caliphate’.”, Salam Plan, 2017. Available at: https://salamplan.com/en/facts-figures/foreign-fighters/1700-ISIS-members-have-returned-to-their-home-in-europe-after-migrating-to-the-caliphate/20171026
Also in terms of foreign fighters per capita, Italy has comparatively lower numbers of foreign fighters (one per million capita) than Scandinavian (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) and Western (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) countries including the UK all having more than nine FF per million inhabitants. Belgium has the highest number per capita, with 41 per million inhabitants\(^{432}\).

Today, out of 2 million and 520 thousands Muslims residing in Italy, the 57% does not have Italian citizenship, while Italian citizens constitute the remaining 43%; in addition, there are 170 thousands irregular Muslim immigrants (the 40% of the total irregular immigrants).

The second-generation immigrants (not only Muslims) in Italy constitute the 2.4% of the Italian population.\textsuperscript{433}

\textsuperscript{433} Fabrizio Ciocca, Quanti sono i Musulmani in Italia? Statistiche, analisi e proiezioni, LeNius, 22nd of August 2017. Available at: https://www.lenius.it/musulmani-in-italia/

\textsuperscript{434} Ibid.
Yet, the Italian advantage in terms of second generation immigrants is rapidly diminishing: the available data demonstrate that the number of the second generation is swiftly increasing. Indeed, the Italian Education Ministry has estimated that the primary and secondary school’s students with a nationality different from the Italian one are the 9,2% of the total students’ population\textsuperscript{435}. Among them the 60% was born in Italy\textsuperscript{436}; therefore, the second generations account for, at least, the 5,4% of the Italian students’ population\textsuperscript{437}. From 2011/2012 to 2015/2016 they increased by 43,2\%\textsuperscript{438}; and just in the last year, their number raised by 6,2% (+28.093)\textsuperscript{439}.

\textsuperscript{435} Alunne e alunni stranieri, 6 su 10 sono nati in Italia. Fedeli: “Scuola e università motore dell’integrazione”, Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, 2017. Available at: http://hubmiur.pubblica.istruzione.it/web/ministero/focus300317
\textsuperscript{436} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{438} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid.
So far in Italy the numbers of the second generation is still low, but rapidly increasing despite the absence of a law on citizenship birthright (100thousands in 2013, 130thousands in 2014, 178thousands in 2015, 205thousands in 2016); therefore, the potential threat represented by the possible radicalization of some of them has to be taken into serious consideration.

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440 Enrico Di Pasquale, Andrea Stuppini e Chiara Tronchin, Diritto di cittadinanza, va bene lo ius soli per i minori ma non dimentichiamo gli adulti, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2017. Available at: https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/07/05/diritto-di-cittadinanza-va-bene-lo-ius-soli-per-i-minori-ma-non-dimentichiamo-gli-adulti/3705737/

441 Sempre più numerosi i cittadini stranieri adulti e minori che acquisiscono la cittadinanza italiana, Fondazione ISMU, 2017. Available at: http://www.ismu.org/2017/03/sempre-piu-numerosi-le-acquisizioni-cittadinanza/
From the 2017 number of repatriated people, it emerges the clear intention of the government to strengthen this tool, rather than just giving to it a new dignity. Indeed, from January to the 6th of October 2017, 82 persons have been expelled from the country because of involvement in religious extremism\textsuperscript{442}, while in the entire 2016 they were only 66. The numbers keep rising every week, and the data demonstrate that repatriations for involvement in extremism have increased by 81% in the last year\textsuperscript{443}. This numbers seem to be the result of a strengthened targeted surveillance: in fact, from January to July 2017 the Italian authorities checked 190,909 people (during the same time in 2016 the people checked were 77,691) and 65,878 vehicles (19,693 in 2016)\textsuperscript{444}. The majority of those expelled from the country are Tunisian citizens, followed by the Moroccans; also Egyptians, Pakistanis, and Kosovars are overrepresented. Three were the imams repatriated in the first seven months of 2017, and 125 the number of monitored foreign fighters\textsuperscript{445}. The choice of the Italian government to use more frequently the “preventive expulsions” seems to be dictated by the difficulties to condemn those suspected of radicalization; indeed, despite the new crimes

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & 2016 & 2017 \\
\hline
Expulsions per motivi di sicurezza & 37 & 67 \\
\hline & \textit{di cui imam} & 3 & 3 \\
\hline Extremisti arrestati\textsuperscript{*} & 25 & 29 \\
\hline Foreign fighters monitorati & 110 & 125 \\
\hline & \textit{di cui deceduti} & 32 & 37 \\
\hline & \textit{di cui rientrati in Europa} & 17 & 22 \\
\hline Persone controllate & 77,691 & 190,909 \\
\hline Veicoli controllati & 19,693 & 65,878 \\
\hline Motonavi controllate & 154 & 71 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{442} Sicurezza: espulso cittadino marocchino, Ministero dell’Interno, 2017.
\textsuperscript{444} Dossier Viminale Ferragosto 2017, Ministero dell0Interno, 2017. Available at: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/modulistica/dossier_15_agosto.pdf
\textsuperscript{445} Ibid.
introduced for those who train themselves to terrorist activities and for targeting the so-called “lone wolves”, it is still difficult to provide evidences to get the suspect condemned.\textsuperscript{446}

In general, Italy gives priority to the criminal justice system in its approach to counter-terrorism, as Italian authorities have ample powers to conduct lengthy surveillance operations and pre-emptive raids. Deportation of foreign suspects, in particular, has been the cornerstone of Italy’s counterterrorism strategy. In fact, two antiterrorism laws, adopted in 2005 and in 2015, expanded the hypotheses for the administrative deportation of non-EU citizens. Since January 2015, authorities have deported 221 individuals; 89 from January to October 2017 alone. Administrative deportations are often ordered when evidence against an individual is deemed insufficient for prosecution, but sufficient enough to determine that he/she may pose a threat to national security. According to many experts, the wide use of this tool represents an important factor in maintaining

\textsuperscript{446} Giovanni Bianconi, L’impennata delle espulsioni dopo gli attentati che hanno colpito l’Europa, Il Corriere della Sera, 2017. Available at: http://www.corriere.it/politica/17_maggio_27/impennata-espulsioni-gli-attentati-che-hanno-colpito-l-europa-aeab1fd4-424a-11e7-b153-c2fd0d43182d.shtml
low levels of radicalization in the country, as the use of fast-track deportations can help prevent the formation of extremist networks on national territory\textsuperscript{447}.

Appendix 5

About the National Pact for an Italian Islam:

1) Composition of the Council for the relationship with Italian Islam:

The Pact has been written in cooperation with the collaboration of the Council for the relationship with Italian Islam, that is a board of experts with consultative functions dealing with issues that have to do with the presence of Islamic communities on the Italian territory. Former Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano has instituted the council on the 19th of January 2016 (http://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/alfano-presiede-prima-riunione-consiglio-relazioni-islam-italiano).

The members of the Council are Italian professor and experts:

1) Stefano Allievi
2) Pasquale Annichiarico
3) Massimo Campanini
4) Alessandro Ferrari
5) Annalisa Frisina
6) Shahrzad Housmand
7) Paolo Naso
8) Enzo Pace
9) Younis Tawfik
10) Khalis Toubat
11) Francesco Zannini
12) Ida Zilio Grandi

2) The Islamic Organizations signatories of the pact are:

1) C.I.I Confederazione Islamica Italiana
2) C.I.C.I. Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia
3) U.CO.I.I. Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia
4) CO. RE. IS. Comunità religiosa Islamica Italiana
5) U.A.M.I. Unione degli Albanesi Musulmani d’Italia
6) ASS.NE CHEIKH AHMADOU BAMBA
7) ASS.NE MADRI E BIMBI SOMALI
8) A.I. IMAM E GUIDE RELIGIOSE
9) A.I.PAKISTANA “MUHAMMADIAH”
The Pact consists of 10 points. The representatives of the Islamic Organizations involved, representing the 70% (1.5 million) of the Muslims living in Italy, commit themselves to:

1) Facilitate the development and the strengthening of the dialogue and confrontation with the Italian Interior Ministry, with the contribution of the Council for the relationship with Italian Islam;
2) Continue the actions aimed at contrasting religious radicalization, also providing the authorities and the institutions tools to interpreter the radicalization phenomenon, which threaten collective security, including the Muslim citizens.
3) Promote a process of juridical organization of the Islamic associations respectful of the existing legislation on religious freedom and of the principles of the Italian legal system.
4) Promote the education of imams and religious leaders who can be employed by Italian institutions as mediators to ensure the full implementation of the principles of pacific coexistence, secular nature of the State, legality, gender equality, in a context characterized by confessional and cultural pluralism.
5) Continue the organization of public events aimed at implementing the efficacy of intercultural dialogue. These events must both enhance the contribution of Islamic tradition to Italian society and promote the integration of Muslim immigrants contrasting the phenomenon of religious radicalization. In this context, the cooperation with Italian institutions and the contribution of young Muslim generations are crucial.
6) Facilitate the implementation of the necessary prerequisites to reach a constitutional agreement; statutes in compliance with the Italian Constitution
7) Continue the commitment to guarantee that the worship places’ standards are respectful of the Italian laws and can be visited by non-Muslim visitors to promote the dialogue with the local civil society.
8) Facilitate the relationship of Italian institutions and civil society with the Islamic associations, publishing the names and addresses of imams, religious leaders and people who can mediate between their own communities and the surrounding civil society.
9) Take the concrete necessary steps to hold the Friday sermon in Italian, or at least to translate it, without prejudice to the original rite. The same must be done for the ordinary communications about the communities or associations.
10) Ensure the highest level of transparency about the documentation dealing with financing coming from Italy and from abroad to manage the worship places, or to build new ones.

The Interior Ministry commit itself to:

1) Support and promote, in collaboration with the Islamic associations, public events to strengthen the dialogue between the Italian institutions and the Islamic communities, enhancing the
contribution that the Muslim community give to the country in contrasting the radicalization and in promoting the integration of immigrants.

2) Enhance the programs and the actions of the Italian Department for civil rights and immigration.

3) Support the Islamic Associations in elaborating statutes coherent with the Italian legal system, so that these associations can be legally recognized.

4) Take into consideration the relevance of the new religious pluralism, as recognized by the European Court of Human Rights.

5) Consolidate the education of the religious officials, in line with the guidelines of the Italian Department for civil rights and immigration.

6) Facilitate the implementation of education trainings for Islamic religious officials in cooperation with the Islamic communities and associations, some universities and the Council for the relationship with Italian Islam.

7) Expand at local level the institution of “interreligious boards” (already positively experimented) in the prefectural local councils for immigration, so that the Italian Islam has the opportunity to directly engage with the local institutions.

8) Start a program to distribute information kits in several languages dealing with the Italian legislation on religious and worship freedom.

9) Plan one or more national meetings between the Institutions and the Muslim Youth dealing with active citizenship, intercultural dialogue and Islamophobia’s contrast.

10) Promote a conference with ANCI (Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani - National Association of Italian Municipalities) to deal with the topic of worship places, to promote the idea that the religious freedom includes the availability of adequate worship places and therefore opening the road to the construction of new worship places according to the legislation.

Appendix 6

Composition of the Italian Antiterrorism Research Committee

On 2016 September the 1st, an Antiterrorism Research Committee has been installed by the Italian Government to examine the current situation dealing with the radicalization and jihadi extremism phenomenon in Italy.

The Committee is totally independent and will last 120 days, at the end of which it will present a final report to the Parliament and the Government.

The list of the members:

- Lorenzo Vidino, Coordinator: professor at George Washington University and director of the Extremism Program in the same University;
- Stefano Allievi: Professor at the Padova University;
- Carlo Bonini: journalist at La Repubblica;
- Benedetta Berti: researcher at Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv;
- Manuela Caiani: professor at Scuola Superiore Normale in Florence;
- Lucio Caracciolo: journalist and director of Limes Magazine;
- Cristina Caparesi: pedagogic expert;
- Marco Cannavicci: psychiatrist;
- Anna Cossiga: professor at Link Campus University in Rome;
- Martino Diez: scientific director of Oasis International Foundation;
- Marco Lombardi: professor at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan;
- Renzo Guolo: professor at University of Padova;
- Alessandro Orsini: terrorism sociology professor at Luiss Guido Carli University in Rome;
- Carlo Panella: Journalist;
- Vittorio Emanuele Parsi: professor at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan;
- Andrea Plebani: researcher at Istituto di Studi di Politica Internazionale;
- Massimo Recalcati: psychoanalyst;
- Ciro Sbailò: professor at Kore University in Enna;
- Marta Serafini: journalist at Il Corriere della Sera.
### Art. 1 Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist extremism</th>
<th>Measures aimed at preventing radicalization and jihadist violent extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art.1,1: this law introduces measures, interventions and programs aimed at preventing radicalization and spreading of the jihadi extremism that causes terrorist acts in the international realm.</td>
<td>Art.1,1: This law, coherently with the international and supranational directives, taking into account 25th of November 2015 EU Parliament resolution on prevention of radicalization and of European citizens’ recruitment by terrorist organizations, regulates the introduction of measures, interventions and programs aimed at preventing radicalization. It also promotes the de-radicalization and the rehabilitation in terms of social, cultural, working integration of the people involved, both Italian citizens and foreigners resident in Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.1,2: the Italian republic promotes the de-radicalization and social, cultural, human and professional recovery of those, both Italian citizens and residents, involved in radicalization phenomena</td>
<td>Abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.1,2: In the scope of the present law, radicalization has been defined as those phenomena that make people sympathizing or openly adhering to jihadi ideologies inspiring the use of religious or politically motivated violence and terrorism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. 2. National Center on Radicalization.</td>
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</table>
Art 2,2: To promote and develop the measures, the interventions and the programs referred to in article 1, The National Center on Deradicalization (CRAD) is instituted at the Department for Civil Rights and Immigration of the Interior Ministry. An Interior Ministry’s decree, that has to be passed by three months from the entering into force of this law, has to discipline the composition and the functioning of the CRAD, provisioning the presence of representatives of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, Justice, Defense Work and Social Politics, Education, University and Research and Health Ministries, as well as qualified representatives of institutions, entities and organizations working in the field of religion, education, culture and society, and also representatives of the Committee for the Italian Islam that has been instituted with Interior Ministry’s decree on the 10th of September 2005. And published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale n.250 on 26th of October 2005.

Art.2,2: The CRAD yearly draft the National Strategic Plan to prevent the processes of radicalization and of adhesions to violent jihadist extremism, as well to rehabilitate the people involved in radicalization phenomena. The National Strategic Plan defines the projects, the actions and the initiatives that must to be implemented, including the adoption of new-technology’s instruments, among which also the creation of a hot line,
pilot projects or centers to experiment the identification of the prevention’s best practices. It also provisions the possibility to use the European Funds aimed at Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). The Strategic Plan has to be approved by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the Minister of the Interior, with prior approval of the opinions of the competent Parliamentary Commissions and of the Parliamentary Committee provisioned at art.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art. 2,3: The CRAD in carrying out its functions makes use of the monitoring activities carried out by the Department for Civil Rights and Immigration of the Interior Ministry, on the basis of the information provided by the local prefectures’ offices of the government referred to in article 3.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 3. Regional coordination centers on radicalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.3,1: The regional coordination centers on radicalization (CCR) are instituted at the territorial prefectures’ offices of the government. Their task is to implement the Strategic Planned referred to article 2. The CCRs have to present every year a report on the implementation of the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CCR is headed by the prefect or by a prefect’s delegate and it is composed by the representatives of the competent territorial offices of the state and local administrations, as well as by qualified representatives of the</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Art. 4: Institution of a Parliamentary Committee</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>The Prefect of the regional capital chooses the CCR’s composition and the functioning modalities, taking into consideration the necessity to guarantee the continual exchange of information with the other regional prefectures’ offices of the government.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Art.4,1: To monitor the radicalization and violent jihadist extremism’s phenomena a Parliamentary Committee is instituted. It has to be composed by five deputies and five senators, appointed within 20 days from the beginning of each legislature by the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, in proportion to the number of components of the parliamentary groups, guaranteeing the parity of representation of the majority and the oppositions, and taking into consideration the specificity of the tasks the committee has to</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
carry out. 20 days from the beginning of each legislature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art. 4, 2</th>
<th>The Presidential Office, composed by one president, one vice-president and a secretary, is elected by the components of the committee with secret scrutiny.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4, 3</td>
<td>The president is elected by absolute majority of the components of the committee. If nobody reaches such majority, a ballot between the most voted candidates will take place. In case of same number of votes the older of the two is elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4, 4</td>
<td>The vice-president and the secretary are elected according the majority of votes. In case of same number of votes, the older is elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 5, 1</td>
<td>The Committee monitors the radicalization and violent jihadist extremism’s phenomena on the national soil, with special attention to problems affecting women and children. The committee carries out its functions also by auditing institutional figures, juridical and police representatives, as well as religious leaders and social workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 5, 2</td>
<td>The Committee carries out a special monitoring activity on schools and universities, also by listening or by reading the reports of the directors, rectors and school managers on facts happened in every institute.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Art. 5, 3 | The Committee carries out a specific monitoring activity on Hospitals and public
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>The Committee carries out a specific monitoring activity on prisons, also by listening or by reading the reports of the directors, and assess the reports on the development of radicalization phenomena in Italian prisons. The Prison Service Department has to send this report every three months from the moment this law enters into force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>The Committee has also to examine the Internet functioning Report written by the Postal and Communication Police in collaboration with specialized institutes, including information elements and statistics on the web diffusion of extremist ideas tending to violent extremism. The Postal and Communication Police has to send a report every three months from the moment this law enters into force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>The Committee carries out a specific monitoring activity on places where the migrants are hosted or administratively detained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>The committee presents to the Parliament an annual report on the activities it carried out and in which it also formulate proposals on its matters of competences.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.6,2: The Committee can also refer to the Parliament during the year for urgent reports.</td>
<td>Art.6,3: Every year by February, the Government send to the Parliament a report on the previous year implemented and on the results achieved in preventing radicalization and violent jihadist extremism.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Art.2: Specialist training for the Police Force.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Art.7 Specialist training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.2, 1: in the framework of the education program for the Police Force, specialist education must be guaranteed for assisting policemen to identify and interpret the radicalization’s signals necessary to intervene. The Ministry of Interior is charged of identifying the specific modalities by passing a decree.</td>
<td>Art.7,1: The training activities, also for learning foreign languages, of the Police Forces, Armed Forces, Prison Service, national and local defenders of prisoners’ rights, teachers and schools directors, universities employees, socio-sanitary and social services workers and police employees at local level include specialist courses and programs to provide the tools, also those dealing with interreligious and intercultural dialogue, necessary to prevent radicalization and violent jihadist extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Art.3: Information system on jihadi radicalization.</strong></td>
<td>Abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.3, 1: the Ministry of Interior must pass a decree to create an Informative System on the jihadi radicalization phenomenon aimed at guaranteeing social reintegration of those already affected by radicalization and at guaranteeing social and state security. The decree must be passed within three months from the law’s entering into force, without entailing further public expenditure’s costs.</td>
<td>Art.3, 2: the Ministry of Interior decree must define the implementation’s modalities and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.3, 3: warning police headquarters of the presence of persons at radicalization’s risk is up to law enforcement bodies, municipalities and schools offices. Then it is for the police headquarters taking the necessary measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.4: School Preventive Interventions.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.4, 1: The National Observatory for Integrating Foreign Students and for Intercultural Activities must elaborate guidelines for interreligious and intercultural dialogue, within six months from the law’s entering into force, to prevent radicalization episodes at school.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.8: School Preventive Interventions.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.8,1: The National Observatory for Integrating Foreign Students and for Intercultural Activities must elaborate guidelines for interreligious and intercultural dialogue, within six months from the law’s entering into force, to diffuse the pluralism culture and to prevent radicalization episodes at school. The observatory elaborates the above-mentioned guidelines and defines the consequent actions in accordance to the Strategic plan referred to article 2.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.4, 2: The guidelines provisioned in article 4,1 are implemented by decree of the Ministry of Education, which is also in charge of making them circulating in all the school institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.8,2: The guidelines provisioned in article 8,1 are implemented by decree of the Ministry of Education and communicated to the regional school offices. They must be periodically updated.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.4, 3: the National Observatory for Integrating Foreign Students and for Intercultural Activities is in charge of yearly reporting and monitoring the initiatives that the schools take.</td>
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<td>The same</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.4, 4: The schools network can conclude agreements with universities, association, institutions or governmental agencies to implement initiatives involving psychologists,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.8,4: The schools network can conclude agreements with universities, association, institutions or governmental agencies to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4, 5:</td>
<td>20 billion euros 2016-2017 expenditure is guaranteed to ensure the schools with the ability of enhancing the network infrastructures they need to make the teachers and the students involved in interreligious and intercultural dialogues’ international programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 8, 5:</td>
<td>To make the teachers and the students able to carry out intercultural and interreligious dialogue activities with other countries’ teacher and students and to create programs to fight against online hatred, 5 million euros in 2017 and 2018 are allocated to the schools to foster their international relations with other schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4, 6:</td>
<td>20 billion euros 2016-2017 expenditure is guaranteed to ensure education and updating activities for public schools’ teachers to enhance their competences in fostering school integration and intercultural teaching. The Ministry for education must pass a decree defining the modalities for managing the training activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 8, 6:</td>
<td>To strengthen the knowledge and the skills of global citizenship and scholastic integration, 5 million euros in 2017 and 2018 are allocated to train the school teachers and directors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4, 7:</td>
<td>The 40 billion euros provisioned by this law will come from same amount reduction in The Structural Fund for Political Economic Intervention (art. 10,5, law decree n.282 2004 November the 29th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4, 7:</td>
<td>The 10 billion euros provisioned by this law will come from same amount reduction in The Structural Fund for Political Economic Intervention (art. 10,5, law decree n.282 2004 November the 29th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 5:</td>
<td>Interventions in the framework of active labor market policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 5, 1:</td>
<td>people at risk of jihadi radicalization must be added in the list of at risk persons provisioned in the art. 4,1 of the law 1991 November the 8th n.381.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolished</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 5, 2:</td>
<td>the following provision must be added to art. 9,1 of the decree law 2015 November the 14th n.150: “specific employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolished</td>
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</table>
must be provided to persons exposed to jihadi radicalization risk. They must be identified by the Informative System in collaboration with the regional employment agencies, according to the modalities that will be defined by The Ministry for Employment and Social Policies in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art.9: Graduation and Post-Graduation projects to train specialized professionals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art.9,1: 5 million euros are allocated to finance projects to train specialized professionals in contrasting radicalization and violent jihadi extremism, in intercultural and interreligious dialogue.</td>
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</table>

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<tr>
<th>Art.6: Communication Activities</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art.6, 1: The Presidency of the Council of Ministries must promote the creation of an internet information portal dealing with radicalization and jihadi extremism aimed at spreading information and knowledge about pacific religious, political, gender and ethnic coexistence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.10: Communication and Information Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.10,1: To facilitate integration and interreligious dialogue and to contrast radicalization and jihadi violent extremism, the Strategic Plan referred to article 2 provisions projects to develop informative campaigns, via multimedia platforms in different languages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Art.6, 2: the information portal must promote its content on social networks and any other electronic communication tool. |
| Art.10,2: For the same reasons referred at article 10,1, RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana Spa, the national channel, realizes a specific multimedia platform to broadcast information and education programs both in Italian and in Arabic. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art. 6, 3: the information portal must be realized with the Presidency of the Council of Ministries budget expenditure.</th>
<th>Art. 10,3: For the same reasons referred at article 10,1, The Strategic Plan referred to article 2 promotes activities in collaboration with public and private sectors subjects, as synergies between the national media, aimed at diffusing the integration culture, dialogue and the principle of gender equality.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 7, 1: the Ministry of Justice must pass a decree to guarantee prisoners with a penitentiary treatment aimed at their reeducation and reintegration in the society.</td>
<td>Art. 11, 1: the Ministry of Justice must pass a decree to guarantee prisoners with a penitentiary treatment aimed at their reeducation and reintegration in the society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 7, 2: to reintegrate previously radicalized prisoners in the society, the jail system must hire radicalization and terrorism experts.</td>
<td>Art. 11, 2: to reintegrate previously radicalized prisoners in the society, the jail system must hire radicalization and terrorism experts.</td>
</tr>
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Appendix 8

Summarizing document on the results of the Research Committee on radicalization and jihadist extremism phenomenon.

“Toward an Italian approach for preventing radicalization:

Executive summary:
Several indicators suggest that the radicalization phenomenon in Italy, though present, cannot be compared to the one of the center-northern Europe either in size or intensity of the threat. Indeed Italy has not registered either massive mobilization toward conflict areas, or massive recruitment, or attacks of the scale registered elsewhere; the reasons of this Italian peculiarity include demography and capabilities of Italian counterterrorism efforts.

Nevertheless, on Italian territory there are some small-scale dynamics replicating those of other northern European countries. Most of the people involved in jihadism in Italy do not share a common profile, because they have different socio-cultural, family and religious backgrounds and because their ages vary considerably.

The radicalization processes also are very different: in some cases they take years, in others they take just a few weeks. The individuals can radicalize either by themselves, in small virtual communities or physical spaces, or establishing connections with translational organizations such as the Islamic State, Al Qaeda or others, but in most of the cases they do not affiliate to the organizations, either by choice, or by inability. Some of the individuals in contact with the organizations have tried to perpetrate attacks in Italy, but they either have stopped or have been stopped before acting.

Several theories have tried to explain this phenomenon. Some of them focus on structural factors such as political or cultural tensions and conflicts. Others focus on psychological and personal factors. Others also emphasize elements such as search for identity, sufferance due to discrimination or economics problems. However, most of the experts agree on the complexity and subjectivity of the radicalization’s phenomenon, which is often the result of the interaction of structural and personal factors, which is difficult to be explained.

In the last years, two spaces, one physical and the other virtual, have been significant in the diffusion and absorption of jihadist ideology both in Italy and in other countries:
1) **Prisons**: some of the latest antiterrorism operations in Italy have been conducted against individuals who radicalized entirely, or at least largely, in prison. It is the case of Anis Amri, the Tunisian man who carried out the attack against the Christmas market in Berlin on 19 December 2016, and who seems to have started his radicalization process in prison in Sicily.

2) **Web**: internet is often the main tool to get in touch with the jihadist ideology, to know more details about it, to interact with individuals who are either on the same process of radicalization or are already radicalized. Moreover, once the individual has decided to act, either to travel to a conflict area or to plan an attack, Internet is the best tool to look for operational support. In the last years, the embryonic jihadist Italian community has been growing on the web, especially on some social networks.

It is difficult to predict how the autochthonous jihadist scene will develop and if it will fill the gap with the other European countries, for example growing in size and sophistication. There are too many endogenous and exogenous elements that can affect these dynamics. Yet it is necessary to build an approach to radicalization in Italy because there is growing concern, among the police forces and the other people working in the antiterrorism, that the contrast action based solely on repression is not enough. Although the traditional measures of anti-terrorism, such as arrests and expulsions, have proven to be extremely effective in preventing acts of terrorism, today there is shared awareness that these instruments must be completed by policies aimed at preventing radicalization itself through non-repressive actions.

This approach is almost unexplored in Italy but very common in many European countries and the United Nations and the European Union have repeatedly urged Member States to create programs for the prevention of violent extremism (internationally known as CVE, Countering Violent Extremism- Contrasting Violent Extremism).

The term CVE is in fact intrinsically vague because it includes initiatives aimed at contrasting radicalization in different ways and at different stages. It is appropriate to talk about “prevention of radicalization” for those measures that take place before the beginning of the radicalization process, and to talk about de-radicalization measures (that is, the abandonment of violent ideologies) or disengagement measures (that is the abandonment of active militancy) when the radicalization process has already begun.

The Committee recommends that Italy aligns itself with most of the European countries adopting a strategy to contrast violent extremism at **three levels**: macro, medium and micro level, addressing the Italian Muslim population in general, as well as some segments of the latter and specific
individuals. Each of these levels includes a set of initiatives that, together, shape an effective and inclusive approach. In detail, the strategy would operate:

1. At the macro level, it must be adopted a counter-narrative or an alternative narrative able to compete with the appeal of the jihadist message. The content of the message is a crucial issue, as well as the legitimacy of the channels chosen to send the message and the ability to reach the desired recipients.

2. At medium-level, there are “positive engagement” measures that must actively involve the communities and those segments of the communities considered at high potential risk of radicalization by the representatives of the communities themselves. Such measures go from interreligious dialogue, to programs designed to develop critical thinking and resilience to extremism in young people; from meetings between communities and law enforcement to other types of cultural initiatives.

3. At the micro level, there are measures intervening on individuals aimed at de-radicalizing or disengaging those specific subjects identified as radicalized. As in several European countries, it is desirable to create a system through which civil society representatives can report to the authorities in charge about the presence of potentially radicalized individuals.

As it is for other continental experiences, a CVE Italian strategy should include some guiding principles:

- **Involvement of a large number of public and private actors**: the CVE is intrinsically multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary. Therefore public actors (socio-health services, schools, local police and potentially others) can and must be involved next to the traditional actors of the anti-terrorism community (law enforcement, intelligence, investigating magistrates). Yet, also civil society plays an equally important role (volunteering associations, Islamic communities and families).

- **Principle of Safeguarding**: the objective of the CVE is to defuse individual processes leading to violent extremism not only to increase collective security, but also because such processes are dangerous for the subject who begins the radicalization path. Radicalization is therefore seen to be not that different from other problems that may affect vulnerable young people, such as drug addiction. While not excluding the possibility of intervening with classical repressive tools if the established threshold is exceeded, the CVE approach also considers the young person as a subject to be safeguarded.

- **Transparency**: it is possible to get an active participation of a variety of public and private actors
and to carry out actions of recovery and prevention, only if every action is inspired by the principle of transparency. There are dynamics that are necessarily covered by confidentiality. Nonetheless, it is crucial that all the involved actors make clear from the beginning the aims they intend to pursue and the means they intend to use to do so.

- **Territoriality:** Radicalization itself is a phenomenon highly influenced by local factors and therefore varies in its characteristics within the same country, often not only at regional level but also from one city to another, and sometimes also from one neighborhood another. It follows that the activities of each CVE strategy must be set differently.

The experience of the several European countries that have been implementing CVE measures for years has clearly demonstrated that they are extremely useful, but that they also involve many problems, from the difficulty of choosing partners to different ethical issues, from the need of training those who run the implementation of the programs to the methods chosen to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs themselves.

Such experiences have also made it clear, as it is instinctively easy to understand, that interventions only work in certain cases (and the longer and the more advanced the radicalization path is the least the program is likely to be successful). Therefore, a project cannot and is not meant to substitute traditional investigative means. It is no by coincidence these are called threat reduction initiatives, and not threat elimination initiatives. ("threat reduction" not "eliminating the threat").

Despite these limitations, it is the opinion of this Committee that prevention measures are necessary to complement traditional anti-terrorism instruments, even if they cannot replace them. Indeed the fight against jihadi terrorism is a generational struggle that will succeed when the radical ideology loose its attractiveness; military and law enforcement operations against various jihadist groups are necessary and important but not enough. Given the global scenarios and their repercussions in Italy, the moment has come to reflect on the possibility of creating a radicalization prevention strategy in Italy as well.

**Preface**

On September 1st, 2016, the Italian government has set up an independent research committee to analyze the current state of the phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Italy and assessing the opportunity to introduce its own prevention measures in the country. In the next four months, the nineteen members who formed the Commission, all experts in different fields such as sociology, the Islamic world, terrorism and psychology, and who had already studied the subject before, carried
out in-depth research and met with each other. During its work, the Committee has audited some of the highest rankss of Italian anti-terrorism, representatives of Islamic communities and civil society representatives who have come into contact with extremism and terrorism in various ways. Some members of the Commission then conducted various interviews at individual level.

The document resulting from this work is divided into two parts. The first is an interpretation of the jihadist phenomenon in Italy. After a necessary terminological premise on the key concepts of the subject, whose meanings are often controversial, it is provided an analysis of the latest trends in jihadist mobilization in Italy, from the phenomenon of foreign fighters to radicalization in prisons, from cases of radicalized women to the use of social media. Then an attempt to provide non-politicized explanations of the reason why young people living in Italy, like in other western countries, are attracted by the propaganda of the Islamic State, al Qaeda, or, more generally, by jihadist ideology.

The true heart of the study is the second part, which offers concrete guidelines for the development of a strategy for the prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization in Italy. For a variety of reasons examined in detail in the study, Italy has not been exposed to a wave of jihadist violence comparable to that experienced by France or other European countries so far, and Italian anti-terrorism structures have so far succeeded in managing the threat successfully. However, various factors, endogenous and exogenous, suggest that the phenomenon could grow and that Italy could face in the future some of the dynamics seen in other European countries.
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